



HISTORY OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

1945-1970

PROGRESS PUBLISHERS MOSCOW

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1945-1970

**Russian text
edited by**

B. Ponomarev

A. Gromyko

V. Khvostov



PROGRESS PUBLISHERS

M o s c o w

Translated from the Russian by *David Skvirsky*

**История внешней политики СССР
(1945—1970)**

На английском языке

Compiled by A. Alexandrov, A. Blatov, V. Grubyakov, A. Dobrynin,
I. Zemskov, V. Israelyan, M. Kapitsa, I. Koblyakov, L. Kutakov,
A. Roshchin, S. Sanakoyev, V. Falin, V. Khvostov

First printing 1973

© Translation into English. Progress Publishers 1974

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CONTENTS

<i>Chapter Fourteen</i> THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE USSR'S POSITION AFTER WORLD WAR II	9
1. Consolidation of the Soviet Union's Might and Interna- tional Positions	10
2. European and Asian Countries Break Away From Capi- talism and Establish a People's Democratic System . . .	16
3. Upswing of the National Liberation Movement in the East. Soviet Foreign Policy at the Outset of the Disin- tegration of Imperialism's Colonial System	21
4. Shrinking of Imperialism's Positions	26
<i>Chapter Fifteen</i> THE PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH GERMANY'S FORMER ALLIES	34
1. The USSR Upholds the Principles of a Democratic Peace . . .	34
2. The Soviet Union Champions the Sovereignty of the Vanquished States	38
3. Political and Territorial Provisions of the Peace Treaties . . .	45
4. Economic Clauses of the Peace Treaties. The USSR Upholds the Economic Independence of Italy, Rumania Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland	55
5. The Reparations Problem	55
<i>Chapter Sixteen</i> FORMATION OF THE WORLD SOCIALIST SYSTEM AND THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW TYPE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	59
1. People's Democracy Triumphs in Central and South- eastern Europe. Co-operation Among Socialist Countries . . .	59
2. Treaties of Friendship and Mutual Assistance Between the USSR and the People's Democracies and Their Signi- ficance. Socialism Develops into a World System	62
3. Economic Co-operation Between the USSR and the Eu- ropean People's Democracies. Formation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance	68
4. Birth and Development of a New Type of International Relations	73

<i>Chapter Seventeen</i> SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE GERMAN QUESTION DURING THE INITIAL POST-WAR YEARS (1945-1949)	78
1. Democratic Reforms in East Germany	79
2. Burial of the Lessons of History in the Western Occu- pation Zones	83
3. Clash of Two Policies in the Question of Germany's Unity	89
<i>Chapter Eighteen</i> THE SOVIET UNION'S STRUGGLE FOR DISARMAMENT (1946-1952)	107
1. The Soviet Union and the Problem of Banning Nuclear Weapons in the Period 1946-1952	108
2. The USSR's Struggle to Reduce Conventional Armaments and Armed Forces (1946-1952)	119
<i>Chapter Nineteen</i> THE USSR AND THE PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE FAR EAST	128
1. The Defeat of Japan and the Problem of a Peace Settlement	128
2. Establishment of US Control Over Japan	129
3. Decisions of the Three-Power Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference on Japan	132
4. Soviet Moves to Secure Japan's Democratisation and Demilitarisation	135
5. Soviet Proposals for Ensuring Japan's Economic and Political Independence	140
6. The Problem of a Peace Treaty with Japan	141
7. The USSR and the San Francisco Conference	146
<i>Chapter Twenty</i> THE SOVIET UNION'S STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION, AGAINST THE IMPERIALIST POLICY OF DEMOLISHING THE SOVEREIGNTY OF COUNTRIES AND SETTING UP MILITARY BLOCS (1946-1952)	151
1. Two Programmes in World Politics: the Programme of War and the Programme of Peace	152
2. The Soviet Union and the Truman Doctrine	157
3. The Soviet Union's Exposure of the Marshall Plan's Imperialist Objectives	160
4. The Soviet Union Versus the Imperialist Policy of Military Blocs	167
<i>Chapter Twenty-One</i> THE SOVIET UNION IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST US IMPERIALISM FOLLOWING THE USA'S SWITCH TO A POLICY OF UNDISGUISED AGGRESSION IN THE FAR EAST	180
1. The USSR Against the US Policy of Splitting Korea. Soviet Assistance to the Korean People	180

2. US Preparations for War in Korea	184
3. Soviet Moves to Halt the US Intervention in Korea	190

Chapter Twenty-Two THE GERMAN QUESTION FOLLOWING THE CREATION OF TWO GERMAN STATES. THE SOVIET UNION'S STRUGGLE FOR GERMANY'S PEACEFUL AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT (1950-1955) 198

1. Two German States—Two Policies	198
2. Soviet Efforts to Get the Western Powers to Drop Their Plans for the FRG's Rearmament and Fulfil Their Obligations Under the Allied Agreements	206
3. The Soviet Project for a Peace Settlement with Germany	213
4. Development of Friendly and Equal Relations Between the USSR and the GDR	221
5. Berlin Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference	225
6. The Soviet Union's Struggle Against the FRG's Involvement in the North Atlantic Bloc	230
7. The German Question at the Geneva Four-Power Conference (1955)	235
8. The Soviet Union Establishes Diplomatic Relations with the FRG	240
9. Treaty on Relations Between the USSR and the GDR	242

Chapter Twenty-Three THE SOVIET UNION IN THE DRIVE TO END THE WARS IN KOREA AND VIETNAM AND ACHIEVE A GENERAL RELAXATION OF WORLD TENSION (1951-1956) 246

1. Termination of the War in Korea	246
2. Berlin Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference	248
3. The 1954 Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina	251
4. The Soviet Union and the Austrian State Treaty	256
5. Four-Power Summit at Geneva	259
6. Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference at Geneva (1955)	265
7. Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Japan	268
8. Further Strengthening of Fraternal Friendship Between the USSR and the People's Democracies	273
9. Soviet Support for the Struggle of the Peoples to Achieve and Consolidate Independence	278

Chapter Twenty-Four THE SOVIET UNION AND THE DISARMAMENT PROBLEM AFTER THE INVENTION OF THE THERMONUCLEAR BOMB (1953-1958) 283

Chapter Twenty-Five AGGRESSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IMPERIALIST INTRIGUES IN HUNGARY (1956-1957) 299

1. The USSR Supports the Arab Peoples and Curbs the Anglo-French-Israeli Aggression Against Egypt	299
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2. Counter-Revolutionary Rising in Hungary	311
3. The Soviet Union Against Imperialist Policy in the Middle East After the Suez Crisis	318
<i>Chapter Twenty-Six</i> SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO THE INDE- PENDENCE STRUGGLE OF THE PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA (1957-1964)	323
1. The USSR Helps to Uproot Colonialism	323
2. Soviet Assistance in Halting Imperialist Aggression Against Arab Countries in 1957-1964	328
3. Soviet Support for Indonesia	338
4. Geneva Conference on Laos	341
5. Events in the Congo and the Soviet Stand	345
6. The USSR and the Independence of Cyprus	353
7. Soviet Political Relations with and Economic Aid to New Asian and African Countries	354
<i>Chapter Twenty-Seven</i> THE STRUGGLE OF THE USSR FOR A GERMAN PEACE SETTLEMENT. CLOSER FRIENDSHIP AND CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE GDR (1955-1964)	361
1. The German Peace Settlement—Key to the German Question and to an Improvement of the Situation in Europe	363
2. Talks Between the Soviet Union and Other Countries Interested in Settling the German Question	374
3. The GDR Takes Steps to Protect Its Frontier with West Berlin. The USSR and the USA Exchange Views on a German Peace Settlement	382
4. Further Strengthening of Fraternal Relations Between the USSR and the GDR. The USSR-GDR Treaty of Friend- ship, Mutual Assistance and Co-operation	386
<i>Chapter Twenty-Eight</i> THE USSR AND OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY IN 1957-1970	389
1. Further Development and Improvement of Economic Co- operation between the USSR and Other Socialist Countries	389
2. Further Strengthening of Solidarity Among Socialist Countries. The Problem of European Security	401
3. Soviet-Chinese Relations	414
4. Soviet Assistance to Revolutionary Cuba	420
<i>Chapter Twenty-Nine</i> NEW SOVIET INITIATIVES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR DISARMAMENT (1959-1970)	430
1. Soviet Proposals for General and Complete Disarmament at the 14th General Assembly	430
2. The Soviet Union's Struggle for an International Agree- ment on General and Complete Disarmament After the 14th General Assembly	435

3. The Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee and the Disruption of Its Work by the Western Powers. Soviet Proposals for Disarmament of June 2, 1960	437
4. The USSR and the Disarmament Question at the 15th and 16th Sessions of the General Assembly	441
5. The Soviet Union Continues Its Struggle for General and Complete Disarmament in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and at the 17th General Assembly	447
6. The Soviet Union's Efforts to Secure an End to Nuclear Weapons Tests (1959-1962)	453
7. The Moscow Test-Ban Treaty	459
8. Against the Nuclear Arming of the FRG and Giving It Access to Nuclear Weapons in Any Form	460
9. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	465
10. The USSR in the Struggle for Partial Disarmament Measures	468

Chapter Thirty THE STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION. RELATIONS WITH THE DEVELOPING AND CAPITALIST COUNTRIES. THE GERMAN QUESTION AND EUROPEAN SECURITY (1964-1970) 474

1. US Aggression in Indochina. Soviet Assistance to the Peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia	477
2. Soviet Support for Arab Countries in Repulsing Israeli Aggression	490
3. Soviet Relations with Asian, African and Latin American Countries	497
4. Soviet Relations with Capitalist Countries	513
5. Recognition of European Realities as the Only Possible Policy in German Affairs	531
6. Attitude of the Capitalist Countries to the Soviet Proposals for the Organisation of European Security	543

CONCLUSION 547

Chapter Fourteen

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE USSR'S POSITION AFTER WORLD WAR II

The Second World War introduced fundamental changes in the international situation, in the alignment of forces on the world scene. As soon as nazi Germany and her allies attacked the USSR the war became, above all, a war in which the most aggressive assault forces of imperialism tried to destroy and subjugate the Soviet Union, the world's first socialist state. For the USSR it was a struggle in defence of its national interests, of the freedom and independence of the Soviet and many other peoples, and of what was most important—the gains of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which gave birth to the socialist system; it was a war against imperialism's most bellicose forces that had raised their hand against socialism. It was a test of the strength of the socialist state and, at the same time, of socialism as a social system. It was a test by fire, sword and blood forced on the Soviet Union by the most reactionary elements of world imperialism.

The socialist state passed that test with flying colours. The fascist aggressors were crushed mainly through the military effort of the Soviet Union. The USSR emerged from the war stronger than ever politically and morally, with the most powerful Armed Forces in the world and its international prestige unprecedentedly enhanced. The imperialist camp, on the other hand, found itself substantially weakened.

“The victory over fascism showed that no force exists in the world that could reverse the mighty torrent of revo-

lutionary transformations ushered in by the Great October Socialist Revolution. The defeat of nazi Germany, a stronghold of imperialism, in many ways predetermined post-war developments. This victory served as the starting point of a mighty revolutionary resurgence, which led to imperialism's collapse in many Western and Eastern countries. This victory laid the beginning for far-reaching changes in international politics, the world economy, ideology and the thinking of millions of people.

"The post-war period has been marked by the birth of the world socialist system, the growth of the international working-class and communist movement, the expansion of the national liberation revolution and an active struggle of the peoples for peace, against the threat of a world thermo-nuclear war."*

1. Consolidation of the Soviet Union's Might and International Positions

Lenin had noted that a war tests a nation's economic strength and organisation. The experience of the Civil War and of the victory over the foreign intervention at the dawn of the Soviet state's existence brought Lenin round to the conclusion that the imperialists were unable to destroy the Soviet socialist state by war. He wrote: "... No matter what attempts are made to invade Russia and no matter what military moves are made against us—and in all probability many more will be made—all these attempts will go up in smoke as we know from our actual experience, which has steelled us. After every such attempt by our enemies, we shall emerge stronger than ever."** This was strikingly borne out by the Second World War.

The Soviet Union's victory in that most bitter war ever known by mankind gave the world further convincing evidence of socialism's might. It was seen that the socialist

* L. I. Brezhnev, *A Great Victory of the Soviet People*. Speech at a meeting in the Kremlin Palace of Congresses on the 20th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War, May 8, 1965, Moscow, 1965, pp. 34-35 (in Russian).

** V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 329.

system was the source of the Soviet economy's strength, of the Soviet people's indestructible moral and political unity, their solidarity round the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, and the unbreakable friendship between them, of the generalship displayed by Soviet military leaders, of the discipline and valour shown by the Soviet Army, and of the patriotism and heroic deeds of Soviet people behind the firing lines and on territory occupied by the fascists. With amazement the whole world saw what could be achieved in a grim situation by a country where all the wealth and power are in the hands of the people, where exploitation of man by man does not exist.

In that war the Soviet people were led and organised by the Communist Party, which directed all its strength, vast experience and energy toward the defeat of the fascist aggressors. During the war its ranks were joined by five million people. Three million Soviet Communists laid down their lives on the field of battle. Close as the Party's ties were with the masses they were further strengthened in the fire of the sacred struggle for the country's freedom and independence, for the future of socialism.

The Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War was substantially facilitated by the correct foreign policy pursued by the Soviet Government. To a huge extent this victory over the common enemy and the settlement of a number of political problems linked with the termination of the war were due to that policy's flexibility, to the ability to utilise the inner contradictions of the capitalist world in the interests of peace and mankind's progress, and to the active part played by the Soviet Union in forming a broad anti-Hitler coalition during the war.

The victory led to the establishment of just western and eastern frontiers ensuring the Soviet Union's security. The capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union, which had lasted for more than a quarter of a century, was thus broken. An end was put, once and for all, to the attempts of the imperialists to isolate the Soviet Union geographically by creating along its frontiers the infamous "cordon sanitaire", consisting of hostile states, of obedient satellites of the principal imperialist powers. The People's Democracies, proclaimed in a number of countries of Eastern, Central and Southern Europe by the volition of the liberated peo-

ples, firmly took the road of alliance and friendship with the USSR.

By crushing the imperialist aggressors, the Soviet people and their heroic Armed Forces not only safeguarded the freedom and independence of their own country but fulfilled the historic mission of liberating many other peoples from fascist slavery.

Had it not been for the Soviet Union's decisive contribution, thanks to which the Second World War ended with the defeat of the Hitler coalition and then of Japanese militarism, its ally in the Far East, the peoples of Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Denmark, Norway and many countries in Asia would have languished for many years under alien rule.

In Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Italy, whose peoples had been betrayed into vassalage by their own governments, the victory of the Soviet Union created the conditions for a successful struggle for the restoration of national independence and freedom. The defeat of the German armies in Europe led to Finland dropping out of the war. The Soviet Army restored to Austria her state independence that had been throttled by Hitler seven years earlier. Lastly, the Soviet victory helped to liberate the German people themselves from the nazi dictatorship.

In the Far East the rout of Japanese militarism and the liberation of Manchuria and North Korea from the Japanese invaders by the Soviet Army in co-operation with troops of the Mongolian People's Republic and with the aid of the People's Liberation Army of China were of immense assistance to the liberative revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people and of the peoples of Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Burma and other countries that had been occupied by the Japanese imperialists.

The Soviet Union played a prominent role in delivering the peoples from nazi bondage. This enormously enhanced its prestige and international influence. Throughout the world people began to speak of the great socialist power and its courageous people and heroic army with admiration, affection and respect.

Maurice Thorez, true son of the French people and leader of the Communist Party of France, expressed the thoughts and feelings of millions of Frenchmen when he said: "The

undisputed superiority of the socialist system enabled the Soviet Union to play the decisive part in crushing Hitlerite fascism and thereby saving Europe from barbarous enslavement. After this the alliance and friendship with the USSR became dearer to the people of France, more desirable in the eyes of all Frenchmen fighting in defence of their national independence.”*

Wilhelm Pieck, veteran of the German working-class movement who became President of the German Democratic Republic, the first German workers’ and peasants’ state, gave the following assessment of the significance of the Soviet victory to the German people: “It will be no exaggeration to say that the German people are indebted to the Soviet Union ... not only for their liberation from brutal nazi domination, and on one-third of Germany’s territory from the reactionary forces of German imperialism, but also for the preservation of their national existence.”**

The significance of the Soviet Union’s victory to the liberation struggle of the peoples, including the peoples of China and other Asian countries, was repeatedly underscored by the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the People’s Republic of China. On the 40th anniversary of the Soviet Army a message of congratulations signed by Mao Tse-tung, Lui Shao-chi and Chou En-lai stated that in the Second World War the Soviet Army “smashed the main forces of the armies of aggression of German and Japanese fascism and thereby upheld the independence of all countries and saved civilisation”***

A tribute of gratitude and respect to the Soviet people in connection with their victory over the fascist aggressors was paid even by statesmen who had little sympathy for the social system in the USSR.

For instance, at a sitting of the Provisional Consultative Assembly in Paris on December 21, 1944 General Charles de Gaulle, then Chairman of the Provisional Government of the French Republic (and subsequently President of France), declared: “The Russian effort, which dealt the knock-out blow to the German war machine, was the major condition

* *L’Humanité*, November 9, 1957.

** Wilhelm Pieck, *Reden und Aufsätze*, Vol. III, Berlin, 1954, p. 103.

*** *Pravda*, February 23, 1958.

of the liberation of our metropolitan territory.... The enormous effort of millions upon millions of Soviet men and women consecrated to the common struggle on the battlefield or in labour behind the firing lines, the incredible sacrifices that they made, and the ability displayed by those who lead them ... had so profoundly moved our people in their distress of yesterday and in their ardour of today that they raised to a higher stage the long-standing affection that we Frenchmen have always had for the Russian people.”*

In a message of congratulations on Soviet Army Day in February 1945, Winston Churchill, then Prime Minister of Britain, wrote: “The Red Army celebrates its twenty-seventh anniversary amid triumphs which have won the unstinted applause of their allies and have sealed the doom of German militarism. Future generations will acknowledge their debt to the Red Army as unreservedly as do we who have lived to witness these proud achievements.”**

On the occasion of the victory over nazi Germany, Ivanoe Bonomi, who headed the Italian Government at the time, wrote in a message of congratulations: “In this hour of great victory Italy congratulates the peoples of the Soviet Republics who had shed rivers of blood in order to destroy the threat of fascism and nazism in the world.”***

In a speech on August 19, 1945 Karl Renner, who headed the Provisional Government of Austria and subsequently became her first President, declared: “Generations to come will recall with gratitude that the accursed nazi regime was destroyed as a result of the heroic exploits of the Red Army, of the selfless readiness of the Soviet soldiers for sacrifice.... All mankind is indebted to them. And we, the people of this country, have special reasons for recalling these deeds with gratitude. To us these deeds and this sacrifice not only brought freedom from the chains of slavery, but enabled us to restore our own state and the rights of our people.”****

The Soviet Union’s expanding international relations was an indication of the growth of its prestige in the world:

* *Journal Officiel de la République Française*, No. 85, December 22, 1944, p. 595.

** *The Times*, February 24, 1945.

*** *Cheshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza v period velikoi otechestvennoi voyny*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1947, pp. 503-04.

**** *International Affairs*, No. 5, Moscow, May 1955, p. 57.

whereas on the eve of the Great Patriotic War it had diplomatic relations with 26 countries, by the time the war ended it was maintaining relations with 52 countries.

The huge growth of the Soviet Union's influence in international affairs was one of the major political results of the Second World War. While the war was still raging the USSR was able to make a decisive contribution to creating the foundations of lasting peace and international co-operation. Thanks to the USSR important decisions on the settlement of many post-war problems were adopted at the conferences in Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam.

The victory won by the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War created the conditions for further strengthening the cause of socialism on an international scale. That victory marked the eve of epochal developments on the world scene.

After the war the USSR had to tackle extremely complex foreign policy tasks under difficult conditions. The economy had suffered seriously in the war, and more than 20 million people had died in the fighting or fallen victim to the brutalities of the nazi invaders. On the other hand, the US economy, which had not been affected by the hostilities, was growing on war profits. Taking advantage of this circumstance and their temporary monopoly of nuclear arms, the US imperialists went to all lengths in an effort to deprive the Soviet people of the fruits of victory and nullify the results of the anti-fascist liberative struggle of the peoples of Europe.

The task was to safeguard and consolidate the fruits of the victory over fascism and ensure the country's security in the new conditions despite the complexity of the post-war situation. This task was successfully carried out during the first years after the war.

Drawing upon the advantages of the socialist system and on the strong economy that had been built up during the years of socialist construction, the Soviet people with the Communist Party at their head accomplished another heroic feat when, with astounding speed and without any external assistance, they restored their war-ravaged economy. Nothing came of the calculation of the imperialists that for a long time the USSR would remain weak economically. As early as 1948 the Soviet Union reached its pre-war level of

industrial output and created the conditions for the further advancement of its peaceful economy on a scale far greater than before the war.

The Soviet Union's international position and prestige were steadily enhanced and the conditions, more favourable than ever, took shape for a further powerful assault on the positions of imperialism by the revolutionary forces.

2. European and Asian Countries Break Away From Capitalism and Establish a People's Democratic System

The defeat of the most aggressive imperialist states and the over-all weakening of imperialism helped to give rise to a revolutionary situation in vast areas of the world. This point is recorded in the Programme of the CPSU, which states: "The defeat of German fascism and Japanese militarism in the Second World War, in which the Soviet Union played the decisive part, created favourable conditions for the overthrow of capitalist and landlord rule by the peoples in a number of European and Asian countries."^{*} The horrors of the war and the atrocities perpetrated by the invaders made the masses of most of the capitalist states that had suffered from the war thoroughly detest fascism of all kinds and shades, and all its backers, accomplices and agents. The Resistance that unfolded in many countries occupied by the nazis or the Japanese militarists or reduced to the status of vassals united all honest people, all fighters for democracy and national independence. The Communists demonstrated that they were the staunchest patriots and the most dedicated fighters for the freedom of their peoples. During the anti-fascist struggle the Communist parties won steadily growing prestige. On the other hand, in a number of European and Asian countries large sections of the big bourgeoisie and landowners earned the scorn and wrath of the people for their betrayal of national interests and collaboration with the invaders.

The masses in the countries enslaved by the nazis and their accomplices did not wish to live in the old way any longer.

^{*} *The Road to Communism*, Moscow, 1961, p. 464.

Having tarnished themselves by collaborating with the aggressors and oppressors and finding themselves disorganised as a result of the fascist collapse, the governments and ruling classes of these countries were no longer able to govern in the old way. An anti-fascist, anti-imperialist people's revolution became imminent in many European and Asian countries.

Democratic national governments in which the various anti-fascist parties and groups, including the Communists, were broadly represented were formed on the basis of the Resistance movement in most of the liberated countries as soon as the invaders were driven out. In many of these governments the leading role was played by the Communists. Acting on the volition of the revolutionary-inclined peoples these governments removed collaborators from public office and put them on trial. Moreover, they initiated profound political and social reforms. This took place in most of the European countries—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary. Developments followed the same course in France, Italy, Greece and Belgium.

There was a revolutionary upsurge both in countries that were liberated by the Red Army and in those whose territories were entered at the close of the war by United States and British forces. Suffice it to recall that in France the Communists polled over five million votes at the elections in 1945 and 1946 and became one of the major political parties. In Italy the Communist Party became the leading force in the working-class movement, receiving the backing of 20 per cent of the electorate. In France and Italy, and also in Belgium, Norway and Denmark, the Communists held a number of ministerial posts in the post-war governments and were active in restoring the economy and social life. The participation of the Communist parties in the governments brought the working people significant social gains. In France and Italy the Communist parties took part in the drawing up of the post-war Constitutions. Thanks to the influence of the Communists, important democratic principles were incorporated in the new Constitutions.

However, in Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece and other countries of Western and Southern Europe that were occupied by United States and British troops during the last

year of the war, the ruling circles of the USA and Britain struck a heavy blow at the revolutionary forces and halted the democratic changes that had been initiated.

In Greece the situation exploded into an open war. British troops in alliance with the most diehard reactionaries and with United States support fought the democratic, anti-fascist forces of the Greek people, i.e., against those who had borne the brunt of the struggle against the nazi invaders in Greece and, in effect, liberated that country. In France, Italy, Belgium and other West European countries the US ruling circles brought the most unceremonious political and economic pressure to bear in order to direct the course of post-war political developments in these countries into a channel agreeable to the USA, suppress progressive elements and, above all, remove the Communists from the governments. In quashing democracy in Western Europe US imperialism joined hands with the most reactionary groups of the bourgeoisie in the countries concerned, with former Hitler myrmidons, with the Right-wing leaders of the Social-Democratic parties and with the Catholic Church. By the spring of 1947, as a result of this alliance, the enemies of democracy had removed the Communists from the governments of West European countries, and there was a turn toward reaction in the policies of these countries.

Developments followed a different course in the countries of Southeastern and Central Europe that had been liberated by the Red Army. Polish and Czechoslovak units, the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia and, in 1944-1945, the Bulgarian and Rumanian armies had been active in the struggle against nazi Germany.

The break-up of the nazi war machine created favourable conditions for the anti-fascist, national liberation struggle in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Albania and East Germany and for the growth of this struggle into democratic and then socialist revolutions. The Soviet Union safeguarded the national interests, sovereignty and independence of these countries, protecting them against the attacks of internal and international reaction, firmly repulsing all the attempts of the British and US imperialists to interfere in the internal affairs of these countries and restore the rule of the capitalists and landowners. A people's democratic power was established in these coun-

tries as the direct continuation of the patriotic struggle against the fascist oppressors during the war. Supported by the overwhelming majority of the population, the new power put fundamental democratic reforms into effect. An agrarian reform turned the land over to the peasants and abolished the landowner class. The property of the German and Italian imperialists and of all the traitors who had collaborated with the enemy during the fascist occupation was confiscated. Large-scale industry, the banks and transport were nationalised. This fundamentally undermined the positions of the exploiting classes.

Thus, in the liberated countries a "new form of political organisation of society, *people's democracy*, a variety of the dictatorship of the proletariat, emerged. It reflected the distinctive development of socialist revolution at a time when imperialism had been weakened and the balance of forces had tilted in favour of socialism. It also reflected the distinctive historical and national features of the various countries".*

People's democratic states were proclaimed in Korea and Vietnam in approximately the same way. In those countries, too, the establishment of the people's democratic system was the direct continuation of the Korean and Vietnam peoples' liberation struggle against the foreign invaders and the local feudal-bourgeois elite that had collaborated with them. However, in a bid to halt the democratic development of Korea and Vietnam, the foreign imperialists flagrantly intervened in their internal affairs and unleashed drawn-out, bloody wars against the Korean and Vietnamese peoples.

The successes of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the subsequent victory of the people's revolution in China were to an enormous extent facilitated by the defeat of Japan's Kwantung Army at the hands of the Soviet troops.

With the triumph of the socialist revolution in a number of European and Asian countries socialism became a world system. This was the most crucial event in world history after the October Revolution in Russia.

The breakaway of many European and Asian countries from the capitalist system and from its colonial reserve and the victory of the socialist revolution in some of these coun-

* *The Road to Communism*, p. 464.

tries were the natural outcome of the liberative, revolutionary anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples of these countries under the new balance of forces that had taken shape in the world after the Second World War. Imperialist propaganda's assertion that the establishment of People's Democracies was "engineered by Moscow" is a deliberate lie designed to discredit socialism. It is conclusively refuted by historical facts. Moreover, in speaking of post-war developments it must be recalled that the Soviet Union's policies and its struggle against the forces of imperialist reaction and aggression had an immense impact on the destinies of the People's Democracies. One of the key conditions that made the victory of the socialist revolution possible in a number of European and Asian countries was the existence of a great socialist power, its victory over the fascist aggressors, and its policy of consistently safeguarding the new progressive states against imperialist interference and rendering them the utmost assistance and support.

The Potsdam Three-Power Summit, the London Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, Britain, France and China in September-October 1945 and the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA and Britain in December of the same year were the major landmarks of the diplomatic struggle which the Soviet Union had to wage in the very first post-war year against the numerous attempts of the Western powers to interfere in the affairs of the People's Democracies. The firm and principled stand adopted by the Soviet Government made it possible to repulse the attempts of the USA and Britain to restore bourgeois-landowner rule in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary under the guise of "reorganising" the governments of these countries. The Soviet Union disrupted the US plans of again turning Korea into a colony under a ten-year "trusteeship" over the whole of that country.

Soviet diplomacy's struggle in defence of the rights of the People's Democracies was continued in 1946, when the peace treaties with nazi Germany's former European allies were being drawn up.*

In addition to political support, the Soviet Union rendered the People's Democracies substantial material assistance

* See Chapter Fifteen.

during the initial and most difficult years of their existence, despite the fact that its own economy had not yet recovered from the destruction wrought by the war.

The role which the Soviet Union played in the destinies of these countries during their formative years was vividly described by Georgi Dimitrov, outstanding son of the Bulgarian people, who wrote in 1948:

“Without the Soviet Union the Bulgarian people would have been in the grip of the German imperialists and their agents, the Bulgarian fascists, to this day.

“Without the support of the Soviet Union Bulgaria would have been torn to pieces and fallen into the clutches of other, no less brazen, aggressive and perfidious imperialists than the Hitler brigands.

“Without the wholehearted assistance of the Soviet people our people would have died of famine during the grim years of drought. Our economy would have been in a state of decline and ruin to this day.”

This, Dimitrov noted, was true not only of Bulgaria but of all the other countries that had broken away from capitalism. “Without the Soviet Union,” he wrote, “the peoples of Southeastern Europe would have known no freedom and independence and there would have been no flourishing people’s democracy advancing toward socialism.”*

3. Upswing of the National Liberation Movement in the East. Soviet Foreign Policy at the Outset of the Disintegration of Imperialism’s Colonial System

Unleashed by aggressive imperialist ambitions, the Second World War shook one of imperialism’s main sources of power and wealth—the system of colonial enslavement and exploitation. The peoples of China, North Vietnam and North Korea shook off the shackles of imperialist oppression and embarked on the building of socialism. The powerful national liberation movement spread to many other countries, to the colonies and semi-colonies of the imperialist

* *Pravda*, November 10, 1948.

states. First this happened in Asia, where the colonial peoples had been drawn most deeply into hostilities and experienced such ghastly horrors and suffering that their patience broke and fresh courage filled their hearts.

The heroism displayed by the peoples of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War served as a model inspiring the patriots of the Eastern countries in their struggle against the invaders. The defeat of nazi Germany, fascist Italy and imperialist Japan accelerated the growth of the national liberation movement in the East.

The prospect of liberation became very real indeed in Asia and then in Africa as a result of the defeat of the aggressor powers, in which the decisive role was played by the Soviet Union, and of the overall weakening of capitalism, including the oldest colonial powers.

The long-standing myth about the "unconquerable might" of the colonialists, sedulously cultivated by the imperialists, was exploded during the Second World War. The defeat of the aggressive fascist states headed by nazi Germany signified the utter vanquishment of the fascist racist ideology and the triumph of the ideas of national liberation and equality of nations. Moreover, the imperialists of Britain, France, the Netherlands and even the USA showed their helplessness in Asia—they were unable to retain possession of many of their colonies. Burma, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines were quickly overrun by Japanese troops. Singapore, one of Britain's chief military bases in Southeast Asia, fell practically without firing a shot. The Arab countries were turned into the scene of bitter military clashes between the belligerent imperialist states.

In the occupied countries the Japanese imperialists instituted a regime of oppression, terror and exploitation more brutal than that of the former colonialists. This gave rise to a massive movement of resistance to the invaders.

The clash between the rival imperialist groups involved many of the colonies and dependent countries in the fighting. As a result, when the war ended the peoples of some of the colonial and dependent countries found themselves in possession of quite a large quantity of arms. This helped to form big people's armies in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Burma, the Philippines and Indonesia. These armies constituted a

fighting alliance of the patriotic forces—workers, peasants and some sections of the national bourgeoisie, with the Communists usually playing the most active, leading role.

In the spring of 1945, when it was quite evident that the Soviet Union had beaten nazi Germany, the peoples of Southeast Asia went over to massive military operations against the Japanese invaders for the liberation of their countries. In most of these countries this struggle reached its highest point by the time Japan was defeated.

In March 1945 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indochina passed a decision to speed up the preparations for a nation-wide uprising. The first regular units of the Vietnamese People's Army had been formed by that time. In Burma, where the armed forces of the Anti-Fascist League of National Liberation had nearly 200,000 men, the uprising against the invaders began in March.

The Japanese were cleared out of almost the whole of Burma in August 1945. In the same month the Indonesian people's units drove the Japanese troops out of their country, and the independent Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed on August 17. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam was created on September 2. The independence of Laos was proclaimed by a Provisional Government in October.

Toward the close of the war the national liberation forces had set up revolutionary organs of power—people's committees which instituted broad democratic reforms—in huge territories in Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines.

In India the people rose against the British colonialists. Massive anti-colonial demonstrations, strikes and peasant uprisings took place in 1945 and 1946. There was street fighting in Calcutta. In Bombay 200,000 workers went on strike and the people erected barricades in the streets. Army pilots and seamen mutined. The people demanded independence for their country and the withdrawal of the British. A revolutionary peasant movement that subsequently involved a territory with a population of over five millions was started in 1946 in the Telingana area of the principality of Hyderabad. The insurgents set up their own organs of power—people's committees, people's courts and self-defence units—distributed the landed estates among the peasants and organised schools.

In Egypt, Syria and the Lebanon the people started an active struggle for genuine national independence and, above all, for the evacuation of British and French troops from their countries.

The colonial powers responded to this upswing of the national liberation movement by unleashing a war of attrition and a reign of terror and engaging in political dodges with the object of deceiving the peoples and splitting the revolutionary forces.

A ruthless war, that went on for years, was started against the Indonesian Republic by a whole coalition of colonialists. At the close of September 1945 Indonesia was occupied by the British, who used Japanese troops that had not yet surrendered their arms, and then operated together with the Dutch colonialists, who had returned by that time. They received extensive material and technical assistance from the USA.

In Malaya a British army of 250,000 men began the destruction of the people's organs of power as early as September 1945 and engaged the Malayan People's Liberation Army in regular warfare.

In Vietnam a barbarous war, started by France in September 1945, dragged on for many years and was subsequently continued against the courageous Vietnamese patriots by US imperialism.

In the Philippines the powerful national liberation movement compelled the USA formally to recognise that country's independence in the summer of 1946. However, the new Government was at once forced to sign an "agreement" placing the Filipino army under US control and envisaging the building of scores of US military bases in the Philippines. Led by United States officers, the army of the Philippines Government began hostilities against the Hukbalahap people's guerilla army.

Long years of bitter struggle were to pass before the peoples of many enslaved countries achieved independence. India and Burma won recognition of their state independence in 1947, but the peoples of Indonesia, some states of Indochina and other countries had to fight longer, while in Africa the struggle for freedom was only gathering momentum. However, history had already pronounced its verdict: the centuries-old system of colonial rule was on the brink of disintegration. The period foretold by Lenin as early as

1919 now set in. "We know," Lenin wrote, "that in the East the masses will rise as independent participants, as builders of a new life, because hundreds of millions of the people belong to dependent, under-privileged nations, which until now have been objects of international imperialist policy, and have only existed as material to fertilise capitalist culture and civilisation."**

Lenin's conclusion that the "revolutionary movement of the peoples of the East can now develop effectively, can reach a successful issue, only in direct association with the revolutionary struggle of our Soviet Republic against international imperialism"*** has been fully borne out by developments.

By smashing the imperialist aggressors in the Second World War the Soviet Union cleared the way for powerful action by the peoples of colonial and dependent countries against colonialism. True to Lenin's behests, the Soviet Union continued rendering the independence struggle of the oppressed peoples extensive and steadily growing support through its active foreign policy following the termination of the war. In the Soviet Union these peoples acquired a reliable and disinterested friend, who was always prepared to protect their interests.

In the United Nations Organisation the Soviet Union has from the very beginning vigorously and consistently championed the right of all peoples to national independence. In February 1946 when the UN Security Council examined the request of the governments of Syria and the Lebanon for the withdrawal of British and French forces from their territories, the Soviet Union was the only Great Power to defend the sovereign rights of these two small Arab states. The Soviet Union's unfaltering support helped the Syrian and Lebanese peoples to secure the evacuation of the French troops from Syria in 1946 and of the British troops from the Lebanon in 1947.

The USSR was the only Great Power to support Egypt when in 1947 her Government requested UN assistance in securing the withdrawal of British troops from Egyptian and Sudanese territory.

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 159.

** Ibid., p. 151.

The Soviet Union waged a long and persevering struggle in the UN in defence of the people of Indonesia. As early as December 1945 the Soviet Government drew the British Government's attention to the fact that the war it had started against the Indonesian people could not be tolerated. In January 1946 the question of the outrages being committed by British and Japanese troops against the population of Indonesia was raised in the UN Security Council on the initiative of the delegation of the Ukrainian SSR. Opposition from the Western powers prevented the Security Council from passing a decision calling for a halt to the hostilities against the Indonesian people.

Later, in August 1947, and again in June and December 1948 the Soviet Union urged the Security Council to take action in defence of the young Indonesian Republic, which had been attacked by the Dutch imperialists. In 1948, when the Indonesian Republic was facing enormous difficulties caused by the imperialists, who held it in the armlock of economic blockade and political isolation, the Soviet Government declared its readiness to establish diplomatic and trade relations with Indonesia.

With the states which achieved national independence (in most cases much curtailed due to the shifts and dodges of the former colonialists) the Soviet Union established relations based on complete equality and mutual respect without reservations or limitations. Diplomatic relations were established by the USSR with Egypt in 1943, with Syria and the Lebanon in 1944, with India in 1947 and with Burma in early 1948. The foundations of the socialist Soviet Union's friendship with the young national states of Asia and Africa were thus laid already during the war and during the first post-war years.

4. Shrinking of Imperialism's Positions

The Soviet Union's steadily stronger positions on the international scene, the breakaway of more than ten European and Asian countries from capitalism and the formation of the world socialist system, the growth of the revolutionary movement of the working class in the capitalist states, the crumbling of the colonial system and the considerable weak-

ening of some of the leading imperialist powers as a result of the Second World War were evidence of a serious aggravation of the general crisis of capitalism.

Prior to the Second World War the international scene was dominated by six imperialist powers. They were called Great Powers and personified the might of world imperialism. These powers were the USA, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and Italy. Three of them were crushed in the Second World War and two were drastically weakened militarily, economically and politically. Subsequent developments showed that this was a profound and sustained weakening, and it became a distinctive feature of the post-war epoch.

The military defeat of Germany, Japan and Italy was a severe blow to the imperialist system as a whole because with encouragement and support from the reactionary circles of the USA, Britain and France these countries had been for many years the principal assault force against the Soviet Union and the revolutionary, democratic movements in the capitalist world. This assault force had now been incapacitated.

The crux of the new situation lay not only in the fact that the fascist coalition had been smashed. As a social system capitalism had been substantially weakened, particularly in Europe. Even capitalist powers like Britain and France, which had been among the victors in the Second World War, found their wings clipped.

The second strongest bourgeois power after the USA, Britain ended the Second World War with her capitalist economy considerably exhausted. Having been cut off from a substantial part of her colonial empire by the hostilities, she became dependent on food and industrial supplies from the USA. During the war years her state debt more than trebled, and her volume of exports shrank by over 66 per cent.

The USA was quick to take advantage of Britain's dependence. In the summer of 1946 the USA granted her a loan of US \$3,750 million, which was one of the means of subordinating Britain to Washington's military and political plans of establishing US domination in Europe and the rest of the world. At the British loan debate in the House of Representatives the Majority Leader John McCormack bluntly declared that on the outcome of the vote "depends

whether or not . . . the United States will assume its place as leader, constructive leader, among the nations of the world".*

British imperialism failed in its attempt to use Germany's defeat and France's weakened position to play the leading economic and political role in the European continent. Britain found herself up against the USA, a far stronger claimant to supremacy in capitalist Europe.

The USA thwarted the plan of the British monopolies, conceived during the war, of seizing control of the Ruhr and thereby giving Britain economic and military supremacy in Western Europe, and by 1947 it became the power with the decisive say in matters concerning the Ruhr.

Britain's diminishing political influence was strikingly seen in the collapse of the plan, conceived in London soon after the war, of forming in Western Europe a bloc of colonial powers (Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands) under British leadership. When matters reached the stage of actually setting up the bloc, of signing the Brussels Pact in March 1948 (see Chapter Nineteen), it was found that this bloc was in fact not an instrument of British supremacy in Europe but merely a link in the chain of military blocs set up by US imperialism and serving its interests.

Action by the British ruling circles such as the military intervention in Greece and the sending of troops to Indonesia in the autumn of 1945 to help the Dutch colonialists crush the national liberation movement of the Indonesian people only further undermined Britain's international prestige.

As regards France, her defeat in 1940 and the German occupation dislocated her economy for a long time. In 1944 her industrial output was only 30 per cent of the pre-war level. The role played by French capital in the world market fell to negligible proportions. In 1945 France's share of the export of the capitalist countries was less than one per cent. At the end of the war France, naturally, had a small army because until 1944 her territory had been in the hands of the enemy.

However, France owed her weakness not only to her enemies in the Second World War but also to the policies

* William Hardy McNeill, *Survey of International Affairs. 1939-1946. America, Britain and Russia. Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946*, London, 1953, p 688.

of her Western allies. Both during and after the war the US ruling circles deliberately pursued a policy of weakening France politically and militarily, their purpose being to prepare the soil for their control of that country. Moreover, the USA believed that a weak France would give it a stronger hand in Western Europe.

During the war the US leaders mooted the idea of a disarmed post-war France.* While preparing for the landing in France and drawing up the plans for instituting an occupation regime on French territory, the USA and Britain opposed the participation of French fighting units in the landing. At the concluding stage of the war the US Government was opposed to French participation in the settlement of some key political issues. It was set against inviting French representatives to the Yalta Conference. After the war it continued obstructing France's efforts to strengthen her sovereignty. Its post-war loans to France were granted on terms prejudicial to her independence.

The USA was the only large capitalist power that emerged from the Second World War stronger economically and militarily, with a considerably enhanced influence over the whole of the capitalist world.

US territory had not been affected in any way by the hostilities. During the Second World War the military technology level was such that the oceans separating America from Europe and Asia served the USA as a reliable shield. Not a single bomb fell on any American city and not a single US factory was destroyed by the hostilities. In his *Outline Political History of the Americas* William Z. Foster noted: "While the other capitalist countries were ruining their industries in the war, the United States was developing its industrial facilities at a feverish rate. It added to its plant \$25 billion worth of the most modern productive capacity."**

The swift growth of the war industry brought the US monopolies fabulous profits. During the five war years these monopolies netted a profit of US \$117,000 million, which is

* Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History*, New York, 1948, p. 712.

** William Z. Foster, *Outline Political History of the Americas*, New York, 1951, p. 452.

equal to a 300 per cent increase compared with the five years preceding the war.*

When the Second World War broke out the US Army was the seventeenth largest among the armies of the capitalist states. By the time the war ended the USA was the strongest land, sea and air power in the capitalist world.

The USA's increased strength as a result of the Second World War was a vivid manifestation of capitalism's uneven development, particularly at its imperialist stage. US imperialism grew strong through the exhaustion of the other bourgeois states and this served as the foundation for the rise of further far-reaching contradictions in the capitalist world.

Taking advantage of its rivals' enfeeblement, US capital seized a considerable share of the world capitalist market during the very first years after the war. Whereas prior to the war, in 1937, the USA's share of the total export of the capitalist world amounted to 14.2 per cent, in 1947 this share exceeded 32 per cent. Moreover, US commerce with the other capitalist countries bore the sharply pronounced stamp of unilateral trade expansion that undermined the financial position and economic independence of its partners.

After the war US monopoly capital launched a determined assault on the interests of the other imperialist powers, notably of Britain and France, in the colonial and dependent countries of the Middle East and Southeast Asia, even in a country like India, which was a traditional sphere of British influence. In order to secure a position enabling it to intensify the exploitation of the undeveloped countries of the East, the USA went over to direct interference in their internal affairs, to open support of the efforts of the colonialists to crush the national liberation movement.

While ousting the old colonial powers, the USA used them against the peoples of Asia and Africa. It supplied armaments and credits to the Netherlands, which was endeavouring to destroy Indonesia's independence, and to France in her long war against the Vietnamese people.** US

* N. Inozemtsev, *Amerikansky imperializm i germansky vopros (1941-1954)*, Moscow, 1954, p. 37.

** *Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya posle vtoroi mirovoi voyny*, Vol. I (1945-1949), Moscow, 1962, p. 336.

aid to the old colonialists gave the whole world, the peoples of Asia and Africa in particular, a clear insight into the true imperialist substance of US policy in the colonial question.

But expansion in the world markets could not deliver the USA's post-war economy from its principal vice. Chronic under-capacity operation, leading to the stoppage of half of the capacities in the key industries, and permanent mass unemployment became a feature of the US economy after the war. US imperialism, as had been the case with German imperialism in the 1930s, began to look for a way out of this situation in permanent militarisation in order to sustain production by war orders and step up the arms race in furtherance of the reactionary, aggressive aims of its foreign policy.

US imperialism's post-war foreign policy was characterised as follows in the resolution adopted by the 20th Congress of the CPSU: "Soon after the end of the war the imperialist powers led by reactionary circles in the USA began pursuing a 'positions of strength' policy, which mirrored the aspiration of the most aggressive elements in these countries to suppress the working-class, democratic and national liberation movements, undermine the socialist camp and dominate the world. In practice this policy spells out an unbridled arms race; the building of US military bases along the frontiers of the USSR and the People's Democracies, and the formation of aggressive blocs spearheaded at the countries of the socialist community; the unfolding of a so-called cold war against the socialist states and preparations for further bloody wars."*

The USA's temporary monopoly of the atom bomb played a major role in shaping this policy. The guideline of US foreign policy in that period was subsequently characterised by General Maxwell D. Taylor, former US Army Chief-of-Staff, who said: "The A-bomb's awesome destructiveness encouraged belief that our Air Force had an ultimate weapon that would allow the US henceforth to police the world and impose a sort of Pax Americana."**

* XX s'yezd *Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuza*, Verbatim Report, Vol. II, Moscow, 1956, p. 411.

** *Look*, November 24, 1959.

This was the period when US imperialism set out on its "nuclear diplomacy". Explaining the criminal annihilation of hundreds of thousands of civilians in the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945, James F. Byrnes, who was Secretary of State at the time, argued, according to the US press, that the atom bomb was needed not so much to defeat Japan but rather that it should be dropped "to make Russia more manageable in Europe".*

The policy pursued by the US ruling circles after the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt signified a total renunciation of the loyal, mutually beneficial co-operation with the Soviet Union which had been so fruitful during the Second World War, in the period of the joint struggle against the Nazi aggressors.

Having set their sights on the chimerical objective of achieving world supremacy, the US ruling circles launched an unparalleled arms race and declared a cold war on the Soviet Union and the newly-established People's Democracies in the futile hope of halting the growth of the socialist forces. Moreover, the USA sought to deprive its capitalist allies in Western Europe of their independence and subordinate them to its economic, political and military leadership. This was resisted by the patriotic forces in the West European countries.

* * *

The Second World War thus wrought far-reaching changes in the international situation, the immense shift in the balance of strength favouring socialism, at the expense of capitalism. This shift sprang from the enhanced might, international prestige and influence of the USSR, the break with capitalism that was made by a number of countries that embarked on socialist development, and the post-war emergence of the world socialist system. Factors contributing to the new balance of strength were the powerful growth of the national liberation movements of the oppressed peoples and the downfall of imperialism's colonial system.

This shook and weakened the imperialist camp as a whole.

* *Foreign Affairs. An American Quarterly Review*, January 1957, p. 347.

The second stage of capitalism's general crisis began during the Second World War and the socialist revolutions that took place in some European and Asian countries.*

The uneven development of the imperialist powers was further accentuated. Most of them—not only the vanquished but also some of the victors—lost their former influence in the world and found themselves dependent on the United States of America. “The economic, and with it the political and military centre of imperialism, has shifted from Europe to the United States. US monopoly capital, gorged on war profits and the arms race, has seized the most important sources of raw materials, the markets and the spheres of investment, has built up a unique kind of colonial empire and become the biggest *international exploiter*.”**

The US monopoly bourgeoisie made a bid for the role of “saviour” of capitalism in other countries. Relying on its economic resources and temporary atom-bomb monopoly, US imperialism began forming, under its own aegis, a bloc of capitalist states spearheaded at the socialist system, the revolutionary movement in the capitalist countries and the national liberation movement in the colonies.

In foreign policy the USSR was posed with new important international tasks: promoting fraternal friendship with the People's Democracies and achieving the utmost strengthening of the world socialist system; supporting the national liberation movement of the peoples fighting to abolish colonial oppression; fostering friendly co-operation with the young states that had shaken off the yoke of colonial dependence; safeguarding peace, exposing US imperialist policy that was threatening world peace, and resolutely countering the aggressive actions stemming from that policy. Moreover, in keeping with the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence and in order to preserve world peace and avert the threat of another global war the USSR made every effort to maintain mutually beneficial co-operation with the capitalist countries desiring such co-operation.

* *The Road to Communism*, p. 470.

** *Ibid.*, p. 476.

Chapter Fifteen

THE PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH GERMANY'S FORMER ALLIES

1. The USSR Upholds the Principles of a Democratic Peace

When the Second World War ended one of the tasks that confronted the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition was to achieve a peace settlement with Germany's former allies—Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. These countries had not only recognised their defeat before Nazi Germany was completely routed and accepted the terms of the armistice but had declared war on Germany.

The Potsdam Conference charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the immediate and important task of drafting the peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. It was laid down that in drafting each of these treaties the "Council shall consist of members representing the states that signed the terms of surrender" with the given country. Moreover, it was laid down that in the examination of the peace settlement with Italy France would be regarded as having signed the terms of Italy's surrender. Thus, the peace treaty with Italy was to be drawn up by the USSR, the USA, Britain and France, the treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary by the USSR, the USA and Britain, and the treaty with Finland by the USSR and Britain.

Many provisions of the future peace settlement had been worked out by the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition during the war in joint documents such as the decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences and, especially, in the armistice

agreements signed with nazi Germany's former allies. They contained some agreed terms on frontiers, on reparations and restitutions, on the dissolution of fascist organisations, and so forth. This considerably facilitated the task of drawing up the peace treaties provided, of course, that the members of the coalition honoured the decisions that had been jointly adopted. But during the actual drafting of the peace treaties the Western powers did not by any means always abide by these decisions.

When the Council of Foreign Ministers, set up by decision of the Potsdam Conference, began discussing the peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, it became obvious from the very beginning that the Soviet Union and the Western powers were approaching this important task of Europe's post-war arrangement from totally different positions.

The Soviet Union wanted the settlement with Germany's former allies to produce a lasting and just democratic peace that would deliver the peoples from the threat of another war of aggression in Europe, create a solid foundation for European security and ensure these countries with the possibility of democratic development.

In guiding Soviet foreign policy during the first years of the Soviet state Lenin put forward and upheld a number of key propositions on what a just and democratic peace should be like. He stressed: "... We should like to see a minimum of general assurances, solemn promises and grandiloquent formulas, and the greatest possible number of the simplest and most obvious decisions and measures that would certainly lead to peace, if not to the complete elimination of the war danger."* Addressing the Congress of Soviets on the second day after the October Revolution, he said: "We reject all clauses on plunder and violence, but we shall welcome all clauses containing provisions for good-neighbourly relations and all economic agreements; we cannot reject these."** Moreover, Lenin pointed out that the equality of the two systems (socialist and capitalist) was "the only correct way out of the difficulties, chaos and danger of wars

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 386.

** Ibid., Vol. 26, p. 255.

(as long as there remain two property systems...)* In the question of the peace treaties after the Second World War the Soviet Union's attitude conformed to these Leninist propositions.

Its position was that the peace treaties with nazi Germany's former allies had to provide for concrete steps that would show that aggression did not go unpunished, make it difficult to repeat aggression in the future and prevent any resurgence of fascism that had engulfed mankind in the horrors of the Second World War. It therefore insisted that war criminals should receive the punishment they deserved: that the countries which belonged to the aggressor coalition should compensate for some of the damage they had inflicted on the countries attacked by them; and that fascism should be completely uprooted and measures taken to prevent its revival in the former enemy states.

These were also the aim of the limitations of a military character included in the peace treaties with the unanimous agreement of the anti-Hitler coalition powers. According to these limitations nazi Germany's former allies were to have armaments and armed forces exclusively for defence purposes. On Soviet initiative the peace treaties included provisions directed against any reanimation of militarism in Germany.

Moreover, the Soviet Union insisted that the terms of the peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland should ensure to these countries the possibility of unhampered and independent economic development and of establishing friendly relations with all countries. The USSR resolutely opposed the attempts of the Western powers to deprive the vanquished states of their economic independence, to subordinate their national economy to foreign capital.

The Soviet Union took a firm stand against foreign encroachments upon the East European countries' free democratic development, upon the new, people's democratic system that was emerging in these countries.

The USA and Britain were out to turn Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria into a sphere of domination by US and British monopolies. They counted on utilising the peace treaties for

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 357.

interference in the affairs of these countries, deposing the people's governments and restoring the rule of the exploiting classes. The Soviet Government upset these imperialist plans of the Western powers.

It wanted the peace won at such a high price to be a lasting one, making every effort to preserve the close co-operation with its war-time allies—the USA, Britain and France—and achieve a peace settlement in close contact with them.

These efforts came into collision with the ambition of the Western powers headed by the USA to dominate the post-war world, impose their will on the Soviet Union, dictate onerous peace terms to the vanquished states, subordinate them to their influence, interfere in their internal affairs and prevent them from effectuating far-reaching democratic reforms that would be objectionable to Western imperialist circles.

As a result of the clash between these two political lines the framing of the peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland dragged out for more than a year—from September 1945 to the end of 1946—and proceeded in an atmosphere marked by a tense diplomatic struggle over issues that decided the future of a considerable part of Europe. In that struggle the People's Democracies ranged themselves with the Soviet Union against the Western powers. The drafting of the treaties was started at the first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London (September 11-October 2, 1945) and was continued at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA and Britain in Moscow (December 16-26, 1945), the second session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris (from April 25 to May 16, and after a recess, from June 15 to July 12, 1946) and at the Paris Peace Conference (July 29-October 15, 1946). The treaties were finally drawn up at the third session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in New York (November 4-December 11, 1946).

Each of these stages witnessed a clash between two different attitudes to the key problems of a peace settlement. With the close co-operation of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, which participated in the Paris Peace Conference, of Albania, which had been invited to the conference, and also of Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, which had by then become People's Democracies, the Soviet Union pursued

a policy aimed at ensuring a lasting peace. It strove to achieve this peace through continued loyal co-operation with its war-time allies. But its efforts were opposed by the Western powers headed by the USA, which steered toward an imperialist, coercive peace, the rupture of co-operation with the USSR, the throttling of the revolution in the People's Democracies, the imposition of imperialist domination over the vanquished states and the restoration of the old order.

2. The Soviet Union Champions the Sovereignty of the Vanquished States

As soon as the London meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council opened the representatives of the Western powers unceremoniously demanded the removal of the people's democratic governments in Rumania and Bulgaria. The US delegation slandered these governments, declaring it would not discuss peace terms with Rumania and Bulgaria as long as they did not have governments "that could be recognised by the United States". The same attitude was adopted by Britain.

The Rumanian and Bulgarian peoples were putting major democratic reforms into effect in their countries, laying the foundations for the people's democratic system and drawing the teeth of the forces of internal reaction. This did not suit the ruling circles of the USA and Britain and they tried to use the peace negotiations to meddle in the internal affairs of Rumania and Bulgaria, halt their democratic development and restore the bourgeoisie and the landowners to power. The question of a change of government in Hungary was not raised by the Western powers at the time because the Government in that country was headed by their puppet Ferenc Nagy, leader of a kulak party. In line with the wishes of the ruling circles of the USA and Britain that Government was obstructing democratic reforms in Hungary.

In order to make it possible to interfere in the internal affairs of Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, the USA and Britain demanded that the London meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council set up "inspection commissions" osten-

sibly for the purpose of checking up on how these countries carried out the arms limitation terms of the peace treaties.

But the Soviet Union did not allow the peace negotiations to be used for the overthrow of lawful governments or for any other form of foreign interference in the affairs of the People's Democracies. The Soviet representatives made it plain to the Western delegations in the Foreign Ministers Council that these countries had democratic governments, which enjoyed the trust of the overwhelming majority of the population and that there could be no question of foreign interference.

Finding they could not get the USSR to consent to interference in the internal affairs of the People's Democracies, the Western powers decided to wreck the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. They used a question of procedure as the pretext.

As we have already noted, the Potsdam Conference decided on precisely what countries would take part in drawing up the peace treaties with each of Germany's former allies. Ignoring this decision, the US and British delegations demanded that the treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland should be drawn up with the participation of delegations from France and Kuomintang China, in spite of the fact that neither France nor China had been at war with these countries.

The Soviet Government insisted on the Potsdam decision. In response to this the USA and Britain issued what was essentially an ultimatum, declaring that if the procedure established at Potsdam for the Council of Foreign Ministers were not amended they would not sign even those decisions on the peace treaties which had already been agreed on at the London session. The Soviet Union, naturally, could not condone this unscrupulous attempt to replace the negotiations with a *diktat*.

The USA replied by disrupting the London session. This action had been planned well in advance. This is revealed in the memoirs of James F. Byrnes, who as US Secretary of State led the American delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers session in London. He writes that he had arranged with the Kuomintang delegate Wang Shih-chieh to halt the session proceedings on the day it would not be presided over by the American delegate so that externally

the blame for wrecking the session would not fall on the USA. Wang willingly obeyed his masters and on October 2, the day he was in the chair, he declared the session closed.*

After the break-down of the London meeting the Truman Administration sought to deactivate the Foreign Ministers Council and transfer the discussion of the peace treaties to a peace conference with the participation of a large number of countries. In putting forward this scheme the USA counted on using the fact that most of the bourgeois states had become economically dependent on it as a result of the war. It hoped that at that conference it would impose its will on the Soviet Union with the aid of a mechanical majority of votes. Moreover, it demanded that the right to endorse the peace terms after their examination at the peace conference should be given not to the powers that bore the main responsibility for the peace treaties but to the many countries that had been, albeit formally, in a state of war with the given enemy state. In this case, too, the purpose remained unaltered, namely, to replace negotiations with the Soviet Union by pressure, taking advantage of the fact that most of the above-mentioned group of countries were bourgeois states that in those years obediently followed in the wake of US policy.

But the Soviet Union firmly defended the principle of co-ordinated policy of the Great Powers in the anti-Hitler coalition on the question of a peace settlement. Averell Harriman, the US Ambassador in Moscow, who stated Truman's considerations regarding the peace conference to the head of the Soviet Government on October 24 and 25, was told that an effort had to be made to hold another meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council and work out the drafts of the peace treaties: it would be best, he was told, first to work out something general and then convene a conference of countries named in an agreed list.** Further, the Soviet side emphasised, after the peace conference the text of the peace treaties would have to be determined by the powers that had signed the armistice with the corresponding vanquished states.***

* James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, New York, 1947, p. 106.

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Record of conversations on October 24 and 25, 1945 between J. V. Stalin and Averell Harriman.

*** Ibid.

The Western powers had no alternative but to give in. They could not for long abstain from participating in the drawing up of the peace treaties because their self-elimination from the peace settlement could exclude them entirely from a share in the settlement of East European affairs. Moreover, their sabotage of the peace settlement could rouse the indignation of democratic opinion—the peoples were yearning for a lasting peace. Therefore, they had to agree to the resumption of joint work of the Great Powers in drawing up the peace treaties.

The Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA and Britain met in conference in Moscow in December 1945 and, among other international problems (Japan, Korea, China, the UN Atomic Energy Commission, and so on), they discussed the pending peace treaties with Germany's five former allies. Formally held outside the framework of the Council of Foreign Ministers, this Conference was convened in accordance with the Yalta decision of periodic meetings between the Foreign Ministers of the three countries.

Although they agreed to resume the negotiations on the question of the peace treaties, the Western powers did not cease their attempts to intervene in the internal affairs of Rumania and Bulgaria in order to return the reactionaries to power in those countries. These attempts were continued at the Moscow Conference. The US delegation now demanded if not the entire replacement then at least a reorganisation of the Rumanian Government through the infusion of representatives of the bourgeois opposition (the Liberal and National-Tsaranist parties). Moreover, the Americans wanted that Government to promise to hold elections within a set time limit, insisting on measures that were tantamount to undisguised interference in Rumania's internal affairs. They demanded that the principal ministries directly responsible for the election campaign should be freed of control by any political party. They wanted Rumania to declare a general amnesty for all political crimes committed beginning with August 23, 1944.* This was an attempt to secure the release of the fascists and their accomplices, of the enemies of the people's power with a record of crimes against

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Memorandum of December 20, 1945 of the US delegation at the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference.

the Rumanian people, and return them to political activity. The USA made the satisfaction of these demands a condition for its recognition of the reorganised Rumanian Government.

In the case of Bulgaria, too, the USA demanded the reorganisation of her Government through the inclusion in it of representatives of reactionary parties and groups.

The Soviet Government refused to condone this interference in the internal affairs of Rumania and Bulgaria. It was made plain to the US delegation that democratic general elections had only just been held in Bulgaria (November 18, 1945). These elections had brought a sweeping victory for the Fatherland Front of five political parties headed by the Communist Party. As regards the elections in Rumania, the Soviet Government recalled that the Rumanian king had himself explained his actions fettering the preparations for the elections as being due to the attitude adopted by the US and British representatives in Bucharest. Had it not been for their interference, elections held on the basis of universal suffrage by secret ballot would have long ago shown which side had the support of the Rumanian people.

The Soviet Government's firm stand on questions of principle combined, as before, with its desire to achieve an agreed peace settlement jointly with the anti-Hitler coalition members. Its efforts at the Moscow Conference resulted in the working out of a basis for compromise, which, while excluding interference in the internal affairs of Rumania and Bulgaria, made it possible to break the deadlock and continue the drafting of the peace treaties.

At the Conference it was agreed that friendly advice would be given to the governments of Rumania and Bulgaria to the effect that it was desirable that they should include two representatives from the opposition parties or groups. Besides, the Rumanian Government was informed that it was expected to name the earliest possible date for elections on the basis of universal suffrage by secret ballot with the participation of all democratic, anti-fascist parties.

The USA and Britain pledged to recognise the Rumanian and Bulgarian governments after these recommendations had been carried out and the required assurances received. The USSR secured the inclusion of an extremely important reservation stipulating that the persons co-opted into the

Rumanian and Bulgarian governments would "work loyally with the Government".*

The governments of Rumania and Bulgaria communicated their readiness to accept the recommendations of the Moscow Conference.

The USA and Britain had to waive their objections to the drafting of peace treaties with Rumania and Bulgaria. At the Moscow Conference it was agreed that the drafting of the peace settlement would be forthwith resumed in line with the procedure, laid down at Potsdam, according to which the peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland would be drafted only by those members of the Foreign Ministers Council who had actually signed or were considered as having signed (France with regard to Italy) the terms of surrender with the given country.

The task of scrutinizing the drafts of all the five peace treaties drawn up by the Council of Foreign Ministers and of working out recommendations on these treaties was left to the peace conference. Following the peace conference the final wording of the peace treaties was to be decided by the Foreign Ministers Council in the composition established at Potsdam.

Byrnes says that the US delegation agreed to these decisions reluctantly, making the condition that the Soviet Union accept the US proposal for the composition of the peace conference. This proposal, which was accepted, stated that the peace conference should consist of the five members of the Foreign Ministers Council and also of all other members of the United Nations who had had substantial contingents in the war against the enemy states in Europe.** Thus, besides the five Great Powers, the conference would be attended by Australia, Byelorussia, Belgium, Brazil, the Netherlands, Greece, India, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Yugoslavia and the Union of South Africa. Countries that bore only a remote relation to European affairs—such as New Zealand and the Union of South Africa—were thus to attend the conference

* *Vneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1945*. Moscow, 1949. 4-p. 162-63.

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*. Statement by James F. Byrnes at the second session of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

on a par with the states that had suffered huge losses in the war with nazi Germany and her allies and were vitally interested in a lasting peace. It was obvious in advance that the USA and Britain were according a definite role to these countries—that of casting their votes in support of the US and British policies. However, the Moscow Conference decision on the procedure for the final wording of the peace treaties did not give the Western powers the possibility of using this composition of the peace conference for imposing unalterable unilateral decisions with the aid of an obedient body of votes.

The Western powers continued their intrigues against the People's Democracies through backstage manipulation at the peace conference, which opened in Paris on July 29, 1946. The Truman Administration was particularly active in this respect.

On August 27, 1946, while the peace conference was in session, US Secretary of State Byrnes had a talk with the Bulgarian representatives: Prime Minister K. Georgiev, Chairman of the National Assembly V. Kolarov and Foreign Minister G. Kulishov. Without mincing his words he demanded a reshuffle in the Bulgarian Government, insisting above all on the removal of the Communist Minister for Internal Affairs until the new elections. He repeated the threat that if that were not done the USA would not sign the peace treaty with Bulgaria.

The USA followed this move with the demand that the Bulgarian Government invite Petkov, Lulchev, Stoyanov and Ganev, the leaders of the Bulgarian opposition, to Paris to reach agreement on a Government reshuffle under American supervision, without the participation of the Bulgarian parliament and political parties. The US representative gave the assurance that "this time the opposition will be more tractable". "If necessary a word from Byrnes to Petkov and Lulchev would be enough," he added cynically.*

This manoeuvre received a worthy rebuff from the Bulgarian Government, which made it plain that it would not tolerate foreign interference in the internal affairs of the

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*. Record of a conversation on August 28, 1946 between the Soviet Foreign Minister and the Bulgarian delegation.

Bulgarian people. The Bulgarian stand was given every support by the Soviet Union.

At the Paris Peace Conference the Western powers made yet another attempt to interfere in the internal political life of the vanquished states. Prompted by British and US diplomacy, the Australian delegation suggested setting up a kind of "European international court of human rights" ostensibly to supervise the fulfilment of the political terms of the peace treaties in the former enemy states. It was proposed that the governments of the vanquished states should be placed under the jurisdiction of this court. This move to set up a standing body to legalise interference in the affairs of the People's Democracies and also of Italy and Finland and to establish a kind of trusteeship over them was exposed by the Soviet delegation as a flagrant violation of the sovereignty of independent states. The Australian proposal was dismissed.

Earlier, at the Paris meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council, the Soviet Union had stayed an attempt by the USA to secure the formation of a so-called treaty commission with the objective of infringing on Italy's sovereignty. As envisaged by the American project, the commission would have wide executive and juridical powers on Italian territory for the alleged purpose of ensuring the fulfilment of the peace treaty. The Soviet representatives characterised this proposal by the USA as an attempt to impose on Italy a kind of colonial capitulation regime that was incompatible with her state sovereignty.

3. Political and Territorial Provisions of the Peace Treaties

In the peace treaties the political provisions, founded on the armistice agreements, mirrored the anti-fascist, liberative nature of the Second World War. They envisaged the restoration in Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland of all the rights and liberties that had been destroyed or curtailed by the fascist regimes: human rights, including freedom of speech, freedom of the press and publication, freedom of religion, freedom of political opinion, and free-

dom of assembly for all citizens irrespective of sex, language or creed.

At the Paris Peace Conference the Western powers made a stand against the inclusion in the peace treaty with Italy of another key political provision, namely, the disbandment of all fascist-type organisations and the banning of organisations of this type in the future. However, through the vigorous efforts of the Soviet Union and also of Poland and the other People's Democracies the important provisions on the uprooting of fascism and the prevention of its resurgence were included in the peace treaties with all of Germany's former allies. This was of immense assistance to the anti-fascist forces in their struggle for their countries' democratic and peaceful development. The same purpose was served by the provisions on the arrest and extradition of war criminals.

On the whole, the political provisions of the peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland created the possibility for their democratic development in accordance with the volition of their peoples, without forcing on them any definite social system or political regime. This was a major service rendered by the Soviet Union and its foreign policy.

The democratic, anti-fascist provisions of the peace treaties were carried out consistently and to the letter in countries where the new, people's democratic, system was established.

The work of the Foreign Ministers Council and of the Paris Peace Conference brought to light the distinction between the attitude of the Soviet Union, which was supported by the People's Democracies, and that of the Western powers on many important issues linked with the territorial provisions in the peace treaties.

The question of the frontiers of Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland was, in the main, settled in the armistice agreements. The territorial provisions of the peace treaties were, on the recommendation of the Soviet Union, worded in accordance with these agreements and were approved at the Paris meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council.

However, at the Paris Peace Conference it became evident that the USA and Britain were again departing from the

earlier agreed decisions and supporting the claims of third countries to the territory of the People's Democracies.

For example, Britain and some other Western countries supported the claim of the reactionary Tsaldaris Government in Greece to a considerable slice of Bulgarian territory on the ground of "strategic considerations". Although the conference had no bearing whatsoever on issues involving Albania, Greece laid claim to an area in the south of Albania that was equal to about one-third of that country's entire territory.

These claims were rejected by the USSR and Ukrainian representatives as unlawful and aggressive. They constituted an attempt by the Greek Government to gain possession of primordial Bulgarian land, where amongst a population of 300,000 there were only about 200 Greeks. If the question of changing the frontier between Bulgaria and Greece were to be raised at all, the Soviet representatives pointed out, it would have to be recognised that Bulgaria had a case in demanding the return of Western Thrace which had been unjustly wrested from her under the 1919 Treaty of Nevilly, as a result of which she lost her outlet to the Aegean. All the claims to Albanian territory were likewise rejected by the Soviet delegation.

In face of this opposition, the Greek delegation waived its claims on Albania, while its demands on Bulgaria were rejected by an overwhelming majority of votes in the Conference Commission on Political and Territorial Problems for Bulgaria. Britain's further attempts to revise the Bulgarian frontier in favour of Greece were successfully repulsed by the Soviet Union at the New York meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council when the final wording of the peace treaties was endorsed. The frontier between Greece and Bulgaria remained unchanged.

At the Paris Peace Conference the US delegation demagogically demanded a revision of the frontier between Finland and the USSR and between Hungary and Rumania. These frontiers had been agreed on by the Foreign Ministers Council. This move, designed to drive a wedge between the USSR and Finland and between Rumania and Hungary, was defeated.

There were drawn-out negotiations at all the three meetings of the Foreign Ministers Council and at the Peace Con-

ference on the question of the frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia, and particularly on the question of Trieste. The Soviet Union consistently championed Yugoslavia's right to the entire frontier territory in the Istrian Peninsula (Juliiska Kraina), which was populated mainly by Slavs and had passed to Italy only after World War I, including the port of Trieste, situated in this territory and economically linked with it. The Western powers insisted on a division of this territory between Yugoslavia and Italy. At the Paris session of the Foreign Ministers Council the USA had suggested transferring to Italy not only the city of Trieste but also adjoining lands, which had a population of over 200,000 Yugoslavs. A proposal moved by France was somewhat more favourable to Yugoslavia.

The Soviet Union firmly supported the legitimate interests of Yugoslavia and the Slav population of Juliiska Kraina, getting the Western powers to agree to the transfer of most of the Istrian Peninsula to Yugoslavia. But with regard to the city of Trieste and the territory directly adjoining it a compromise decision was adopted to turn them into the Free Territory of Trieste under UN control.

There was a long struggle over the status of Trieste at the Paris meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council, the Peace Conference and the third meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council in New York. The Western powers sought to give that major Mediterranean port a status that would in effect have turned it into a US and British military base.

The Soviet Union did not allow that to happen. A basically democratic status was finally agreed upon at the New York meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council. On Soviet insistence a date was set for the evacuation of foreign troops from Trieste and the corresponding provisions were included in the peace treaty with Italy.*

* Later differences between the permanent members of the Security Council made it impossible to appoint a governor for Trieste, and in 1954 the territory was divided between Yugoslavia and Italy under a compromise agreement between them. The UN took note of the agreement, under which Italy pledged to maintain Trieste as a free port in accordance with the provisions of the peace treaty, while the British and US troops were withdrawn from the city. The Soviet Union's defence of Yugoslavia's legitimate interests during the peace settlement played a positive part also in the final settlement of the issue.

The question of Italy's former colonies Libya, Somali and Eritrea—came up during the discussion of the draft peace treaty with that country. This question was examined at the London and Paris meetings of the Foreign Ministers Council and it was found that there were wide differences of opinion.

The Soviet Union wanted to see Italy's former African colonies receive their independence as quickly as possible and take the road of independent national development instead of passing from the hands of one colonial power to another. It therefore suggested a UN trusteeship to expedite the independence of these territories, the trusteeship to be exercised by one or several members of the United Nations Organisation. It stated that it would be prepared to take part in exercising the trusteeship as a sure guarantee that the territories concerned received their independence at the earliest possible date. The Western powers flatly turned down this suggestion, seeing it as a threat to their colonialist interests.

Britain aspired to annex Italy's former colonies to her own colonial possessions in Africa. At the Paris meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council Ernest Bevin suggested proclaiming the "independence" of Libya (including Tripolitania and Cyrenaica) while leaving it under British military occupation. His plan included the unification of Italian Somali with part of Ethiopian territory and placing them under a trusteeship exercised by Britain. In fact, this meant turning all the Italian colonies over to Britain.

This plan received sympathetic understanding from the USA. John Foster Dulles subsequently wrote: "It (Cyrenaica—Ed.) had good locations for airfields, and the British looked to it as a new strategic basing point for British power in the Mediterranean to take the place of Palestine and Egypt. . . . The United States Government was inclined to support the British in their estimate of the strategic value of Cyrenaica."*

For its part, the US Government was attracted chiefly by the possibility of setting up in Italy's former colonial possessions its own military bases slightly disguised with references to "United Nations control". Hardly had the first session of the Foreign Ministers Council begun its proceed-

* John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace*, New York, 1957, p. 60.

ings than the US Secretary of State Byrnes spoke of "military bases in the (Italian) colonies".*

Fearing for their colonial empire, the ruling circles of France were apprehensive of even the word "independence" in reference to the peoples of Africa. In a conversation with Soviet representatives at the Paris meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council the French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault declared that the independence status "may affect French interests in Africa". "The French delegation," he said, "was therefore firmly opposed to granting independence, for instance, to Tripolitania because of the repercussions that such an action might have in the neighbouring territories, where most of the population know nothing about politics and have no political parties."**

The Soviet Union could not, of course, agree to any enlargement of the British colonial empire in Africa through the use of the flag of a UN trusteeship in Italy's former colonies, to the conversion of these territories into US military bases or, least of all, to any denial of independence to the peoples of the former colonies.

In the end the Paris meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council decided to postpone the settlement of the question of the Italian colonies and, in the event the Four Powers did not reach agreement on this issue within a year following the signing of the peace treaty, to turn it over to the UN General Assembly.***

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Record of a conversation on September 14, 1945 between the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov and the US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes.

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Record of a conversation on May 3, 1946 between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov and the French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault.

*** Decisions on the destiny of Italy's former colonies were adopted by the 4th General Assembly in 1949 and by the 5th General Assembly in 1950. It was decided that Libya would be a united, independent and sovereign state not later than January 1, 1952, and that Eritrea would be an autonomous unit under Ethiopian sovereignty. Somali would achieve independence in December 1960, until which date it would be under Italian trusteeship on behalf of the UN. The Soviet Union pressed for the immediate granting of independence to Libya and Eritrea, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from those territories, and the reduction of the UN trusteeship over Somali to five years. The General Assembly decisions opened the road to national independence for Libya and Somali.

4. Economic Clauses of the Peace Treaties. The USSR Upholds the Economic Independence of Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland

Vigorous action had to be taken by the Soviet Union to prevent the vanquished countries from falling into economic bondage to US and British capital. Not confining themselves to attempts to secure a change of the governments and political regimes in the People's Democracies, the Western powers, notably the USA, sought to include in the peace treaties economic clauses enabling foreign capital to seize the key positions in the economy of the vanquished states and thereby make them dependent on Washington and London.

J. Campbell, who was secretary of the United States delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, later wrote that the USA and Britain were determined to open the door to Eastern Europe at the peace negotiations.* This was fully borne out by the US proposals on the economic clauses of the peace treaties.

The USA's efforts to make the vanquished countries economically dependent on American capital were laid bare by its proposal to establish in these countries a regime of "equality of opportunity". At the very first (London) meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council the US delegation circulated a document suggesting that the peace treaties with Bulgaria and Rumania include "guarantees to Allied nationals of access, in equal terms to ... trade, raw materials and industry". The American document stated further that "similar provision should be made for equality of access to the use of ... ports, waterways, and aviation facilities."**

Acceptance of this proposal would have led to Bulgaria's and Rumania's economic enslavement by foreign capital. At the Paris meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council the Western powers made another attempt to include in all the five peace treaties the onerous terms that the Western monopolies could use as a means of seizing key economic positions

* J. Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs. 1945-1947*, New York, 1947, p. 66.

** *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1945*, Vol. II, Washington, 1967, p. 265.

in the vanquished countries. These terms were put forward under the pretext of safeguarding "free trade" and, as Byrnes put it, "to guarantee equality of opportunity in economic affairs".* The Western powers repeated their suggestions at the Peace Conference.

The Soviet Union came out in defence of the economic independence of the vanquished countries, rejecting the demands of the imperialist powers. Acting on instructions from their Government, the Soviet representatives in the Foreign Ministers Council and at the Peace Conference sharply criticised the US manoeuvres to penetrate the economy of the war-weakened vanquished states, exposed the attempts to subordinate these states to arbitrary rule by foreign monopolies and made it plain that the Soviet Union would not support the aspiration of any country to put a stranglehold on other states even if they had been on the side of the enemy.

In rejecting the USA's suggestions, the Soviet Union defended the economic independence not only of the People's Democracies but also of Italy and Finland. The Soviet delegation at the Paris Peace Conference was instructed to block any claim on Italy with regard to trade, shipping, industry and the rights of companies and individuals that was incompatible with her sovereignty. Moreover, its instructions were to disallow claims "that created obstacles to the development of Italy's civilian economy and did not spring from the task of abolishing Italy's war potential and removing the threat to security and peace".**

The Soviet Union's defence of Italy's national interests was appreciated by the Italian people and received recognition from the Italian Government. On May 6, 1946 Alcide de Gasperi, the Italian Premier and Foreign Minister, called on the Soviet Embassy in France during the Paris meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council and told the Soviet representatives: "Russia's general line is to secure respect for Italy's free national development. The Italian Government is extremely grateful to the Soviet Government for adopt-

* James F. Byrnes, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Draft of additional instructions for the Soviet delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, January 7, 1946.

ing that stand. The policy pursued by the USSR conforms to Italy's national requirements.”*

Ultimately, the USA's demand for “equality of opportunity” was reduced to a decision under which the vanquished countries were to grant all United Nations members reciprocal most favoured nation treatment in trade, industry and shipping for a term of only 18 months from the date the peace treaty entered into force.

The size of the compensation to be paid by the vanquished states for damage inflicted on foreign property in their territory was the subject of sharp debates at the Paris meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council and, especially, at the Peace Conference. The USA, Britain and France insisted on receiving full compensation for their property losses. This amounted to a considerable sum. Before the war in Rumania, for example, British and US capital had controlled over 30 per cent of the oil output, 60 per cent of the oil-refining capacities and 40 per cent of the oil exports. The demand for full compensation was thus another manifestation of the USA's and Britain's intention to seize the key positions in the economy of the vanquished states.

In principle, the Soviet Union recognised that compensation had to be paid for United Nations property lost or damaged during the war. But it insisted that this compensation should only be partial. The Soviet representatives pointed out that to make the war-ruined countries pay full compensation for foreign property would mean saddling them with a burden that was beyond their strength. In this question, as in the question of reparations, the Soviet Union suggested compensation not exceeding 25 per cent of the total damage. Although the USA and Britain continued insisting on full compensation, the Peace Conference accepted a recommendation for a 75 per cent compensation, while at the New York meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council the Soviet Union secured a reduction of the size of the compensation to 66²/₃ per cent. This facilitated post-war economic development in Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, as well as in Italy and Finland.

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Record of a conversation on May 6, 1946 between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov and the Prime Minister of Italy de Gasperi.

In the peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary the provisions concerning shipping on the Danube were of fundamental significance. The Western powers demanded the Danube's internationalisation and "equality of opportunity" with regard to shipping on that river. These demands showed that the Western powers intended to control the Danube and lay down the conditions under which the Danubian states could use that waterway.

Britain sought to restore the pre-war situation where on the basis of the Danubian Convention of 1921, dictated by the British and French imperialists, the Danube was controlled by Britain, France, Italy and Belgium, while the interests of the Danubian states were pushed into the background. At the London meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council in 1945 Bevin bluntly told the Soviet representatives that on the Danube issue he was determined to recover what Britain had lost in the war.* For its part, by putting forward the idea of "internationalising" the Danube, the USA was clearly out to join the non-Danubian powers that had formerly lorded it in the Danube basin.

In the Foreign Ministers Council and at the Peace Conference the Soviet Union persisted in its opinion that the shipping regime on the Danube was first and foremost the affair of the Danubian states themselves, among whom there were Allied states (the USSR, the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) and former allies of Germany (Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and also Austria).

Agreement on the question of the Danube was reached only after the Peace Conference—at the third meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council in New York. Due to the resolute stand adopted by the Soviet Union the Allied powers had to renounce their claims for a system of foreign domination in the Danube basin. On the recommendation of the Soviet Union only some general provisions on freedom of navigation on the Danube, equal port and navigation dues and other conditions for merchant shipping were included in the peace treaties. These provisions did not allow for any foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Danubian states. As regards the other conditions for shipping on the

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Record of a conversation on September 20, 1945 between the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin.

Danube, it was decided to work them out at a special conference with the participation of the eight above-mentioned Danubian states. This conference was held in Belgrade in the summer of 1948 and it worked out a new Danube navigation convention which took the rights and interests of the Danubian states into account.

5. The Reparations Problem

The question of reparations received considerable attention at all three meetings of the Foreign Ministers Council and at the Paris Peace Conference. That such compensation was necessary had been agreed upon at the Yalta and the Potsdam conferences. The armistice agreements specified the sums to be paid by Germany's former allies. These were not large sums and they covered only a small portion of the actual damage caused by the aggression.

The Soviet Union's principled stand on reparations was that no aggression could go unpunished, that the countries which had been a party to aggression had to bear the political and material responsibility. Subsequently, in view of the friendly relations that were established with Rumania, Hungary and Finland after the war,* and wishing to make it easier for these countries to rehabilitate their economy the USSR substantially reduced the amount of reparations due to it.

A totally different approach to the reparations issue was taken by the USA and Britain. As early as at the London meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council it was seen that in this issue as well they were departing from the decisions that had been adopted earlier jointly with the USSR and were bent on getting a reparations settlement that would help them to gain economic control of Germany's former allies.

The Western powers fiercely contested the most minimal reparations for the damage inflicted by the aggressors on the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Albania. Yet at the Paris Peace Conference the USA and Britain backed the exorbitant reparations claims of their friends and satel-

* Bulgaria had no reparations commitments to the USSR.

lites. Greece, for instance, demanded US \$2,877 million from Italy (which was almost 30 times the sum of Italy's reparations to the USSR). The Tsaldaris Government wanted to receive nearly US \$1,000 million from a small country like Bulgaria.

At the Paris meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council the USA and Britain were categorically opposed to Italy paying her reparations to the Soviet Union with deliveries of the current output of her industry. The Soviet Government publicly exposed the real motivations behind this objection: deliveries of current output in payment of reparations would have helped to promote Italy's national industry and laid a good foundation for the development of economic relations between Italy and the USSR; this was exactly what the British and United States monopolies were determined to prevent. At the Peace Conference delegations from countries of the US-British bloc—Australia, Canada, the Union of South Africa—attacked the Soviet Union's bilateral agreements on the payment of reparations in kind and tried to stop Soviet deliveries of raw materials to countries paying reparations. Moreover, an attempt was made to have the reparations paid not in kind but in US dollars or British pounds. This was clearly a move to make the countries paying reparations financially dependent on the USA and Britain.

At the Foreign Ministers Council meetings and at the Peace Conference the Soviet Union insisted on reparations terms that would not reduce the vanquished states to economic bondage or hit their civilian economy.

Due to the Soviet Union's consistent stand agreed decisions were reached after a drawn-out debate at the Paris meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council. On the question of reparations from Italy, over which there was the most bitter disagreement, France supported the Soviet proposal. The USA and Britain had to waive their objections.

The Peace Conference repelled the attempts of the USA, Australia, Canada and some other members of the Anglo-US bloc to wreck the decisions adopted earlier by the Foreign Ministers Council. In the long run the Council's recommendations on the question of reparations were endorsed by the Peace Conference.

After this all the problems linked with reparations were

finally co-ordinated by the Foreign Ministers Council at its meeting in New York. In spite of strong opposition from the USA and Britain, the Soviet Union secured the adoption of a number of decisions conforming to the interests of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania.

* * *

The peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland were signed in Paris on February 10, 1947 by the countries that had taken an active part in the war with these states, and they came into force on September 15 of the same year after their ratification by the Soviet Union, the USA, Britain and France.

Although there was an unremitting struggle, the problem of a peace settlement with nazi Germany's former allies in Europe was finally resolved on the basis of co-operation between the powers in the anti-Hitler coalition in accordance with the interests of a lasting peace in Europe and the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

History knows of many wars and hundreds of peace treaties. When peace treaties were signed justice for the vanquished was usually the least worry of the victors. After the Second World War, thanks to the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies that had emerged in Europe, the peace treaties were the first in history that really accorded with a just, democratic peace.

The peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland contained important political provisions on the total eradication of fascism in those countries, on human rights and on basic democratic liberties for all their citizens. Moreover, they contained provisions designed to prevent aggression in the future (the clauses on the punishment of war criminals, on compensation for damage caused by aggression, on limiting armaments, precluding the remilitarisation of Germany and Japan, and so on).

The territorial changes envisaged in the treaties were made with account of the national rights of the countries concerned. The question of Italy's former colonies was finally resolved in favour of their national liberation and independence.

None of the provisions in the peace treaties infringed on the political or economic independence of these states, outraged the national dignity of their peoples or were an obstruction to their peaceful development. This was the first result of the Soviet Union's energetic struggle for a peace settlement founded on principles of justice and democracy.

The imperialist powers, notably the USA and Britain, endeavoured to use the peace settlement for interfering in the internal affairs of the People's Democracies, overthrowing the people's governments, installing subservient reactionary regimes in these countries and preventing their socialist development.

They tried to get the peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland worded in such a way as to ensure their penetration of the national economies of these countries and enslave them economically. Such were the objectives of the British and US demand for "equality of opportunity" in the industry, trade and transport of the vanquished states, for full compensation for the material damage inflicted by the war, for international control of navigation on the Danube with the participation of non-Danubian states, and so on. These considerations governed the Western attitude on reparations, too.

However, all of these calculations were defeated. With active support from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and in close co-operation with Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary, the Soviet Union protected the Bulgarian, Rumanian and Hungarian, as well as the Italian and Finnish peoples against foreign interference in their internal affairs and upheld their sovereignty, economic independence and their right to choose their own way of life.

The peace settlement with Germany's former allies in Europe enabled the People's Democracies to make further headway in their progressive development and strengthen their international position.

The settlement, reached in the long run on the basis of co-operation among the leading powers of the anti-Hitler coalition, was due mainly to the efforts of the Soviet Union. This was a major post-war triumph of Soviet foreign policy.

Chapter Sixteen

FORMATION OF THE WORLD SOCIALIST SYSTEM AND THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW TYPE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

1. People's Democracy Triumphs in Central and Southeastern Europe. Co-operation Among Socialist Countries

The defeat of nazi Germany, mainstay of world reaction, was an historic victory of socialism over imperialism. It gave rise to a powerful revolutionary and national liberation movement.

Underscoring its significance, L. I. Brezhnev said on May 8, 1965: "This victory cleared the way for an upsurge of the revolutionary struggle of the working class, the unprecedented spread of the national liberation movement and the downfall of the disgraceful colonial system."

In the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe and also in China, Korea and Vietnam the people's democratic revolutions were accomplished in a complex internal and international situation and were marked by a bitter class struggle in each country and by constant imperialist interference in their internal affairs.

Directly after the war the influence of the national bourgeoisie and the foreign monopolies was still strong in the economic and political life of the People's Democracies. The bourgeoisie still held key positions in the national economy and played a considerable role in political life.

In each of the People's Democracies a sharp struggle raged between the forces of reaction and democracy over internal and external policy, chiefly over the question of whether to preserve the old social system or to advance toward socialism. With this, naturally, was connected the basic issue in foreign policy, namely, the alignment on the

international scene: alignment with the Western powers meant the preservation of the old order and subordination to US imperialism, while alignment with the Soviet Union signified free development along the road of people's democracy and socialism. Internal reaction and international imperialism bent every effort to isolate these countries from the Soviet Union and then crush the revolutionary movement in them.

In the sharp class struggle the working class of the People's Democracies, headed by the Communist parties and in close co-operation with the working peasants, overcame the fierce resistance of the exploiting classes and their political parties. The radical revolutionary changes instituted by the working class strengthened the people's power and led to the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship, and to the isolation and then the abolition of the exploiting classes and their parties.

In 1947 and 1948 the anti-fascist, anti-imperialist democratic revolutions in the People's Democracies grew into socialist revolutions. That period witnessed a number of fundamental revolutionary economic and political reforms, with the result that socialist relations of production became predominant in the national economy, the people's power was firmly established and the people's democratic system was consolidated.

The development of the People's Democracies and the strengthening of socialism's economic and political positions were to a huge extent facilitated by fraternal assistance from the USSR. With the further expansion of economic, cultural and political co-operation between them, the USSR and the People's Democracies united in a close-knit socialist community. New, socialist government-to-government relations founded on socialist internationalism, solidarity, political, military, economic and cultural co-operation and fraternal mutual assistance gradually took shape and were improved in the course of their joint struggle to safeguard their revolutionary gains against the concerted onslaught of internal and international reaction.

Even before the world socialist system was formed the international communist movement had some experience of government-to-government relations of a socialist type: between the Soviet republics prior to their union in the USSR

in 1922, between Soviet Russia and the Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919, between the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic over a period of many years, between the Soviet Union and the Soviet regions formed in China in the course of the Chinese revolution, and relations of fraternal solidarity with Republican Spain during the Spanish people's armed struggle against the counter-revolution and the Italian and German fascist intervention. A large contribution to the further development of the new international relations was made by the fighting alliance between the Soviet people and the enslaved peoples against nazi Germany and imperialist Japan. Polish and Czechoslovak combat units that fought shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Army were formed in the USSR, while partisan detachments consisting of men of different nationalities fought behind the enemy lines.

The rise of the fundamentally new relations between the USSR and the People's Democracies was largely due to the internal political situation and the alignment of political forces in the People's Democracies. As the revolution in these countries unfolded in width and depth, the exploiting classes were isolated and then abolished and a solid economic and political foundation was created for the establishment and promotion of the new, socialist relations.

The countries that broke away from capitalism had to overcome enormous difficulties, particularly in the initial period. These difficulties were mainly due to the fact that in the past their economic development level was in most cases medium or even low. The economy of the majority of these countries played the role of an agrarian and raw material adjunct to the economy of the industrialised capitalist states. Besides, it had been severely hit by the war. The difficulties were compounded by the subversive activities of imperialism, which made desperate efforts to prevent these countries in Central and Southeastern Europe from taking the road of socialism, further complicate their economic position and slow down the restoration and development of their national economy.

Difficulties arose also in surmounting nationalistic prejudices. The Communist and Workers' parties of the People's Democracies pursued a policy of uprooting the enmity that had been fostered between nations by the exploiting classes

for many centuries and distrust—a heritage of numerous long-standing national conflicts. It takes many years of patient work by the Marxist-Leninist parties to overcome this heritage, particularly bourgeois nationalism. “We,” Lenin wrote, “want a *voluntary* union of nations—a union which precludes any coercion of one nation by another—a union founded on complete confidence, on a clear recognition of brotherly unity, on absolutely voluntary consent. Such a union cannot be effected at one stroke; we have to work towards it with the greatest patience and circumspection, so as not to spoil matters and not to arouse distrust, and so that the distrust inherited from centuries of land-owner and capitalist oppression, centuries of private property and the enmity caused by its divisions and redivisions may have a chance to wear off.”*

2. Treaties of Friendship and Mutual Assistance Between the USSR and the People's Democracies and Their Significance. Socialism Develops into a World System

One of the principal factors discouraging world imperialism from military adventures against the People's Democracies lay in the treaties of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance signed by the USSR with these countries. It would be hard to overestimate the significance of these treaties in promoting fraternal friendship between the peoples of the socialist countries and ensuring their security and economic and political independence.

The treaties were concluded under various historical conditions. With Czechoslovakia (December 12, 1943) and Poland (April 21, 1945) treaties of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance were signed during the Second World War. Naturally, in these treaties the accent was on mutual military assistance in the war with nazi Germany. They also provided for joint action after the war to eliminate any threat of a repetition of aggression by Germany or any coun-

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 293.

try that would unite with her in acts of direct or other aggression. Moreover, these treaties envisaged increasingly closer economic, political and cultural co-operation. They were thus acts of immense international significance and consolidated the allied relations and deep friendship between the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland. On April 11, 1945, while the war was still raging, a treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and post-war co-operation was concluded by the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

After the war the Soviet Union signed treaties of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance with Rumania (February 4, 1948), Hungary (February 18, 1948) and Bulgaria (March 18, 1948), and an agreement with Albania on the supply of Soviet equipment and raw materials on credit (April 10, 1949).

The texts of these treaties were determined by the international situation soon after the termination of the Second World War, when ominous signs of German imperialism's resurgence were beginning to loom large and when, having proclaimed a frankly expansionist foreign policy, the USA and the other imperialist powers started preparations for a war against the USSR and the People's Democracies.

In view of the stern lessons of the Second World War and taking the post-war international situation into account, these treaties contained a clause, as for example, the treaty between the USSR and Hungary, stating that the signatories pledged "to undertake jointly all the measures in their power to avert any threat of a repetition of aggression by Germany or by any other state that associates itself with Germany directly or in any other form".* The treaties made provision for the participation of its signatories in all international actions aimed at ensuring peace and security. In the event one of the signatories became involved in war with Germany or any other state associated with her in a policy of aggression, the other signatory pledged its immediate military and other assistance. These treaties were thus directed entirely against the possibility of further aggression by German imperialism, which had on several occasions in the past chosen to attack countries of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe.

* *Uneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1948*, Part I, pp. 127-30.

The signatories of these treaties undertook not to join alliances or coalitions or take any action or steps directed against the other party. They undertook to consult each other on all important international issues affecting their interests and to act in a spirit of friendship and co-operation in promoting their economic and cultural relations on the basis of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. In the period between 1947 and 1949 treaties of friendship, mutual assistance and co-operation were signed between the People's Democracies themselves.*

This broad system of equal and friendly government-to-government treaty relations in the socialist community ushered in a considerable deepening of co-operation among the member states and helped to enhance the might and international role of the socialist community as a whole. A feature characterising all the treaties of friendship and mutual assistance between the countries of the socialist community is that their object is to ensure lasting peace and international security and prevent any recurrence of German aggression. This is what fundamentally distinguishes them from the pacts concluded between the USA and its imperialist partners with the aim of forming aggressive blocs for the purpose of preparing another war against the USSR and the other socialist states.

The treaties of friendship and mutual assistance between the USSR and the People's Democracies and also between the People's Democracies themselves provide the international legal foundation for the socialist community's system of collective security. The defensive treaties between the socialist countries are an important factor strengthening peace and preventing imperialism from carrying out its plans of aggression. The close political co-operation between the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies is founded on a

* Between Poland and Czechoslovakia (March 10, 1947); Albania and Bulgaria (December 16, 1947); Bulgaria and Rumania (January 16, 1948); Hungary and Rumania (January 24, 1948); Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia (April 23, 1948); Bulgaria and Poland (May 29, 1948); Hungary and Poland (June 18, 1948); Bulgaria and Hungary (July 16, 1948); Rumania and Czechoslovakia (July 21, 1948); Poland and Rumania (January 26, 1949); and Hungary and Czechoslovakia (April 16, 1949).

uniform social system and on its joint defence (which constitutes the internationalist duty of the socialist states), on the common aim of building the new society and on a sincere and profound interest in defending the socialist system and maintaining lasting peace.

In 1949 there were new epochal developments that fostered a further change of the world balance of political strength in favour of socialism. The people's revolution triumphed in China in October 1949. The proclamation of the People's Republic of China was another staggering blow to world imperialism and its colonial system and one more victory of socialism. The triumph of the people's revolution in China considerably widened the boundaries of the socialist community and created new conditions for the further unfolding of the national liberation movement of the Eastern peoples.

This victory of the Chinese people, as the victories of the peoples of the European People's Democracies, was made possible chiefly by the Great October Socialist Revolution, by the existence of and constant assistance from the Soviet Union. It was made possible by the defeat of nazi Germany and militarist Japan. This was acknowledged and stressed by the leaders of the PRC at the time. Mao Tse-tung wrote that "if the Soviet Union had not existed, if there had been no victory in the anti-fascist Second World War, if Japanese imperialism had not been defeated, if the People's Democracies had not come into being ... the international reactionary forces bearing down upon us would certainly be many times greater than now. In such circumstances, could we have won victory? Obviously not".* The treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance signed by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in February 1950 was a major contribution towards peace and security in the Far East and the rest of the world.

Article 1 of that treaty states: "The two Contracting Parties undertake to carry out jointly all necessary measures within their power to prevent a repetition of aggression and breach of the peace by Japan or any other state which might directly or indirectly join with Japan in acts of aggression."** They pledged that in the event Japan or states allied

* Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, Peking, 1961, p. 416.

** *Uneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza. 1950*, Moscow, 1953, p. 59.

with her attacked one of them, the other would immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal. The two countries undertook to enter into no alliance or to participate in no coalition, action or measure directed against any one of them.

Article 5 states that the USSR and China "undertake, in a spirit of friendship and co-operation and in accordance with the principles of equal rights, mutual interests, mutual respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-interference in the domestic affairs of the other party, to develop and strengthen the economic and cultural ties between the Soviet Union and China, to render each other all possible economic assistance and to effect the necessary economic co-operation".* The Soviet-Chinese Treaty became an important instrument guaranteeing China's security and a powerful barrier to US imperialism's plans of aggression.

Another extremely important development was the emergence of other people's democratic states in Asia: the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The proclamation of the KPDR (September 1948) was preceded by far-reaching reforms in North Korea, where in keeping with the inter-Allied agreements following the defeat of militarist Japan, Soviet troops had been stationed and prevented foreign interference in the affairs of the Korean people. In North Korea the democratic, patriotic forces of the Korean people were able to act without hindrance. They put into effect an agrarian reform that abolished the system of semi-feudal exploitation and nationalised the industrial enterprises belonging to Japanese capitalists and Korean renegades.

The struggle of the patriotic forces in Vietnam and the swift growth of their liberation movement led, after the expulsion of the Japanese invaders, to a nation-wide armed uprising which placed the power in the hands of the people and brought the Democratic Republic of Vietnam into existence (September 1945). Both the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Korean People's Democratic Republic became members of the socialist community.

* *Uncshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza. 1950, Moscow, 1953, p. 60.*

An event of immense historic significance was the formation in October 1949 of the German Democratic Republic, the first workers' and peasants' state in the history of the German people. The establishment of the people's democratic system in the eastern part of Germany substantially reduced the resources of German imperialism and militarism. As soon as it was proclaimed the GDR began to develop as a people's democratic state and then took the road of socialism. Militarism and imperialism were rooted out in it. From the very beginning it established fraternal relations with the socialist states. The German Democratic Republic is the western outpost of socialism in Europe, where it directly confronts the revanchist-militarist forces in Western Germany.

The world socialist system thus came into being at the close of the 1940s.

That system's emergence was a complex process. The countries that formed it had substantially different levels of economic, cultural and political development. At the time the world socialist system took shape some of its members (the European People's Democracies) had socialist relations of production and a proletarian dictatorship, while others (the Asian states) were still at the initial stage of the people's democratic revolution. They embarked on democratic development directly after their liberation from colonial or semi-colonial oppression. There were many other factors that hindered the building of socialism in the People's Democracies. Chiefly these were various survivals of the past and nationalism, which in some countries had penetrated even the ranks of the Communists.

The emergence of the world socialist system was the most noteworthy event in world history after the Great October Socialist Revolution. Its formation was the result of a long stage of social development started by the October Revolution, and it marked a significant advance along the road of progress, which Lenin had foretold, namely, the conversion of the dictatorship of the proletariat from a national into an international factor capable of decisively influencing world policy.*

* See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 148.

3. Economic Co-operation Between the USSR and the European People's Democracies. Formation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

In most of the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe, where people's democratic revolutions were accomplished, the people's power inherited a grim economic legacy. The long domination of the foreign monopolies, the nazi occupation and the hostilities had dislocated their national economy. In fact, fascism and the war had brought some of them to the brink of economic catastrophe. In Rumania the volume of industrial output in early 1947 was only 48 per cent of the 1938 level. After the war industrial production in Bulgaria was 64 per cent of the pre-war level, while farm output was about 70 per cent of that level. In Poland the war and the occupation had reduced the national wealth by 38 per cent, destroyed over 70 per cent of the factories, shattered the productive forces and caused a sharp decline of the living standard even in comparison with the low pre-war level. In 1945 Hungary's production capacities were only 60 per cent and her industrial output only one-third of the 1938 level. Colossal damage had been inflicted on the national economy in Yugoslavia. In all these countries there were acute food shortages.

The Communist and Workers' parties of the People's Democracies set down to remedying this situation. From the very outset the People's Democracies could rely on all-sided Soviet assistance in rehabilitating and developing their economy. Immediately after their liberation, despite its own post-war economic difficulties, the Soviet Union rendered these countries immense material assistance without which they could not have normalised their economic life and restored their war-ravaged national economy.

Soviet economic assistance played a key role not only in helping the People's Democracies to overcome their post-war difficulties; it was of immense significance in safeguarding their economic and, consequently, national independence and enabled them to build the new, socialist society. While overcoming the economic dislocation with Soviet assistance, the peoples of Eastern and Southeastern Europe successfully

repelled the economic expansion of US imperialism. They rejected the notorious Marshall Plan, which was used as a means of subordinating many West European countries economically and politically to the interests of the US monopolies. Besides, in some of the People's Democracies the working people had to overcome the resistance of bourgeois elements, who were eager to accept Marshall Plan aid.

Vivid testimony of the fraternal assistance extended by the Soviet Union to the People's Democracies during that initial period of their existence is provided by the first trade agreements and the accompanying Soviet deliveries of raw materials, equipment and food.

For instance, the first trade agreement between the USSR and Bulgaria was signed as early as March 14, 1945. It stated that both sides regarded it as the "first stage in the promotion of economic relations between their countries under the new conditions and will draw up a programme of measures aimed at achieving fuller economic co-operation".* On December 15 of the same year an agreement was signed under which the USSR supplied Bulgaria with 30,000 tons of corn and 20,000 tons of wheat. The growing food shortage made Bulgaria ask the USSR for additional deliveries of grain. On April 5, 1946 Kimon Georgiev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria, wrote to J. V. Stalin, head of the Soviet Government, stating that although the assistance that had been rendered "had considerably lightened our glaring requirements in food and fodder", it "will not be possible to feed the population during the next four months—a period of intensive labour effort—without more supplies of grain". Georgiev asked for an additional quantity of 40,000 tons of wheat.** Already on April 15, 1946, the Soviet Foreign Ministry informed the Bulgarian Government of the Soviet Government's decision to supply this wheat in the course of three or four months.***

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*. Trade agreement of March 14, 1945 between the USSR and Bulgaria.

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Letter of April, 5, 1946 from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria Kimon Georgiev to J. V. Stalin.

*** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Telegram of April 15, 1946 from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the Bulgarian Government.

A new trade agreement envisaging a 150 per cent increase of exports from the Soviet Union over the deliveries under the 1945 agreement was signed in Moscow by the USSR and Bulgaria on April 27, 1946.* In the period from 1945 to 1947 Bulgaria received from the Soviet Union 229,000 tons of oil products, including lubricants, 217,000 tons of metal and metal articles, 33,000 tons of cotton, 72,000 sets of automobile tyres, 2,020 trucks and tractors, and a large number of self-propelled combine harvesters and other farm machines, railway carriages, spare parts and other items.

In 1945 the Soviet Union supplied Rumania with 300,000 tons of wheat on credit.** In the following year, when the crop in Rumania failed again the Soviet Union gave that country 50,000 tons of wheat in exchange for oil products, and a further 80,000 tons of wheat under an agreement signed on June 25, 1947.***

On June 27, 1947 the Rumanian Prime Minister Petru Groza said: "The years of drought put us in a difficult situation. We had to pay in gold in order to get corn from the West. The terms forced on us were onerous, and in spite of that we got very little corn. Once more we had to knock on the door of our friends in the East. We know that they had a drought. Nevertheless last year they loaned us 30,000 carriage-loads of grain, which they delivered to our doorstep without asking for any guarantees or demanding gold. We have not been able to repay that debt. In spite of that, we again appealed to our friends, and they understood us and are again helping us."****

Reciprocal deliveries of goods between the USSR and Czechoslovakia were included in the volume and nomenclature envisaged in the agreement of April 12, 1946.***** On the same day a protocol was signed on emergency deliveries of grain to the Czechoslovak Republic (to be repaid with deliveries of goods from Czechoslovakia for the correspond-

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Trade agreement of April 26, 1946 between the USSR and Bulgaria.

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Annual report of the USSR Embassy in Rumania for 1947.

*** *Ibid.*

**** *Ibid.*

***** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Agreement of April 12, 1946 on reciprocal deliveries of goods between the USSR and Czechoslovakia,

ing sum in the course of 1946). At the Soviet-Czechoslovak talks in Moscow in mid-July 1947 agreement was reached on reciprocal deliveries for a term of five years.* Great quantities of food were supplied to the German people by the Soviet Army following the liberation of East Germany and Berlin.

In those years besides supplying them with food the Soviet Union rendered the People's Democracies the most diverse assistance, including financial aid. For example, under the agreement of December 14, 1948 Czechoslovakia received from the USSR a loan (in gold bars) amounting to 132,500,000 rubles at an annual interest rate of 2.5 per cent.**

Economic relations between the USSR and the People's Democracies were fostered by treaties on trade and navigation and other bilateral long-term agreements. A trade and navigation treaty providing for the utmost strengthening of economic relations was signed in Moscow on February 20, 1947 by the USSR and Rumania. Under that treaty the two countries undertook to "accord each other unconditional and unlimited most favoured nation treatment with regard to all issues concerning trade between them and navigation and also with regard to industry and other forms of economic activity on their territories".*** Similar treaties were signed by the Soviet Union with other socialist countries: Hungary (July 15, 1947), Czechoslovakia (December 11, 1947) and Bulgaria (April 1, 1948). Article 1 of the Soviet-Bulgarian treaty stated that the governments of the two countries would "from time to time sign agreements determining the volume and nomenclature of reciprocal deliveries of goods both for one-year and longer periods, and also stipulating other conditions ensuring uninterrupted and growing trade between them in accordance with the requirements of each country's developing national economy".**** On January 26,

* Klement Gottwald, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1947, pp. 164-66 (in Russian).

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Agreement of December 14, 1948 between the USSR and Czechoslovakia on reciprocal deliveries of goods.

*** *Uneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza. 1947*, Part I, Moscow, 1952, p. 361.

**** *Uneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza. 1948*, Part II, Moscow, 1950, p. 165.

1948 the USSR and the Polish People's Republic signed an agreement on reciprocal goods deliveries valued at over US \$1,000 million for the period 1948-1952. Moreover, an agreement was signed on the delivery to Poland of industrial plant on credit in the course of 1948-1956.

The trade and economic agreements concluded by the USSR with the People's Democracies in 1947-1950 were an expression of the new economic relations that were taking shape between socialist states. They showed the USSR's desire to help these countries restore their national economy. Mutually beneficial economic relations expanded between the USSR and the People's Democracies during the fulfilment of these agreements, and trade grew swiftly among the People's Democracies themselves. At the close of 1950 the USSR went over to long-term economic agreements with them. For instance, a five-year agreement for 1951-1955 was signed with Czechoslovakia in November 1950, and a four-year agreement for 1952-1955 was signed with the GDR in November 1951. Long-term agreements were signed with Rumania and Albania in 1951 and with Hungary in January 1952.

Soviet assistance and the economic co-operation that was instituted by that time between the People's Democracies themselves made a large contribution towards the successful fulfilment of the two- and three-year plans of economic rehabilitation in these countries and to the transition to long-term planning. This created a solid foundation for the further promotion of economic co-operation and the appearance of new forms of economic relations between socialist countries.

There were many difficulties on this road as well, chiefly on account of the terrible destruction caused by the war and also because the economy of almost all the People's Democracies had been oriented on the West and, at the first stage, it naturally retained the imprint of its subordination to the interests of the capitalist monopolies. That stage witnessed the transition from the old, capitalist pattern of foreign trade to the creation of new, socialist economic relations.

At that time the economic relations between the socialist countries developed chiefly on a bilateral basis. The new forms of co-operation and the world socialist market were as yet only appearing.

A large part was played by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in establishing broad economic co-operation among the socialist countries. It was set up by a decision adopted by representatives of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia at an economic conference held in Moscow on January 5-8, 1949. The decision stated that the co-ordination of the economic policy of the People's Democracies and the Soviet Union demanded a transition from bilateral to multilateral relations and the establishment of an appropriate agency to co-ordinate activity in this sphere. It declared that the "Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is an open organisation which may be joined by other European countries accepting its principles and desiring to take part in broad economic co-operation with the above-mentioned countries".* CMEA was joined by Albania in February of the same year, by the GDR in September 1950 and by the Mongolian People's Republic in June 1962.

The founding of CMEA marked the beginning of broad multilateral economic co-operation among the socialist countries.

4. Birth and Development of a New Type of International Relations

The new, socialist international relations in the socialist community were steadily consolidated. They differ fundamentally from the relations predominant in the capitalist world. "The world socialist system is *a new type of economic and political relationship between countries*," states the Programme of the CPSU.**

"The essential nature of international relations under capitalism," Lenin wrote, boils down to "open robbery of the weaker."*** In the capitalist world the relations among states are governed by the economic and political domina-

* *Uneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza. 1949*, Moscow, 1953, pp. 44-45.

** *The Road to Communism*, p. 465.

*** V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, p. 189.

tion of the weak by the strong, by the enslavement of small countries and peoples. In the international political practice of imperialism the general democratic provisions of international law enacted in the period of the bourgeois revolutions, such as the equality of states and respect for their territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty, have been reduced to a fiction. They are recognised by the bourgeoisie only in words and are used solely as a cover for its policy of conquest.

Socialism has brought into being totally different relations between peoples and states. In determining the basic content of socialism's international policy, Lenin pointed out that "the Bolsheviks are establishing completely different international relations which make it possible for all oppressed peoples to rid themselves of the imperialist yoke".* Whereas the relations of the socialist countries with states of the capitalist system are founded on the principles of peaceful coexistence, the relations within the world socialist community are guided by the principles of socialist internationalism. These relations are not confined to the maintenance of peace and equal co-operation. They provide for extensive mutual assistance. Essentially, they are predicated on the nature of the social system in the USSR and other socialist countries, a system founded on public ownership of the means of production, a system ruling out exploitation of man by man. "To really unite," Marx wrote, "peoples must have common interests. To enable them to have common interests the existing property relations must be destroyed for these relations create the conditions for the exploitation of nations by nations.... The victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie signifies, at the same time, an end to all national industrial conflicts that today generate hostility between peoples".**

The unity and solidarity of the Soviet and other peoples of the socialist community are determined by the uniformity of their socio-economic system, common ideology (Marxism-Leninism), common interests in safeguarding their revolutionary socialist achievements and national independence

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 477.

** K. Marx, F. Engels, *Werke*, Bd. 4, Berlin, 1964, p. 416.

against imperialist reaction, and their common great purpose of building socialism and communism. This creates the objective foundation for lasting friendly interstate relations in the socialist community and for joint efforts in building socialism and communism and resisting imperialism and its policies, and forms the basis for concerted action in championing the international interests of all the countries belonging to the socialist community. United action by the socialist countries in foreign policy is a vital factor in preserving peace and ensuring the progressive development of all mankind.

Co-operation among the socialist countries in foreign policy issues developed and improved with the advance of the People's Democracies along the road of socialism.

The foreign policy of the socialist countries has been marked by close co-operation on the international scene, by joint, co-ordinated action to avert war and safeguard world peace, by an unflagging struggle for disarmament and world-wide recognition of the principles of peaceful coexistence, by support for the national liberation movement aimed at abolishing the colonial system, and by joint action against all the military adventures of the USA and other imperialist powers.

The formation of the world socialist system widened the framework of international relations. In the old world the concept "international relations" is the equivalent of the concept "interstate relations". It only embraces the system of relations between governments and their agencies. In the case of socialist international relations, they cannot be reduced solely to relations between states; they embrace all aspects of the life of the peoples. The working people themselves—workers, peasants and working intellectuals of all the socialist countries—take a direct and active part in strengthening the socialist community and, consequently, in implementing the principles of socialist interstate relations. In promoting co-operation in the socialist community, a key role is played by fraternal relations among the Communist and Workers' parties, which adhere to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and by friendly relations between mass public organisations.

As the ruling parties, the Marxist-Leninist Communist and Workers' parties of the socialist countries chart the

foreign policy of their countries on the basis of a scientific Marxist analysis of developments. They attach paramount significance to solidarity among the socialist countries. Their work among all strata of the population is aimed at eradicating survivals of nationalism, chauvinism and all manifestations of national narrowness, and at removing all the tensions hindering the successful development of genuinely socialist relations between nations. Nationalism, which penetrated the Communist parties of China and some other countries, was the cause of the difficulties that subsequently arose in the relations of these countries with the other socialist states.

* *

The victory of the people's democratic revolutions in some European and Asian countries and the breakaway of these countries from the capitalist system created the economic and political conditions for the establishment of a world socialist system. The development of the socialist revolution in the People's Democracies was accompanied by the broadening of economic, political and cultural co-operation between these countries and the Soviet Union.

The formation of the world socialist system ushered in a radical change in international relations and swung the balance of class and political strength on the international scene decisively in favour of socialism. The socialist countries began to exercise a growing influence on international developments.

Moreover, the formation of the world socialist system was accompanied by the emergence of a new type of international relations, which wholly conforms to the very nature of socialism. The relations of friendship and mutual assistance between the socialist countries help their peoples to carry out their national tasks in the building of socialism and communism and make it possible to strengthen the might of the socialist community as a whole. These relations expedite the attainment of the common objective of the peoples of the socialist countries, namely, the building of a communist society.

Socialist international relations spell out not only peace and genuine equality but also fraternal mutual assistance

between the free and sovereign peoples of the socialist community, and they soon gave rise to the idea of socialist integration. These relations are the prototype of the relations that will be established in future between all the peoples and countries of the world.

Chapter Seventeen

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE GERMAN QUESTION DURING THE INITIAL POST-WAR YEARS (1945-1949)

The Soviet people's victory over German fascism opened up a realistic possibility for setting up a system of collective security under which the world would be freed of the fear of war. The attainment of this aim necessitated the settlement of one of the most complex international issues, namely, Germany's reorganisation along democratic, peaceful lines and the prevention of a resurgence of a German military potential capable of threatening peace in Europe and the world. This was one of the cardinal objectives of Soviet foreign policy by which the Soviet Government was guided in working out Allied decisions and implementing practical measures in Germany.

The new Germany could not emerge suddenly. It was not a matter of simply recasting state institutions or reshuffling individual leaders in the club of the former ruling élite. Immense work had to be conducted to uproot German militarism and nazism, extirpate their social foundation, remove their exponents from state institutions, the economy and the social sphere and remould the way of thinking.

Germany had to compensate as much as possible for the destruction and losses she had inflicted on the Soviet Union, Poland, France, Yugoslavia and other countries. The war criminals and those who helped to plan or carry out the nazi programmes that opened the door to brutality and crime had to be made to answer for their deeds. The German people, on whose behalf and with whose participation nazism

committed its crimes, had to bear the responsibility for the consequences of these crimes. At the same time, the Germans were given the possibility of beginning a new chapter of their history, a chapter free of aggression and war, of attempts to achieve domination over other peoples and countries and violate their interests and rights.

Germany's economy and her system of political power, justice and education had to be overhauled, democratic liberties restored and Germany prepared for peaceful co-operation in international life.

Had Germany the forces capable of making a resolute break with her criminal past and leading her along the road of peace and friendship with other nations? She undoubtedly had. They were, in the first instance, the advanced workers. In the struggle against the Hitler regime the Communist Party of Germany had lost tens of thousands of its members but it emerged unvanquished from that struggle. The stern experience of nazi persecution and prison forced many Social-Democrats and also bourgeois and intellectual circles to make a sober evaluation of the events of the past few decades, which had plunged Germany into national catastrophe. The right to speak on behalf of Germany belonged, more than to anybody else, to the German working people, who had paid a ghastly price for the adventurism and greed of their rulers.

Such was the situation in Germany. The principles proclaimed in the Potsdam and other Four-Power agreements had to be given effect in the policies and actions of the USSR, the USA, Britain and France and their military administration in Germany.

1. Democratic Reforms in East Germany

The Soviet people and Government had never identified the people of Germany with the fascist clique that ruled that country. The Soviet Union fought to destroy the nazi army, the nazi government and the nazi state. Guided by Leninist foreign policy principles, the Soviet Government and its representatives acted as friends of the German working class and supported all the patriotic, progressive forces in Germany. The Soviet military authorities appealed to the

German population to join actively in remaking their life. They gave the utmost encouragement to the people's participation in considering and deciding questions linked with political and economic development.

In the statute covering the organisation of the Military Administration in the Soviet occupation zone in Germany, approved by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on June 6, 1945, it is stated that its (the Military Administration's) "task is to control the fulfilment by Germany of the terms of unconditional surrender, administer the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany and put into effect the agreed decisions of the Control Council on the principal military, political, economic and other questions common to the whole of Germany".*

Operating within the framework of these strictly defined powers, the Soviet Military Administration in Germany undeviatingly observed the German people's right to self-determination. In the Soviet zone the Germans were accorded the right to decide for themselves what social system should exist in Germany. As the historian S. Doernberg, of the German Democratic Republic, rightly points out, the Soviet Military Administration "took no steps whatever to change the socio-economic system, holding that that was the internal affair of the German people. All the laws and instructions, which penetrated deep into the existing social practices and formed an important part of the anti-fascist, democratic, revolutionary changes (land reform, expropriation of the property of war criminals and active nazis, the creation of a public sector, the democratic school reform, and so forth) were therefore not only carried out but drawn up and adopted by the democratic, patriotic forces of the German people and by the parliamentary, state and administrative organs set up by them".**

Permission to form political parties and trade unions was given in East Germany earlier than in the other zones of occupation. The Communist Party of Germany, the Social-

* Decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of June 6, 1945, published in *Za antifashistskuyu demokraticeskuyu Germaniyu, Sbornik dokumentov 1945-1949*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 65-67.

** S. Doernberg, "The Soviet Military Administration in Germany (1945-1949)", *Voyenno-istorichesky zhurnal* No. 8, 1966, p. 8.

Democratic Party of Germany, the Christian Democratic Union, the Liberal Democratic Party and the Association of Free German Trade Unions began functioning in the Soviet zone in June 1945. These parties co-operated closely in the anti-fascist bloc established by them. Together with the Trade Union Association, this bloc played a large role in democratising socio-political life in the Soviet zone, restoring the civilian economy and setting up local self-administration and a system of social insurance.

A major development was the merging in April 1946 of the CPG and the SDPG in the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. This ended the split in the German working-class movement, which Germany's reactionary circles had time and again utilised for their own ends.

Local self-administration bodies were formed in all the towns and villages of East Germany by mid-1945, and six months after Germany's surrender the Länder administrations also began to function in that zone with the right to promulgate instructions that had the strength of law.

Elections to community, district and Länder assemblies of people's representatives were held in East Germany in September-October 1946. These were equal, direct elections by secret ballot and were conducted under the proportionate representation system traditional in Germany. In the elections to the district and Länder assemblies the SUPG polled 47.8 per cent of the votes, the CDU 26.5 per cent and the LDP 22.7 per cent. These elections thus ended in victory for the anti-fascist parties, notably for the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, which headed the progressive forces of the German people against the intrigues of external and internal reaction.

An agrarian reform was enforced in the Soviet occupation zone in the period from 1945 to 1948. In the countryside of East Germany the reform put an end to domination by the reactionary Junkers, who had long been among the chief proponents of militarism. This reform was a major achievement not only of the German peasants but of all the working people. It was initiated by the Communist Party of Germany with the vigorous support of other parties and organisations.

The land was distributed by special commissions elected by secret ballot at meetings of rural workers, land-hungry

peasants, resettlers and small tenants. These were democratic commissions in which over 51,000 persons participated.* Nearly 290,000 new peasant households were formed, and land was received by over 530,000 households.** Over 30 per cent of all the land passed through the reform fund. The reform fundamentally changed the appearance of the German countryside, marked a turning point in the development of the German peasantry and drew it into active participation in political life in East Germany.

In compliance with the demand of the Free German Trade Unions and the democratic political parties, and with the will of the overwhelming majority of the population the property of war criminals and active nazis in East Germany was turned over to the self-administration bodies. The factories of the I. G. Farbenindustrie, Hermann Goering, AEG, Siemens, Flick and other concerns were made the property of the people. That ended monopoly rule in East Germany once and for all.

In the Soviet zone the German armed forces were disbanded and the war factories, military installations, munition dumps and so forth were dismantled in accordance with the Potsdam Agreements. In January 1947 a Four-Power commission, acting on instructions from the Control Council, conducted an inspection and confirmed that the Soviet occupation authorities had scrupulously discharged their commitments under the Potsdam Agreements. In the reports of the commanders-in-chief of the four zones to the Control Council on the state of affairs on December 1, 1947 it was noted that for all practical purposes the dismantling of German military installations and the destruction of materials had been completed in the Soviet zone.***

The Soviet Union pursued a consistent policy of uprooting fascism in all its forms and manifestations. In its denazification activities the Soviet Military Administration relied on the assistance of the German working people and their political and public organisations. In Saxony, for example,

* *Die Bodenreform in Deutschland*, Berlin, 1947, p. 19.

** *3 Jahre Bodenreform in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone*, Berlin, 1948, p. 18.

*** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Document C/II/47/49-50 of December 31, 1947 of the Joint Military Directorate of the Control Council in Germany.

an opinion poll was taken on a draft law providing for the punishment of war criminals and active nazis and the eradication of the influence of the nazis. In this poll 2,683,401 persons (77.7 per cent) declared themselves in favour of the draft law and 571,600 persons (16.5 per cent) said they were against it. With the people's assistance many leading nazi war criminals were found and tried and a purge was conducted in the police, the press, the judiciary and the organs of self-administration and education. After it had carried out its task, the denazification commission in the Soviet zone was disbanded on March 10, 1948.

The economic and political changes effectuated by the Soviet Military Administration and the German self-administration organisations remoulded East Germany, turning it from the seat of Junkerdom to a champion of the democratic renewal of the German nation.

2. Burial of the Lessons of History in the Western Occupation Zones

As in East Germany, the demarcation of social forces proceeded in the Western zones in the initial period after the war. That period witnessed the rapid growth of the prestige and numerical strength of the anti-fascist parties and organisations, notably of the Communist Party, which had rendered immense services to the people in the struggle against the Hitler regime. On the other hand, the politicians who had compromised themselves by their collaboration with the Hitler regime feared to come out into the open and their influence steadily waned. The democratic reforms in the Soviet zone had a tremendous impact on public opinion in West Germany. These processes frightened the governments of the USA, Britain and France and they did their utmost to direct development into a channel that suited their aims.

In 1946 the Landtag of Hessen (US zone), which had before it the example of democratic reforms in the Soviet zone, included in its draft Land Constitution an article on the nationalisation of the mining and metallurgical enterprises, the power stations and the railways and on the transfer of the large banks and insurance companies to state

control or management. The US occupation authorities ordered the removal of this article from the draft. When the Hessen Government acted in accordance with the public mind and refused to make this concession, General Lucius D. Clay (appointed US commander-in-chief in 1947) demanded a plebiscite on the article of the Constitution providing for the nationalisation of some enterprises. The plebiscite did not justify the General's hopes: 70 per cent of the Hessen electorate declared themselves in favour of retaining that article in the Constitution. Nonetheless the US administration prevented it from coming into force.*

This was not the only arbitrary action of the US administration. The Truman Government in the US and the Labour Government that replaced the Churchill Cabinet in Britain vetoed the law on the nationalisation of the heavy industry and on the alienation of the property of reactionary industrial magnates that was passed on August 6, 1948 by the Landtag of North Rhine-Westphalia in accordance with the will of the electorate of that large industrial region of West Germany.**

The USA, Britain and France prevented the enforcement of a land reform in West Germany that would have conformed to the demands of the working peasantry. The Potsdam decisions on the outlawing of all forms of militarist activity and organisations were not fulfilled. As a rule the Western powers shelved all decisions of a progressive nature for which they had voted in the Control Council on the insistence of the Soviet Union and under pressure from German democratic opinion.

For example, decartelisation was cut short in the Western occupation zones. The laws promulgated on that issue in those zones formally reiterated the Potsdam decisions but made no provision for concrete steps towards their implementation. The Ferguson Committee, appointed by the US Secretary of the Army to study progress of the decartelisation programme in West Germany, noted in its report of

* *Weissbuch über die amerikanisch-englische Interventionspolitik in Westdeutschland und das Wiedererstehen des deutschen Imperialismus*, Leipzig, 1951, p. 71.

** *Ibid.*, The Ruhr industrial region is part of North Rhine-Westphalia.

April 15, 1949 that not a single one of the giant German cartels had been touched by the US occupation authorities.*

In the Western zones denazification was turned into an ignoble farce. The vast majority of active nazis and officials of the nazi regime were not brought to book and those that were tried got off with a nominal fine or a short term of imprisonment. Many prominent nazis and nazi industrialists were cleared by denazification tribunals and retained their posts in industry and in the judiciary and the police. This was not surprising in view of the fact that in the German denazification tribunals in the US zone 60 per cent of the judges and 76 per cent of the prosecutors had themselves been members of the nazi party. Besides, as was admitted by General Clay, who was deputy to the US commander-in-chief at the time, the denazification law in the US zone was largely slanted in such a way as to return as many people as possible to their former posts rather than to punish the guilty.**

Matters were no better in the British occupation zone, where most of the nazi officials, judges and teachers remained in their former posts. In their occupation zones the Western powers thus wrecked the fulfilment of one of the main points of the Potsdam Agreements.

At sittings of the Control Council and at the meetings of the Foreign Ministers Council the Soviet Union had constantly to draw attention to facts showing that the governments of the USA, Britain and France were subverting the demilitarisation measures in West Germany. For example, at a sitting of the Control Council on November 26, 1945 the Soviet representative read a memorandum stating that in the British zone an army group (Nord) numbering over 100,000 men had been formed of units of the nazi Wehrmacht and that in Schleswig-Holstein nearly a million German officers and men had not only not been made prisoners of war but were even engaged in military training. This could not be denied by the British representatives, who promised the Control Council that the named units would be disbanded by January 31, 1946.

* *The New York Times*, April 30, 1949.

** *The New York Times*, November 6, 1946.

Large German military units numbering 580,000 men were maintained in the US zone. Similar units with nearly 35,000 men were maintained in the French zone.*

But even after the stipulated date the British and US authorities continued maintaining German combat units under the guise of "labour battalions", "guard companies", "German service groups" and "industrial police". According to official US and British figures, which only give a very approximate picture of the truth, there were in mid-1946 over 150,000 men in only the "service groups" and "labour battalions" in their zones.

Acting on a Soviet proposal, the Foreign Ministers Council (at its Moscow meeting in March 1947) examined what had been done in the way of demilitarising Germany. Under pressure of the facts cited by the Soviet Government, the Western Foreign Ministers had to admit that very little progress was being made in fulfilling the inter-Allied decisions on the dismantling of the military installations and war factories in their zones. The Foreign Ministers Council instructed the Control Council to complete the demilitarisation programme as soon as possible.

However, even these instructions remained a dead letter. Of the 186 underground war factories, warehouses and workshops in the US zone 161 were still intact on December 1, 1947, as were 162 permanent fortifications. By that date nothing had been done in the British zone either to destroy 158 anti-aircraft installations and 860 permanent fortifications.**

On February 10, 1948 the Soviet representative in the Control Council proposed that urgent steps be taken for the fulfilment of the Allied agreements on Germany's demilitarisation. The Western representatives rejected this proposal, refusing even to discuss it. Subsequent developments showed that this was part of a planned policy of preserving the material and technical basis for a resurgence of German militarism.

Under the inter-Allied agreements, one of the aims of the occupation of Germany was to ensure the fulfilment by

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Report on the work of the Allied Control Council in Germany. July 1945-March 1948, pp. 37-38.

** UN Document S/P.47/49-50 of December 31, 1947.

Germany of her reparations commitments. Actually, however, in their zones the Western powers did everything to disrupt the reparations programme set out in the Yalta and the Potsdam agreements and later concretised in the pertinent decisions of the Control Council. Instead of getting 25 per cent of the industrial plant that was non-vital to the German civilian economy from the Western zones as stipulated in the Potsdam Agreements, the Soviet Union received reparations only amounting to US \$12,500,000.*

West Germany's economic requirements, to which the USA and Britain usually referred, were by no means the reason behind this glaring contravention of Allied commitments. At the fifth meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council the Soviet delegation noted with full grounds that in the joint Anglo-US zone industrial output comprised only 35 per cent of the 1938 level while in the Soviet zone, which had been carrying out the reparations deliveries, production had reached 52 per cent of that level. It was enough to increase industrial output in the Western zones to 70 per cent of that level to make it possible to allocate 10 per cent for current reparations deliveries while radically improving the supply of commodities for the German population.** In the reparations issue the real motivations of the USA and Britain were to hinder post-war economic rehabilitation in the Soviet Union, Poland and Yugoslavia.

This was one of the guidelines of the economic blockade of the socialist countries planned at the time and of the cold war. France made her support of the Soviet Union's legitimate demand conditional on Soviet support for her claim to the Saar region.

At the same time, the Western powers more than satisfied their own reparations claims by confiscating German property in foreign countries, expropriating patents and gold and compelling West Germany to export critical goods at give-away prices. According to official West German estimates, the German property confiscated in foreign countries was alone worth at least 20,000 million marks (in pre-war

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Council of Foreign Ministers Document 47/M/34 of March 19, 1947.

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Council of Foreign Ministers Document 47/L/31 of December 12, 1947.

prices).^{*} The lion's share of that sum went to the USA and Britain. At the Moscow meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council Jacques Rueff, President of the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency, had good cause to state that it would be hard to "distort the intentions of the compilers of the Potsdam act" more than was done by the Western powers in the question of reparations.^{**}

While the Soviet authorities in East Germany readily responded to the democratic initiatives of the German population, the military administrations in the Western zones made every effort to check the political activity of the people. For a long time they did not allow the German political parties to function on the claim that the new German political currents could not be permitted to develop spontaneously and organically.^{***} In practice, the steps taken by the USA, Britain and France against the "spontaneous development" of West German political life created a barrier to the efforts of the Communist Party and other progressive organisations to restore the unity of the West German working class and encouraged the bourgeois parties and the Right wing of the Social-Democratic Party. Moreover, the Western powers blocked all the Soviet proposals for giving the German parties and trade unions the right to unite on a national scale, which would have been of immense significance for the preservation of Germany's political unity.

Time and again the Soviet Government drew attention to the fact that in the Western zones the occupation authorities were having recourse to subterfuge and political speculation in order to bar the progressive forces from participation in the self-governing bodies. The following case was examined by the control Council. At the community elections in the British zone in September 1946 the Social-Democratic Party of Germany received 11,178,000 votes and 2,549 mandates, the Communist Party 2,000,000 votes and only 139 mandates, and the Christian Democratic Union 11,000,000

^{*}*Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung* No. 140, 5. VII. 1958, p. 1467.

^{**} *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Council of Foreign Ministers Document 47/M/87 of March 30, 1947.

^{***} *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, "Democratisation" Section of the Report of the Control Council in Germany to the Council of Foreign Ministers, April 1947.

votes and 8,583 mandates. To justify this flagrant violation of democracy, the representatives of the British authorities declared: "It is a fact that although for a beginning this (election) system was possibly new to the German people it was put into effect by the German officials, authorised for the elections, with striking skill and accuracy."* These and many other facts indicate that had Britain, the USA and France not obstructed the fusion of the Communist Party with the Social-Democratic Party of West Germany or close co-operation between them and not resorted to dodges to place the economic and political power in the hands of reactionary bourgeois groups the internal political development in the Western zones might have taken a totally different course.

In all the Western zones the trade unions and the democratic women's, youth and other mass organisations were barred from participation in elections. Every encouragement was given to reactionary forces, the same forces that had been the mainstay of fascism and aggression. Hatred of communism and fear of democratic changes prompted the Western powers to support reactionary elements and turn a blind eye to the lessons of history, to the role played by the German imperialists in starting two world wars and to the crimes committed by the nazis.

3. Clash of Two Policies in the Question of Germany's Unity

Throughout all the post-war years the USSR waged an unflagging struggle against the attempts of the three Western powers to wreck the fulfilment of the Allied decisions on Germany and to use Germany or at least the Western zones in the military and political interests of the capitalist bloc headed by the USA. The West saw no value in "nominal political unity"*** in Germany, to quote a phrase used by US President Harry S. Truman. The USA and the other im-

* Ibid.

** *Germany, 1947-1949. The Story in Documents*, Washington, 1950, p. 70.

perialist states were determined to adapt Germany or, at least the zones controlled by them, to their plans of counteracting the growing influence of socialism. They had never regarded the preservation of Germany's unity as an end in itself or as a factor that could keep them from divisive activity. They did not stop to think of the consequences of their subversion of the Four-Power administration of Germany and of their renunciation of co-operation with the USSR in the German question.

It was only due to the efforts of the Soviet Government that such vital questions to Germany as the creation of central German administrative departments envisaged by the Potsdam Agreements, the formation of a provisional all-German government, permission for the operation of political parties and trade unions throughout the whole of Germany, the working out of a uniform election system for all the occupation zones and uniform economic measures embracing the entire country remained on the agenda of the Foreign Ministers Council and the Control Council meetings. The Soviet Union pressed for the enforcement throughout Germany of a democratic land reform and other changes in political and economic life that would indeed ensure Germany's democratic renewal and turn her into a peace-loving state. But the Soviet proposals were turned down by the Western powers.

At the Foreign Ministers Council meeting in Paris in 1949 US Secretary of State Dean Acheson alleged that the Potsdam Agreements could not be used as a basis for discussing questions related to currency, German exports and imports, and so on, and that this was why Germany had been split. "Germany," he declared, "quite automatically disintegrated into separate cells."* The existence of a united, independent, democratic and peace-loving German state on the political map of Europe in no way entered into the West's post-war plans.

As early as at the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council (London, September-October 1945), the French Government issued a Memorandum in which it was stated that "if it had been the outcome of natural evolution and not

**USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Verbatim Report of the second meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, May 24, 1949.

of a solution imposed from without, the division of Germany into several states would have been favourable to the maintenance of security in Europe". The Memorandum expressed regret that the Potsdam Agreements envisaged the establishment of central administrative departments and other measures that could "revive the trends toward German unity and favour a return to the formula of a centralised German state". Further, it was suggested that North Rhine-Westphalia, including the Ruhr, should be separated from Germany.*

Acting on these considerations, the French representatives made it impossible for the Control Council to adopt practical measures to organise all-German departments. Along with the USA and Britain, France assumed the responsibility for denying permission to the German trade unions and political parties to unite on a nationwide scale.

Byron Price, who went on a fact-finding mission to Germany at the close of 1945 as Truman's special representative, reported that French policy was aimed at dismembering the German economy and that the United States "must decide whether the obstructions raised by the French Government, which have deadlocked the Four-Power Control Council at Berlin, are to be permitted".**

However, the West had decided on its course long before the Price report was written. But while the USA and Britain were acting in the same direction as France, they were not yet prepared to advertise the fact.

At the Foreign Ministers Council's second meeting in Paris (May and July 1946), the Soviet Union proposed the formation of an all-German Government that would undertake the responsibility of signing a peace treaty and ensure the fulfilment of Germany's obligations under that treaty. As a transitional measure, the Soviet Union suggested setting up a central German administration in the immediate future.

France and Britain objected categorically to the Soviet proposal. At a meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council on

* *Documents français relatifs à l'Allemagne (August 1945-February 1947)*, Paris, 1947, pp. 13-14.

** *The Department of State Bulletin*, December 2, 1945, Vol. XIII, No. 336, pp. 885-92.

May 15, 1946 French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault declared that as an economic entity Germany had been "destroyed and this had been just; she had to be destroyed".* Bidault demanded the separation of the Rhine region, the Ruhr and the Saar from Germany and the partition of the rest of Germany into several independent states. At the same meeting the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin noted that apart from the French proposals for the separation of these territories from Germany he was thinking along the same lines as the French.**

In view of the Soviet Union's participation in the Four-Power control of Germany's development, it was of course difficult for the Western powers to count on preserving militarist elements, bringing them to power and openly conspiring with them. They therefore directed their efforts towards destroying the foundations of joint Allied policy in Germany and removing their occupation zones from Four-Power control.

The initiative came from the USA with, at first, an anti-French hue. On October 2, 1945 in a conversation with General V. D. Sokolovsky, who headed the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, General Lucius D. Clay, representing the US Administration in Germany, declared that if the French continued their opposition to the establishment of central German departments, he would recommend that his Government contact the Government of the USSR with a view to setting up such departments for two zones, the US and the Soviet, and then whether they liked it or not the others would have to join. Clay expressed regret that France was given control of territory that earlier had been part of the US zone.***

In the Control Council in November 1945 the Americans suggested setting up central administrative departments for three or two zones. The Soviet Union opposed this solution on the grounds that it would violate the principle of Four-

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Record of a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on May 15, 1946.

** Ibid.

*** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Record of a conversation on October 2, 1945 between General of the Army V. D. Sokolovsky, head of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, and General Lucius D. Clay, representative of the US Military Administration in Germany.

Power administration and of treating Germany as an integral state.

The US Government then took matters into its own hands and, circumventing the Control Council, started negotiations with the British on the economic and administrative merging of their zones. Despite the warnings of the Soviet Union and the protests of German democratic opinion, on December 2, 1946 the USA and Britain signed an agreement on the establishment of a so-called Bizonal area (Bizonia).

Recalling the events of that period many years later in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in the FRG, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer said that the USA and Britain calculated that by forming Bizonia they would wreck, in particular, the plan of placing the Rhine-Ruhr industrial area under international control. In order to prevent the realisation of that plan and deprive France of her hopes of using the economy of the Ruhr, the US and British governments secretly conducted the preparations for the fusion of their zones and set up the North Rhine-Westphalia region. Adenauer and Kurt Schumacher, Chairman of the Social-Democratic Party, were informed of what was taking place only at the concluding stage of the preparations in Berlin, where they were summoned in secret.*

On January 1, 1947 the USA and Britain transferred the settlement of trade accounts between Bizonia and the other zones from marks to US dollars, in other words, they placed internal trade in Germany on a footing practised only in trade between countries. Even the French representatives in the Control Council had to acknowledge that this decision signified the final renunciation by the US and British zones of the principle of joint distribution of basic products, which is the "chief element of economic unity". Abandonment of that principle "changes Germany's monetary status, which, as was hitherto considered, is one of the most essential factors of economic unity . . . and leads to the creation of a separate economic unit inside Germany".**

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Report of August 23, 1966 from the USSR Embassy in the FRG to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Report of the Control Council in Germany to the Council of Foreign Ministers, April 1947, Section IV: "Economic Principles".

A separate German administrative apparatus was set up in Bizonia in mid-1947. This was followed by the institution of joint US-British control of the Ruhr mining industry. Then, in December 1947, the USA and Britain signed an agreement, which, as General Clay put it, gave the Americans "the right of final decision in financial and economic matters" in Bizonia.*

At the fourth meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council (in Moscow, in March-April 1947), the Soviet Union called on the Western powers to abandon their separatist, divisive activities. It suggested that preparations should forthwith be started for the formation of an all-German Government: the immediate establishment of all-German administrative departments, the drawing up of a provisional democratic constitution and the holding of free elections in all zones in accordance with that constitution. That would be followed by the formation of a provisional all-German Government.

The Soviet proposals dealt at length with the question of Germany's state system. It was declared that "Germany is to be restored as a united peace-loving state, as a democratic republic with an all-German parliament consisting of two chambers and an all-German Government, with the Länder in the German state enjoying constitutional rights."** The all-German and the Länder constitutions would guarantee democratic liberties to all citizens and the election of all representative bodies on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage by secret ballot and a proportionate system. The Soviet proposals embodied the wishes of the German progressive parties and organisations. They were formulated with account of German democratic traditions and opened the way to creating a united democratic German republic without changing the existing socio-political relations.

The US, British and French representatives objected to the creation of an all-German parliament and of a central Government on the basis of general elections. The US Secretary of State George C. Marshall bluntly stated that the US delegation did not feel elections were necessary for

* Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany*, New York, 1950, p. 178.

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Council of Foreign Ministers Document 47/M/46 of March 22, 1947.

the formation of a provisional Government.* The response of the Western powers was also negative to the Soviet suggestion that the question of Germany's state system should be decided by the Germans themselves. On this question Marshall said he doubted the ability of the German people to approach this important issue reasonably.

Georges Bidault, who led the French delegation, likewise refused to back the Soviet proposals, saying that the formation of a provisional all-German Government was "premature". "The French delegation," he declared, "feels that at present the prime task of the occupying powers is to consolidate what has been achieved. It is necessary—and for our part we are doing out best to achieve this—to create conclusively different states on a democratic foundation."***

The negative attitude of the Western powers at the talks in Moscow prevented the settlement of a number of other major questions that were brought up by the Soviet Union, for example, the drawing up of a peace treaty with Germany, the working out of a uniform election law for the whole of Germany, reparations, and so on. According to John Foster Dulles, one of the architects of US post-war foreign policy, the chief aim of the US delegation at the Moscow meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council was by no means to achieve understanding with the USSR on various aspects of the German problem. The USA sought to win France to its side, to drive a wedge between her and the Soviet Union and thereby form a Three-Power bloc. To this end the Americans backed up the French claim to the Saar and to deliveries of Ruhr coal to France.***

A report written by former US President Herbert Hoover, who toured Europe and visited West Germany on behalf of the US Government, was published in the USA on March 18, 1947, i.e., when Four-Power talks were proceeding in the Foreign Ministers Council. Hoover recommended the formation of a separate German Government only for the Western zones, the signing of a separate peace treaty with it, the cessation of the dismantling of war factories and of the

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Council of Foreign Ministers Document, 47/M/101 of April 4, 1947.

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Council of Foreign Ministers Document, 47/M/48 of March 22, 1947.

*** John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace*, New York, 1957, p. 103.

decartelisation programme, a separate monetary reform in West Germany and the return of the war-time leaders of the German industry to economic management.* It was precisely this programme of splitting the country and not the interests of creating a united, democratic, peace-loving German state that motivated the actions of the US Government.

It is, therefore, hardly surprising that there was no response from the Western powers to the Soviet Union's striving to preserve Germany's unity and co-operation among the victor powers in the German question.

At the London meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council (November-December 1947) the Soviet Union made yet another attempt to get the Western powers to fulfil the international agreements on Germany in the interests of the German people and of peace in Europe. It proposed considering the question of a speedy peace settlement with Germany, underscoring the immense significance of a peace treaty not only to Germany but also to the whole of Europe. The peace treaty, the Soviet Government said, should be founded on the principles of a democratic peace and should help to rejuvenate Germany economically and to restore her as an independent, democratic and united country.

It was proposed that jointly with the USSR the three Western powers should take immediate steps to set up a central German Government that would participate in the drawing up of the peace treaty. The Soviet Government proposed convening a peace conference, inviting all countries whose armed forces had participated in the war against Germany and drafting the foundations of a peace treaty within a period of two months and in line with the decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences.**

In opposition to the Soviet Union's striving to find a solution to the question of all-German free elections and an all-German Government, the peace treaty and other problems on the basis of Allied agreements, the Western powers made an attempt to revise the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. At the talks in London they submitted a draft of "additional

* *Congressional Record*, March 24, 1947, pp. A1280-A1283.

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Council of Foreign Ministers Document 47/L/9 of November 27, 1947.

principles" for relations with Germany, which were designed to replace the former Allied agreements and give a semblance of legality to the separate actions of the USA, Britain and France in West Germany.

In London the Western powers categorically rejected the Soviet proposal that a hearing be given to representatives of the German people at the Four-Power negotiations. The British Government went so far as to deny entry to Britain to a delegation of the German People's Congress, which was perhaps the broadest-ever patriotic movement in Germany. The delegation had been instructed to inform the Foreign Ministers Council that "the German people want the peace treaty to ensure the economic and political unity of Germany or that the German people be granted the right to settle that question themselves through a nation-wide referendum."*

The USA, Britain and France rendered the talks in the Foreign Ministers Council fruitless. It was hard to have expected anything else. While the Western Foreign Ministers, making an outward show of fidelity to Allied commitments, were attending the Foreign Ministers Council meeting in London's Lancaster House, backstage preparations were in full swing for the formation of a separate West German state.

On US initiative a series of separate conferences of representatives of the USA, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg were held in London during the first half of 1948. These conferences ended with the adoption of a decision to set up the Federal Republic of Germany and to include West Germany in the Marshall Plan. A separate monetary reform was enforced in West Germany on June 20, 1948 and in West Berlin on June 24, 1948, with the result that the all-German currency was removed from circulation and new monetary units were introduced in the Western zones and West Berlin. This destroyed Germany's economic unity. A single currency and a uniform circulation of money ceased to exist in Germany. This step wrecked the normal economic links between

* Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, *The Truth About Western Policy on the German Question. An Historical Survey*, Moscow-Berlin, 1959, p. 27 (in Russian).

individual areas. The separate monetary reform was spread to West Berlin despite the written assurances made earlier by the US, British and French commanders-in-chief that the Western mark would not be introduced in that city. The reform was enforced at a time when, thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union, agreement had been reached in the Control Council on the basic principles for a monetary reform embracing the whole of Germany. But this did not fit in with the aims of the Western powers, who were determined to split Germany and set up a reactionary, anti-Soviet regime in West Germany. They were not interested in creating a peace-loving, democratic German state.

A conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia was held in Warsaw in June 1948. The conference denounced the decisions passed by the Western powers at their separate negotiations in London as a gross violation of Allied duty and as a conspiracy to turn West Germany, notably the Ruhr heavy industry, into an instrument for the restoration of the German military potential with the design of using it in the interests of Western imperialist circles. The Warsaw conference demanded that the Great Powers take steps to ensure Germany's demilitarisation, place the Ruhr heavy industry under joint control for a definite period, form a provisional all-German Government of representatives of German democratic parties and organisations, and sign a peace treaty with Germany in accordance with the Potsdam decisions.

The USA, Britain and France methodically advanced toward their goal of dividing Germany and setting up a reactionary regime in the Western zones. In their zones they banned the collection of signatures under the demand for a nation-wide referendum of German unity put forward by the democratic forces in the Soviet zone. While viciously suppressing the German People's Congress movement for unity and a just peace in West Germany, the three powers put their stake on the monopolies and the Junkers, on reactionary politicians who were determined to cling to power even at the price of dividing the country, at the price of betraying the nation.

In Frankfurt-am-Main on July 26, 1948 the commanders-in-chief of the three Western zones held a conference with

the Prime Ministers of the Länder governments of West Germany with the purpose of constituting a West German state. Six days later the French zone was joined to Bizonia.

The so-called Parliamentary Council was convened in Bonn on September 1, 1948, under the chairmanship of Konrad Adenauer, who later became Chancellor of the FRG. Its purpose was to frame the West German Basic Law. The principles underlying the future Constitution were, in fact, dictated by the occupation authorities. The Basic Law was adopted on May 8, 1949 by the Parliamentary Council and then approved by the US, British and French commanders-in-chief in Germany.

The West German state was constituted on the initiative of the three occupying Western powers with obviously suspicious haste, in a situation marked by political intrigues and machinations. This haste, it was stated in the report of the US commander-in-chief, was due to the fact that the Western powers wanted to complete the framing of the Basic Law of the future Federal Republic of Germany before the Foreign Ministers Council began its meeting in Paris in May 1949.*

In a book entitled *Again the Goose Step*, Delbert Clark who was *The New York Times* correspondent in Germany for many years and had inside information on US policy in the German question, writes: "Surely, but not very slowly, the United States Government and the British Government were undoing their wartime achievements. With a dreadful inevitability the German economy was being put back into the hands of the wreckers of the Weimar Republic, and no month went by without a fresh grant of authority to them. . . . Bit by bit the denazification program was destroyed. The old guard made its way into politics as well as into industry."**

These separatist, divisive actions on the part of the Western powers sharply aggravated the situation in Germany and the whole of Europe and put an end to the unity of Germany and of Berlin. On March 20, 1948 the Control Council ceased to exist after the three Western powers refused to inform it of the decisions of their separate

* *Germany 1947-1949. The Story in Documents*, p. 281.

** Delbert Clark, *Again the Goose Step*, New York, 1949, pp. 16-17.

conference. Soon after, on June 16, 1948, the Western powers disrupted the operation of the Allied Kommandatura in Berlin.

The Soviet Military Administration had no alternative but to take steps to safeguard the economy of the Soviet zone and the interests of the population of East Germany. This was imperative because the three Western powers had spread their divisive actions to Berlin, although they themselves recognised it as the capital of the Soviet occupation zone.* The separate monetary reform enforced unlawfully in West Berlin was threatening to disorganise the currency system throughout the Soviet zone and severely hit its population and economy. There was the danger that East Germany would be flooded with the entire mass of banknotes that had been annulled in the Western zones. To protect the currency and the economy of the Soviet zone it was found necessary to ban the inflow of the new banknotes issued in the Western occupation zones and also the inflow of reichsmarks and of the marks issued by the Allied Military Command. The Soviet military authorities were put in a position where they had to tighten control over the movement of goods and people between the Eastern zone, including Berlin, and the Western zones. The rigid control imposed on communications between Berlin and the Western occupation zones was a necessary counter-measure to the subversive actions of the three Western powers, to their attempts to violate the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union and of the population of East Germany.

Naturally, the Western sectors of Berlin were not denied the possibility of maintaining normal communication, including economic relations, with the rest of East Germany. The Soviet Military Administration expressed its readiness to undertake the entire burden of furnishing the population of these sectors with necessities.

* For example, in a report to the Foreign Ministers Council in 1947, the Control Council pointed out:

"2. In view of the special status of Greater Berlin, which is an area occupied jointly by the Four Powers (as defined in the Four-Power agreement on the occupation zones in Germany) and, at the same time, the capital of the Soviet occupation zone, the Berlin central organs of these four parties served also as the central organs of these parties in the Soviet zone."

However, for provocative purposes the three Western powers forced a self-blockade on West Berlin. They organised an expensive air lift of food, coal and other commodities to Berlin and turned West Berlin into a centre of the cold war.

World tension was the nourishing environment in which the USA, Britain and France reared the Bonn state. The objectives pursued by the Western powers in aggravating the situation over Berlin were divulged by John Foster Dulles in a speech at the Overseas Writers' Association on January 10, 1949. "There could be," he said, "a settlement of the Berlin situation at any time on the basis of a Soviet currency for Berlin and our right to bring in food, raw materials and fuel to the Western sectors. The present situation is, however, to US advantage for propaganda purposes. We are getting the credit for keeping the people of Berlin from starving*: the Russians are getting the blame for their privations. If we settle Berlin, then we have to deal with Germany as a whole. We will have to deal immediately with a Russian proposal for withdrawal of all occupation troops and a return of Germany to the Germans."** But that was exactly what the USA wanted to avoid. In pursuance of its aims it did not shrink from backing out of what it had suggested earlier and blocked every attempt to reach agreement even when Britain and France indicated their willingness to work out decisions acceptable to the Soviet Union.

After all necessary measures had been taken to protect the economy of the Soviet zone the Soviet Government, acting in the interests of relaxing international tension, lifted the restrictions on Berlin's communications with the Western zones. It insisted that the USA, Britain and France halt their boycott of co-operation between the Four Powers and restore the Foreign Ministers Council.***

The following agreement was reached in May 1949 at the Four-Power talks in New York: "1. All the restrictions imposed since March 1, 1948 by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on communications,

* The threat of starvation existed only in West Berlin and was due solely to the rejection by the USA, Britain and France of the Soviet offer to supply the whole of Berlin.

** Johannes Steel, *The Case for Peace*, New York, p. 8.

*** *Izvestia*, June 30, 1949.

transportation and trade between Berlin and the Western zones of Germany and between the Eastern zone and the Western zones will be removed on May 12, 1949.

"2. All the restrictions imposed since March 1, 1948 by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, or any one of them, on communications, transportation and trade between Berlin and the Eastern zone and between the Western and Eastern zones of Germany will also be removed on May 12, 1949.

"3. Eleven days subsequent to the removal of the restrictions referred to in paragraphs one and two, namely, on May 23, 1949, a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers will be convened in Paris to consider questions relating to Germany and problems arising out of the situation in Berlin, including also the question of currency in Berlin."*

The German question was considered by the Foreign Ministers Council at its sixth meeting that opened in Paris at the end of May 1949. The Soviet Government urged the restoration of the Control Council as a body co-ordinating the policies of the occupation authorities in Germany. It suggested setting up a German State Council on the basis of the economic organs existing in West and East Germany, the restoration of Berlin's unity, which had been broken by the separate monetary reform and its consequences, the resumption of the functioning of the Allied Kommandatura in Berlin with the purpose of co-ordinating the city's administration, the holding of free elections in Berlin and the restoration of the Berlin magistracy. Moreover, it proposed that the Four Powers should draft a peace treaty with Germany within three months, providing for the withdrawal of all occupation troops from Germany within a year of the signing of the treaty. The Soviet Union insisted that the procedure for drawing up the peace treaty with Germany should be finally decided upon at that (Paris) meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.**

What was the response of the US, British and French representatives to these proposals, which were permeated

* *Documents on Germany, 1944-1959*, May 8, 1959. Washington, 1959, pp. 59-60.

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Council of Foreign Ministers Document 49/P/29 of June 10, 1949.

with concern for Germany's destiny, for her unity and for world peace? They declared that the Control Council and all other Four-Power bodies set up in accordance with the agreements on the control machinery in Germany were obsolete, and instead suggested setting up a new occupation organ, a High Commission, whose decisions would be adopted by a majority vote, in other words, by the USA, Britain and France. They withheld their agreement to the establishment of a central organ for the whole of Germany and refused to hear the viewpoint of the Germans themselves. They were opposed to any steps toward the drawing up of a peace treaty with Germany.

Particularly emphatic objections were levelled by the Western powers against the proposal for withdrawing the forces of occupation. At the sitting on June 12, 1949 Ernest Bevin said the British Government was "not yet prepared to commit themselves to a definite date for the withdrawal of our troops from Germany. . . . I do not wish to give the Germans or anybody else false hopes. That is our attitude to the problem. I state this categorically so that my statement is recorded in the minutes."^{*}

The patience and perseverance displayed by the Soviet Government at the Paris meeting made it possible to settle the Berlin crisis. The sides agreed that it was necessary to help foster trade and economic relations and ensure the normal functioning of transportation between the Eastern and Western zones of occupation.

But almost as soon as the Paris conference was closed the Western powers flouted its decisions. Among themselves they signed an agreement on June 20, 1949 establishing the Allied High Commission and transferring to it the supreme power in West Germany and "all the power of control of Germany". Somewhat earlier they adopted an occupation statute for West Germany, under which the key functions of state administration were the prerogative of the occupation authorities, while the population was in effect denied participation in these functions.

The occupation statute for West Berlin was published at the same time. Under that statute the Allied Kommandatura

^{*} *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Verbatim Report of the 18th sitting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on June 12, 1949.

reserved the right "to ensure the security, good order and financial and economic stability of the city".* Actually this statute formalised Berlin's partition and the separate development of its Western part. It recorded the Western powers' renunciation of the aims of the occupation of Germany (and Berlin) as envisaged in the Potsdam Agreements,** thereby undermining the legal foundation for the presence of occupation troops.

Elections for the parliament of a separate West German state were held in the Western zones on August 14, 1949. With the enforcement of the agreement on the Allied High Commission and the occupation statute, and with the formation of the FRG Government on September 20, 1949, Germany ceased to exist as a single whole not only actually but also juridically. The policy of partition pursued by the USA and its partners reached its logical culmination.

In a Note to the USA, Britain and France on October 1, 1949, the Soviet Union underscored the extremely grave responsibility that devolved on the Western powers as a result of their policy in Germany "which has led to the formation of an anti-popular separate Government in Bonn that is hostile to the Potsdam Conference's decisions on the democratisation and demilitarisation of Germany and to the obligations imposed on Germany. This is incompatible with the interests of the peace-loving peoples of Europe".***

The policy of partition pursued by the imperialist powers in collusion with the reactionary circles in West Germany was stoutly resisted by large sections of the German people, by democratic and patriotic forces. The German People's Congress movement swept across the whole of Germany, demanding the earliest possible signing of a just, democratic peace treaty with Germany and calling on the Germans to take the destiny of their country into their own hands. The German People's Council elected by the Congress drafted an all-German Constitution and submitted it for discussion to the people.

The bans and persecution to which the Congress was subjected in West Germany deprived the population in the

* *Documents on Germany, 1944-1959*, May 8, 1959, p. 61.

** *The Truth About the Western Policies on the German Question*.

*** *Uneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1949*, Moscow, 1953, p. 170.

Western occupation zones of the possibility of freely stating their attitude to the draft Constitution or to take part in electing delegates to the Third German People's Congress.

In East Germany and the democratic sector of Berlin 95.2 per cent of the people entitled to vote took part in electing the delegates to that Congress. The candidates polled 66.1 per cent of the votes, i.e., they received the votes of practically two-thirds of the population of East Germany.

The Third German People's Congress, which was held on May 29-30, 1949, approved the Constitution. "Germany," the Constitution states, "is an indivisible democratic Republic, its constituent parts are the German Länder." Article 5 states: "The organs of State have the duty of maintaining and preserving friendly relations with all peoples." The Constitution outlawed war-like and racist propaganda. "Incitement to boycott democratic institutions and organisations," Article 6 states, "incitement to murder democratic politicians, the profession of religious or racial hatred, militarist propaganda and incitement to war... are crimes under the definition of the Criminal Code." The Constitution guaranteed democratic liberties and rights to all German citizens regardless of their property or social status.*

On October 7, 1949, after the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany had become a fait accompli, the People's Council unanimously passed a manifesto proclaiming the formation of the German Democratic Republic and the Constitution of the GDR, which had been earlier approved by the Third German People's Congress. The Soviet Union recognised the legitimate aspiration of the German democratic circles to undertake to restore Germany's unity and secure her resurgence as a democratic and peace-loving state.**

The Potsdam Agreements had created the conditions for Germany's democratic, peaceful development, which ruled out the former policies of war and aggression. The preserva-

* *Constitution of the German Democratic Republic*, Berlin, pp. 11, 12, 13 (in German).

** *Uneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuzu*. 1949, p. 223.

tion of co-operation that had taken shape between the USSR, the USA, Britain and France in the war against the nazi aggressors was the major prerequisite for the fulfilment of these agreements.

Shortly before his death US President Franklin D. Roosevelt said that on the fulfilment of the Allied agreements on Germany depended "the fate of the United States—and of the world for generations to come". He warned: "There can be no middle ground here. We shall have to take the responsibility for world collaboration, or we shall have to bear the responsibility for another world conflict."* His successors paid no heed to his words.

The USA, Britain and France chose the cold war and the arms race to co-operation with the Soviet Union. They put their stake on the revival of an imperialist Germany that could return to the notorious *Drang nach Osten* policy. Naturally, this vicious aim was never proclaimed officially. It was carried out gradually, stealthily.

This policy led to Germany's partition. Two differently orientated states emerged on her territory. The Federal Republic of Germany became the champion of the interests of German militarist, revenge-seeking circles who were determined to revise the basic results of the Second World War. In the other German state, the German Democratic Republic, the power passed into the hands of the working people for the first time in German history. The GDR proclaimed that it would pursue a policy of peace and would respect international decisions aimed at strengthening peace in Europe and averting the threat of war.

* *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1944-45*, Vol. XIII, *Victory and the Threshold of Peace*, New York, 1950, p. 585.

Chapter Eighteen

THE SOVIET UNION'S STRUGGLE FOR DISARMAMENT (1946-1952)

Disarmament has always been, before and after the Second World War, a major objective of Soviet foreign policy, a fundamental guideline of which is Lenin's thesis that "disarmament is the ideal of socialism". The problem of ensuring disarmament in the post-war period was raised by the Soviet Union while the Second World War was still raging. In the Declaration adopted in Moscow on October 30, 1943 by the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and China on the question of world security it is stated that the governments of these countries would "consult and co-operate with each other and with other members of the United Nations for the purpose of achieving a realisable general agreement on the regulation of armaments in the post-war period".

When the Second World War ended the Soviet Union started an energetic drive for disarmament, which it continues to this day. Its unswerving efforts to halt the arms race and achieve an international agreement on this issue emanate from the socialist character of Soviet society. In its attitude to this problem the Soviet Union unchangeably acts on the principle that the arms race holds out extremely grave consequences to the peoples of all countries. It can inflame world tension and heighten the threat of another war. The burden of military expenditures falls squarely on the shoulders of the working people. The struggle for disarmament, therefore, pursues an important international objective, namely, to diminish the threat of war and improve the condition of the working people.

Disarmament was, moreover, dictated by the need for switching the country's war economy to civilian production as soon as possible, restoring the huge number of factories that were destroyed during the occupation of Soviet territory and achieving an upsurge of all branches of the national economy and also of science, culture, the health services and so on. In order to restore its national economy the Soviet Union had to return a large proportion of its Armed Forces to peaceful civilian work. Therefore, as soon as the war in Europe ended, the Soviet Government took steps to effect demobilisation in the Armed Forces. As early as June 23, 1945, the first post-war demobilisation law was passed providing for the demobilisation of a considerable part of the Army in the field. This was soon followed by the further demobilisation of many categories of servicemen. The demobilisation of millions of men brought to the fore the problem of employment, material insurance and retraining. Arrangements for children who had lost their parents in the war was also an urgent task. Many other measures linked with the organisation of peaceful life had to be taken. The restoration of the country's economy and the development of peaceful construction required lasting peace and the settlement of the problem of disarmament.

1. The Soviet Union and the Problem of Banning Nuclear Weapons in the Period 1946-1952

After the war crucial importance was acquired by the problem of banning nuclear weapons and removing them from national arsenals. The momentous scientific discoveries in nuclear energy made it possible to use the atomic nucleus as an inexhaustible source of energy. However, at the first stage of their practical utilisation these discoveries brought mankind no benefits. They led to the creation and use of an atomic bomb, a lethal weapon of tremendous destructive power, in the very last days of the Second World War. On July 16, 1945, after Germany had been defeated and had surrendered, the first atomic test was conducted in a desert in New Mexico, USA. Scientists hailing from many countries

had helped to create the bomb. "The American scientific contribution was very small. The entire line of development leading to nuclear fission occurred mostly abroad."* Soon after this nuclear test, namely, on August 6 and 9, atomic bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by order of US President Harry S. Truman.

There had been no military necessity for using the atomic bomb and it did not play an essential role in defeating Japan. This is admitted even by prominent US and British political and military leaders. Admiral William D. Leahy of the USA wrote that "the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan".** A similar view was offered in a report published in May 1947 by the US President's consultative commission on questions of military training. Professor P. M. S. Blackett, a leading British physicist, noted in this connection "that the dropping of the atomic bombs was not so much the last military act of the Second World War, as one of the first major operations of the cold diplomatic war with Russia now in progress".***

The use of the discoveries in nuclear physics and technology for the development of a weapon of mass annihilation, the tremendous destructive power of this weapon and the wanton destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki accentuated the task of banning nuclear weapons, of ceasing their production and removing this type of armament from national arsenals.

With the appearance of the atomic bomb one of the main objectives of the Soviet policy in disarmament was to secure the banning of that weapon and promote the use of atomic energy exclusively for peaceful purposes, for the benefit of people: for raising the living standard and cultural level, enlarging the power generating facilities and developing industry, agriculture, transport and so forth. In various international organs the Soviet representatives made it plain that the use of atomic bombs was incompatible with the

* James S. Allen, *Atomic Energy and Society*, New York, 1949, p. 21.

** William D. Leahy, *I Was There*, New York-London-Toronto, 1950, p. 441.

*** P. M. S. Blackett, *Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy*, London, 1949, p. 127.

honour and conscience of nations and proposed the conclusion of an international agreement on the banning of these weapons and on the use of fissionable material exclusively for peaceful purposes with strict international control of the fulfilment of the terms of such an agreement by all countries.

However, in the question of disarmament the USA, which had a monopoly of atomic weapons during the initial years after the world war, pursued a policy that was diametrically opposite to the policy followed by the Soviet Union. In order to carry out its far-reaching plans for political expansion, which amounted to a bid for world supremacy by means of atomic weapons, the USA sought to preserve its nuclear monopoly and utilise it in its policies. At the same time, pressured by public opinion, which was demanding the banning of nuclear weapons, the US Government endeavoured to give the impression that it was prepared to remove the atomic bomb from its national arsenal. While declaring its willingness to sign an international agreement banning this weapon, it went to all lengths to prevent progress towards that goal. Moreover, it used every means in its power to maintain a veil of secrecy round the scientific discoveries in the uses of atomic energy. In a joint statement published on November 15, 1945, Britain, Canada and the USA declared that until the atomic bomb was banned they doubted if it was expedient to proliferate information on the practical uses of atomic energy. This was a clear indication of their intention to prolong their monopoly in that sphere although they were aware that their "extremely favoured position... is only temporary".*

The banning of the atomic bomb and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes were discussed broadly for the first time at the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the USA and Britain in December 1945. It was decided to set up a Commission on Atomic Energy within the UN framework to consider the problem. A bitter struggle round the question of banning atomic weapons flared up in that Commission between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

Acheson-Lilienthal Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy. See *The International Control of Atomic Energy, Growth of a Policy*, Washington, 1946, p. 47.

In pursuance of its goal of preventing the banning of the atomic bomb and reinforcing its monopoly of that weapon the USA drew up and submitted to the UN Atomic Energy Commission a plan for "internationalising" atomic production that would prohibit all countries to build up a nuclear industry and possess nuclear enterprises. Called the Baruch plan after the American representative in the UN Atomic Energy Commission, it was put before the Commission in June 1946. It envisaged the establishment of an Atomic Development Authority (nominally international but, in fact, bossed by the USA) that would have extensive rights and powers. Inasmuch as at the time the USA could count on a majority of votes in the United Nations and in the Atomic Energy Commission it calculated on individually dominating the "international" Authority.

The Baruch plan recommended turning over to this Authority all enterprises producing fissionable material and giving it the exclusive right of producing such material and of using atomic energy at its discretion. The transfer of equipment, special apparatuses, and raw and other materials to the Authority would be accomplished in stages beginning with the extraction of raw material. Then control would be spread to industrial production and, lastly, to explosives.

Had the removal of the threat of nuclear weapons been seriously contemplated, the plan would have called first and foremost for control over explosives, which are the basis of these weapons. But inasmuch as the USA's purpose was not to ban the atomic bomb but to secure a key position in relation to all the nuclear enterprises of other countries, the Baruch plan recommended control first of the sources and extraction of raw material, then of all enterprises producing nuclear materials and atomic energy and only at the last stage of the finished product, i.e., fissionable material. The USA calculated that this control, introduced by stages, would "internationalise" all nuclear production in the world, in other words, that it would be subordinated to US imperialism long before any control was established over the fissionable material and atomic bombs available to the USA.

Furthermore, it was proposed that the "international" Authority should be granted the right of control and inspection and of issuing to all states permission for all forms of activity in any way linked with atomic energy. As envisaged

by the Baruch plan, some states would be forbidden not only to produce atomic energy but also conduct research in that sphere. The system of issuing permission for the use of nuclear energy recommended in the plan could artificially restrict the economic development of individual countries that possessed considerable possibilities for using atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

Thus, the control system proposed by the USA would have not only consolidated the US atomic monopoly but given the USA the possibility of constantly interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and ultimately subordinating their economy to the American monopolies.

In putting forward this plan for the control of atomic energy through the "internationalisation" of production and use of that energy the USA in fact not only demonstrated its opposition to the banning of atomic and other weapons of mass annihilation but, moreover, suggested giving the "international" Authority the right to improve nuclear weapons. "The Authority," the Baruch plan stated, "should be given the sole and exclusive right to conduct research in the field of atomic explosives."^{*}

The main objective of the Baruch plan was thus to transfer all atomic enterprises, wherever they might be, to an "international" Authority through which the USA calculated it would manage and control atomic production throughout the world. The Baruch plan was a detailed programme of demands which US diplomacy attempted to impose on other countries. These demands went so far that their acceptance would have been tantamount to a renunciation of sovereign rights. A situation would have been created in which an "international" Authority would lay down the law to governments, interfere in the internal affairs of countries and decide what enterprise linked with atomic production would be allowed to operate, in other words, it would control the economic development of different countries. Moreover, making no provision for the banning of nuclear weapons, this plan pursued the aim of preserving the US monopoly of atomic weapons and utilising this monopoly in the interests of USA imperialism to the detriment of the vital interests, sovereign rights and security

^{*} *International Control of Atomic Energy. Growth of a Policy*, p. 144.

of other countries. It expressed the aggressive, expansionist ambitions of the US militarist circles. The Baruch plan was a bid by US diplomacy to give the USA a monopoly over the world output of nuclear fuel and atomic energy under cover of an "international" Authority and legalise the production and improvement of nuclear arms and the stockpiling of atomic bombs for military purposes. In a letter to the then US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, Dean Acheson wrote that the "plan does not require that the United States shall discontinue such manufacture either upon the proposal of the plan or upon the inauguration of the International Agency".*

On June 19, 1946, in contradistinction to the US plan, the Soviet Union submitted to the UN Atomic Energy Commission a draft convention on the complete and unconditional banning of the manufacture and use of atomic weapons. The main provision of this draft obligated the signatories to the convention to refrain from using atomic weapons under any circumstances, ban the manufacture and stockpiling of these weapons and destroy the entire arsenal of such weapons at all stages of their manufacture within a period of three months after the convention came into force. Violation of the convention was qualified as "the most grave international crime against mankind". Moreover, the USSR suggested working out the terms for control of the use of atomic energy exclusively for peaceful purposes and of the observance of the provisions of the above-mentioned international convention.

In proposing the banning of atomic weapons and the ways and means of organising the work of the Atomic Energy Commission the Soviet Union aimed to secure the use of atomic energy solely for peaceful purposes and to close the door to its use as a means of mass annihilation. "The use of this discovery only for the purpose of promoting the welfare of the peoples and widening their scientific and cultural horizons," A. A. Gromyko, then the Soviet representative in the Atomic Energy Commission, said, "will help to strengthen confidence between countries and friendly relations between them. On the other hand, to continue the use of this

* *A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy. Washington, London, 1946, p. VI.*

discovery for the production of weapons of mass destruction is likely to intensify mistrust between states and to keep the peoples of the world in continual anxiety and uncertainty.”**

The Soviet proposal for an international convention banning nuclear arms was welcomed and supported by democratic opinion throughout the world. The British association of scientists adopted a Memorandum which stated that the convention was extremely desirable and it was hard to justify the reluctance of the United Kingdom and the USA to agree with this.

However, since the banning of nuclear weapons did not enter into the plans of the USA, its representatives used the US-controlled majority vote in the UN to reject the Soviet proposals on the spurious argument that the Soviet Union was against the control of atomic energy, that in its proposals the question of control was passed over in silence and that these proposals provided loopholes for circumventing the provisions on the banning of atomic weapons.

There were no grounds whatsoever for assertions of that kind, which were obviously designed to mislead public opinion regarding the substance of the Soviet proposals. When the Soviet Union submitted the draft convention on banning nuclear weapons it proposed setting up a special agency to work out measures for organising control of the fulfilment of an agreement banning these weapons. On June 11, 1947, to facilitate the speedy solution of this problem, the Soviet Union submitted to the UN Atomic Energy Commission a detailed proposal regarding the organisation and system of nuclear energy control.

This proposal provided for strict international control “simultaneously of all enterprises engaged in the extraction of atomic raw materials and in the production of atomic materials and nuclear energy”.*** It was suggested that the Security Council should set up an international control commission that would periodically inspect enterprises extracting atomic raw materials or producing atomic materials and nuclear energy. This control agency would have broad powers, including the right of access to and

* *Official Records, United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, Second Meeting, June 19, 1946, pp. 23-30.*

** *50 let borby SSSR za razoruzheniye, A Collection of Documents, Moscow, 1967, p. 219.*

inspection of any enterprise extracting, manufacturing or storing atomic raw and other materials, or using atomic energy, and also the right to conduct a special inspection in cases where it is suspected that there has been an infringement of the agreement on banning nuclear weapons. This proposal was ample evidence of the Soviet Union's readiness to implement all the necessary measures for the establishment of a system of international control that would deliver mankind from the threat of a destructive nuclear war. Its realisation would have opened all enterprises producing atomic materials and nuclear energy to international inspection. This would have enabled the control agency to keep itself fully posted on the situation in the manufacture and use of atomic materials in any country and at any enterprise. This Soviet proposal completely refuted the US propaganda allegation that the Soviet Union was opposed to control of atomic energy.

Since US policy was set against banning atomic weapons, the US Government showed no interest in the Soviet proposals for the control of atomic energy. It counted on utilising that weapon to reinforce its political and economic positions in Europe, the Middle East and Asia. US imperialism regarded the atomic bomb as a means of achieving world supremacy. Some prominent US politicians went so far as to urge a nuclear war against the Soviet Union.

However, the USA could not afford to reject out of hand the proposals for banning atomic weapons. It had to reckon with world opinion, which was demanding the speediest removal of the threat of a nuclear war. In order to evade the issue, the USA rejected the Soviet proposals for control of atomic energy on the pretext that they were unacceptable. It was argued that the periodic inspection and special investigations envisaged in the Soviet proposals were an insufficient guarantee against the concealment of dangerous materials.* Further, it was contended that the enforcement of control only after the convention on banning nuclear weapons came into operation did not guarantee the security of the countries committed to the non-use of atomic weapons and to the destruction of their stockpiles of these weapons.

* *United Nations, Atomic Energy Commission 1946-1948, AEC/C. 1/76, April 8, 1948.*

Moreover, it was asserted that according to the Soviet proposals the international control agency would "have no other means of enforcing its rules and recommendations . . . than by appealing to the Security Council".* What the USA wanted was that the control agency should be in a position to lay down the line for governments in armaments and nuclear policy and also in other political issues. US diplomacy was opposed to linking the control agency with the UN Security Council and insisted that the unanimity ruling in the UN Charter giving the five permanent members of the Security Council the veto should not be adopted in the control agency.

By demanding that the control agency should have the right to enforce its decision in circumvention of the Security Council, the US Government counted on using that agency for its own political aims and, above all, for the preservation of its monopoly of atomic weapons. Inasmuch as most of the bourgeois states in those years depended on US imperialism and accepted its political leadership, the US Government hoped that in the control agency it would have a solid majority that would allow it to dictate its will to the Soviet Union and other countries.

The Soviet Union stood firm against the pressure from the USA and its Western partners to give the control agency rights and functions in contravention of the UN Charter and the Security Council's rights as stated in the Charter. The USSR insisted on the unanimity principle in any decision of issues in cases where this was required by the UN Charter. In international bodies the Soviet representatives showed that the US demands were incompatible with the provisions of the UN Charter and the sovereign rights of countries. This firm stand prevented the USA from using its voting machine in the UN and its monopoly of nuclear weapons to dictate its will to other countries.

Wishing to clear the way to an agreement on banning nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union specified its former proposals for disarmament control. It accepted the Western demand that a convention on nuclear energy control should be signed simultaneously with the enforcement of the ban

* *United Nations. Atomic Energy Commission 1946-1948, AEC/C. 1/76, April 8, 1948.*

on nuclear weapons. At the 3rd General Assembly in 1948 the Soviet delegation proposed the simultaneous enforcement of the ban on nuclear weapons and of control of that ban. This was a further major step towards drawing the Soviet stand closer to that of the Western powers in the question of controlling the ban on nuclear weapons. Somewhat later the Soviet Union agreed also to the demand that control and inspection of the ban on nuclear weapons should be not periodic but constant, without, of course, the right to interfere in the internal affairs of countries. The pertinent proposal was submitted to the 6th General Assembly in January 1952 in order to remove yet another of the barriers erected by the Western powers to the banning of nuclear weapons.

But even these proposals, which were a concession to the position adopted by the USA and its Western partners, did not lead to a solution of the nuclear problem. The efforts to sign an agreement banning nuclear weapons under international control came up against a blank wall. The United States and its allies—Britain, France and other Western states—steadily departed from the policy of peaceful co-operation with socialist countries and from the quest for a peaceful settlement of outstanding international issues. They adopted a “positions of strength” policy based on the threat to use armed force, including nuclear weapons. They concentrated on forming aggressive military blocs—NATO, SEATO and others—and started a feverish arms race. The USA staked mainly on enlarging its nuclear stockpile, openly declaring its intention, under certain circumstances, to use this weapon. In fact, during the Korean war influential circles in the USA demanded the use of atomic bombs against the armed forces of the Korean People’s Democratic Republic and the Chinese volunteers.

But these plans could not be put into effect. The international situation had changed. A major factor behind that change was that by the beginning of the 1950s the USA had lost its monopoly of nuclear weapons. On September 25, 1949 TASS reported that the Soviet Union had discovered the secret of nuclear weapons and now had such weapons at its disposal.* The report referred to a statement made by the

* *Izvestia*, September 25, 1949.

Soviet Foreign Minister on November 6, 1947 to the effect that the atomic bomb had long ago ceased to be a secret. This report, which had world-wide repercussions, showed that the Western "experts" had been wrong in believing that the Soviet Union would not have nuclear weapons for a long time. The Soviet Union not only unravelled the secret of manufacturing nuclear weapons but made rapid progress in the production of the most powerful thermonuclear devices.

The Soviet Union's conspicuous achievements in science and technology, especially in the sphere of nuclear and thermonuclear energy, put an end to a difficult and dangerous period in international life when the USA pursued an aggressive policy founded on its monopoly of nuclear weapons and tried to impose its will on many countries.

The Soviet Union's ceaseless efforts to secure the banning of nuclear weapons and institute control of the ban powerfully influenced post-war international developments. The Soviet proposals created the possibility of settling the major international problem springing from the use of great scientific discoveries for purposes of destruction. These proposals won the approval and support of broad democratic circles in all countries. A vivid expression of the demand of these circles for the banning of nuclear weapons was the Appeal adopted by the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress in Stockholm in March 1950. The Appeal called for the unconditional banning of nuclear weapons under strict international control. "We," the Appeal stated, "consider that any Government that uses atomic weapons against any country first shall be committing a crime against mankind and must be regarded as a war criminal."

The historic significance of the struggle which the Soviet Union, along with progressive forces in all countries, waged in 1946-1952 for the banning of nuclear weapons was that the mobilisation of world democratic opinion led to the erection of a barrier to the use of nuclear weapons by the USA for mercenary aims. In face of the Soviet Union's might, its consummate diplomacy and the support given it by broad democratic circles in different countries, the US imperialists did not venture to use nuclear weapons in the period when they had a monopoly of these weapons.

2. The USSR's Struggle to Reduce Conventional Armaments and Armed Forces (1946-1952)

In order to strengthen peace and security after the Second World War the Soviet Union used its best endeavours to achieve not only an international agreement banning nuclear weapons but also an agreement on a reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. Alongside the demand for the banning of nuclear weapons, this was a major issue in Soviet foreign policy. The problem of disarmament became particularly acute on account of the frenzied arms race started by the USA soon after the Second World War. Military expenditures and the numerical strength of the armed forces were steadily increased in the USA and also in Britain, France and other Western countries. The arms race in these countries was accompanied by intensified nuclear production and stockpiling in the USA. An idea of the scale of this arms race is given by the following data on the build-up of the armed forces of the USA and other countries after the war. In the period from 1949 to 1957 the Armed Forces of the United States were increased from 1,600,000 to 2,800,000 effectives and of France from 589,000 to 1,200,000 effectives, while Britain too maintained large military units.* Even more indicative is the growth of military expenditures and the increase of their share in the budgets of the Western countries. Military spending grew faster than the numerical strength of the armed forces on account of the growth of the cost of armaments. From 1949 to 1959 military expenditures in the USA more than trebled, increasing from US \$13,500 million to US \$46,600 million, in Britain from US \$2,200 million to US \$4,460 million, and in France from US \$1,400 million to US \$3,600 million. The military budgets of small countries grew at a similar rate after they joined NATO. For instance, in that decade Turkey nearly quadrupled her military spending from 556 million to 2,153 million liras, and Greece increased her military expenditures from 1,600 million to 4,700 million

* *Militarizm. Razoruzheniye*, a book of reference. Moscow, 1963, p. 39; also see *Borba Sovetskogo Soyuza za razoruzheniye*, Moscow, 1961, pp. 228-29.

drachmas.* In only the period from 1949 to 1953 aggregate military spending of the NATO members rose from US \$18,500 million to US \$65,500 million.**

The build-up of conventional and nuclear armaments by the USA and the other Western powers aggravated the international situation and created tension in the relations between states. The arms race thereby hindered the settlement of many outstanding post-war problems, including the German, Austrian, Far East and other questions. It intensified the cold war, which other Western countries joined under pressure from the USA. Countries that had formed the Hitler coalition and were then drawn into the US-headed military blocs—the FRG, Italy and Japan—began to arm rapidly with assistance from the USA and other Western countries.

Western propaganda peddled the view that the arms race was only the consequence of the aggravated international situation and that increased military strength would give the West more chances of settling outstanding international issues on its own terms. Hence the conclusion that armaments and armed forces should not be reduced before key outstanding international issues, above all the German question, were settled. This approach to disarmament was a manifestation of the “positions of strength” policy pursued by US imperialism.

The Soviet Union, on the contrary, wanted to normalise the international situation, achieve a peaceful settlement of outstanding international issues and halt the arms race. Its policy was directed at securing the earliest possible conclusion of an agreement on disarmament. With full grounds the Soviet Government saw in disarmament a means of relaxing world tension and facilitating the settlement of disputed international problems. As early as at the 1st General Assembly in 1946 the USSR raised the question of reducing armaments and armed forces. It submitted a draft resolution that stated in part: “In the interests of strengthening world peace and security and in conformity with the

* *Zapadnaya Yevropa: militarizm i razoruzheniye*, Moscow, 1966, pp. 8-9; also see *Militarizm. Razoruzheniye*, pp. 81-82.

** *Economic Report of the President Transmitted to the Congress, February 1970*, Washington, 1970, p. 177.

aims and principles of the United Nations Organisation the General Assembly recognises that a general reduction of armaments is necessary.”*

In a situation where the race for conventional arms was accompanied by a rapid expansion of the manufacture and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and especially where US imperialist foreign policy was based on a monopoly possession of these weapons, it would have been unjustified to raise the question of reducing armaments without a simultaneous banning of nuclear weapons. In order to remove the menace of a nuclear war the Soviet Union insisted that the conclusion of an arms reduction agreement should be accompanied by an agreement banning nuclear weapons. In the Soviet draft resolution on general disarmament it was stated that “the enforcement of the decision on reducing armaments must include, as a primary aim, the banning of the manufacture and use of atomic energy for military purposes”.**

The question of a general reduction of armaments, including the banning of nuclear weapons, was raised by the Soviet Union together with the question of ensuring the appropriate international control of disarmament. For this purpose it proposed the establishment of two international agencies within the framework of the UN Security Council: a commission to control the fulfilment of the decision on an arms reduction and a commission to control the fulfilment of the decision banning the use of atomic energy for military purposes.*** To ensure the appropriate control of disarmament the Soviet Union declared it was prepared to exchange information on armaments and armed forces with other countries.****

However, the Soviet proposal for disarmament did not chime in with the USA's plans for broad political and economic expansion in Europe, Asia and other parts of the world. US policy called for the accelerated manufacture of nuclear weapons, the building of a large network of US military bases on foreign territory and the formation of

* *Izvestia*, October 31, 1946.

** *Ibid.*

*** *Izvestia*, November 29, 1946.

**** *Izvestia*, November 27, 1946.

aggressive military blocs. The USA high-handedly interfered in the internal affairs of other countries, setting up or supporting reactionary regimes in these countries and fighting the democratic and national liberation movements. In pursuance of this policy it erected every possible barrier to the settlement of the disarmament problem.

When the question of disarmament was considered in United Nations agencies the USA and the other Western powers stipulated various preliminary terms, which they knew were unacceptable to the USSR and many other countries and would obstruct disarmament. Terms of this kind were: the conclusion of peace treaties with Germany and Japan worded in such a way as to accord to US claims to supremacy in Europe and the Far East; the formation of UN "international" armed forces that would be, in effect, a weapon of US expansion; the establishment of "international" control of atomic energy that would help to preserve the US monopoly of nuclear arms. One of the Western terms for disarmament was the preliminary establishment of control of existing armed forces prior to the conclusion of an agreement.

By stipulating terms for disarmament that were unacceptable to the USSR and many other countries, the Western powers destroyed the possibility of reaching agreement on this issue. Their propaganda tried to shift the blame for the breakdown of the disarmament talks on the Soviet Union. Playing on the aspirations of the peoples who were demanding the earliest possible disarmament, the Western powers sought to force the Soviet Union into making political concessions for a settlement of various outstanding international issues.

For instance, making their agreement to disarmament conditional on the conclusion of peace treaties with Germany and Japan on terms dictated by the USA,* they sought to present Soviet policy in a false light, alleging that it was obstructing the post-war peaceful settlement. By insisting on setting up "international" armed forces under the UN flag as a condition for reducing armaments, US diplomacy endeavoured to circumvent the UN Charter, one of whose provisions was that member countries would place armed

* See Chapter Seventeen.

forces at the disposal of the Security Council; this was an attempt to form ostensibly international but essentially US-led armed forces consisting of contingents from countries belonging to the United Nations. Having in those years an assured majority of votes in the UN, the USA counted on having these armed forces entirely at its own disposal.

Well aware of the fact that such UN armed forces would be used as a weapon of US imperialism in violation of the UN Charter, the Soviet Union emphatically rejected the US proposals for the formation of this "international" armed force.

At the disarmament talks the Western powers invariably gave prominence to the question of control and inspection. For instance, the US proposals envisaged the compiling of information on the organisation of armed forces, their strength and location, the type of equipment, logistics, manufacturing plants, shipbuilding yards, overhaul and repair plants, laboratories, training and research centres, military headquarters, supply and distribution depots, power plants, communication and signal equipment, and so on.*

At these talks the other Western powers likewise insisted on control and inspection as a preliminary condition for any step towards disarmament. Regarding the plan for the UN Commission for Conventional Armaments the British Government stipulated that the creation of an effective system of international control and inspection must precede the adoption of a system for regulating and reducing armaments.** Control of existing armed forces figured prominently also in the French proposals. They called for a census of all "military and para-military forces, active and reserve, on full-time or part-time basis" and of all conventional armaments, and also verification of the census data. Moreover, it was required that the "control organ should enjoy... the greatest possible freedom of movement and access to data fully depicting the level of conventional armaments and effectiveness".***

* *United Nations*. Security Council Document 3/SC. 3/25 of July 13, 1950.

** *United Nations*. Security Council Document 3/SC. 3/27 of September 17, 1947.

*** *United Nations*. Security Council Document 3/SC. 3/21 of May 26, 1949.

Thus, under the pretext of creating an "atmosphere of trust" as a preliminary condition for a disarmament agreement, the Western powers tried to set up a large network of military espionage on the territory of the future signatories of a disarmament agreement, notably the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This approach to the disarmament problem was a threat to the security of the USSR and many other countries. Control of existing armed forces and the disclosure of defence systems would have been used by militarist circles and the general staffs of the imperialist powers to plan aggression against the socialist countries. Far from helping to settle the disarmament problem, this approach only led to a further exacerbation of the international situation. The sole object of the demands and the preliminary conditions which the USA and other Western powers made in those years was to drag out and ultimately wreck the settlement of this vital problem.

While rejecting the clearly unacceptable preliminary terms of the Western powers for an agreement on a reduction of armaments and armed forces, Soviet diplomacy exposed the real aims of the policy pursued by the USA and its allies in the question of disarmament. In reply to the Western preliminary conditions, that were allegedly designed to ensure international trust and security, the Soviet Government noted that disarmament was precisely the key factor that would help to relax world tension, create trust between states and guarantee the security of nations. It pointed out that the arms race and, in particular, the manufacture of nuclear weapons were whipping up world tension and creating a direct threat to peace and security.

The fact that the USA and other Western countries were gripped by war propaganda and were urging an attack on the socialist countries induced the USSR to propose measures against war propaganda and the warmongers at the 2nd General Assembly in the autumn of 1947. It proposed "banning, on pain of punishment, all forms of war propaganda and the adoption of measures to prevent and halt war propaganda as socially dangerous activities threatening the vital interests and security of peace-loving peoples".* This proposal received the support of democratic opinion in many

* *Izvestia*, September 20, 1947.

countries. In November 1947 it was used as the basis for an important resolution of the General Assembly condemning "all forms of propaganda, in whatsoever country conducted, which is either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression".* There was a favourable response to this resolution from people desiring lasting world peace and security.

Despite this favourable response, the resolution was ignored by the capitalist countries, who continued disseminating war propaganda and thereby still further aggravating the international situation and fanning the cold war.

To halt this unfavourable development of the international situation and help to strengthen peace the Soviet Union suggested a concrete and simple solution to the disarmament problem. At the 3rd General Assembly in the autumn of 1948 it proposed that in the course of a year the five permanent members of the Security Council—the USA, the USSR, China, Britain and France—should reduce their land, sea and air forces by one-third as the first step towards the reduction of armaments and armed forces. In addition, it proposed the banning of nuclear weapons as weapons of aggression.** To ensure the realisation of this clear-cut and extremely simple disarmament plan, it was suggested that the Security Council should set up an international control agency which the above-mentioned five countries would provide with complete official data on the state of their armed forces.

Besides urging the reduction of conventional armaments and the banning of nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union made a number of important proposals in the UN designed to create an atmosphere of trust between countries and facilitate agreement on disarmament issues. At the 4th General Assembly in the autumn of 1949 the Soviet Union proposed that the five powers—the USA, the USSR, China, Britain and France—should sign a pact on the consolidation of peace. Further, the Soviet Union suggested the dissolution of military blocs and the dismantling of military bases in

* *United Nations. Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Resolutions, September 16-November 29, 1947, New York, p. 14.*

** *Izvestia, September 26, 1948.*

foreign territory. In the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet delegation to the 6th General Assembly in the autumn of 1951 it was suggested declaring "participation in the aggressive Atlantic bloc and the creation by certain states, and primarily by the United States of America, of military, naval and air bases in foreign territory incompatible with membership of the United Nations".* For its part, the Soviet Union took steps to dismantle its military bases in foreign countries. As early as February 14, 1950 the Soviet Union signed an agreement with the People's Republic of China providing for, among other measures, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the jointly used naval base at Port Arthur and the transfer of all the installations at that base to the People's Republic of China.

Far from accepting the Soviet proposal for the dissolution of military alliances and the dismantling of military bases in foreign territory, the Western powers stepped up their efforts to enlarge the Atlantic bloc and increase the armaments and armed forces of its members.

In order to conceal the militarist design of its policy of wrecking the disarmament talks, the USA started a propaganda campaign round the reorganisation of the UN agencies. On its insistence the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments were dissolved and replaced by an Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission under the Security Council "for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments".** The reorganisation of the UN disarmament agencies went on for more than a year and, as a consequence, the disarmament talks were in effect suspended.

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In view of the aggressive policies of the Western powers all the efforts made by the Soviet Union in the period from 1946 to 1952 to achieve an effective settlement of the disarmament problem did not yield the desired results. Developments made it abundantly clear that the USA and

* *UN General Assembly*. Sixth Session. A/1944, November 8, 1951.

** *UN General Assembly*. Sixth Session. 1/667, December 13, 1951.

its military bloc partners were by no means eager to reach agreement on disarmament. The war that broke out between North and South Korea in the summer of 1950 and the USA's intervention in that war still further aggravated the already tense international situation and raised greater obstacles than ever before to an agreement on disarmament. The swift arms race was stepped up to immense proportions, evidence of this being the expansion of the USA's military expenditures and the steady numerical growth of its Armed Forces.

Thus, despite the efforts of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving states to secure an international agreement on a general reduction of armaments and armed forces, no progress was made towards the solution of this problem in the period from 1946 to 1952. By 1952 the disarmament talks had come to a standstill. Nevertheless, the struggle which the Soviet Union and other socialist countries waged for disarmament was of immense significance in that it greatly influenced the international developments of that period, exposing the aggressive policies of the imperialist powers and mobilising and uniting the peace-loving peoples and progressive forces of all countries against the expansionist designs of the Western powers, in defence of peace and world security. The peace-seeking foreign policy of the Soviet Union prevented the imperialist powers from starting another world war in that extremely tense period in international relations.

THE USSR AND THE PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE FAR EAST

1. The Defeat of Japan and the Problem of a Peace Settlement

The termination of the Second World War and post-war economic and political developments brought fundamental changes to the life of the peoples and the international situation both in Europe and in the Far East. Japan's defeat signified more than the collapse of a rival of the USA and Britain in the struggle for supremacy in the Pacific. It marked the downfall of world reaction's shock detachment in Asia, of the most active adversary of the national liberation movement in China and the rest of the Far East, of a country that was constantly threatening the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan and the decisive part that it played in crushing the aggressor's land forces powerfully influenced developments in Asia. The USSR's participation in defeating Japan and the presence of strong Soviet forces in the Far East were a great help to the progressive forces in that region.

The disintegration of the Japanese colonial empire was the direct result of Japan's defeat. The Japanese invaders were driven out of China, Korea and Taiwan ceased to be Japanese colonies. The liberation movement acquired immense proportions in China and other countries of the Far East and Southeast Asia.

The Soviet Union recovered its rights to the Kuril Islands and Southern Sakhalin, which had been key strategic strongpoints of Japanese imperialism in the Northwestern Pacific and strengthened its position as a great Pacific power.

All this created favourable conditions for a peace settlement that could ensure lasting peace and independence for the peoples and countries of the Far East. Japan's conversion into a peace-loving democratic state would have been a major factor leading towards such a settlement.

The Soviet Government held that the victory over militarist Japan had to be backed up by that country's demilitarisation and democratisation and by the conclusion of a peace treaty that would enable Japan to develop as a peace-loving, independent country, rebuild her economy and promote her foreign trade. Moreover, this would have ruled out the possibility of Japan sliding back into a policy of aggression.

This attitude conformed to the peace settlement programme agreed upon during the war at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. The Soviet Government worked consistently to give effect to the decisions passed by these conferences.

However, a just settlement of the Far Eastern problems was obstructed by the USA and other imperialist powers, who directed their efforts towards crushing the national liberation revolutions in Asia. The US imperialists ignored Soviet interests in the Pacific and hindered the development of friendly relations between the USSR and the Asian countries. At the same time the USA sought to oust the old colonial powers—Britain, France and the Netherlands—from their colonial possessions and gain undivided control of the raw material sources and markets of South and Southeast Asia and the Far East. It nourished the capitalist system in Japan, relied on the reactionary forces in that defeated country, prevented that major Far Eastern industrial power from taking the road of progressive development and made every effort to turn Japan into a stronghold of its influence in the Far East and the Pacific.

2. Establishment of US Control Over Japan

Japan signed the act of surrender on September 2, 1945. General Douglas MacArthur, the US Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific, was appointed commander of the Allied forces of occupation. The US imperialists were determined to

become the undisputed masters of Japan, occupy her with their own troops and keep the other Allies out of that country. The US Government declined the Soviet offer to participate in the military occupation of Japanese territory, specifically the northern part of Hokkaido. Besides the USA, Britain was the only other Allied power with occupation troops in Japan. These were very small units and were subordinated to MacArthur.

In the evening of September 2, 1945 the Japanese Foreign Ministry received from MacArthur's headquarters an order instituting a military administration throughout the territory of Japan. On the next day Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu called on MacArthur. He was in a state of alarm and pleaded with the US General to rescind the order, stating that if the Allies counted on effectuating the Potsdam Declaration their most reasonable course of action would be to pursue an occupation policy through the Japanese Government.* In this way the Japanese ruling circles hoped to retain the reins of government and subsequently restore Japanese imperialism to its pre-war position in Asia. The Japanese Government's offer to co-operate with the occupation authorities and act as the agency for the enforcement of the occupation policy was accepted by the US Government.

The Americans intended to chart their policy toward occupied Japan separately without taking the opinion of their Allies or the recent joint decisions of the Allied powers into consideration. This was put bluntly in a State Department document headed "Basic Principles of US Policy Toward Japan in the Early Period of Occupation" published on September 23, 1945. These "Basic Principles" oriented the Allied (actually the US) Commander-in-Chief toward the single-handed implementation of a policy designed to further the interests of US imperialism.

True, on account of the victorious termination of the war against fascism and the tremendous upsurge of democratic activity on the part of the people of Japan the US Government could not side-step the question of democratic reforms. It was compelled to include in the "Basic Principles" the

* *Istoriya voyny na Tikhom okeane*, translated from the Japanese, Vol. V, Moscow, 1958, p. 93.

promise to democratise Japan, uproot the ideas of militarism and ensure peaceful economic development.*

US imperialism planned measures to weaken Japan as a rival and at the same time direct the revolutionary democratic movement in Japan into the channel of bourgeois reforms. It strove to inject American ideas into the Japanese system of administration, reshape it to suit its interests and bring the Japanese monopolies under its control.

For its part, the Japanese Government took steps to preserve the financial basis of the Japanese big bourgeoisie. In a matter of two weeks, with feverish speed, huge material assets of the armed forces (valued at nearly 100,000 million yen) were distributed among the industrialists. In order to safeguard the officers corps the army was quickly demobilised. This preserved for the future the possibility of reviving Japanese militarism, a deadly enemy of the peace and independence of the peoples of the Far East.

This prospect gave the Soviet Government cause for anxiety. On September 22, 1945 it suggested to the USA a Four-Power treaty as a guarantee against any renewal of Japanese aggression.** For a long time there was no reply from Washington. Finally, after a number of reminders, in March 1946 the US Government suggested that the USA, Britain, the USSR and Kuomintang China sign a treaty on the disarmament and demilitarisation of Japan.

However, the American draft treaty, forwarded to the Soviet Government in June 1946, contained no effective guarantees of Japan's demilitarisation and her peaceful and democratic development. The decisions on the basic problems springing from the treaty were to be adopted by a majority vote. This would have reduced the USSR to an unequal position.***

* *Kairinskaya deklaratsiya, Krymskoye soglasheniye, Potsdamskaya deklaratsiya, resheniye Moskovskogo Soveshchaniya i drugiye dokumenty, svyazannyye s kapitulyatsiyey Yaponii, zbornik dokumentov, 1943-1946, Moscow, 1947, pp. 43-44.*

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Record of a conversation on September 22, 1945 between the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and the US Secretary of State.

*** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Letter of June 15, 1946 from the US Ambassador in the USSR Walter Bedell Smith to the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Solomon Lozovsky containing the American draft treaty on Japan's disarmament and demilitarisation.

In particular, Article IV of the American draft stated that the Control Commission, to be set up on a quadrilateral basis for the purpose of inspection, would decide all issues by a majority vote. In the event the provisions on disarmament and demilitarisation were violated, the Soviet Union would have no right to demand the adoption of effective measures against these violations if the representatives of the USA, Britain and China did not see eye to eye with the Soviet representative. The US Government, however, refused to consider the Soviet Union's substantiated and legitimate objections to the draft.

3. Decisions of the Three-Power Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference on Japan

With every right and on the basis of the pertinent provisions recorded in Allied agreements, the Soviet Government insisted on Soviet participation in the control of the occupation policy in Japan. It took a series of steps designed to prevent the establishment of American domination over the Japanese people. In a Memorandum to the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers Council in London on September 24, 1945 the Soviet Government suggested setting up a Control Council for Japan consisting of representatives of four powers (the USA, Britain, the USSR and China). Parallel with this, it was suggested that an Allied Consultative Commission should be formed which would include, in addition to the above four powers, representatives of other countries that had fought in the war against Japan.* However, with the backing of the British representative, the US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes refused to discuss this matter.**

American diplomacy decided to place the USSR and other countries before a fait accompli. In October 1945 the USA announced the formation of a Far Eastern Consultative

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Letter of October 1, 1945 from the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the US Secretary of State. Also see *Izvestia*, October 3, 1945.

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Record of a conversation on September 26, 1945 between the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the US Secretary of State and the British Foreign Secretary.

Commission consisting of representatives of nine countries (the USA, the USSR, China, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the Netherlands), which had signed the act of Japan's surrender.

The Soviet Government did not deny the expediency of such a consultative commission, but it felt that political, economic and financial problems should be handled by an organ through whose agency the four Allied powers that had played the principal role in defeating Japan could pursue a co-ordinated policy toward Japan and jointly bear the responsibility for that policy. The establishment of such an organ (the Control Council for Japan), it maintained, should precede the formation of an Allied Consultative Commission.*

Key problems of international politics such as the conclusion of peace treaties with Germany's former allies and so forth could not be settled without taking the Soviet attitude into account. This compelled the USA to reconsider some aspects of its own attitude. As a result of a correspondence between the Heads of Government of the USA and the USSR and also of the Soviet-US talks this question was raised at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA and Britain in Moscow in December 1945.

At that Conference a compromise decision was reached on the principles for giving effect to the terms of Japan's surrender. The USA had to agree to the disbandment of the Far Eastern Consultative Commission and to the formation of two new organs.

One of these was the Far Eastern Commission consisting of representatives of 11 countries: the USSR, the USA, Britain, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and the Philippines. Subsequently, representatives of Burma and Pakistan were admitted to the Commission. The Commission's headquarters were in Washington. The other organ, on whose formation agreement was reached at the Moscow Conference, was the Allied Council for Japan consisting of four members (one each from the USA, the USSR and China and one representing Britain, Australia, New Zealand and India). The Council's headquarters were in Tokyo.

* *Uneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza v period Otechestvennoi voyny. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1947, pp. 71-72.

The Far Eastern Commission had the task of "charting the policy, principles and general grounds under which Japan could carry out her obligations in accordance with the terms of the surrender".* In the Commission the decisions were adopted by a majority vote provided there was agreement between the representatives of the USSR, the USA, Britain and China. In the decision of the Japanese problem the principle of unanimity among the Great Powers was thus established in the Commission. The US Government's plenary powers were confined to a definite legal framework: it drafted directives and sent them to the Commander-in-Chief. However, these directives had to conform to the policy laid down by the Far Eastern Commission. It was stipulated that directives on essential changes, namely, in the Constitution, the control regime, a change of Government and so forth, would be given to the Commander-in-Chief by the US Government with the agreement of the Commission.

Whereas the Far Eastern Commission was set above the Commander-in-Chief, the Allied Council for Japan was largely an advisory body, which the Commander-in-Chief pledged to consult before issuing orders on matters of substantial importance.** A vital point was that each member of the Council had the right to halt the actions of the Commander-in-Chief on essential matters and turn the dispute over to the Far Eastern Commission.

The system of joint administration envisaged in the decisions of the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference created some foundation for joint Allied control over the Commander-in-Chief and for the attainment of the principal objectives of the occupation, namely, the democratisation and demilitarisation of Japan. These decisions of the Moscow Conference were a breakthrough for Soviet diplomacy at this stage. Under the influence of the USSR, which had strong support from the democratic forces of many countries, and also under the impact of popular action in Japan herself the USA had to proclaim and give effect to some measures that led to a certain democratisation of Japan.

* *Uneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza v period Otechestvennoi voiny. Dokumenty i materialy*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1947, p. 156.

** *Ibid.*, p. 159.

4. Soviet Moves to Secure Japan's Democratisation and Demilitarisation

While the Soviet Union strove to turn the Allied control organs—the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council—into effective agencies of international co-operation, the USA regarded them as a hindrance to its plans. It went to all lengths to paralyse these organs and keep the Soviet Union away from the decision of problems linked with the occupation policy in Japan.

The Far Eastern Commission took more than a year to work out and finally, on June 19, 1947, adopted a decision on basic policy toward Japan after the surrender. This decision defined what had to be done to achieve a democratic reorganisation of Japan and preclude her remilitarisation.

Also important were the Far Eastern Commission's decisions on the basic principles of the new Japanese Constitution, on the principles for the organisation of the trade unions, on the reduction of Japan's war industry potential, on an agrarian reform, on a revision of the Japanese system of education, and so on.

The US Government began to ignore the Far Eastern Commission openly in 1948. Whereas during the first 15 months of its operation the Commission passed 41 decisions, in the next 18 months (up to the close of 1948) it adopted only 13 decisions and, lastly, during the concluding 18 months of its existence (from the beginning of 1949 to mid-1950) it passed only nine decisions.*

The US occupation authorities hindered the work of the Allied Council for Japan as well. They reduced it to a silent registrar of the actions of the US Commander-in-Chief. The Council was inactive from the second half of 1948 until its disbandment in 1952.

In both these bodies most of the proposals of the Soviet representatives were rejected by the USA and its allies. However, this does not mean that the struggle waged by Soviet diplomacy in these agencies was useless. Soviet criticism of the actions of the occupation authorities and of

* *The Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 23, No. 581, August 21, 1950, p. 283.

the directives of the US Government and also the Soviet proposals for the achievement of the tasks that confronted the Allies paved the way for the realisation of some democratic measures, made it difficult for the US authorities to pursue a reactionary policy and co-operate with reactionary circles in Japan, and facilitated the struggle of the progressive Japanese parties and organisations against the forces of reaction.

A sharp struggle flared up round the draft of the new Japanese Constitution. The US occupation authorities regarded the imperial system as a convenient vehicle for US policy. MacArthur cynically declared that the Emperor had the strength of 20 divisions.*

In order to give the imperial regime a somewhat more "democratic" façade, MacArthur suggested that the Emperor publish a declaration repudiating his "divine origin". He placed the former Prime Minister Prince Fumimaro Konoye at the head of the work of altering the 1889 Constitution. The Konoye draft called for the preservation of the imperial system and the House of Peers. It differed little from the drafts drawn up by the bourgeois parties.

These drafts were sharply criticised abroad and in Japan herself. The Soviet Government favoured the abolition of the imperial system. China was inclined to adopt the same stand. However, the USA insisted on preserving the Emperor as a "symbol"*** on the pattern of the British monarchy. Still, as MacArthur admitted, the USA had to make concessions to the Soviet Union in the implementation of the decisions on Japan's democratisation and demilitarisation. It also had to reckon with the influence of the popular democratic movement in Japan.

Amendments were introduced into the drafts drawn up by the Japanese reactionaries. Notable amendments were the introduction of an article on Japan's renunciation of war as a sovereign right and the use of armed force as a means of settling disputes with other nations, and an article forbidding Japan to have armed forces. These were progressive amendments, but it should not be forgotten that in accepting them the Americans pursued their own imperialist objectives

* *Istoriya voyny na Tikhom okeane*, Vol., V, p. 117.

** *Ibid.*, p. 119.

of weakening Japan and excluding the possibility of her restoration as a rival in the Pacific. The memory of the crushing defeats inflicted on the USA by Japan was still fresh in the minds of MacArthur and his advisors.

At the time the USA counted on Kuomintang China becoming its mainstay and ally in the Far East.

A concession to democratic opinion in Japan and to the Soviet Union was the proclamation of some basic civil liberties in the Constitution.

The Soviet Government insisted that the Constitution should in fact be democratic. At the discussion of the draft in the Far Eastern Commission on September 19, 1946 the Soviet representative suggested that the sovereign rights of the people should be specified more exactly and lucidly and that the Parliament (Diet) should have wider powers, in particular the right to appoint not only the Prime Minister but also the other Cabinet ministers, and the right to elect members of the Supreme Court.*

These suggestions were not accepted.

In October 1946 the draft Constitution was approved by both houses of Parliament and it came into force on May 3, 1947. Despite its bourgeois limitations and inconsistency, the new Constitution was a considerable step forward compared with the reactionary and archaic Constitution of 1889. The Constitution's anti-war character gave the democratic forces in Japan a certain legal basis for their struggle against the country's remilitarisation and its involvement in military blocs.

The US occupation authorities did not consider that it was necessary to break up Japan's old state apparatus. On the contrary, they kept it intact, confining themselves to the expulsion of some militarists, who had conspicuously compromised themselves during the war, and to the punishment of people known for their anti-American attitude. They calculated that this sort of reorganisation of the state apparatus would suit them best and that at the same time it would enhance the prestige of "American democracy" among the Japanese people. A directive was issued on the purge of state and public institutions. The USA agreed to set up

* *Sbornik zayavlenii, predlozhenii i zaprosov predstavitel'nykh SSSR v Dalnevostochnoi Komissii*, Moscow, 1950, p. 17-18.

an International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The purge was conducted by the Japanese Government, which sought to turn it into a farce. Financial circles and the monopolies, which had inspired the policy of aggression, were unaffected by the purge. Of the 660,000 officials who were screened, less than 7,000 were dismissed.

The Soviet representatives on the International Military Tribunal tried to make the trial of the chief Japanese war criminals a means of publicly condemning aggression, militarism and fascism. But the USA used the trial as a means of demonstrating the military might of the imperialist victor and impressing on the Japanese that any attempt to fight US imperialism was doomed to failure.

The agrarian reform was of immense significance. The domination of feudal and militarist elements rested on the solid foundation of landed proprietorship. Japanese democratic opinion, therefore, demanded a reorganisation above all in the countryside.

At the third sitting of the Allied Council the Soviet representative proposed a discussion of the question of an agrarian reform and on May 29, 1946 submitted a draft that conformed to the demands of the Japanese peasantry.

On October 11, 1946 the Japanese Diet passed an agrarian reform bill based on a British draft, which limited the size of holdings to three hectares (12 hectares on Hokkaido). Surplus landowner land was turned over to the peasants, who had to pay a redemption for it. Despite its limitations, the reform in the main abolished the landed proprietorship system and accelerated the development of capitalist relations in the countryside.

Pressured by the Soviet Union and by the broad peasant movement, which in those days intertwined with the struggle of the working class, the Government and the occupation authorities had to make concessions to the peasants. The US imperialists and the Japanese reactionaries feared the possibility of revolutionary agrarian changes carried out from below, by the peasants themselves.

The Japanese working class demanded the right to set up trade unions, to stage strikes and so on. The Soviet Union endeavoured to help it. On the initiative of the Soviet representative the question of labour legislation was brought up for discussion in the Allied Council on July 10, 1946.

The proposals moved by the Soviet representative envisaged founding the new laws on the following: guarantee of the freedom to organise trade unions; the banning of dismissals and other repressions for participation in strikes; the institution of collective agreements, an eight-hour working day, a paid fortnight's leave, and so forth.*

On November 21, 1946 the Japanese Government promulgated a trade union law, which contained a number of concessions to the working class: it recognised the right of the workers to set up trade unions, to conduct collective negotiations with employers and to stage strikes. The struggle waged by the USSR against US imperialism in Japan thus helped the Japanese labouring classes—the workers and the peasants—to achieve certain successes.

The US occupation authorities broadly advertised their measures to abolish the zaibatsu (the giant monopolies). Actually, these measures were designed to subordinate Japanese monopoly capital to the American monopolies. At the same time, the Americans took steps to weaken Japanese industries that offered them direct competition. But they had no intention whatever of destroying the monopolies as such. The department set up by the occupation authorities to abolish the trusts and cartels was deservedly given the ironic name of “department for the preservation of the zaibatsu”.

This situation could not be ignored by the Soviet Government. In the Allied Council on May 12, 1947 the Soviet representative exposed the fact that the zaibatsu had been untouched, that the big monopolies continued to reign supreme in the country's economy.

The overall situation in Japan and the upsurge of public democratic activity did not allow General MacArthur to disregard this exposure altogether. A law abolishing excessive economic concentration was passed in July 1947.

However, this law contained many loopholes enabling the big monopolies to retain their position in the country's economy. Japan remained a country dominated by big monopoly capital.

* *Sbornik zayavlenii* . . . , pp. 18-22.

5. Soviet Proposals for Ensuring Japan's Economic and Political Independence

Following the defeat of the Kuomintang and the proclamation of the People's Republic of China, the US Government, which had earlier staked on the Kuomintang regime, somewhat amended its policy toward Japan, planning to turn that country into its principal strategic bridgehead in the Far East. In January 1950 the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that the USA had to build up Japan as one of the principal bulwarks against communism in Asia.

The Americans forthwith drew up a programme for Japan's "economic stabilisation" which had little in common with that country's economic rehabilitation. That programme pursued the objective of creating favourable conditions for American investments and giving the Americans greater control of Japanese foreign trade and finances. Aided by the occupation authorities, the American monopolies bought up the shares of many Japanese oil, electrical engineering, shipbuilding, chemical and engineering firms. Japanese state finances became increasingly dependent on the US monopolies.

Wherever possible the Soviet Union opposed Japan's economic enslavement by US monopolies. On September 23, 1948 the Soviet representative in the Far Eastern Commission made a statement on the level of industrial development in Japan. This statement outlined a broad programme for the attainment of economic independence by Japan. It envisaged the unrestricted development of Japan's civilian industry and export trade and the banning of any attempt to restore the war industry. In 1949 and 1950 the Soviet representative in the Far Eastern Commission submitted a series of proposals opening the road to economic independence for Japan. However, the USA refused to discuss the Soviet proposals.

The occupation authorities now no longer took any trouble to disguise their policy of turning Japan into a bridgehead of US imperialism. The US military feverishly built war bases in Japan and fortified the islands of Okinawa and Tsushima. The restoration of the Yokosuka naval base and the Misawa, Yokota, Itazuka, Titikawa and other air bases

was started as early as the close of 1948. The Soviet representatives in the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council insisted on a halt to this activity, drawing world attention to the danger of the policy adopted by the US Government.

The reactionary character of the USA's guidelines was seen in even bolder relief in Japan's home policy. In February 1949, with the approval of the occupation authorities, the Japanese Government ordered the disbandment of trade unions engaged in political activity. In September 1949 all the workers and employees of state-owned enterprises and institutions were forbidden membership or support of political parties and societies and participation in demonstrations and rallies. On June 6, 1950 MacArthur ordered the Japanese Government to outlaw 24 members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Japan. The Communist Party of Japan was reduced to a semi-legal status.

6. The Problem of a Peace Treaty with Japan

The Soviet Union consistently urged the conclusion of a just peace treaty with Japan that would ensure that country's independent, peaceful and democratic development.

In accordance with the Potsdam Agreement on the formation of the Foreign Ministers Council, the Soviet Government's point of departure was that the peace treaty with Japan should be drawn up by the Foreign Ministers Council consisting of representatives of the USSR, the USA, Britain and China on whose behalf the instruments of Japan's surrender were signed and whose special interest in Japan's post-war development was reaffirmed by the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference in December 1945. As regards the other countries that had contributed to the victory over Japan and were represented on the Far Eastern Commission, the Soviet Government held that their interests had to be taken into account in the draft of the peace treaty.

The US Government looked for ways of circumventing the Foreign Ministers Council where the principle of unanimity had been established and mutually acceptable decisions had therefore to be worked out by means of nego-

tiation. It wanted to dictate its own terms and, therefore, proposed replacing the Council by a Conference of the 11 countries represented on the Far Eastern Commission. There it hoped to secure unilaterally advantageous solutions by using an obedient voting machine without troubling to find mutually acceptable decisions.

On July 11, 1947 the US Ambassador in Moscow informed the Soviet Government that the US Government was proposing to convene a conference of the 11 countries represented on the Far Eastern Commission on August 19, 1947 with the purpose of drawing up a peace treaty with Japan. Without waiting for the Soviet reply and without consulting Britain and China, the Americans began unilateral preparations for a peace conference, starting negotiations on this issue with representatives of the other countries on the Far Eastern Commission. The USA thus ignored its international commitments: it disregarded the agreement between the Great Powers on the procedure in the Foreign Ministers Council for drawing up peace treaties.

On July 22, 1947 the Soviet Government stated that it could not accept the American proposal. In accordance with earlier decisions it demanded that this question should be considered beforehand in the Foreign Ministers Council with the participation of the USSR, the USA, Britain and China. Arbitrarily interpreting the Potsdam Agreement on the formation of the Foreign Ministers Council, the US Government continued to insist on its proposal. The talks dragged out for two years but failed to lead to an agreement.

Meanwhile, Japan was increasingly becoming a US military strategic base both economically and politically. With growing insistence the Japanese people demanded an end to the occupation and the granting of independence to their country. The formation of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of China and the growth of the liberation movement in Southeast Asia alarmed the US rulers, who felt they had to make some concession in order to maintain their military presence in Japan.

US diplomacy devised a plan for restoring formal independence to Japan and turning her into a "voluntary" ally of US imperialism in the Far East.

In June 1950, following the outbreak of the war in Korea, the US Government hastened the conclusion of a peace

treaty with Japan. The diplomatic preparations were entrusted to John Foster Dulles, a State Department advisor, prominent member of the US Republican Party and an exponent of a "hard line" toward the USSR.

The general principles of the peace treaty with Japan, drawn up by the US State Department, were sent to the countries represented on the Far Eastern Commission in the form of a Memorandum in October 1950.

The Memorandum showed that the US ruling circles had no intention of including in the peace treaty provisions for Japan's demilitarisation and democratisation. It called for removing the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa (the main island of the archipelago) and the Bonin Islands from Japanese control and placing them under US administration. The question of the status of Taiwan, the Pescadores, Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands was raised despite the fact that it had been settled by the Cairo Declaration and the Yalta Agreement.

In the communique of the Cairo Conference of the Heads of Government of the USA, Britain and China it was proclaimed that their purpose was to secure the return to the Chinese Republic of all territories that had been wrested by Japan from the Chinese such as, for example, Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores.*

On the question of the Far East the Yalta Agreement, signed, among others, by the President of the USA, clearly stated that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan on the side of the Allies under definite conditions and, in particular, on the understanding that "the southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it" and also "the Kuril Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union".**

"The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated."***

The American Memorandum said nothing about the withdrawal of the occupation troops from Japan: the USA had

* *Izvestia*, December 3, 1943.

** *The Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. Documents*, Moscow, 1969, p. 145.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 146.

no intention of evacuating them. By means of a bilateral agreement with the Japanese Government it aimed to legalise its military occupation of Japan for an unstated period.

On November 20, 1950 Dulles was handed a Soviet Memorandum, which contained a number of questions and remarks in connection with the American Memorandum: Was it felt possible to sign a separate peace treaty with Japan with the participation of only some of the countries that had fought against her? Would the treaty specify a date for the withdrawal of occupation troops from Japan? Did the USA propose to preserve its military bases in Japan after the conclusion of a peace treaty? Moreover, it was asked if any provision had been made for the lifting of all restrictions to the development of the Japanese civilian economy and to giving Japan access to raw material resources and an equal participation in world trade. The Soviet Memorandum pointed out that China, which for a number of years had been a victim of aggression by the Japanese militarists, had a special interest in a peace treaty with Japan and that the Soviet Government desired to know what was being done to ascertain the viewpoint of the Government of the People's Republic of China on this question.*

The Soviet Memorandum showed that the Government of the USSR sincerely wanted a peace treaty with Japan that would mirror the interests of all the Allied powers and guarantee peace in the Far East.

In the US Government's reply,** which was received within a week, an attempt was made to justify the American renunciation of 'the Allied commitment to refrain from signing a separate peace treaty with an enemy country on the grounds that it was impossible to work out peace terms that would fully satisfy all the participants in the treaty.

The US Government explained its refusal to ascertain the PRC's stand on this question by the absence of diplomatic relations between the USA and the People's Republic of China. Moreover, Washington continued to allege that the USA had a special responsibility in the preservation of

* *Pravda*, November 24, 1950.

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Memorandum of December 28, 1950 of the Government of the USA to the Government of the USSR.

peace and security in Japan. The US Government emphasised that the Japanese authorities and the US and, possibly, other troops would continue to bear "joint responsibility" for the maintenance of peace and security in Japan until "satisfactory" measures were taken to ensure Japan's security by the United Nations Organisation.

Washington's claims that the USA had a special role to play in the Far East were evidence that in violation of the Allied agreements on Japan the USA had entered into a conspiracy with the Japanese reactionaries and was actively preparing to sign a separate peace treaty with them. In February 1951 John Foster Dulles conducted talks in Japan on the content of a peace treaty. Upon his return from Japan he declared that the settlement in the Pacific was not simply a question of terminating the war with Japan but also one of creating a strong bastion "against the threat of communist aggression from the East".* Furthermore, he stated that agreement had been reached with the Japanese Prime Minister on the retention of US troops and military bases in Japan after the signing of the peace treaty in order to prevent the formation of a "power vacuum".

Consequently, in drawing up the terms of the peace treaty with Japan the USA accentuated the aim of preserving the American military presence in Japan and creating the conditions for Japan's subsequent remilitarisation. That explained why the American draft of the peace treaty contained no guarantees against the revival of Japanese militarism and ran counter to the earlier decisions to complete the "physical and spiritual demilitarisation of Japan".

The draft stipulated Japan's renunciation of all right, title and claim to Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands but said nothing of the fact that in accordance with international agreements these territories had to be transferred to the Soviet Union, to which they legitimately belonged.

The Soviet Government considered as similarly impermissible the draft's omission of the stipulation that Taiwan and the Pescadores (Penghu) should be transferred to the People's Republic of China. Moreover, it proposed that the draft

* *The Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XXIV, Part 610, March 12, 1951.

treaty should contain a provision on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Japan and on the dismantling of foreign military bases in that country. The Soviet Union repeated its insistence that the Council of Foreign Ministers of Britain, China, the USSR and the USA should be convened with the purpose of jointly drawing up a peace treaty. It denounced the separate preparations for the peace treaty, demanding that all the countries that had fought Japan should be drawn into the preparations and that the agreements adopted by the Allies during the war should be enforced. The governments of the People's Republic of China and the Korean People's Democratic Republic officially subscribed to the Soviet proposals.

Some of the provisions of the American draft of the peace treaty were criticised also by the governments of India, Indonesia, Australia and the Philippines.

For instance, in the Indian Government's Statement of August 23, 1951 to the Government of the USA it was pointed out that as drafted by the Americans the peace treaty was unequal with regard to Japan and her people for it did not accord Japan the status of an equal and respected partner in international intercourse and did not conform to the aim of preserving and consolidating peace in the Far East. The Indian Government noted that the draft's silence as to whom the Kuril Islands, Southern Sakhalin and Taiwan should belong in accordance with international agreements, and the USA's striving to secure control of the Ryukyu, Bonin and other islands were unjust and prejudicial.

A broad movement unfolded in Japan with the aim of achieving an all-embracing peace treaty that would guarantee peace, independence and freedom to the Japanese people.

7. The USSR and the San Francisco Conference

In this situation and in view of the fact that the Yoshida Government was prepared to sign any treaty favoured by the United States, US diplomacy decided to speed up the realisation of its designs. A joint US-British draft of the peace treaty with Japan was published on July 12, 1951.

In effect, it did not differ from the American draft. It gave no consideration to the Soviet proposals that had earlier

been forwarded to the Government of the USA. Further, it ignored the opinion of other countries, in particular, Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines with regard to reparations from Japan. The USA planned a conference in San Francisco, to be opened on September 4, 1951, for the purpose of signing the treaty and thereby legalising the backstage deal of the US Government with the governments of Britain and Japan.

China, one of the most interested countries, and also the Korean People's Democratic Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were not invited to the conference. Leading Asian countries such as India and Burma, who had been victims of Japanese aggression, refused to attend the conference. On the other hand, representatives were sent by all the Latin American states and also by Luxembourg, Greece and other countries which had not been at war with Japan and had not the slightest interest in the Japanese problem. The only reason they were invited was that Washington counted on their votes. The rules of procedure, which excluded the possibility of a serious and businesslike discussion of the draft treaty, were worked out before the conference opened. Contrary to the USA's expectations, the Soviet Government accepted the invitation. It felt that it would be expedient to use the conference rostrum to make a public exposure of the actual imperialist nature of the American draft and also to explain the Soviet attitude and the ways of concluding a really democratic peace treaty.

When the conference opened the Soviet delegation once again raised the question of inviting the People's Republic of China as a country "particularly interested in the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan and in the establishment of a durable peace in the Far East".* The Soviet proposal was backed by the delegates of Czechoslovakia and Poland. However, it was rejected by representatives of most of the attending countries, which were dependent on the USA and Britain.

The Soviet delegation exhaustively criticised the American draft. It stated that "Japan's involvement in military groups,

* *Record of Proceedings of the Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan*, Washington, 1951, p. 39.

as envisaged in the US-British draft of the peace treaty, cannot but alarm the countries really interested in preserving and maintaining peace in the Far East".* Further, it stressed that "the peace treaty with Japan should also settle a number of territorial issues in accordance with the provisions of the Cairo and Potsdam declarations and the Yalta Agreement. In particular, the Yalta Agreement recognised the Soviet Union's undisputed right to the southern part of Sakhalin Island and all the adjacent islands and also to the Kuril Islands. The draft treaty contravened the commitments undertaken by the USA and Great Britain under the Yalta Agreement on the return of Southern Sakhalin and on the transfer of the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union". The statement criticised the economic terms in the draft treaty, terms which reinforced the economic positions acquired by the United States in Japan during the years of occupation. Further, the statement pointed out that the draft contained no provision giving Japan equal rights with other countries to world sources of raw materials as envisaged in the Potsdam Declaration.

The Soviet delegation submitted clear-cut, constructive proposals in the form of amendments and additions to the US-British draft. Their adoption would have considerably improved the peace treaty. They envisaged the following provisions: Japan's recognition of the PRC's sovereignty over Manchuria, Taiwan, the Pescadores (Penghu), the Pratas, Paracel and Nansha islands and Soviet sovereignty over the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands (and, of course, Japan's renunciation of all right, title and claim to these territories); recognition of Japan's sovereignty over the Ryukyu, Bonin, Rosario, Volcano, Pares Velo, Marcus, Tsushima and other islands that had been Japanese territory prior to December 7, 1941 (while having no title to these territories the USA was making a bid to wrest them away from Japan).

In order to ensure Japan with true independence the Soviet delegation suggested that all Allied forces be withdrawn from Japan not later than 90 days after the treaty came into force, "following which no Allied power or group of powers or any other foreign power would have the right

* *Pravda*, September 7, 1951.

to maintain troops or military bases on the territory of Japan".*

In addition to amendments the Soviet delegation suggested eight new articles obligating Japan "to remove all obstacles to the rejuvenation and strengthening of democratic trends among the Japanese people", guarantee basic civil liberties such as freedom of "speech, press, publication, religion, political convictions and public assemblies", "bar the revival of fascist and militarist organisations" and "refrain from joining any coalition or military alliance directed against any of the powers whose armed forces had taken part in the war with Japan". The Soviet proposals envisaged the strict limitation of Japan's armed forces and their use only for purposes of self-defence, and also a ban on the production of or experimentation with atomic weapons or other weapons of mass annihilation. The Soviet Union proposed that no restrictions should be imposed on the development of Japan's civilian industry and foreign trade. There was a sympathetic response to the Soviet proposal among the public in Japan, the USA and other countries.

The Soviet stand was vigorously supported by the representatives of Czechoslovakia and Poland. Serious objections to the US-British draft were raised also by the representatives of some Asian countries.

The Soviet proposals were not taken into consideration. The additions and amendments proposed by other delegations were not considered either.

The peace treaty with Japan was signed on September 8, 1951. The representatives of the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia did not sign the treaty and did not attend the signature ceremony. India and Burma, which had not participated in the conference, did not sign the peace treaty either. This further accentuated the fact that it was a separate treaty.

Most of the signatories were representatives of countries that had not been directly involved in the war with Japan.

The peace treaty did not terminate the state of war between Japan and the Soviet Union, China, India, Burma and other countries with an aggregate population of over 1,000 million.

* Ibid.

The very fact of the signing of the treaty made it clear that at San Francisco the Japanese Government had renounced all title to Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, inasmuch as this renunciation was included in the signed document. Article 2 of the treaty stated: "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kuril Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905."*

In subsequent years, despite this unambiguous, clearly worded obligation, the Japanese Government made a number of attempts to reinterpret the stand of the Japanese delegation at the San Francisco Conference, in particular on the question of the territories which Japan renounced under the terms of the treaty.

A Security Treaty was signed between Japan and the USA a few hours after the formal signature ceremony at the San Francisco Conference.

The main point of that treaty was given in its opening article, which stated that Japan granted the USA "the right... to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan", that these forces "may be utilised" for "the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East" and "the security of Japan" and also "to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan".**

The operation of the Security Treaty was not restricted by any time limit, thus indefinitely protracting the US occupation of Japan and that country's position as a US strategic bridgehead in the Far East.

The treaty clashed with the Japanese Constitution, which recorded the country's renunciation of war and of the use of armed force as a means of settling conflicts with other countries. The treaty envisaged the use of US troops, stationed in Japan, throughout the Far East and thereby held out the threat of involving Japan in war with other countries at the discretion of the USA. Moreover, the US forces in Japan undertook the police function of suppressing actions by the Japanese people. Japan's destiny was thus placed in the hands of the US military.

* *American Foreign Policy. 1950-1955. Basic Documents*, Vol. I, Washington. July 1957, p. 426.

** *Ibid.*, pp. 885-86.

Chapter Twenty

THE SOVIET UNION'S STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION, AGAINST THE IMPERIALIST POLICY OF DEMOLISHING THE SOVEREIGNTY OF COUNTRIES AND SETTING UP MILITARY BLOCS (1946-1952)

The evolution of such fundamental problems on the post-war international scene as the problem of Germany, disarmament, the Far East and so on was convincing evidence that soon after the war the USA and other Western powers had sharply modified their foreign policies, veered away from co-operation with the USSR and taken the road of undisguised enmity and war preparations against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies.

The hostility of the imperialist politicians toward the socialist countries and their fear of the revolutionary movement in their own countries and of the upswing of the liberation struggle in the colonies led the ruling circles of Britain and some other West European capitalist countries, which had been weakened by the war, to play the role of exponents of American policies in the hope that US imperialism would help them remain in power.

On this point the resolution adopted at the 20th Congress of the CPSU states: "Soon after the termination of the war the imperialist powers headed by reactionary circles in the USA began pursuing a 'positions of strength' policy, which mirrored the striving of the most bellicose elements in these powers to crush the working-class, democratic and national liberation movements, undermine the socialist camp and establish their domination of the world. In practice this policy spells out an unbridled arms race, the building of American military bases along the frontiers of the USSR

and the People's Democracies, the formation of aggressive blocs directed at the countries of the socialist camp, the unfolding of the so-called cold war against socialist states and preparations for new bloody wars."**

The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall plan and the formation of the North Atlantic bloc (NATO) were the principal milestones of US imperialism's aggressive policy during the initial years after the war. International tension was heightened sharply by the cold war started by the imperialists. In the Far East the imperialist forces led by the USA went so far as to start direct military action against socialist countries.** World peace and security were seriously threatened.

During that period Soviet foreign policy was faced with the important task of safeguarding the socialist countries against the aggressive designs of the imperialists, upholding in international relations the principles of respect for the sovereignty of other countries and non-interference in their internal affairs, maintaining peace and ensuring international security.

1. Two Programmes in World Politics: the Programme of War and the Programme of Peace

The speech delivered by Winston Churchill on March 5, 1946 at Fulton (Missouri, USA) in the presence of President Harry S. Truman and other leading American statesmen was in a way the post-war ideological manifesto of US-British imperialism. In that speech, which was punctuated with vitriolic slander against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies, Churchill called for a crusade against socialism and charted a programme for US-British world supremacy "not only for our time but for a century to come."***

Churchill's Fulton speech was the summons for the creation of an Anglo-US military and political bloc directed

KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezдов, konferentsii i plenumov TsK, Part IV, Moscow, 1960, p. 126.

** For the war in Korea see Chapter Twenty-One.

*** *The New York Times*, March 6, 1946.

against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and also against the national liberation movement of the oppressed peoples.

It was vital to show beyond the shadow of a doubt that this policy of the US and British imperialists menaced all the peoples of the world. That was done. In public statements made in this period Soviet statesmen probingly assessed the warmongering policies of Churchill and his supporters in Britain and the USA showing that they were directed toward war and that they were attempts to repeat the policies of Hitler. They stressed the urgent need to expose the proponents of another war and organise a broad struggle for peace.

The war programme of the claimants to world supremacy from the camp of US-British imperialism was countered by the Soviet Government with a comprehensive programme of peaceful relations between countries founded on equality and friendly co-operation. This was a programme of peaceful coexistence between the two systems, a programme of peace. It contained proposals on key issues such as peaceful coexistence and co-operation between the Great Powers, which had belonged to the anti-Hitler coalition, the strengthening of the United Nations Organisation, disarmament and so on. These proposals were set out in 1946 in statements by Soviet statesmen and in interviews given by J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, to American and British journalists, and also in the speeches of Soviet representatives in the UN.

The Soviet Government proposed:

—*Peaceful coexistence.* The Soviet Government stressed its absolute confidence in the possibility of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition between the two social systems despite their ideological differences. As early as at the 1st General Assembly the Soviet delegation declared that the Soviet people desired peaceful competition between states and social systems under which the peoples could organise closer and more diversified co-operation with each other, and pressed for more friendly relations between countries and peoples.

—*Continued co-operation between the countries that had jointly won the war.* In the above-mentioned interviews with Western journalists the confidence was expressed that

it was possible and desirable to promote friendly relations between the USSR and the Western powers, particularly the USA and Britain. Moreover, the ways and means were concretely outlined for the establishment of friendly relations: a mutually beneficial agreement with the USA on loans or credits, the expansion of political, trade and cultural relations with Britain and the USA, and periodic conferences of the Heads of Government of the three powers to discuss urgent international problems. In the UN as well the Soviet Union drew attention to the importance of co-operation among the Great Powers on the basis of mutual benefit and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

The Soviet Government called for the renunciation of the idea of forming closed blocs and groups directed against other countries, pointing out that the formation of blocs was a dangerous road which led not to the curbing of aggressors but, on the contrary, to the kindling of aggression. It pointed out that the Soviet Union had never participated in groups directed against other peace-loving countries and was steadfastly advocating closer peace-time co-operation among the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition.

—*The strengthening of the United Nations.* Already then, at the dawn of the UN's existence, the Soviet Union made it plain that it was against the UN being turned into a tool of any Great Power or group of powers. In many official Soviet statements it was noted that the UN's strength lay in the fact that it was founded on the principle of the equality of countries and not on the domination of some countries over others, and that that principle had to be safeguarded.

One of the main guarantees of the equality of countries in the UN and of their protection against the dictates and arbitrary actions of the imperialists was the rule of unanimity among the five permanent members of the Security Council, one of whom was the Soviet Union. This was strikingly seen in the period when in the world there were only two socialist countries: the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic (the latter's admission to the UN was blocked by the Western powers), when the People's Democracies had in effect only begun to take shape as countries of a new type, and the process of the liberation of the colonial countries from

foreign domination and the formation of independent states in Asia and Africa was only in its embryonic stage.

When at the very first General Assembly the rule of unanimity was attacked by the Western countries, the Soviet Union resolutely upheld it as a key condition of the efficacy of the United Nations.

—Withdrawal of the troops of UN members from the territory of other United Nations; general reduction of armaments; the banning of nuclear weapons. On these issues the Soviet delegation submitted concrete proposals to the UN as early as 1946, the first year of the existence of that organisation. These proposals underlay the resolution "On the Principles of a General Regulation and Reduction of Armaments" adopted by the General Assembly in December 1946.*

Such was the programme of peace and friendly co-operation that was offered by the Soviet Union to the Western powers in 1946.

The Soviet Union accompanied its proposals with concrete actions that convincingly showed its peaceful intentions and the sincerity of its call for peaceful coexistence.

The Soviet Government not only denounced the arms race and called for a general reduction of armaments but, beginning in 1945, upon the termination of the war, it demobilised a large proportion of its armed forces, cutting them back from 11,365,000 to 2,874,000 by 1948.

The Soviet Government not only raised (in 1946 in the Security Council and the General Assembly) the question of the stationing of the armed forces of UN members in the territory of other non-enemy countries, it not only denounced the actions of the USA and Britain, which continued to maintain troops in many countries in Europe, Asia and Africa, interfering in their internal affairs and building military bases on their territory, but set the world a concrete example of how the independence of other countries should in fact be respected and how these countries should be helped to return to normal, peace-time life. Soon after the termination of the war the Soviet Union began the withdrawal of its troops from the territory of Allied countries which they had entered during the hostilities against the

* For details see Chapter Eighteen.

nazi and Japanese aggressors. All Soviet troops were withdrawn from Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Norway as early as the autumn of 1945, from the Danish island of Bornholm by April, and from China and Iran by the beginning of May 1946.* They were withdrawn from North Korea as soon as the Korean People's Democratic Republic was proclaimed (at the close of 1948), although United States troops continued to remain in South Korea.

When the war ended the Soviet people, to whom aggressive designs and war plans are alien, devoted all their energy to rehabilitating their war-ravaged economy. The Communist Party and the Soviet Government oriented the country toward the continuation of peaceful socialist construction, which had been interrupted by the war. The five-year plan of economic rehabilitation and development for 1946-1950, adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, opened up the prospect for the rapid growth of the country's productive forces and for the promotion of the people's living standard and cultural level. The main targets of a more long-term development plan were also determined. It was planned to treble the Soviet Union's industrial output within a period of three five-year plans.** This was a far-reaching programme for peaceful economic development. In foreign policy it dovetailed with the Soviet programme of peaceful co-operation among countries on the basis of the equality and respect for the sovereignty of all states.

However, peaceful co-operation with the Soviet Union and the normalisation of the international situation as a whole did not enter into the calculations of the aggressive imperialist circles who charted US foreign policy after the war. The US rulers rejected the Soviet peace proposals and took the line of suppressing the liberation struggle of the working class and oppressed peoples throughout the world

* In early 1946 the Western powers tried to raise a clamour in the UN over what they claimed was the Soviet Union's "refusal" to withdraw its troops from Iran. These attempts came to nothing because the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran was successfully settled by agreement between the Soviet and Iranian governments.

** The main targets of that long-term plan, published in February 1946, were not only achieved but greatly surpassed in the course of 15 post-war years, while in the output of steel, oil and coal they were in effect achieved within 10 years.

and forming military and political blocs against the USSR and the People's Democracies, drawing the capitalist countries dependent on the USA into the orbit of their adventurist policies. The first stage along this road was the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine.

2. The Soviet Union and the Truman Doctrine

The decision of the British Government in February 1947 to withdraw British troops from Greece and halt financial aid to Turkey's reactionary rulers served US imperialism as the pretext for intensifying its expansion in Europe and openly proclaiming its anti-Soviet policy. The British organisers of interference in the internal affairs of Greece had been compelled to back out because Britain's financial resources were exhausted and a wave of indignation swept across the world at the British intervention in Greece, especially after the Soviet Union had in 1946 drawn the attention of the UN Security Council to that intervention.

The US ruling circles promptly took advantage of Britain's enfeeblement to seize important military-strategic positions in the Balkan Peninsula and the Eastern Mediterranean, moving their sphere of military and political influence directly to the frontiers of the USSR and the European People's Democracies.

On March 12, 1947 Truman requested the US Congress to allocate US \$400 million as emergency "aid" to Greece and Turkey. Britain, he said, "finds itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world, including Greece". The military character of the proposed "aid" was not concealed, and neither were the USA's aspirations to entrench itself in the countries selected as objects for "aid". Truman recommended sending American military and civilian personnel to Greece and Turkey "to assist on the task of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished".*

* *Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 80th Congress, First Session, March 10, 1947, Vol. 93, No. 45-50, pp. 1999. 2000.*

However, here it was more than a matter of interference in the affairs of Greece and Turkey. In an address containing venomous slander against the socialist countries, Truman in effect raised the question of the USA undertaking the role of world policeman in order to interfere in the affairs of other countries on the side of reaction and counter-revolution, help to strangle the liberation movement in all parts of the world and openly oppose revolution and socialist development. "At the present moment in world history," Truman declared, "nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. . . . We cannot allow changes in the status quo."**

The foreign policy programme outlined in the Truman Doctrine was from the very beginning clearly anti-Soviet and anti-socialist.

On the very next day after Truman's speech, a representative of the French Foreign Ministry told journalists: "They have adopted a clear-cut stand directed—it is no longer a secret to anybody—against the USSR. . . . Obviously, this marks a new stage in the relations between the USA and the Soviets. It shows that the US Government desires to gain a footing in the Mediterranean." The prominent US columnist Walter Lippmann did not mince his words, writing: "We have selected Turkey and Greece not because they are specially in need of relief, not because they are shining examples of democracy . . . but because they are the strategic gateway to the Black Sea and the heart of the Soviet Union."**

The Soviet Government and press graphically exposed the imperialist character of the Truman Doctrine. *Pravda* wrote that the Doctrine signified further interference in the affairs of other countries. The USA's claims to international leadership were growing together with the appetites of the interested American circles. The newspaper pointed out that in the new historical situation the American politicians were ignoring the fact that the old methods of the colonialists and die-hard statesmen were outworn and doomed.

* *Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 80th Congress, First Session*, March 10, 1947, Vol. 93, No. 45-50, p. 1981. In May 1947 the US Congress passed the bill on allocations for "aid" to Greece and Turkey, and the Truman Doctrine became US official policy.

** *The New York Herald Tribune*, April 1, 1947.

The USSR sharply denounced the Truman Doctrine also in the UN, stressing that the USA's attempts to dictate its will to other independent countries were incompatible with the principles proclaimed by the General Assembly in 1946, one of which was that aid to other countries should not be used as a political weapon.

The USA's aggressive policies in the regions adjoining the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies led to the further unity of these countries, which were vitally interested in safeguarding peace and the sovereign rights of nations against encroachment by the imperialists. An expression of this greater cohesion of the forces of peace and socialism was the signing, in early 1948, of treaties of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance between the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania.*

The Communist Party and the Government of the USSR could not, of course, fail to draw the appropriate conclusions from the USA's openly hostile and bellicose policy toward the Soviet Union. Steps were taken to strengthen the security of the Soviet people. One of these steps was the development of nuclear weapons.

The frankly aggressive Truman Doctrine and its obviously expansionist character were sharply criticised in broad public circles in the Western countries, including the USA. Harold Laski, the noted theorist of the British Labour Party, characterised the US bid to halt the development of socialism in Europe, a bid expressed in the Truman Doctrine, as the greatest threat to peace since Hitler's accession to power.** Former US Vice-President Henry Wallace stated in a radio broadcast that Truman had in effect proposed that Americans should police all the frontiers of Russia. If America stood for opposition to changes, he said, then it would have lost and become the most hated country in the world.*** New York's Mayor Fiorello La Guardia and other leading American politicians were openly critical of the fact that by circumventing the UN the United States was giving ground for the accusation of interfering in the affairs of other countries and creating a threat to peace in Europe.

* See Chapter Sixteen.

** *Avanti*, March 29, 1947.

*** *Pravda*, March 15, 1947.

Confronted with world-wide censure of the Truman Doctrine, the US rulers, while by no means ceasing their interference in the affairs of Greece and Turkey and the building of US military bases in the Eastern Mediterranean, found they had to devise a more subtle, camouflaged form for their further actions in expanding the sphere of the USA's political and military domination.

3. The Soviet Union's Exposure of the Marshall Plan's Imperialist Objectives

On June 5, 1947 US Secretary of State George C. Marshall delivered a speech at Harvard University in which, referring to the difficult economic position in which many European countries had found themselves as a result of the war, declared that the USA desired to help these countries to rehabilitate their economies. He spoke in glowing terms of the generosity and disinterestedness of the American proposals, which, he asserted, was directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos.*

In his speech Marshall did not state the size or terms of the proposed US aid to European countries. Neither did he reveal the true motivations of the new American plan. The entire speech consisted of vague generalities. Subsequent developments showed that this was a deliberate tactic on the part of the US Government.

Frightened by the growth of the forces of socialism and democracy, a considerable section of the European bourgeoisie welcomed Marshall's speech. This welcome was echoed by the Right Socialist leaders who beguiled the people with illusions about the American plan. The "generosity" of the US proposal was lauded in some West European countries. But the Soviet Government saw through this new American move. If anybody, it knew the worth of the US Government's assurances about wishing to help in the restoration of countries that had suffered in the war. The

* *The Department of State Bulletin*, June 15, 1947, pp. 1159-60.

Soviet Union—an ally of the USA in the war against the common enemy, an ally which had borne the brunt of that struggle and suffered the greatest losses in the name of the common victory—had already had contacts with the USA on this question, the only country that had grown rich during the war years. The Soviet Government had put before the USA the question of granting the USSR a long-term state credit and of using this credit for placing large orders in the USA for goods and industrial plant. It expressed its readiness to promote economic co-operation with the USA on a mutually beneficial basis, which would be an earnest of the development of relations of trust and friendship between the USSR and the USA and, consequently, of lasting world peace. The USSR put these questions in 1945, 1946 and the spring of 1947 confidentially at the summit and also through the appropriate channels of the state apparatus. However these approaches did not receive a favourable response from the Americans.

After the war the US Government counted on utilising its economic resources not for equal co-operation with other countries but for quite different purposes. This was quite clearly demonstrated as early as 1946 by the USA's attempts to use its economic potential as a weapon for undermining the positions of the USSR and for organising an anti-Soviet front of countries dependent on Washington. When the question of a large loan to Britain was debated in the US Congress in the spring of 1946, the decision to grant the loan was passed chiefly in the hope that it would help the USA use Britain against the Soviet Union. One of the speakers in the debate, Senator Burton K. Wheeler, bluntly declared: "The only reason I can find for making the loan is to bolster the British sufficiently to head off communism in Europe."^{*}

Similarly indicative was the US Government's arbitrary order in May 1946 halting the reparations deliveries to the Soviet Union from the American zone of occupation in Germany envisaged by the Potsdam Agreement. This step was taken in order to bring political pressure to bear on the USSR.

^{*} *Survey of International Affairs. 1939-1946. America, Britain and Russia. Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946* by William Hardy McNeill, London, 1953, p. 686.

In 1947 Washington devised the ambitious plan of using American economic aid as a means of achieving economic, political and military influence in the West European countries that had been devastated by the war, halting the growth of the revolutionary movement in many of these countries, isolating from the USSR and returning to the capitalist fold all or at least some of the People's Democracies.

Tactically this action, which later became known as the Marshall plan, was started as a manoeuvre designed to delude world public opinion. The roles were assigned in advance. The USA zealously created the illusion that it was "disinterested" in how the aid it had promised Europe would be organised. The governments of Britain and France undertook to conduct the diplomatic preparations for the realisation of the American plan.

The British and French Foreign Ministers met in conference in Paris on June 17 and 18, following which the governments of Britain and France invited the Soviet Union to a conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, Britain and France to discuss the Marshall proposal. The Anglo-French Memorandum of June 19, 1947 stressed the "urgency" of the question and also the need for drawing up wide-ranging economic programmes for the European countries without delay.*

The invitation to the Soviet Union was sent with the obvious calculation that it would be turned down and that this would make it possible to accuse the USSR of reluctance to help in the receipt of American aid for Europe. At the time the American press candidly wrote that it was Marshall's intention to open a door, which, Washington was confident, Russia would not enter.

However, Washington miscalculated.

On June 22 the governments of Britain and France were notified that the USSR would participate in a Three-Power conference in Paris. Further, the Soviet Note stated: "The Soviet Government agrees that at present the immediate task of the European countries is to restore as quickly as possible and further develop their national economies which had

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Memorandum of June 19, 1947 of the governments of Britain and France.

been disrupted by the war. It goes without saying that the fulfilment of this task could be facilitated if the United States of America, whose production potential, far from diminishing, had increased during the war, rendered the appropriate aid for the above-mentioned purposes.”*

By agreeing to attend the conference the Soviet Union gave the US leaders another opportunity to prove that it was in fact their honest intention to help restore the economies of the European countries on the basis of equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of these countries. The Soviet Government wanted to ascertain what lay behind Marshall's vague proposal, the nature and terms of American economic aid to the European countries and the size of the aid the Americans were prepared to grant. These questions were brought up by the Soviet representatives at the conference.

In the instructions of the Soviet Government to its delegation it was stated unambiguously: “In the discussion of any concrete proposals touching on American aid to Europe the Soviet delegation shall object to terms of aid that might prejudice the sovereignty of the European countries or infringe upon their economic independence.”**

The Paris conference sat in session from June 27 to July 2, 1947. At the conference it became clear that neither Bevin nor Bidault wished to give any definite information on the American plan. They pleaded ignorance, maintaining that they knew only what Marshall said in his speech on June 5 although it was common knowledge that prior to the conference Bevin and other members of the British Government had had long talks with William L. Clayton, Marshall's deputy, who went to London specially for that purpose. It was patently clear that the US Government did not wish to tie itself down with any concrete promises of aid, particularly to the Soviet Union, which was the principal obstacle to US imperialism's aggressive policies.

At the Paris conference Bevin and Bidault pursued the sole objective of drawing up an all-embracing, co-ordinated

* *Pravda*, June 23, 1947.

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Instructions of the Government of the USSR to the Soviet delegation to the Foreign Ministers Conference in Paris on June 25, 1947.

economic programme for four years for all European countries, which would then be submitted for approval to the USA. The US Government would thus be given the possibility of determining the economic development of the European countries. The British and French Foreign Ministers proposed that the economic programme should be formulated by a Directing Committee composed of representatives of Britain, France, the USSR and four other countries.*

Contradicting their own statements about their "lack of information" about the USA's intentions, the British and French Foreign Ministers categorically insisted that unless an economic programme was drawn up for the European countries the USA would under no circumstances agree to grant any aid to Europe.

The Soviet Union laid bare the purport of these plans of attacking the sovereignty of the European countries, showing that the Anglo-French proposals were an attempt to deprive the European states of their economic independence and national sovereignty in the interest of some strong powers, to bring these countries under the latter's control and determine their internal affairs to the extent of dictating the direction of the development of the key branches of their economies.

The Soviet Government warned that the realisation of these plans would lead to American credits being used not for the economic rehabilitation of Europe but for ranging some European countries against others to the benefit of certain strong powers that were striving for supremacy.

The Soviet Union submitted its own proposal founded on respect for the sovereignty of the countries that were to be recipients of aid. It suggested setting up an Assistance Committee that would study the American aid requirements of the European countries on the basis of the corresponding applications from these countries. On this foundation it was proposed that a summary programme of necessary aid be drawn up and the USA requested to state its possible dimensions. In the Soviet proposal it was stressed that priority consideration should be given to countries that had

* *Pravda*, July 1, 1947.

suffered from German aggression and contributed to the Allied victory.

The Soviet proposal was rejected out of hand by the British and French representatives. Unable to propose in its stead anything except a plan of interference in the affairs of European countries as dictated by the Americans, they hastily brought the conference to an end.

The USSR's stand thus helped the peoples to see the actual aims of the Marshall plan. The Soviet Union once again came forward on the international scene as a consistent and staunch champion of the sovereign rights and independence of all countries and of non-interference in their internal affairs.

Despite US, British and French diplomatic pressure, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Finland joined the USSR in refusing to participate in the Marshall plan.

The Government of the USA now drew the mask from its aims and openly engaged in using the Marshall plan as a means of forming an anti-Soviet bloc of capitalist countries dependent on US imperialism. As was foreseen by the Soviet Government, the Marshall plan proved to be a project for splitting Europe and interfering in the internal affairs of the European countries.

This was strikingly borne out in Paris in July 1947 at a conference of 16 West European countries that had agreed to participate in the realisation of the Marshall plan. Some of the participants in that conference (for instance, Sweden) wanted the information submitted to the Marshall plan distributors (in effect, the USA) to be given only once and to embrace only matters directly pertaining to the receipt of aid from the USA. But the proponents of this viewpoint soon saw their political naiveté. The USA imposed a procedure under which each country receiving Marshall aid had to submit exhaustive data on the state of its economy, on the destruction wrought by the war, on the course of the rehabilitation, on currency reserves and so forth.

From the very outset the architects of the Marshall plan accorded it a special role in restoring German militarism as an important member of the US-sponsored military bloc directed against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Only 20 days after Marshall spoke at Harvard Univer-

sity on the subject of US "aid" to Europe, his former assistant and subsequent successor to the post of Secretary of State Dean Acheson told the Credits Commission of the House of Representatives that the US Government regarded the question of restoring German industry as the foundation of the Marshall plan.*

In his *Reminiscences*, published in 1965, Konrad Adenauer, the first head of the West German Government, accentuated the fact that from the very beginning one of the basic elements of the Marshall plan was the design to use American capital—in spite of objections from France—to restore the heavy industry, notably the production of steel and steel articles, in West Germany (to be more exact, initially in the combined Anglo-US zone, the so-called Bizonia, which included the Ruhr). "The production level of industries, whose capacities had been reduced, were thus to be raised above the pre-war level,"** wrote Adenauer about the plans that had been hatched out by the USA and Britain as early as the summer of 1947.

The Soviet Government made it plain that the Marshall plan was a menace to the peace and independence of the peoples. At the 2nd General Assembly in September 1947 the Soviet delegation made a statement in which it pointed out: "It is becoming increasingly obvious to everybody that the realisation of the Marshall plan will signify the subordination of the European countries to US economic and political control and direct US interference in the internal affairs of these countries.

"Moreover, this plan is an attempt to split Europe into two camps and, with the assistance of Great Britain and France, to complete the formation of a bloc of a number of European countries directed against the interests of the democratic states of Eastern Europe, notably of the Soviet Union.

"An important feature of this plan is the striving to oppose the countries of Eastern Europe with a bloc of a number of West European countries, including West

* G. Andreyev, *Eksport amerikanskogo kapitala*, Moscow, 1957, p. 358.

** Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen, 1945-1953*, Vol. 1, Stuttgart, 1965, p. 114.

Germany. It is intended to use West Germany and the German heavy industry (the Ruhr) as a key economic base of United States expansion in Europe in contravention of the national interests of the countries that have been victims of German aggression.”* The governments of the People’s Democracies likewise denounced the ominous designs of US imperialism camouflaged by the “philanthropic” signboard of the Marshall plan.

4. The Soviet Union Versus the Imperialist Policy of Military Blocs

The decisions passed at the separate Western conference in London in February 1948** provided incontrovertible evidence of the fact that the USA, Britain and France had adopted a policy of setting up a military bloc, with the participation of West Germany, directed against the USSR.

In the same month the Soviet Information Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR published a comprehensive document under the title of *Falsifiers of History*. This document was a rebuff to the attempts of the Western powers to screen their ignoble conspiracy with the West German militarists by slandering Soviet foreign policy. On the basis of innumerable historical facts and documents, the Soviet Government showed that British, French and United States support for the nazi regime led to the outbreak of the Second World War, and drew world attention to the circumstance that after the war the Western powers were continuing their sinister policy of conspiring with German militarism.

The first bloc of West European countries directed against the USSR and the People’s Democracies was set up in March 1948 on British initiative. This was the Western Union, a military and political alliance consisting of Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The preamble to the treaty on the creation of this bloc, signed in Brussels

* *Uneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuz. 1947*, Part II, Moscow, 1952, p. 132.

** See Chapter Seventeen.

on March 17, 1948, had a formal reference to the possibility of Germany repeating her aggression. But this was only a screen with which to deceive the peoples. Actually, the organisers of this anti-Soviet bloc were already then preparing to co-operate with the West German militarists.

In a Note of March 6, 1948 to the Government of Britain the Soviet Government pointed out that the plan of setting up the Western Union was closely linked with and supplemented the Marshall plan and that it revealed the political objectives of the American plan for Europe. It warned that both these plans were driving a wedge between Western and Eastern Europe and were consequently leading to the political division of Europe. Further, the Soviet Government pointed out that the policy of the Western Union's creators "contained the danger of turning the Western part of Germany into a strategic base for future aggression in Europe".*

Initially, the formation of the Western Union mirrored the intentions of Britain's rulers to strengthen their international position by setting up, under their own aegis, a bloc of West European colonial powers. However, it soon became clear that US imperialism had no intention of encouraging such "separatism" in the camp of its allies.

The US ruling circles hastened to take the newly-created Western Union under their wing. Truman declared that the USA would extend to this bloc the support "which the situation requires".** As was quite rightly pointed out by *Pravda*, Truman's bellicose anti-Soviet message to the US Congress on March 17, 1948 (the day the Western Union was inaugurated) was "in fact designed to secure the Congress' endorsement of the USA's formal membership of the West European military and political bloc in violation of the traditional principles of US foreign policy".*** Indeed, the pertinent moves were officially made by the American Government in the US Congress as early as June 1948.****

* *Uneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1948*, Part I, Moscow, 1950, pp. 144, 145.

** *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, January 1 to December 31, 1948*, Washington, 1964, p. 184.

*** *Pravda*, March 22, 1948.

**** The adoption of the Vandenberg resolution by the US Senate on June 11, 1948 signified that in pursuance of their anti-Soviet objectives

However, these moves were preceded by yet another step clearly designed to mislead public opinion. On May 4, 1948 the US Ambassador in Moscow Walter Bedell Smith called on the Soviet Foreign Ministry and on behalf of his Government made a statement on Soviet-US relations.* In this statement the US policy of forming military blocs directed against the USSR and the People's Democracies, of stockpiling armaments and setting up a network of military bases in foreign countries was called a policy of "mutual self-defence". In order to "justify" these actions, which were menacing world peace, the US Government referred to the establishment of the people's democratic system in a number of East European countries and to the Soviet Union's enhanced influence in that region. The US Ambassador went so far as to declare that "the communist revolution in Czechoslovakia had shocked the United States" and was the reason for the formation of a military bloc in Western Europe. He made the absurd assertion that there were secret provisions in the treaties on mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies.

The statement, which was full of fabrications of this kind, ended with the unsubstantiated assertion that the US had no hostile or aggressive intentions toward the Soviet Union and proposed an exhaustive discussion with the aim of settling the differences between the USSR and the USA.

The Soviet Union quickly gave a lucid reply to this American statement. On May 9 the US Ambassador was informed that the Soviet Government looked favourably upon the US Government's desire to improve relations with the USSR and for this purpose agreed to begin discussions with the purpose of settling the differences between the two countries. At the same time, the Soviet Government exposed the US Government statement's misrepresentation of the USSR's policies and its relations with the People's Democracies. It emphasised that international tension was being fanned by US actions such as the building of military bases in all parts of the world, the bellicose threats levelled

the US ruling circles had made a complete break with the traditional policy of peace-time non-participation in military alliances outside the American continent.

* *Pravda*, May 11, 1948.

at the USSR and the formation of military alliances directed against it.*

The Soviet Union's unconditional agreement to talks with the aim of improving Soviet-US relations and the publication of the pertinent announcement clearly upset the calculations of the Truman Administration. Immediately it became obvious that in Washington they had not counted on any negotiations, that they had made their statement simply as a diplomatic move before taking further steps to enlarge the anti-Soviet military bloc so as to have the possibility to refer later to this "peace gesture".

The authors of the American statement had to beat a retreat. At a press conference Truman declared that the exchange of statements with the Government of the USSR had not increased his hopes for peace. The British Foreign Secretary added his voice to that of the US President. Although the US and Soviet statements had not mentioned Britain, Bevin felt he had to declare in Parliament that he was not anxious to enter into further conferences until the ground had been cleared.**

At this time the Soviet Government informed the USA and the whole world of its standpoint regarding the possible programme for Soviet-US negotiations. This was done in connection with a letter to J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, from former US Vice-President Henry Wallace, who suggested that the Soviet Union and the USA reach agreement on a general reduction of armaments, the banning of all weapons of mass annihilation, the dismantling of foreign military bases on the territory of countries belonging to the UN, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, the conclusion of peace treaties with Germany and Japan, the withdrawal of troops from China and Korea, the utmost promotion of international trade, and so on.

In the Soviet reply to Wallace's letter, published on May 17, 1948, it was stated that in the opinion of the Soviet Government the Wallace programme could serve as a good

* *Pravda*, May 11, 1948.

** *Parliamentary Debates*, Fifth Series, Volume 450, House of Commons Official Report, Eighth Volume of Session 1947-48. London 1948, p. 2125.

and fruitful basis for agreement between the USSR and the USA. Further, it was reiterated that the Soviet Government believed that coexistence between the two social systems and a peaceful settlement of Soviet-US differences were both possible and necessary.*

The Truman Government rejected the Soviet proposals, thereby again demonstrating the insincerity of its peace statements. On May 19 the US State Department published a Statement in which it declared that the points brought up in the Wallace letter and in the Soviet reply could not serve as an object of bilateral discussion between the USA and the USSR.**

The US ruling circles now made no effort to disguise their moves towards the formation of an American-sponsored military bloc of capitalist states directed against the USSR and other peace-loving countries. This bloc, set up in April 1949, was the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation consisting of the USA, Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Iceland and Luxembourg, and subsequently joined by Turkey, Greece (1952) and the Federal Republic of Germany (1955).

NATO's formation was accompanied by demagogic statements by its creators that it was a "purely defensive" organisation,** and that Western Europe was "threatened by communist aggression". By repeating these fabrications the US ruling circles tried to create the semblance of justification for their aggressive policies, of which the Atlantic Treaty was the embodiment.

The treaty**** opened with an expression of "faith in the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter". In one form or another some of the articles of the treaty contained references to the UN and its Charter. However, this could not conceal the fact that the creation of that military bloc was a gross violation of the principles and

* *Pravda*, May 18, 1948.

** *Pravda*, May 20, 1948.

*** *The New York Times*, March 20, 1949. In its *White Paper on the Atlantic Pact* (New York, 1949, pp. 26-27) the US State Department gave the assurance that the pact was purely a defensive organisation and that its objective was to maintain peace.

**** The text of the treaty is given in *A Decade of American Foreign Policy. Basic Documents 1941-1949*, Washington, 1950, pp. 1328-30.

purposes of the UN and that it undermined the foundations of that organisation, namely, co-operation among the Great Powers, who were permanent members of the Security Council.

Article 3, which laid down that pact members would "separately and jointly... maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack" gave the US imperialists the means of making the other members of NATO militarily dependent on the USA and of turning them into bridgeheads for US troops and nuclear and other military bases and into suppliers of the additional manpower and armaments needed by the American strategists.

The military commitments of the pact members were worded in such a way (Article 5) as to enable the USA to act at its discretion in the event a military conflict broke out. Dean Acheson, who was Secretary of State at the time the North Atlantic pact was concluded, declared in a radio broadcast that the treaty "does not mean that the United States would be automatically at war if one of the nations covered by the pact is subjected to armed attack". The decision on "the action which we deemed necessary," he said, "would be taken in accordance with our constitutional procedures."**

Article 8 subordinates all other international agreements and, consequently, the foreign policy of the NATO members to the provisions of the pact, which was drawn up and dictated by the USA. Article 13 establishes 20 years as the general time limit in which the treaty remains in force. Touching upon the period of the treaty's operation, Acheson declared that it had no time limit. Upon the expiry of the term of the treaty's operation it would be automatically prolonged.**

NATO's organisers portrayed it as a regional bloc set up for collective self-defence. But in this case there could be no question of "self-defence" because nobody attacked or intended to attack the USA or any other NATO member. It is indicative that even John Foster Dulles, who replaced

* *Strengthening the Forces of Freedom. Selected Speeches and Statements of Secretary of State Acheson. February 1949-April 1950.* Washington, 1950, p. 85.

** Ibid.

Acheson as Secretary of State, quite plainly admitted that in forming NATO the leaders of the USA and of the West European capitalist countries did not believe there was any threat of "aggression" from the USSR. The Soviet Union, he wrote, "avoids anything that suggests a war of nation against nation. . . . Some of the highest and most competent authorities in Europe have recently told me that they do not believe that the Communist Party would dare to order the Russian armies to march into Western Europe as an invading force unless Russia had first been attacked, so that it was clear to the Russian people that the operation was necessary for self-defence. . . . Most well qualified people are inclined to feel that there is no imminent danger of the Red Army's being marched out of Russia against Western Europe or Asia in a war of aggression".*

This admission by one of the architects of the North Atlantic pact forcefully exposes the speciousness of all the statements to the effect that NATO had to be set up for the purpose of defence against "communist aggression".

Actually, the bloc was created as a means of bringing military pressure to bear on the socialist community and suppressing the national liberation movement in the colonial countries. The first of these objectives found expression in the notorious doctrines of "liberating" the People's Democracies (in other words, restoring the capitalist system in these countries) and "rolling back communism" proclaimed in those years by the makers of US foreign policy. It was calculated that ultimately these objectives would give US imperialism world supremacy.

In a speech on July 6, 1949 in which he urged the US Senate to ratify the Atlantic treaty, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, one of the architects of NATO and then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, declared: "Now we are unavoidably the leader and the reliance of free men throughout this free world. We cannot escape from our prestige nor from its hazard."** Later, when NATO had begun its activities, US General Gruenther, the NATO Commander-in-Chief, said in a speech in the USA: "... The mantle of world leadership has fallen upon our

* John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace*, New York, 1957, pp. 113, 115.

** *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*, Boston, 1952. p. 494.

shoulders. This alliance will succeed, in large measure, in the degree to which we are able to exercise that leadership.”*

Developments fully bore out the assessment of the North Atlantic pact that was made in 1949 by US Senator Robert Taft, who noted that “the pact . . . will promote war in the world . . . and it is wholly contrary to the spirit of the obligations we assumed in the United Nations Charter.”**

Even when the preparations for its formation were still under way, the Soviet Government exposed the real aims of NATO. In a Statement of January 29, 1949, the Soviet Foreign Ministry pointed out that the aims of the intended military bloc were closely linked with the plans for the forcible establishment of US-British domination under the aegis of the USA in Western Europe, the North Atlantic, Latin America, the Mediterranean, Asia and Africa, in fact “everywhere their hands can reach.”***

The Soviet Government warned the countries being drawn into the Atlantic pact that the bloc’s organisers would deprive them of the possibility of pursuing an independent foreign and internal policy and use them as ancillary means for the implementation of their aggressive plans.

In the Soviet Statement it was pointed out that the creation of the North Atlantic alliance was entirely at variance with the UN Charter, that it was directed toward undermining the United Nations and signified the flouting of important political agreements concluded by the USA, Britain and France with the Soviet Union, including the Soviet-British and Soviet-French treaties of friendship and mutual assistance. It sharply criticised the building of US military bases in Europe, Asia, Africa and America.

Further, the Soviet Government indicated the forces that were opposed to the designs of NATO’s creators and would quash their wild plans of achieving world domination. These forces were named in the Statement: the Soviet Union

* *The Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 34, No. 870, February 27, 1956, p. 334.

** *Congressional Record*, Vol. 95, No. 123, July 11, 1949, p. 9383.

*** *Uneshnaya Politika Sovetskogo Soyuza*. 1949, pp. 46-71.

and the People's Democracies, which were championing the great principles of friendship and equality in international relations; the huge upsurge of the national liberation movement of the Eastern peoples; the powerful support of the democratic elements in other countries; the unwillingness of a number of countries, including those who had joined aggressive groups, to accept American dictation unconditionally.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry Statement ended with the following conclusions: "The Soviet Union must more vigorously and consistently wage a struggle against all warmongers, against the policy of aggression and unleashing wars, for lasting, democratic peace in the world. . . . The Soviet Union must more firmly and more perseveringly struggle against the undermining and destruction of the United Nations Organisation."

The Soviet view of the plans of setting up NATO was officially brought to the notice of the future members of the bloc in the "Memorandum of the Government of the USSR on the North Atlantic Treaty" of March 31, 1949.* Earlier, at the close of January, the Soviet Government had sent a Statement to the Norwegian Government, drawing its attention to the aggressive, anti-Soviet objectives of NATO and asking whether Norway was assuming any commitment regarding the creation of that bloc's military bases on its territory. This step was taken because Norway—a small, traditionally neutral country that had in the past been friendly to the Soviet Union but which had found itself heavily dependent economically on the USA and Britain after the war—had interested the NATO organisers as a country with a common frontier with the USSR in the north. The Soviet Union could not remain indifferent to the plans of moving the springboards of the aggressive imperialist bloc into a region directly adjoining its frontiers.

In its reply the Norwegian Government assured the Soviet Government that it "will not abet in a policy that has aggressive aims and will not provide bases on Norwegian territory to the armed forces of foreign powers until Norway is attacked or is threatened with attack".

* Ibid., pp. 89-94.

In reply to an official Soviet inquiry, the Government of Denmark stated that it would not be a party to any policy pursuing aggressive aims and would not agree with any interpretation or use of the Atlantic pact against the Soviet Union "with which Denmark has traditional peaceful and friendly relations". Sweden, which valued her neutrality, flatly refused to join the Atlantic bloc despite strong American pressure.

From the very beginning the NATO organisers thus had to limit to a certain extent their plans of war preparations against the USSR and other socialist countries.

On July 19, 1949 the Soviet Government sent Notes to the Italian and also the US and British governments, in which it declared that Italy's accession to NATO and her military preparations within the framework of that bloc constituted a direct violation of the peace treaty with Italy. Under the terms of that treaty Italy assumed the obligation to refrain from any actions against the signatory powers and to maintain armed forces solely for the defence of the Italian frontiers and for domestic purposes.

In the UN, too, the Soviet Union waged a tireless struggle against imperialist military blocs, for peaceful co-operation. At the 4th General Assembly in September 1949 the Soviet Union proposed the condemnation of the policy of forming aggressive military blocs and the banning of the use of nuclear weapons and other means of mass annihilation, and the recommendation that the USA, Britain, China, France and the USSR sign a pact on strengthening peace. The opposition of the Western powers prevented the adoption of this proposal.

Later, in the spring of 1951, when the USSR, the USA, Britain and France were conducting talks on the agenda of a planned conference of Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers, the Soviet Government, in its desire to improve relations with the Western powers, proposed a frank discussion of the question of the Atlantic pact and of the US military bases in Europe and the Middle East. The Soviet Union expressed its willingness to discuss, if the Western powers so desired, any of its pacts of mutual assistance, either with China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland, or also with France and Britain. However, this proposal was turned down by the USA, Britain and France.

In November 1951 the Soviet Government drew world attention to the aggressive designs of the USA, Britain and France to enslave the whole of the Middle East. With Turkey, which they had drawn into their plans, these three powers tried to set up an Allied Middle East Command for the collective "defence" of the Middle East, which would have involved Egypt, Syria, the Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and other Middle Eastern states in imperialist military blocs. In Notes to these countries the Soviet Union pointed out that the creation of the Middle East Command would lead to the virtual military occupation of the Middle East by the organisers of the Atlantic bloc, notably the USA and Britain. It exposed the absurdity of the attempts of the NATO chiefs to substantiate their predatory designs with references to a Soviet "threat" to the countries of the Middle East. "From the very first days of the existence of the Soviet state," the Notes declared, "the Soviet Government has shown understanding and sympathy for the national aspirations of the peoples of the East and for their struggle for national independence and sovereignty." The Soviet Government warned that the participation of the Middle Eastern countries in the Middle East Command would seriously prejudice the Soviet Union's relations with these countries and also the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East.*

This diplomatic action by the Soviet Union considerably bolstered the resistance of the national patriotic forces of the Middle Eastern countries to the attempts to draw them into imperialist military blocs and helped to disrupt the plan of setting up a Middle East Command. The countries of the Arab East did not join the military blocs formed by the USA and Britain. The only exception, and a temporary one at that, was Iraq, which in 1955 the traitor clique of Nuri Al-Said and King Faisal drew into the Bagdad pact, a military bloc consisting of Britain, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. For this the reactionary clique was deposed by the infuriated Iraqi people during the revolution of July 1958. As a result of that revolution Iraq severed her connection with the Bagdad treaty.

* *Pravda*, November 23, 1951.

After the Second World War US imperialism thus laid claim to world supremacy, and the Western powers headed by it began a new arms race and pursued a policy of forming aggressive military blocs, suppressing the national sovereignty of other countries and starting military preparations against the USSR and other socialist states.

The Soviet Union exposed and denounced this imperialist programme of oppression and aggression. It opposed it with a programme of its own, a programme calling for peaceful coexistence, respect for the sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, the continuation of co-operation among the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition in order to preserve and strengthen peace, the consolidation of the United Nations on the basis of the principles proclaimed in its Charter, the banning of nuclear weapons and a cut-back of conventional armed forces under strict international control.

The Soviet Union's consistent struggle against the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall plan and the formation of imperialist military blocs helped the peoples of the world to see that the designs of US imperialism were a menace to peace and to the freedom and independence of all countries. Millions of people throughout the world came out in opposition to the arms race, the formation of military blocs and the preparations for a nuclear war. Some European capitalist countries and the vast majority of the Asian states did not let themselves be drawn into the military blocs being organised by the Western powers, preferring a policy of neutrality.

The imperialists were powerless to prevent the socialist development of the People's Democracies and the growth of the national liberation movement in the colonial countries.

As is noted in the Programme of the CPSU, "the facts reveal the utter incongruity of the US imperialist claims to world domination. Imperialism has proved incapable of stemming the socialist and national-liberation revolutions".* This was a substantial victory for the forces of

* *The Road to Communism*, Moscow, 1961, p. 476.

peace, a victory of the policy of peaceful coexistence, of the policy of supporting the national sovereignty, freedom and independence of nations consistently pursued by the Soviet Union.

However, peace continued to be menaced by the imperialist military blocs, especially in connection with the revival of militarism in West Germany under the aegis of NATO. The international situation remained tense at the close of the 1940s and the early 1950s. The struggle against the imperialist threat of war remained one of the major tasks of the USSR and other peace-loving states.

Chapter Twenty-One

THE SOVIET UNION IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST US IMPERIALISM FOLLOWING THE USA'S SWITCH TO A POLICY OF UNDISGUISED AGGRESSION IN THE FAR EAST

1. The USSR Against the US Policy of Splitting Korea. Soviet Assistance to the Korean People

The USA's imperialist policy assumed one of its sharpest forms in Korea at the close of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s.

The defeat of imperialist Japan and the Soviet Army's entry into Northeast China and advance to the frontiers of Korea facilitated the national liberation struggle, which the Korean people had been heroically waging for several decades. It looked as though the long overdue social changes would at last crystallise in Korea. However, after Japanese militarism had been whipped, the US ruling circles hastened to occupy its place and entrench themselves in South Korea.

US foreign policy in Asia provided for undisguised aggression in order to halt the national liberation struggle and safeguard capitalism's positions in that important area.

In the spring of 1950 US diplomats had a series of conferences with representatives of the reactionary governments of some Southeast Asian countries. At these conferences they considered plans for strengthening the reactionary regimes in these countries.

Korea was accorded the premier role in the USA's Far Eastern policy.

Liberated from Japanese colonial rule by the Soviet Army, which was aided by Korean partisans, the Korean people wanted national independence. This aspiration was opposed by the USA, which landed troops in South Korea following Japan's surrender. After consolidating its hold on

South Korea it sought to control the entire country. At the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA and Britain in December 1945 the USA included in the agenda the following heading: "the creation of a unified administration for Korea looking toward the establishment of an independent Korean Government".*

At that conference the US representatives made a dead set against the restoration of Korea's independence despite the promises made during the war and recorded in the Cairo and Potsdam declarations. They proposed a draft agreement under which Korea would pass through two stages of foreign administration before achieving independence. During the first stage Korea would be controlled by the US and Soviet commanders in that country, and during the second stage there would be a Four-Power administration functioning on the basis of an international trusteeship agreement. The Americans suggested setting up a special administrative organ that would operate in the name of the United Nations. In addition to Soviet and US representatives, it would have representatives from Britain and the Kuomintang Government of China.

This organ, according to the US plan, would exercise executive, legislative and juridical power in Korea with Koreans acting only as administrators, consultants and advisers. The trusteeship could be extended to ten years.**

Having an obedient majority in the UN, including its trusteeship agencies, the USA counted on suppressing the democratic forces in Korea, strengthening the position of the reactionaries and installing a puppet regime that would make Korea politically dependent on the Americans.

The USSR proposed a fundamentally different plan designed to grant the Korean people independence at the earliest possible date. Following an acute struggle the Soviet proposals were approved with slight amendments and used as the basis for the Moscow Agreement on Korea.*** This agreement envisaged the formation of a democratic Korean Provisional Government. Moreover, it provided for

* *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, Vol. II, New York, 1956, p. 318.

** *Sovetsky Soyuz i koréiskiy vopros*, Dokumenty, Moscow, 1948, pp. 8-12.

*** Ibid.

the establishment of a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the Soviet Command in North Korea and the United States Command in South Korea, which would, through consultations with Korean democratic parties and organisations, expedite the formation of that Government.

However, due to sabotage by the American representatives, the Joint Commission failed to make headway. The USA did not desire the creation of a democratic and independent Korea.

In June 1946, six months after the Moscow Conference, the US President's personal representative on reparations Pauli who had visited both South and North Korea, suggested enforcing US domination in Korea by political and economic measures, which did not rule out the use of armed force. Truman approved this programme.

The US Government was determined to prolong its military occupation of South Korea in order to stamp out the democratic movement, reinforce the reactionaries and augment the economic and political influence of the American monopolies in that country. The American authorities disbanded the people's committees that had been set up in South Korea following its liberation and put a military administration in control. They obstructed the work of the Soviet-US Joint Commission and hindered the formation of a Korean Provisional Government. In this situation the Soviet Government saw that the only solution was to give the Korean people the possibility of forming a democratic government themselves. On September 26, 1947 it proposed that Soviet and US troops be withdrawn from Korea. In October 1947 the US rejection of this proposal brought the work of the Soviet-US Joint Commission to a standstill.

US diplomacy solicited international support for its actions. In the autumn of 1947 the USA brought the Korean problem up for discussion at the 2nd General Assembly. In that discussion the Soviet representative proposed the simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet and US troops from Korea. This proposal was defeated by the US-controlled majority in the UN.

On May 10, 1948, flouting all the norms of democracy, the US occupation authorities conducted elections to the so-called National Assembly. These elections were marked by barefaced terrorism, by the persecution of democratic

elements and everybody else opposed to these separate elections. The rigged elections ended with the formation of a South Korean Government headed by Syngman Rhee, a reactionary who had lived for many years in the USA and was brought to Seoul at the close of 1945.

The formation of a puppet regime in South Korea signified the country's division and showed that the USA was openly steering towards converting South Korea into its strategic base in the Far East.

This partition of Korea by the US authorities seriously disturbed the democratic forces in that country. A conference of representatives of political parties and public organisations of North and South Korea, held in June and July 1948, adopted a decision to hold democratic elections for the Supreme People's Assembly throughout the territory of Korea. In South Korea, due to obstruction by the American authorities, the elections were held in secret.

As a result of these elections, the Supreme People's Assembly was established in August 1948. In September it adopted the Constitution of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and formed the republic's first Government.

The creation of the KPDR was a triumph of the Korean people in their struggle for their country's independence and democratic development. This event was of immense significance not only to the destiny of the Korean people but also to the development of international relations in the Far East as a whole. It was yet another blow at colonialism and set the peoples of Asia an example in their struggle for independence and freedom.

Acting on the principle of recognising the right of nations to self-determination and respecting their sovereignty, the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Korea towards the close of 1948. But the American authorities denied the request of the Supreme People's Assembly of Korea for the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea.

In March 1949 the USSR and the KPDR signed agreements on economic and cultural co-operation, on trade and payments, on the granting of a Soviet credit to Korea and on Soviet technical assistance. Under these agreements the Soviet Union rendered fraternal assistance which enabled the KPDR to invigorate its economy and consolidate the people's democratic system.

The United Democratic Patriotic Front, representing political parties and organisations in both parts of the country, was formed in June 1949 on the initiative of a number of political and public organisations of South Korea. In its address to the nation the UDPF proffered a plan for the country's peaceful unification through the establishment, on the basis of general elections, of a supreme legislative organ that would adopt a Constitution and form a united Government.

The US ruling circles took every step to prevent the creation of a united and independent Korea. With the aim of pressuring the South Korean bourgeois and petty-bourgeois circles and blocking Korea's unification, the US Congress passed a law on February 14, 1950 cutting off aid "in the event of the formation in the Republic of Korea of a coalition government which includes one or more members of the Communist Party or of the party now in control of the government of northern Korea".* This amounted to direct and flagrant US intervention in Korea's internal affairs. The US-controlled regime of South Korea rejected the UDPF proposal. It was nursing other plans calling for the "unification" of Korea in its own way, by armed force, by the forcible seizure of the Korean People's Democratic Republic.

2. US Preparations for War in Korea

As soon as it came to power the reactionary Syngman Rhee regime started preparations for an attack on the KPDR. As early as on August 24, 1948 it signed a secret military agreement with the USA on the formation of a South Korean army controlled by the US Military Mission. Under the law authorising aid to allies in aggressive blocs, the USA allocated US \$75 million in military aid to Syngman Rhee in the autumn of 1949. In 1950 South Korea received another US \$110 million.

* *United States Statutes at Large. 1950-1951, Vol. 64, Part I, Washington, 1952, p. 5.*

By the close of 1949 South Korea had an army of over 100,000 men equipped with US weapons. In January 1950 General William L. Roberts, chief of the US Military Advisory Group in South Korea told ministers of the South Korean regime that the plan for a campaign against the North had been decided on.* On January 26, 1950 the USA and South Korea signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement under which the USA undertook to provide South Korea with "equipment, materials, services, or other military assistance", while the Syngman Rhee regime pledged "to make effective use" of that assistance.**

While preparing for aggression the USA and its South Korean puppets fanned tension in the relations with the Korean People's Democratic Republic. Hardly a day passed without the South Korean military provoking clashes on the 38th parallel. In only the period from 1949 to April 1950 there were 1,274 intrusions of KPDR territory by South Korean troops and police. Moreover, there were 133 violations of North Korea's sea and air boundaries.

Alongside these provocations by the South Korean authorities, the US military and intelligence stepped up their activities. Senior ranking US officers and politicians visited South Korea one after another. US Under-Secretary of Defence Kenneth C. Royall, who visited Seoul in January 1950, was followed to the Far East by Defence Secretary Louis A. Johnson, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar N. Bradley and State Department adviser John Foster Dulles. On June 19 Dulles addressed the "National Assembly" of South Korea, assuring the South Korean authorities that the USA would give South Korea all the necessary material and moral assistance "against communism".

These preparations were evidence that the US ruling circles were determined to dissolve the KPDR and bring the whole of Korea under the Syngman Rhee regime. The destruction of the KPDR was designed as a demonstration of world imperialism's strength in Asia and as a prelude to the invasion of the People's Republic of China.

* *Documents and Materials Exposing the Instigators of the Civil War in Korea*, Pyöngyang, 1950, p. 7.

** *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents*, Vol. II, Washington, 1957, pp. 2529-30.

The US ruling circles hoped that the defeat of the KPDR and the PRC would dispel the faith of the Asian peoples in the possibility of a successful struggle against imperialism, weaken the national liberation movement and strengthen the position of the colonial powers.

Moreover, US imperialism needed the war in Korea as a means of whipping up world tension in order to use the resultant uneasy atmosphere to strengthen the North Atlantic bloc and restore militarism in West Germany and Japan.

Besides, it was calculated that the war in Korea would unleash an arms race and thereby prevent the further growth of an economic crisis, whose symptoms could be more and more distinctly discerned in the economy of the USA and some other capitalist countries. The US ruling circles believed that the huge appropriations for arms would help to bolster the declining business activity.

On June 25, 1950 South Korean troops began the aggression against the Korean People's Democratic Republic conceived by the USA, starting a civil war. In some areas they penetrated the territory of the KPDR. To repulse the aggression and safeguard the republic's security the Government of the KPDR ordered its troops to mount a counter-offensive, hurl back the enemy and pursue him into the territory of South Korea.

In the evening of June 25 (June 26 Korean time), when it was clear that the South Korean troops were on the run US President Truman held a conference that was attended by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defence Louis A. Johnson, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Bradley and a number of other top-ranking officials. This conference recommended sending the US 7th Fleet based in the Philippines to the Taiwan Strait and use US air and naval forces in South Korea for the alleged purpose of covering the evacuation of American nationals. Further, it recommended stepping up the flow of arms to the Syngman Rhee army. These recommendations were promptly put into effect.

On the next day, June 26, another conference attended by these same persons and a number of senators decided to extend the US intervention in the Far East. General Douglas MacArthur was ordered to send naval and air units to help

Syngman Rhee.* The US military had long been eager to send their armed forces into action in the Far East. General James A. Van Fleet, Commander of the US 8th Army, later (in January 1952) declared: "Korea has been a blessing. There had to be a Korea either here or some place in the world."**

The ordering of the US 7th Fleet to proceed to the Taiwan Strait on June 25, 1950 made the beginning of the US armed intervention in Korea the start of an undeclared war against the People's Republic of China. On June 26 the US Government decided to send army units to Korea and, in addition, to use the war in Korea for the occupation of Taiwan.*** The statement on Korean developments made by Truman on June 27 left no doubt that the USA was intent on crushing the national liberation movement in Asia. The USA promised aid to the Philippines Government in suppressing the democratic forces and to the Government of France in the war against the Vietnamese people.

US diplomacy took pains to screen the American armed intervention against North Korea with the flag of the United Nations, utilising to this end the situation that had taken shape in the Security Council. After the People's Republic of China had been proclaimed the Soviet Union vigorously backed the PRC Government's demand for the expulsion from the Security Council of the representative of the bankrupt Chiang Kai-shek clique and his replacement by the representative of People's China. Although this was an indisputably legitimate demand, the Western powers refused to admit the PRC representative to the UN. On January 13, 1950, in protest against these unlawful actions of the USA and its allies, the Soviet representatives walked out of the Security Council and other UN organs.

The Security Council was convened on June 25 on the insistence of the American representative, who submitted a draft resolution unfoundedly accusing the Korean People's Democratic Republic of aggression. In view of the setbacks

* *Military Situation in the Far East*, Part II, Washington, 1951, p. 992.

** I. F. Stone, *The Hidden History of the Korean War*, London, 1952, p. 348.

*** *American Foreign Policy. 1950-1955. Basic Documents*, Vol. II, Washington, 1957, p. 2539.

of the South Korean troops and counting on gaining time. the USA, in this resolution, demanded the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the KPDR troops to the frontier running along the 38th parallel. It was suggested that the UN Commission on Korea should observe this withdrawal. All UN members were called upon "to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities".* A Yugoslav proposal calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of forces and an invitation to the Government of the KPDR to state its case before the Security Council was defeated.** The USA secured the passage of its resolution, in which, despite the facts, it was stated that "North Korean forces had invaded the territory of the Republic of Korea".*** In spite of its formal approval by the majority in the Security Council, this resolution, as the two subsequent to it, had no legal force because both in form and substance it clearly contravened and flouted the UN Charter. The Soviet representative did not attend that sitting of the Council and this important issue linked with the maintenance of peace and security was illegally decided without the participation of a permanent member of the Security Council in violation of the UN Charter, which required unanimity among all the five permanent members.

The underlying principle of the United Nations, namely, that there should be unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council, was thus set at naught. But US diplomacy calculated on using the Security Council resolution to cover the armed intervention, which the USA had in fact already begun, in Korea's internal affairs.

The US Government intended to use all the means at its disposal to secure UN approval of its armed intervention in Korea. Against the event the US draft resolution was rejected by the Security Council, the State Department had prepared a demand for the immediate convocation of the General Assembly. In violation of the UN Charter, under which only the Security Council was authorised to pass a decision on the use of armed forces, the Americans counted

* *United Nations. Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly. Covering the Period from 16 July 1949 to 15 July 1950*, New York, 1950, pp. 21-22.

** *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 21.

on the US-controlled majority in the General Assembly to railroad a resolution on the sending of US troops to Korea.

On June 27 the Americans got the Security Council to pass yet another unlawful resolution, this time recommending that members of the United Nations furnish the Syngman Rhee regime "such assistance . . . as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area".* This was precisely the kind of resolution the US Government wanted as a screen for its aggressive actions, i.e., as a cover for the US armed intervention that had in fact been started two days before the resolution was adopted. In the Security Council Yugoslavia voted against this resolution, while Egypt and India abstained. Lastly, on July 7 the Security Council passed another (the third) resolution, which designated the interventionists in Korea as "UN troops" and allowed them to use the flag of the United Nations. The resolution placed the command of the armed intervention in Korea in the hands of the USA.** On the basis of this resolution General MacArthur, who was in fact directing the military operations in Korea, was appointed commander-in-chief of the "UN forces".

All these unlawful resolutions, which contravened the UN Charter, were passed after the US intervention had actually been started. Their only purpose was to cover the American intervention with the UN flag.

Pressured by the USA, 15 countries***—allies of the USA in aggressive blocs or countries entirely dependent on the USA—agreed to participate in the Korean war. But only two—Britain and Turkey—gave the USA military support, each sending a brigade to Korea. Moreover, Britain placed her naval forces in Japanese waters at the disposal of the USA. The other countries sent only small contingents. Thus 90 per cent of the so-called "UN forces" consisted of United States units.

* Ibid., p. 23.

** Ibid., p. 25.

*** The official participants in the intervention were, in addition to the USA: Britain, France, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, Greece, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Luxembourg and the Union of South Africa.

3. Soviet Moves to Halt the US Intervention in Korea

The intervention in Korea sharply aggravated the international situation and threatened to spark another world war. The problem of ending the war in Korea became one of cardinal significance in Soviet foreign policy.

In a Statement on the US armed intervention in Korea, published on July 4, 1950, the Soviet Government cited irrefutable facts exposing the US preparations for the invasion of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and showed the unlawfulness of the Security Council resolutions, that in effect supported the US intervention which had been started before these resolutions were adopted. In this Statement it was noted that "the Government of the United States of America has committed a hostile act against peace and shall bear the responsibility for the consequences of its armed aggression".* The Soviet Government urged the unconditional termination of the US armed intervention and the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea.

In the Soviet reply to the UN Secretary-General's notification on the Security Council resolutions it was underscored that the Security Council had flagrantly violated the UN Charter by passing a decision in support of the armed intervention against the Korean people. The Soviet Government, the reply stated, could not recognise the decisions as lawful.

In a Note to the US Embassy of July 6, 1950 the Soviet Foreign Ministry qualified the enforcement of a naval blockade of the KPDR as a further act of aggression that was incompatible with the principles of the United Nations. The Note stated that the Soviet Government would hold the Government of the USA "responsible for all the consequences of that act and for all the losses that may be inflicted on the interests of the Soviet Union".**

These Soviet moves were supported by the governments of the People's Republic of China and the Korean People's

* *Izvestia*, July 4, 1950; *Vneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuz*, 1950, Moscow, 1953, p. 203.

** *Vneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuz*, 1950, p. 204.

Democratic Republic, which assessed the American operations as an overt act of aggression against the peoples of Asia. In the UN the Soviet Union was actively supported by the socialist countries—Poland and Czechoslovakia. They declared that the Security Council resolutions were unlawful. Poland justly charged that the US Government “had begun military intervention in Korea without waiting for the consideration of the matter by the legal organs of the United Nations, thus taking unilateral action contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter”.*

The action taken by the governments of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries had wide repercussions, helping to mobilise the peace forces for the struggle to end the war in Korea.

Some neutral countries likewise condemned the escalation of the war in the Far East. India, for example, refused to send troops to Korea and did not subscribe to the Security Council resolution designating the interventionist army as “UN forces”. On July 13 Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru sent the USSR and the USA official messages in which he called for the earliest termination of hostilities in Korea through negotiations with the participation of People’s China, and insisted on the restoration of the PRC’s lawful status in the United Nations.

The Soviet Union whole-heartedly approved the Indian initiative. In a letter to Nehru on July 15 the Soviet Government wrote that it shared the view that it was “expedient to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem through the Security Council with the mandatory participation of the five Great Powers, including the People’s Government of China”**. The People’s Republic of China likewise responded favourably to the Indian initiative. However, the US Government categorically rejected the idea of negotiations.

The US military adamantly persisted in their intention to shatter the people’s democratic system in North Korea by force of arms. To break the resistance of the Korean people US aircraft barbarously bombed Korean towns and

* *United Nations. Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly. Covering the Period from 16 July 1949 to 15 July 1950*, New York, 1950, p. 27.

** *Vneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuz. 1950*, p. 27.

villages, ruthlessly butchering the civilian population and flouting universally accepted norms of international law. The US Navy acted with similar lawlessness, shelling the Korean coast.

In this tense situation the Soviet Government continued its efforts to secure the speediest termination of the war. On August 1, 1950 the Soviet representative resumed his duties in the Security Council, assuming the functions of its next chairman and convening a sitting. On August 4 the USSR introduced a draft resolution headed "Peaceful Settlement of the Korean Question", and suggested inviting a representative of the People's Republic of China to the Security Council sitting, hearing the representatives of the Korean people, ending the hostilities in Korea and, at the same time, withdrawing all foreign troops.*

The Western powers dragged out the discussion of the Soviet proposal and then opposed its adoption. Moreover, they rejected a Soviet draft resolution condemning the bombing of the Korean civilian population by US aircraft.

The whole world closely followed the discussion of these issues in the Security Council. The Soviet attitude received substantial support from democratic organisations and parties in many countries. The US rejection of a peaceful settlement exposed the true aims of American policy in the Korean problem.

On October 2, 1950, in an effort to restore peace in Korea the USSR delegation, jointly with the delegations of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Poland and Czechoslovakia, submitted to the 5th General Assembly a draft resolution calling for the immediate termination of hostilities and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea. In addition, it provided for measures to ensure the free democratic development of Korea: free all-Korea elections for the National Assembly, an election observation commission consisting of representatives of both parts of Korea, assistance through the United Nations for the restoration of the Korean national economy, and so forth.**

However, even this resolution calling for the termination

* *United Nations. Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly. Covering the Period from 16 July 1950 to 15 July 1951*, New York, 1951, p. 8.

** *Uneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza. 1950*, pp. 419-20.

of the war and the unification of Korea was rejected by the USA and its allies. Further, pressured by the USA, the General Assembly rejected the Soviet proposal, submitted earlier to the Security Council, calling for a halt to the bombing of the Korean civilian population by US aircraft.

On September 30, 1950, in order to legalise the US aggression, the British representative, acting on behalf of eight countries (Britain, Australia, Brazil, Cuba, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Norway and the Philippines), proposed a draft resolution recommending steps "to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea", which in the diplomatic language of the Western powers meant the extension of the sphere of action by US troops to North Korea. In addition, the resolution envisaged elections in North Korea under UN observation and US occupation and on the basis of the Constitution in force in South Korea.* The UN commission, set up for the alleged purpose of helping to reunite and rehabilitate Korea, was formed with an obvious bias. Participants in the intervention in Korea predominated in it (of its eight members five were allies of the USA in the war in Korea). The resolution was categorically opposed by the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

The Government of the People's Republic of China lodged a protest with the UN Security Council against the actions of the USA. The Soviet Union secured the inclusion in the Security Council agenda of the protest against armed invasion of Taiwan. On Soviet insistence a representative of the PRC was invited to the discussion of the protest. At the discussion, which was held in November 1950, the Soviet and Chinese representatives proved without a shadow of doubt that the US military occupation of Taiwan was an act of direct aggression. They insisted on the withdrawal of the US forces from Taiwan and on a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem through the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and the granting to the Korean people of the possibility of deciding their internal affairs by themselves.** Besides, the world was given further proof that

* *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955. Basic Documents*, Vol. II, pp. 2576-78.

** *United Nations. Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly. Covering the Period From 16 July 1950 to 15 July 1951*, New York, 1951, pp. 47-50.

the USA was pursuing a policy of aggression and flouting international agreements and international law.

Although these Soviet proposals were also rejected by the USA and its supporters, the debate was a moral and political defeat for the US ruling circles.

The aggression launched against the people of Korea encountered stiff resistance. The appeal of the Korean Party of Labour and the Government of the KPDR united the Korean people for the defence of their country's independence and freedom. Despite US armed support the Syngman Rhee army was routed. By mid-September 1950 the KPDR forces had liberated 95 per cent of Korea's territory and 97 per cent of the population. Only a small bridgehead at Pusan in Southeast Korea remained in American hands. The very first test showed the rottenness of the Syngman Rhee regime, which had no support from the people. The US ruling circles had not expected this reactionary regime, set up by them in South Korea, to prove to be so unstable. However, the US military refused to be deterred from achieving their objectives and demonstrating American might. In September 1950 the US Command considerably enlarged the scale of the intervention and launched big offensive operations. Utilising its naval superiority it landed, in the vicinity of Inchon, a force of 50,000 men supported by artillery and tanks. This force threatened the logistics services and communications of the KPDR army. The landing was covered by 500 aircraft and 300 naval vessels. The US troops thus formed a bridgehead behind the lines of the KPDR's main forces. This and the huge numerical superiority enabled the US Command to start an offensive. The interventionists crossed the 38th parallel and advanced northward to the Yalu and Tumen rivers.

Parallel with the operations against the KPDR the USA started an armed intervention against China. The US 7th Fleet patrolled not only Korean waters but the entire coastline of China from Swatow in the south to Tsingtao (in the Shantung Peninsula) in the north. US warships shelled merchant ships and hindered free navigation in violation of international law.

With similar lawlessness US aircraft intruded into China's air space as early as August 27, 1950 and raided the railway station of Talitzu and the town of Antung. The

Chinese Government qualified these actions as acts of direct and open armed aggression against China and warned the USA that the "Chinese people cannot remain indifferent to the situation created by the invasion of Korea by the USA and its accomplices and to the threat that the war will be escalated".*

China's security was seriously menaced by the US offensive in North Korea, the approach of US troops to the frontier of the PRC and the bombing of Chinese territory.

At the 5th General Assembly the representatives of the USSR and other socialist countries underscored this danger. The Soviet delegation submitted a proposal calling for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea in order to enable the Korean people to decide their affairs by themselves, noting, furthermore, that in the Far East an effective settlement could only be reached with the participation of the People's Republic of China and with account being taken of its interests.** A warning was issued to the US Government through the Indian Ambassador in Peking, K. M. Panikkar. At the same time, the Chinese Government sent a telegram to the UN stating that urgent steps had to be taken to prevent the extension of the war.

The US Command ignored all these warnings and continued expanding its military operations against the People's Republic of China. In early November 1950 US heavy bombers began raiding targets along the Yalu River.

A wide movement to help the Korean people and safeguard the Chinese frontier unfolded in the PRC. Units of people's volunteers began to be formed. On November 12, 1950 the Chinese Government announced that it had granted permission to volunteers to take part in the liberation struggle of the Korean people. This spelled out the collapse of the US gamble in Korea.

On November 24 MacArthur announced the start of a general, decisive offensive in Korea. He was confident of success and promised his troops that they would be home by Christmas.

* Wu Hsiu-chuan, *The US Armed Aggression Against China*, Moscow, 1950, p. 14 (in Russian).

** *Uneshnaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuz. 1950*, pp. 588-89.

But with massive assistance from the Soviet Union, the Korean People's Army and the Chinese volunteers mounted a counter-offensive. The USSR supplied them with weapons, ammunition, vehicles, fuel, food and medicaments. There were Soviet military advisers in Korea.

In this crucial period the Soviet Government transferred several Soviet air divisions to China's Northeastern provinces at the request of the Government of the PRC. In the ensuing air battles Soviet flyers shot down scores of US aircraft and reliably safeguarded Northeast China against air raids. Battle-steeled Soviet fighter-pilots took part in these operations. Against the event the situation deteriorated the USSR made preparations for sending five divisions to help the Korean People's Democratic Republic repulse the American aggression. Moreover, the USSR continued giving the KPDR and the PRC all the necessary political support.* The US and Syngman Rhee forces were rolled back by the Korean People's Army and the Chinese volunteers and by mid-December the whole of the Korean People's Democratic Republic was liberated.

Truman threatened to use atomic weapons in Korea, saying: "We will take whatever steps are necessary to meet the military situation. . . . That includes every weapon that we have." General MacArthur emphatically requested to be allowed to bomb Northeast China on a large scale. From documents published after MacArthur's death it became known that in February 1951 he suggested dropping from 30 to 50 atomic bombs on air bases and rear installations in the KPDR and the PRC. To prevent the Korean People's Army and the Chinese volunteers from launching offensive operations he planned to create a belt of radioactive cobalt stretching from the Japan to the Yellow seas. Moreover, he proposed employing half a million Chiang Kai-shek troops.**

The US Command in the Far East did not confine itself to plans of war against China. According to Truman, MacArthur was "ready to risk general war".*** In this MacArthur was not alone. He had influential supporters in

* M. S. Kapitsa, *KNR: dva desyatiletiya—dve politiki*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 36-37.

** *The New York Times*, April 9, 1964, p. 16.

*** *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, Vol. II, p. 416.

the Government (Secretary of Defence Louis A. Johnson, Secretary of the Navy H. Freeman Matthews) and in the US Senate and Congress (the Republican Right wing led by Senator Robert A. Taft, and a section of the Democrats siding with the Taft group). These circles demanded using the war in Korea to unleash a major "preventive war" against People's China and the Soviet Union. They argued: "We've got to battle some time, why not now?"*

The principal reason the US imperialists did not attack the People's Republic of China and start a world war was their fear of the Soviet Union's military and political might. This is admitted by Truman, who wrote in his memoirs that fear of the Soviet Union's entry into the war made him reject the plan suggested by MacArthur and his supporters and even to relieve the general of his command.

By mid-1951 the front in Korea had been stabilised approximately along the 38th parallel.** This was evidence that the US "positions of strength" policy was in the grip of a serious crisis.

US imperialism failed to achieve the main objectives that it had set itself when it started the war in Korea. The Korean People's Democratic Republic upheld its freedom and independence, repulsing the aggression by the USA. The Korean people had the material and moral support of all the progressive forces in the world, and particularly effective assistance was rendered the KPDR by the Soviet Union and by the People's Republic of China, which sent volunteers to Korea. The US imperialists were prevented from escalating the war by the close co-operation among socialist countries, especially between the USSR and the PRC.

The Korean developments showed that given close co-operation the socialist countries had the power to curb the imperialists, that they had in fact stopped them when, in the person of the USA, they committed acts of armed aggression five years after the Second World War.

* I. F. Stone, *The Hidden History of the Korean War*, p. 22.

** The front line did not exactly follow the 38th parallel: in the west the Korean troops and the Chinese volunteers controlled a territory of about 3,600 square kilometres south of the 38th parallel: in the east the interventionists controlled a territory of 4,600 square kilometres north of the 38th parallel (See *Pravda*, August 7, 1951).

Chapter Twenty-Two

THE GERMAN QUESTION FOLLOWING THE CREATION OF TWO GERMAN STATES. THE SOVIET UNION'S STRUGGLE FOR GERMANY'S PEACEFUL AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT (1950-1955)

1. Two German States—Two Policies

Germany* remained one of the key issues of the Soviet Union's struggle against US imperialist policy.

The creation of the German Democratic Republic was a great and truly historic achievement of the German working people, of all peace-loving Germans. Whereas the former German states had been an instrument of the exploiting classes, of the proponents of war and aggression, in the German Democratic Republic the leadership of society was in the hands of the working class, which, in alliance with the peasants and progressive intellectuals, turned the country into a bulwark of peace and democratic development. The working people received the possibility of re-organising their life on the basis of social equality, restoring the esteem for Germany which the nazis had shattered, and establishing relations of friendship, peace and co-operation with other countries.

The Soviet Government regarded the creation of the GDR as a turning point in European history. In a telegram of congratulations to the GDR President Wilhelm Pieck and the Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl, J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, noted that the German and Soviet peoples "have the greatest potential in Europe for accomplishing great acts of world-wide significance. If these two peoples display the determination

* See Chapter Seventeen.

to fight for peace with the same energy that they conducted the war, peace in Europe may be regarded as being ensured".*

The GDR Government solemnly pledged to translate the Potsdam Agreements into life. In its very first Statement it declared: "Peace and friendship with the Soviet Union are the only condition for the blossoming, more, for the very existence, of the German people and state."**

The Soviet Union founded its relations with the GDR on equality, respect and fraternal mutual assistance. The functions of administration that had until then been exercised by the Soviet Military Administration were turned over to the Provisional Government of the GDR on October 10, 1949. That Government was authorised to act freely in internal and external affairs in accordance with the republic's Constitution insofar as its actions did not violate the Potsdam decisions and the commitments arising from the decisions adopted jointly by the Four Powers. The Soviet Control Commission that replaced the military administration had the function of making sure that no measures were taken in contravention of the Four-Power decisions on Germany's demilitarisation and democratisation, Germany's reparation commitments and the right to receive necessary information from the GDR.***

Diplomatic relations with the GDR were established by the Soviet Union on October 15, 1949.

The fundamental democratic reforms effectuated in the GDR covered all spheres of social, economic and cultural life. These reforms completely uprooted the vicious traditions of the past and freed people's minds of the bitter heritage of Hitlerism.

In the Federal Republic of Germany developments followed an entirely different course. It gave refuge to big industrialists and bankers, Junkers, senior officers of the Wehrmacht, and leading SS men, in short, to all those who had helped the nazis to seize power and collaborated with

* *Sovetsky Soyuz i vopros o yedinstve Germanii i o mirnom dogovore s Germaniyei*, Moscow, 1952, p. 8.

** *Dokumente zur Aussenpolitik der Regierung der DDR*, Berlin, 1954, p. 29.

*** *Dokumenty o vneshnei politike pravitelstva GDR*, Moscow, 1955, p. 249.

them. Many of these people bore the responsibility, along with Hitler, for monstrous crimes.

Enjoying the patronage of the occupation authorities, the reactionary forces retained their hold on West Germany's political, social and economic life. The façade of the West German state was the cover for the suppression of democracy, the undivided rule of the monopolies, the encouragement of militarism and the preaching of a policy of revenge.

Thus, in the GDR and the FRG there were, from the very beginning, essential differences in the class structure, the character of the political power, civic consciousness and social ideals. The ruins of the Nazi Reich became the arena of a most acute political struggle between two different state systems. The Soviet Union firmly sided with the democratic circles, who desired peace and progress for their own people and for the people of other countries. Time and again it warned the governments of the USA, Britain and France of the dangerous consequences of their policy of mustering reactionary, pro-fascist forces and building up a militarist West German state on that basis. It demanded a return to the Potsdam principles, the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany and the withdrawal of all occupation troops to enable the German people to organise their affairs without foreign interference and pressure.

However, the Western powers made haste to burn their bridges and prevent any return to a co-ordinated policy toward Germany. To use the words of Walter Bedell Smith, then the US Ambassador in the Soviet Union, the Western powers could be made to abandon their intention to set up a West German Government only at gun point.*

The monopoly that they still had on the manufacture of nuclear weapons was turning the heads of the USA's ruling élite. It saw itself on the threshold of world supremacy. Hence the doctrine of "rolling back communism", in other words, of aggression against socialist countries, a doctrine that became official policy when Dulles was appointed US Secretary of State. In concentrating all the forces of international reaction under their aegis, the US ruling circles

* Quoted from H. Abosch, *L'Allemagne sans miracle d'Hitler à Adenauer*, Paris, 1960, p. 44.

pinned much of their hopes on the rejuvenation of German militarism as a long-standing enemy of the Soviet Union.

In that period the alliance which began to crystallise in the early 1950s between the aggressive circles of the USA and the FRG had some distinctive features: in return for the Americans' undertaking to trample the inter-Allied agreements and facilitate the revival of German militarism the Bonn authorities had to pay with German divisions and by turning West Germany into a springboard for a future war against the Soviet Union.

The war-time and post-war agreements on Germany were a hindrance to the Western powers and they decided to sweep them away. The Allied High Commission, which had been set up by the Western powers began unilaterally to issue laws annulling the laws and directives that had been issued, with Soviet participation, by the Control Council on uprooting militarism and nazism in Germany, breaking up the monopolies into smaller units and guaranteeing democratic liberties. Among others, laws No. 8 and No. 34 of the Control Council ("On Prohibition and Elimination of Military Training" and "The Dissolution of the Wehrmacht") were declared "inoperative in the territory of the Federal Republic". The Western powers reduced their obligations on Germany's demilitarisation and democratisation to a worthless scrap of paper. "The truth," said Professor Bernard Lavergne, the well-known French sociologist, "compels us to state that there is practically no commitment that we undertook in regard to Germany that we did not violate. Every unbiassed person must acknowledge that we cannot acquit ourselves before the tribunal of history."*

A point that must be noted is that after stripping the Four-Power agreements of everything that ensured Germany's demilitarisation and democratisation and her development as a united, peace-loving state, of everything that was demanded by the interests of peace and security in Europe, the governments of the Western powers continued to cling to individual provisions, which they artificially tore out of the context of decisions they had themselves repudiated.

The militarisation plans were one of the original motives and the end goal of the creation of the FRG, which the USA

* *L'Humanité*, December 28, 1962.

and its allies needed mainly as the assault force of NATO against the socialist community.

In 1948 an entourage of military advisers, including the nazi generals Hans Speidel and von Manteuffel, formed round Konrad Adenauer, then chairman of the Parliamentary Council that was working on a Constitution for West Germany on instructions from the Western occupation authorities. Earlier, the USA and Britain had begun to enlist former Wehrmacht personnel into various auxiliary and "special" services of their forces in Germany. On assignment from US military agencies many of the former nazi generals were in this period "summing up" their experience of the war on the Soviet front.

In the USA's aggressive anti-Soviet and anti-socialist plans one of the key roles was accorded to West Germany. In these plans it took into account the FRG's strategic location, war-industrial potential and manpower resources and also the inclination of its ruling circles toward aggression and political gambles. In their turn, these ruling circles counted on achieving their revanchist aims with the aid of the USA and its allies.

Wilfred G. Burchett, who was a correspondent of the Conservative newspaper *Daily Express* in Germany for over three years, quite correctly noted: "There was a deliberate conspiracy to restore the regime of the Junkers and Ruhr industrialists in Germany; to prevent any of the social reforms long overdue in Germany, and there was a conspiracy to prepare Germany for a future base of aggression against the Soviet Union."*

Already then the Soviet Government had a distinct idea of the Western powers' real aims relative to the German question. Whatever proposals were made by the Soviet Union on that question they were sure to be rejected by the USA. In order to control Western Europe the USA had to have armed forces in the FRG. Moreover, it was patently clear that the USA would go to all lengths to build up a West German army and draw the FRG into the North Atlantic pact. It, therefore, ignored the Potsdam Agreements, regarding them only as an encumbrance.

* Wilfred G. Burchett, *Cold War in Germany*, Melbourne, 1950, p. 10.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, did all in its power to safeguard the principles of peace, democracy and progress as worked out by the anti-Hitler coalition at Potsdam. In its foreign policy actions it tirelessly kept world opinion alerted, and exposed the plans of forming a West German army and involving the FRG in the Western military groupings.

All the more was this necessary in view of the fact that at first the inspirers of West Germany's militarisation masked their plans with specious assurances. In November 1949 Chancellor Adenauer signed the Petersberg Agreement with the High Commissioners of the USA, Britain and France under which the FRG Government pledged "to maintain the demilitarisation of the Federal territory and to endeavour by all means in its power to prevent the re-creation of armed forces of any kind".* That same month US President Truman declared at a press conference that no negotiations regarding the setting up of a new German army were being conducted.** Actually, the arming of West Germany had been decided on by the autumn of 1949 and all that now remained was to set the time limit and work out the ways of achieving this.

James P. Warburg, a leading American expert on foreign policy, noted the discrepancy between the words and deeds of the US Government in the German question, writing: "In 1949 our Government said that it would never acquiesce in German rearmament. In 1950 our Government demanded German troops for NATO, but said it would never allow Germany to rebuild its own war industries. In 1959 and 1960 our Government has agreed to give Germany everything except nuclear warheads and has permitted American corporations to go into partnership with Krupp, Kloeckner, Heinckel and Messerschmidt and other German war industries in re-creating German capacity to build almost every kind of war equipment."***

While widening the abyss between the GDR and the FRG, the Western powers took every measure to camouflage

* *Current History*, January 1950, p. 43.

** *The Truth About Western Policy on the German Question*, Moscow, 1959, p. 82.

*** James P. Warburg, *Disarmament: the Challenge of the Nineteen Sixties*, New York, 1961, p. 140.

their divisive plans. They affected that they were not opposed to the creation of a united German state. In February 1950, acting through John J. McCloy, the US High Commissioner in Germany, they sought to brush off the Soviet proposals for the unification of Germany with talk about "free" elections throughout Germany under the supervision of the Four Powers. Soon after, a Western Foreign Ministers' Conference (May 11-13, 1950) issued a declaration stating "that the first step toward the restoration of German unity should be the holding throughout Germany of free elections to a Constituent Assembly".* Among the conditions for this they demanded the cessation of reparations payments from current industrial output and the return of the alienated industrial enterprises to their former owners.

Formerly, when the two German states had not yet been formed, when the Soviet Union was energetically pressing for the formation of central organs of authority for the whole of Germany and the holding of free elections throughout Germany on the basis of a uniform election law, and also the granting to parties and trade unions the right to function throughout Germany, the Western powers were adamant in their rejection of these proposals. It was only after Germany had been split by them and it became much more difficult to hold elections throughout that country that the USA and its allies embraced the idea of elections throughout Germany as a propaganda slogan in the calculation that such elections were no longer feasible. At first they divided Germany and installed militarists and reactionaries in power in the Western part of that country, and only then did they begin their propaganda manoeuvres with the slogan about "free elections throughout Germany". The ideas of peace and democracy that had begun to penetrate the minds of the population of West Germany during the initial years after the war and the Potsdam Agreement were now once again turned inside out. The Soviet Union, which had brought deliverance from fascism to the German people as well, was now depicted by Western propaganda as the cause of all the troubles experienced by the Germans. The press and radio poured out an unending stream of

* *Documents on Germany, 1944-1961. Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, December 1961, Washington, 1961, p. 97.*

fabrications accusing the Soviet Union of "evil designs". Those who had horrified the European peoples by their crimes were now declared champions of "free Europe". The West German journalist H. Abosch wrote that "all the accumulated hatred, discontent and fear, all the desire for justification and thirst for revenge engendered by defeat could now find an outlet against Russia".* By returning the Germans to fascist slogans of anti-communism that were familiar to them, and sowing lies and slander in regard to the Soviet foreign policy of peace, imperialist propaganda in effect whitewashed the war started by nazi Germany against the USSR. It cultivated the ideology of militarism and revenge and justified the reactionary, revenge-seeking policy of the FRG Government.

The talk about unity and "free elections" was nothing more than a screen for the policy of splitting Germany and remilitarising the FRG. At their separate conference in London in May 1950 the Foreign Ministers of the three Western powers concentrated their attention not on ways and means of uniting Germany but on bringing the FRG into NATO and rebuilding its military potential in the interests of that aggressive bloc. At a press conference, a US State Department spokesman admitted that on the eve of the London conference Adenauer requested the three powers to consider allowing German military units to be formed under the guise of a police force.

At their next conference, in New York (September 12-18, 1950), the three Western Foreign Ministers adopted a declaration which spoke quite frankly of large-scale remilitarisation in West Germany. The communique noted that the conference had approved "German participation in an integrated force for the defence of European freedom".** A few days later, the NATO Council, which had also sat in New York, issued a communique stating that it had been decided to set up joint armed forces and that "Germany should be enabled to contribute to the build-up of the defence of Western Europe".***

* H. Abosch, *L'Allemagne sans miracle d'Hitler à Adenauer*, p. 40.

** *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955. Basic Documents*, Vol. II. Washington, 1957, p. 1712.

*** *The Department of State Bulletin*, October 9, 1950, Vol XXIII, p. 588.

Following the New York conference the central and practically only subject of all the decisions of the Western powers on Germany was the restoration of the FRG's war-industrial potential and the preparations for the creation of a West German army. Addressing the National Assembly in October 1950 French Prime Minister René Plevin outlined a veiled plan for the remilitarisation of West Germany, speaking of a "European army" that would include German contingents, which would "as far as possible be small units". This camouflage was needed to deceive the French people, most of whom condemned the idea of remilitarising Germany.

The plans for arming West Germany were specified at a NATO Council meeting in Brussels (December 18-19, 1950), which announced that it had "reached unanimous agreement regarding the part which Germany might assume in the common defence".* On December 21, 1950 Truman acknowledged that at Brussels the USA had achieved its objective,** namely, the agreement of its allies to the rearmament of West Germany.

2. Soviet Efforts to Get the Western Powers to Drop Their Plans for the FRG's Rearmament and Fulfil Their Obligations Under the Allied Agreements

In Notes and Statements the Soviet Union warned the USA, Britain and France that by pursuing a policy of reviving German militarism in West Germany and concluding a military alliance with the FRG they were assuming a very grave responsibility to the world for this policy. It urged the Western powers to return to a joint Allied policy.

A conference of the Foreign Ministers of European socialist countries—the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia—was held in Prague in October 1950. The Statement issued by that

* *The Manchester Guardian*, December 20, 1950.

** *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Harry S. Truman, 1950*, Washington, 1965, p. 755.

conference pointed out that the policy pursued by the three Western powers with regard to Germany constituted a complete rupture with their commitments under Allied agreements and created "a threat of further aggression, of further military adventures in Europe".* The Statement emphasised that the separate agreements adopted by the Three-Power conference in New York had no legal force. The Prague conference expressed itself in favour of concluding a peace treaty with Germany without delay and restoring Germany's unity, for which purpose it suggested setting up a Constituent Council with East and West Germany represented on it on a parity basis. Further, it noted that all restrictions to the development of a peaceful economy in Germany had to be lifted. These reasonable proposals clashed with the objectives of the USA, Britain and France, and also of the FRG, and were ignored.

In November 1950 the Soviet Government proposed convening the Council of Foreign Ministers of the USA, Britain, France and the USSR to consider the fulfilment of the Potsdam Agreements on the demilitarisation of Germany. This proposal was given a frosty reception in the Western capitals. The governments of the USA, Britain and France were obviously disinclined to convene the Foreign Ministers Council. They suggested first holding a conference of Assistant Foreign Ministers to work out the agenda for a Foreign Ministers Council meeting without examining the substance of the issues at this preliminary conference.

In line with its desire to achieve an agreed settlement of the German question, the Soviet Government accepted this proposal. But hardly had it done so than the Western powers began putting off the holding of even this preliminary conference, which they had themselves proposed. Meanwhile, they stepped up the preparations for the formation of a West German regular army and the restoration of the war industry in the FRG. They were clearly out to confront the Foreign Ministers Council meeting with the remilitarisation of West Germany as a *fait accompli*.

On December 15, 1950 the Soviet Government drew the attention of the governments of Britain and France to the fact that their course toward the regeneration of the German

* *Pravda*, October 22, 1950.

army and the war industry in West Germany was a glaring violation not only of the Potsdam Agreements but also of the Anglo-Soviet (May 26, 1942) and Franco-Soviet (December 10, 1944) treaties, inasmuch as these treaties contained the provision that upon the termination of the war with Germany the signatories would jointly take all the necessary steps to remove any further threat of German aggression.

After long procrastination on the part of the Western powers, the preliminary conference of Assistant Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, Britain and France finally opened on March 5, 1951. From the very outset it could be plainly seen that the Western powers were intent on complicating the tasks confronting the conference and making it difficult to work out agreed proposals for the agenda of the Foreign Ministers Council. Whenever A. A. Gromyko, who led the Soviet delegation, accepted a Western proposal, the authors of the proposal immediately lost interest in it. The US representatives tried to move the question of Germany's demilitarisation into the background and drag into the agenda problems that had nothing to do with that country. They doggedly refused to discuss the question of an immediate peace treaty and the withdrawal of the occupation troops from Germany and avoided all mention of the Potsdam Agreements. In the end the Western powers blocked every possibility of working out an agreement on the agenda for the Foreign Ministers Council. The conference in Paris was a total failure.

Instead of resuming the Four-Power negotiations on the German question, as proposed by the Soviet Union, the Western powers signed a treaty in Paris on April 18, 1951 setting up the European Coal and Steel Community (Schuman plan) with the participation of the FRG. They hardly made a secret of the aims of that community. Robert Schuman declared that the plan for pooling coal and steel resources would open the way to military co-operation among the countries concerned. The treaty came into force on July 25, 1952.

While keeping up its efforts to settle the German question on a peaceful and democratic basis, the Soviet Government supported initiatives in this question by other socialist countries, particularly the GDR. Between 1950 and 1953

the German Democratic Republic made a series of important moves with the aim of establishing contact with the Federal Republic of Germany. Its Government called upon the West German Government to take the road of co-operation among Germans for the purpose of settling national problems, and offered concrete considerations on the forms of such co-operation. A major move in that direction was the holding in Berlin in August 1950 of the first German National Congress, at which the patriotic forces of West Germany were broadly represented.

On November 30, 1950 the GDR Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl sent the FRG Chancellor Konrad Adenauer a letter proposing the formation, on a parity basis, of a Constituent Council that could begin preparing the conditions for free elections throughout Germany to a National Assembly. On September 15, 1951 the People's Chamber of the GDR sent the West German Bundestag a proposal for a conference of representatives of the GDR and the FRG to discuss two questions: the holding of free elections throughout Germany and speeding up the signing of a peace treaty with Germany. All these proposals had the wholehearted support of the Soviet Union.

The GDR Government's call for an all-German conference had a wide response in democratic circles in West Germany. The Bonn Government did not find it easy to quash this feeling. At first Adenauer turned down the GDR proposals with insidious attacks on the policies of the USSR and the GDR without offering anything instead. Needless to say, this reply could not calm popular discontent with Adenauer's stand. Then the FRG Government put forward 14 points as conditions for its acceptance of the GDR proposals and for the holding of elections throughout Germany. The GDR People's Chamber issued a statement declaring that most of these points were acceptable.

But the FRG Government did not respond to this step of the People's Chamber. The West German Government and Bundestag rejected all the other proposals of the Government, President and People's Chamber of the GDR for joint action in the interests of Germany's unity.

At the same time, in order to suppress the widespread democratic feeling in the FRG, recourse was had to all means of coercion, including police terror. On July 11,

1951 the Bonn Government hastened through the Bundestag a reactionary law giving the authorities the right to institute criminal proceedings against any organisation or individual whose activity was regarded as "dangerous to state". Overnight they branded as "traitors" all patriots who were urging negotiations with the GDR. Many participants in the anti-Hitler underground and champions of Germany's peaceful and democratic development were sentenced to terms of imprisonment.

As their main step they decided to do away with the Communist Party of Germany, which was waging a selfless struggle against the policy of splitting Germany and remilitarising the FRG, against everything that the Adenauer regime stood for. It was demanding negotiations with the GDR and the restoration of Germany's national unity. In violation of the law, a provocative trial of the CPG was started in the federal constitutional court in November 1951. Scores of other mass progressive organisations of West Germany were attacked. Police raids on the premises of democratic parties and organisations and the arrest of members of the movement for peace and unity became daily occurrences.

At the same time the ex-nazi generals and officials, and everybody else who sought to revive the spirit and methods of Germany's militarist past, enjoyed the patronage of the authorities. The Bonn Government sought the full exoneration of war criminals. This had the sympathy of the Western powers. According to statistics published in the FRG, 2,655 war criminals, including Field Marshals Kesselring, List and Manstein, were released from prison in only the period from April 1950 to October 1952. Many who had been Hitler's accomplices were drawn into the preparations for building up the Bundeswehr or co-opted into the Bonn brain trust. After a study of West German reality Robert Kempner, who was Chief US Prosecutor at the Nuremberg trial of war criminals, found that people who had ordered the mass exterminations during the nazi regime went unpunished in the FRG.*

Moreover, the FRG Government gave the world a glimpse of yet another facet of its policy: its preparations

* *Der Spiegel* No. 15, April 16, 1964.

to take revenge for the lost war. On May 4, 1951 it published a Statement under the heading "German Sovereignty", in which it unambiguously recorded its refusal to recognise Germany's post-war frontiers. Adenauer did not even shrink from repeating the nazi demand for a "New Order in Eastern Europe".*

The appetite of the Bonn Government grew faster than the concessions that were made to it by the Western powers. Adenauer, who had earlier made no conditions for the arming of the FRG, now demanded "equality" with the other members of the "European army". The Bonn Government made adroit use of the pronouncements of Kurt Schumacher and other leaders of the FRG Social-Democratic Party, who had started a demagogic campaign protesting against West Germany's subordinate position in the "European army". The Pleven plan and the Spofford plan,** which had been drawn up in NATO, were declared inadequate.

In the long run, the Western powers and the FRG agreed on a plan for the creation of a European Defence Community. That plan, adopted at a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the USA, Britain and France in Washington (September 10-14, 1951), envisaged the inclusion of West German contingents in the "European army" being created by France, the FRG, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. In its turn, the "European army" would become part of the NATO armed forces. One of the provisions of this plan was that simultaneously with the formation of the "European army" the occupation statute in the FRG would be replaced with "treaty relations" with the three powers. The draft of a general treaty regulating the relations of the Western powers with the FRG was approved at a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the three powers with Adenauer's participation. The conference was held in Paris on November 22, 1951.

* *Archiv der Gegenwart*, 1951, p. 2926.

** Charles M. Spofford was appointed Deputy US Representative in the North Atlantic Council in June 1950. Drawn up as a compromise, the Spofford plan envisaged that instead of the German battalions called for by the Pleven plan there would be West German tactical units of 4,000-5,000 men without heavy armament and without their own logistics.

While refusing to consider the Soviet proposals on the German question and trying to divert world attention from the intensive preparations for the rearmament of the FRG, the Western powers gave prominence to their demand for elections throughout Germany and the setting up a UN commission on Germany. It did not enter their calculations to propose the type of elections usually held in parliamentary states, for they clearly feared genuinely free elections. They proposed that the elections in Germany should be held under foreign control, which would have been a contravention of elementary democratic freedoms. As they saw it, the Germans would be barred from the organisation and actual conduct of the elections. The elections would be held in an atmosphere enabling the Western powers to bring pressure to bear on the Germans.

According to the Western proposals the UN commission would carry out an investigation in order to determine "whether existing conditions there (in the FRG and the GDR.—*Ed.*) make it possible to hold genuinely free elections throughout these areas". Moreover, the functions of the commission were linked with the creation of the appropriate conditions where that was necessary.* They were not at all disturbed by the fact that the appointment of a foreign commission would signify that Germany was being regarded as a backward country with no experience of holding elections or of parliamentary activity. The Soviet Union was opposed to this project, holding that it would be more equitable if such a commission were appointed by the Germans themselves and consisted of Germans.

In December 1951 the USA, Britain and France brought the question of appointing a UN commission up at the General Assembly. Representatives of the GDR and the FRG were invited to the discussion of this question at the General Assembly. The Western powers imposed on the General Assembly a decision that had no validity because it was an obvious violation of the UN Charter. Needless to say, the Soviet Government emphatically condemned the attempts of the Western powers to legalise interference in the internal affairs of the Germans and compel them to accept

* *Selected Documents on Germany and the Question of Berlin, 1944-1961*, London, 1961, p. 142.

foreign wardship. The creation of a UN commission on Germany was a stillborn idea, which very soon failed altogether.

3. The Soviet Project for a Peace Settlement With Germany

While consistently bending every effort to secure Germany's peaceful and democratic development, the Soviet Government unequivocally denounced the plans of setting up a European Defence Community, pointing out that the creation of a "European army" was a way of legalising German militarism, which would threaten Europe with another war. It stressed that the Western powers were counting on using German militarism with the purpose of preparing for another war.

On March 10, 1952 it proposed a project giving the principles of a peace treaty with Germany* and making it plain that Germany had to be restored as a united sovereign state. Under the Soviet project Germany would be guaranteed an equal position among the other countries of the world.

The Soviet project provided for the withdrawal of all occupation forces from Germany not later than a year after the peace treaty came into force, the dismantling of foreign military bases on German territory and Germany's release from the political and military commitments springing from the treaties and agreements signed by the governments of the FRG and the GDR.

Germany would be granted the right to maintain armed forces for her defence and to manufacture the military equipment necessary for these armed forces. However, she would have to renounce her participation in military coalitions and alliances directed against any of the powers that had fought in the war against the nazis.

Moreover, a provision of the Soviet project was that the peace treaty would be drawn up with the direct participation of a Government representing the whole of Germany. In this connection the Soviet Government proposed "exam-

* *Pravda*, March 11, 1952.

ining the question of conditions favouring the earliest formation of a Government expressing the will of the whole of the German people".*

In its Note of April 9, 1952 to the governments of the USA, Britain and France, the Soviet Government suggested considering without further delay the question of holding free elections throughout Germany. Conceding to the desires of the Western powers and wishing to settle this question as soon as possible, it raised no objection to a commission, to be formed by the Four Powers, determining whether the conditions existed for such elections.

In the situation obtaining at the time the Soviet plan for a peace settlement was the only realistic way for a democratic solution of the German question in the interests of lasting peace and security in Europe and in the interests of the German people themselves.

As soon as it was put forward in the spring of 1952 the Soviet programme for a settlement of the German question excited attention throughout the world. It was eagerly discussed, particularly in the GDR and the FRG, where the Soviet proposals found their way to the hearts of millions of Germans, for they showed everybody, including the Germans who had hitherto been reluctant to recognise that truth, that of all the occupying powers the Soviet Union was the only one striving to ensure the peaceful development, national unity and freedom of Germany. It was not accidental that many years later some West German politicians still spoke of these proposals, frankly regretting the missed opportunities.

For all that, the Western powers and the FRG turned down the Soviet proposals, thereby assuming a grave responsibility for the consequences of their decision and making it clear to the whole world that the talk about free elections and the unification of Germany had never been taken seriously by them.

The Soviet initiative threw the governments of the Western powers into another fit of resentment and irritation. They regarded every Soviet proposal as only a further hindrance to the remilitarisation of West Germany and her inclusion in aggressive military blocs.

* *Izvestia*, March 11, 1952.

In their Note of reply of May 13, 1952, the governments of the USA, Britain and France evaded stating their attitude to the question of a peace treaty with Germany. They confined themselves to the statement that they could not accept any provision forbidding Germany to enter into an alliance with other states. Further, the Note declared at that time that no negotiations could be conducted on the provisions of a German peace treaty on the grounds that the treaty itself could only be drafted if there were an all-German Government formed as a result of free elections and having the possibility of freely taking part in the discussion of the treaty.*

The Western powers kept making reservations in order to evade a concrete examination of the Soviet proposals. They continued entangling and compounding the question of elections throughout Germany, making that question the object of a sinister game.

In May 1952 the Soviet Government stated that the further examination of the question of a peace treaty and the unification of Germany by means of Notes could not, on the evidence of facts, yield the necessary results. This was only making it difficult to reach agreement. It therefore suggested that direct talks on these issues should be started without further delay.

But, as they had done a year earlier, the USA, Britain and France again declined negotiations with the Soviet Union. Instead, they stepped up the signing of prepared agreements with the FRG. In Bonn on May 26, 1952 they signed a General Treaty on their relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. This became known as the Bonn Treaty.**

To a certain extent the Bonn Treaty conformed to the interests of the ruling circles in the FRG. It annulled the occupation statute, gave the FRG Government broader powers in internal and foreign policy, lifted many restrictions on the building up of a war economy and legalised the formation of a large army. However, it contained provisions reinforcing the FRG's status as a dependent country. The Western powers retained their "special rights" with regard

* *Izvestia*, May 25, 1952.

** *Archiv der Gegenwart*, 1952, pp. 3486-91.

to the FRG, including the decision on the country's unification and the signing of a peace treaty. The very possibility of uniting Germany was made conditional on the preservation of all the privileges accorded to the USA, Britain and France by the Bonn Treaty. The Western powers ensured to themselves the right (Article 5) to declare a state of emergency in the FRG in the event of an attack on the FRG or West Berlin, a revolution or a threat to public security. By claiming that there was a direct threat to the armed forces subordinated to him, each commander could take any measures, including the use of arms, for the elimination of the threat. Article 6 provided for co-operation among the signatories on questions linked with Berlin. The term of the treaty's validity was not stipulated. The USA, Britain and France recorded their right to maintain troops in the FRG until a peace settlement and the unification of Germany were achieved. Besides, the foreign garrisons retained many of the privileges they had earlier enjoyed under the occupation regime. This treaty saddled the FRG with a considerable financial burden. It had to reimburse up to 50 per cent of the foreign currency expenditures for the upkeep of the British, French and US troops in its territory by purchasing armaments in Britain and the USA.

On May 27, 1952, the day after the General Treaty was signed, a treaty instituting the European Defence Community was signed in Paris* by the Foreign Ministers of France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the FRG. Thus, in reply to the Soviet proposals for a peace settlement, the Western powers legalised and accelerated remilitarisation in West Germany.

Neither the Bonn nor the Paris treaty was in any way compatible with the true sovereignty of the FRG. In order to make West Germany's unequal position clearer to her, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman declared at a press conference on May 30, 1952, a few days after the signing of the treaty: "The occupation of Germany will continue not because the latter consents but because this is our right, which we by no means lose with the signing of these treaties."**

* This treaty's term of validity was set at 50 years.

** *Der Kurier*, May 30, 1952.

Complicated as the situation was in the heart of Europe, it was still further compounded by the fact that a large West German army would be formed. The people of the GDR became increasingly apprehensive. For a number of years they had concentrated on economic and cultural development. The 3rd Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, held in the summer of 1950, had adopted the first five-year plan of economic development, which the people justifiably called a plan of peace and peaceful construction. Now they were confronted with the need to safeguard their country's security.

In a speech on May 1, 1952 in Berlin GDR President Wilhelm Pieck raised the question of forming armed forces in the GDR in reply to the remilitarisation of West Germany. The Soviet Union agreed to supply weapons for the GDR people's police, which had, until then, maintained law and order practically unarmed. Contingents of paramilitary police began to be formed on a volunteer basis.

A frontier regime was established along the demarcation line between the GDR and the FRG on the day the Bonn Treaty was signed. Throughout the next six months the SUPG leadership and the GDR Government took steps to strengthen the republic as an independent state with its own guarded frontiers, armed forces (paramilitary police) and revolutionary law. These steps were taken in face of subversion and direct provocations against the GDR by West Germany.

The Bonn and Paris treaties gave rise to mounting anxiety in many West European countries, not only among the people but also in influential bourgeois circles. There was growing realisation that the plans for West Germany's remilitarisation and her involvement in military blocs were the main obstacle to the attainment of a peace settlement.

Furthermore, the governments of Britain, France and the USA reacted differently to the Soviet proposal for Four-Power negotiations. On June 10, 1952 the British Foreign Secretary told the House of Commons that he was keeping in mind the idea of a Four-Power conference.* Almost at

* Eden writes that he was anxious to keep the correspondence with the USSR open in the hope that it might be possible to hold a Four-Power conference on the German problem "on terms we could accept",

the same time the French Government issued a communique stating that France favoured the proposal for a Four-Power conference, but that at the given stage the subject of negotiation could not be precisely defined.* In response to this US Secretary of State Acheson sent a message to the French and British Foreign Ministers insisting that France and Britain abandon the idea of holding a Four-Power conference. Clearly, the USA feared such a conference would jeopardise the ratification of the Bonn Treaty and the treaty on the formation of the European Defence Community.

Press reports made it quite plain that the US ruling circles were counting on the military and political agreements with the FRG to come into force in the summer of 1952 so that it would be possible to begin forming the West German armed force in the latter half of the same year. On July 1, 1952 the ratification of the Bonn Treaty was rushed through the US Senate, following which the US Government increased its pressure on the West European countries, making them speed up the ratification of the treaty. However, this pressure initially found its mark only in Britain, where the Bonn Treaty was ratified on August 1, 1952.

In West Germany herself ratification encountered considerable difficulties. During a visit to Paris in May 1952 Adenauer promised the US Government that both treaties would be ratified by the Bundestag in June of the same year. However, reality did not bear out this promise. A popular movement condemning militarisation and military blocs and demanding Germany's unification and the signing of a peace treaty unfolded in West Germany, where the horrors of the war were still fresh in the people's minds. This movement reached such proportions that it affected the attitude of the political parties in the Bundestag. Discord and uncertainty reigned even in the ruling party, the Christian Democratic Union. But Adenauer's high-handed treatment of the principles of parliamentarism ultimately enabled him to find a way out of the difficulties and secure, though with almost a year's delay, the ratification of the

although there was complete allied agreement to press ahead with plans to make Western Europe militarily strong (*The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle*, London, 1960, p. 46).

* *Archiv der Gegenwart*, 1952, p. 3516.

treaties. He used that delay for additional bargaining with the Western powers.

The storm of indignation against the Bonn and Paris treaties, which legalised the revival of German militarism, was more violent in France than in any other West European country. The French people could not and did not forget the calamities that the German military had rained down on them during the lifetime of several generations, particularly under Hitler. For a long time the Pinay Government did not even venture to submit the bill on the ratification of the treaties to the National Assembly.

The US rulers were obviously feeling nervous. The threat that the treaties, on which years had been spent in negotiation, would collapse was upsetting their equanimity. In December 1952 Truman felt compelled to call on the West European countries to expedite the ratification of both treaties. This was followed by a decision of the NATO Council, which likewise demanded the earliest possible ratification of the two treaties. On January 27, 1953, Dulles, who was appointed Secretary of State, declared in his maiden foreign policy speech that the USA would reconsider its programme of aid to European countries "if it appeared there were no chances of getting effective unity" in Europe. In February 1953 Dulles and Harold Stassen, Director of the Mutual-Assistance Programme, toured France, the FRG, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Britain with the mission of breaking the deadlock over the question of forming a "European army".

In the USA a campaign was started to secure West Germany's inclusion in NATO in the event there was further delay over the ratification of the Bonn and Paris treaties. High-ranking officials of the US Government were involved in this campaign. The US Government announced the allocation of US \$385 million in aid to France for the conduct of the war in Indochina in the hope that this would at once solve two problems: push the French into escalating the war in Indochina and make it easier for the French Government to ratify the Bonn and Paris treaties. In France, as in other West European countries, the Soviet proposals were finding growing understanding and there was increasing discontent with the attitude of the USA, which was evading negotiations with the USSR.

In August 1952 the Soviet Government had renewed its proposal for a Four-Power conference to consider a peace treaty with Germany, the formation of an all-German Government, the holding of free elections throughout Germany and the setting up of a commission to check whether the conditions for such elections existed in Germany. Further, it had suggested discussing a deadline for the withdrawal of the occupation troops from Germany and that this discussion should be attended by representatives of the GDR and the FRG.* But these proposals too had received a negative response from the USA and its allies.

The GDR People's Chamber, for its part, passed a decision to send an authorised delegation to Bonn for talks with the Bundestag on 1) the participation of representatives of the GDR and the FRG in the work of a Four-Power conference and 2) the formation of a German commission to ascertain if the conditions existed for elections throughout Germany.**

On September 19, 1952 the People's Chamber delegation led by Hermann Matern, member of the SUPG Political Bureau, was received by the Bundestag President Hermann Ehlers, who promised to forward the proposals of the People's Chamber to the Bundestag and the FRG Government.

A wave of pronouncements favouring official talks between the GDR and the FRG swept across West Germany. *The New York Times* wrote at the time that Adenauer and the US Government were confronted with a popular movement that expressed the ardent hopes of the German people, and that the strength and growth prospects of this movement for Germany's unification were putting the American officials in Germany in a difficult position.

Opinion in favour of serious and constructive talks on the German question was voiced with renewed vigour in Western Europe in the spring of 1953 under the impact of the Soviet proposals. This complicated the plans of the Western powers because negotiations would have made it still more difficult to secure the ratification of the treaties. The British were the first to see the weakness of their posi-

* *Pravda*, August 24, 1952.

** *Belaya kniga ob agressivnoi politike pravitelstva FRG*, Moscow, 1959, p. 135.

tion. They evidently realised that in pressing for the FRG's remilitarisation the Western powers would encounter even more formidable difficulties if they failed to lessen the influence of the Soviet proposals for a peace settlement with Germany and neutralise the demands for talks with the USSR.

On May 11, 1953, Winston Churchill, who was Britain's Prime Minister once again, declared in Parliament that "a conference on the highest level should take place between the leading powers without long delay".*

In the USA and West Germany the ruling circles received this statement with ill-disguised irritation. Adenauer told pressmen that a "Four-Power conference was a risky venture". The US Government demanded "concrete proof that a meeting with the Soviet leaders would bring positive results".**

On May 13, 1953 the Foreign Policy Commission of the French National Assembly supported the proposal for a Four-Power summit conference.***

Writing in the *New York Herald Tribune*, Joseph and Stewart Alsop noted: "The prospect of renewed negotiations with the Russians about Germany fills some officials (of the State Department.—*Ed.*) with something very like panic. . . . The panic is understandable. Even a seemingly serious offer by the Soviets to negotiate a reasonable German peace treaty could throw the Western alliance into an uproar. . . . It could persuade the Germans that only the Americans stood in the way of a united Germany."****

4. Development of Friendly and Equal Relations Between the USSR and the GDR

While striving to secure a settlement of the German problem, the Soviet Government devoted much attention to promoting and strengthening friendly relations with the

* *Parliamentary Debates*, Fifth Series, Vol. 515, House of Commons, Official Report, Session 1952-53. London, 1953, col. 897.

** *Archiv der Gegenwart*, 1953, p. 3993.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 3994.

**** *New York Herald Tribune*, European edition, April 10, 1953.

German Democratic Republic, which was, for its part, calling for Germany's unity on a democratic, anti-fascist foundation and pressing for peace and co-operation between all countries. As early as May 1950 the Soviet Government adopted a decision to reduce the reparations by 50 per cent and grant a postponement on the payment of the outstanding instalments. This decision was followed up by the signing of a protocol with the GDR on the transfer to the German people of 23 factories that had been assigned to the USSR under the Potsdam Agreement. In June 1950 the management and protection of foreign property in GDR territory was transferred to the GDR authorities by the Soviet Control Commission. In September 1950 the GDR became a full member of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

Impressive unanimity was displayed by the GDR population at the elections for the People's Chamber, the landtags, the district councils and the communal councils in October 1950. The National Front candidates polled 99.7 per cent of the votes.

Led by the Socialist Unity Party the working people of the German Democratic Republic did much to remove the disproportions and difficulties that arose in the national economy when the Western powers split Germany and sundered the existing economic links. East Germany's economy had always been dependent on industry in the western part of the country, notably in the Ruhr. This created immense difficulties for the GDR's economy. The Western occupation and FRG authorities sought to use this circumstance and raised every possible obstruction to the GDR's economic development. In West Germany an embargo was enforced on the sale of steel to the GDR and restrictions were imposed on many items of trade. Businessmen and firms wishing to trade with the GDR were threatened with court proceedings. The Western occupation authorities completely disregarded the 1949 New York and Paris agreements, whose signatories had pledged to restore and help to promote trade between West and East Germany as it existed before March 1, 1948. It was only due to the protests and energetic intervention of the Soviet Control Commission that the Western powers were prevented from halting all GDR-FRG trade, which shrank from over 200

million marks in the first six months of 1951 to 9 million marks in the first six months of 1952.

The hindrances in trade with the FRG compelled the GDR to reorient its economic links. There was a particularly marked growth of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union.

In the decisions of the 2nd Conference of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, which was a major landmark in the life of the GDR, it was stated: "Democratic and economic advancement and also the political consciousness of the working class and the majority of the people have reached a level where the building of socialism has become the basic objective. . . . It must be taken into consideration that an aggravation of the class struggle is inevitable and the working people must break the resistance of hostile elements."* The line towards the building of the foundations of socialism was the natural outcome of the ideas that inspired the workers, peasants and the advanced section of the intelligentsia since the day the republic was proclaimed. Socialism is not alien to the Germans. Germany is the birthplace of the theory of scientific socialism, of Marx and Engels. Socialism is the product of developments that had taken place in Germany during the past century and has long been the ideal of the German working-class movement.

Soviet-GDR friendship and fraternal co-operation were moulded and grew strong in the drive to build a socialist society. The Soviet Union took every possible step to found its relations with the GDR on equality, mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs. In April 1953 the Soviet Government cut down and in some cases annulled the GDR's economic commitments to the USSR, increased Soviet deliveries of raw materials and fodder and enlarged scientific and technical assistance to the GDR. In May 1953 the Soviet Control Commission was abolished and replaced with the office of Soviet High Commissioner, whose functions were reduced to observing the fulfilment by the GDR of the commitments stipulated in the Potsdam decisions and maintaining liaison with re-

* *Neues Deutschland*, July 15, 1952.

representatives of the US, British and French occupation authorities.

The building of the foundations of socialism in the GDR and, in particular, the formation of agricultural co-operatives led to an exacerbation of the class struggle in both town and countryside. In the first six months of 1953, due to the Bonn authorities' steps to sever the traditional economic relations between East and West Germany and also to other reasons, difficulties arose in ensuring the GDR population with food and manufactured goods. On June 9 the Political Bureau of the Socialist Unity Party's Central Committee passed a decision envisaging measures to bring the situation back to normal and introduce a new policy. The pertinent communique named the immediate tasks in supply, finances, agriculture and administrative policy. The GDR press reported that some of the restrictions imposed on the urban and rural bourgeoisie had been lifted and that the agricultural co-operatives set up in violation of the principle of voluntary membership had been disbanded. On June 11 the GDR Council of Ministers passed a decision on the institution of a new policy.

This policy, the West Berlin newspaper *Der Tagesspiegel* wrote, precipitated "ominous demoralisation and even disorganisation"* in the West German ruling circles. Subversive organisations set up by the Social-Democratic Party and the department headed by Jakob Kaiser, the FRG Minister for All-German Affairs, and also US subversive agencies were set in motion. Their numerous agents incited backward elements, who were discontented with the existing order, to stage hostile demonstrations and strikes on June 17, 1953. This was the first post-war open action of the imperialist forces against the socialist system in the GDR.

The imperialist provocateurs found little support in the GDR, managing to provoke disorders in only a few towns. True to its internationalist duty, the Soviet Union helped the GDR authorities to restore peace and order.

A programme to improve the country's economic and political position and raise the standard of living was mapped out by the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity

* *Der Tagesspiegel*, June 14, 1953.

Party of Germany at its 15th plenary meeting on July 24-26, 1953. The plenary meeting reaffirmed the correctness of the SUPG's general line of building the foundations of socialism and condemned the policy of speeding up the rate of socialist construction.

Talks which made a large contribution towards fostering friendly co-operation were held between the governments of the USSR and the GDR in Moscow on August 22-23, 1953. These talks showed that the two governments saw eye to eye on the German problem. The GDR Government unequivocally supported the Soviet proposals for a German peace treaty and the holding of a peace conference in the immediate future.

At the talks the Soviet Government announced that as of January 1, 1954 it would cease exacting reparations from Germany in any form. This decision released the GDR from the remainder of the reparations, which on January 1, 1954 amounted to US \$2,537 million (the total reparations due to the Soviet Union had been fixed at US \$10,000 million). The Soviet Government handed over to the GDR, without compensation, 33 large German factories that had been transferred to the USSR as part of the reparations. Further, the GDR's expenditures on the upkeep of Soviet troops in its territory were reduced by the Soviet Government to not above 5 per cent of the GDR state budget. Moreover, the GDR's debt for the industrial enterprises that had been transferred to it earlier and for foreign occupation expenditures was cancelled. A large Soviet loan was granted to the GDR. The Soviet Vismut enterprise was turned into a Soviet-German firm. The two governments agreed to raise their diplomatic missions to the rank of embassies.

5. Berlin Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference

The Western powers could not fail to see that their attempts to obstruct the holding of a Four-Power conference on the German question were alienating world opinion. This issue had been considered at the Washington conference

of the Foreign Ministers of the USA, Britain and France on July 10-14, 1953. By that time not only the British Government but also the Government of the USA saw that it would be inexpedient to come out openly against the talks with the Soviet Union, especially as in Western Europe opinion was strongly in favour of these talks. However, neither the USA nor its European allies had any intention of modifying their stand and conducting these talks in a constructive manner that would allow agreement to be reached on the German question. Indicative of this attitude was a statement made by Dulles on June 30, 1953, shortly before the Washington conference, that in Washington the main issue would be how the West could best utilise the "unrest behind the iron curtain".*

A result of the Washington conference was the Note of July 15, 1953 in which the USA, Britain and France informed the Soviet Union of their consent to a Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference. However, their proposals for the agenda boiled down to an examination of the question of holding elections throughout Germany. Their objective was, as before, to camouflage their policy of splitting Germany for the purpose of remilitarising the western part of that country. But, while not venturing to reject negotiations altogether, they tried to get the Soviet Union to agree to discuss only one point, namely, the appointment of a commission to ascertain whether the conditions existed in Germany for free elections. If it proved to be impossible to organise negotiations on that basis they were prepared, in the last extreme, to consider the question of elections as a whole but **nothing more**.

The Soviet Government quickly saw through these manoeuvres. In its Notes of August 4 and 15, 1953 to the governments of the USA, Britain and France it quoted facts to show that nothing except unnecessary and fruitless talks could be expected from their proposals. It warned them once again that their policy toward Germany would have dangerous consequences. In the Soviet Note of August 15 it was underscored that Germany's unification would be made impossible as soon as West Germany became a member of the North Atlantic alliance.

* *Archiv der Gegenwart*, 1953, p. 4060.

The Soviet Government repeated its proposal for a discussion of the German question, including the problem of restoring Germany's unity and signing a peace treaty. In addition, it pinpointed the urgent tasks linked with the settlement of the German question: a peace conference to consider the peace treaty; the formation, on the basis of the appropriate agreement between the parliaments of the GDR and the FRG, of a provisional all-German Government, whose main task would be to arrange and hold free elections throughout Germany; the lightening of Germany's financial and economic commitments arising out of the consequences of the war.

Further, the Soviet Government proposed a conference with the participation of the People's Republic of China to consider the ways and means of easing international tension inasmuch as favourable conditions for such a relaxation had been created through the efforts of peace-loving states.

This far-ranging programme did not receive a positive response from the USA, Britain and France. However, for world opinion it was quite evident that the Soviet Union was displaying the maximum good will and striving to find a common language with its war-time allies and thereby deliver Europe from the threat of a revival of German militarism. In this situation the Western powers could no longer block the holding of a conference insisting on a "limited agenda".

In September 1953, in Notes on the question of a Foreign Ministers Conference, the Western powers stated that they would not insist on "any prior condition that an investigating commission be established".* In subsequent Notes they declared that at the conference any of the Four Powers would have the opportunity to state its views on any aspect of the German and Austrian questions which it might wish to present. In the end the Soviet viewpoint regarding the Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference was accepted.

Exchange of Notes Between the Government of the USSR and the Governments of the USA, Britain and France on the German Question and the Holding of a Foreign Ministers Conference (February 1952—November 1953), Moscow, 1953, p. 71 (in Russian).

On the eve of the conference the US Government was concerned most with how to save the European Defence Community. The edifice built with such difficulty was clearly shaking and threatening to crumble.

In September 1953 the British Government added its weight to the US pressure on France in the question of the ratification of the Bonn and Paris treaties. Much was made of the British statement that Britain would co-operate closely with the European Defence Committee. It was felt that this statement would help the French to settle the question of their participation in the treaties. Nonetheless, a negative attitude to the arming of West Germany persevered among the deputies in the French National Assembly.

On January 25, 1954 a Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers began its sittings in Berlin. This was their first meeting in five years and they devoted most of their attention to the German question. The Soviet delegation suggested discussing the question of a peace treaty with Germany and submitted the draft of such a treaty. It proposed the formation of a provisional all-German Government that would handle all preparations for and conduct elections throughout Germany. In reply to the Western arguments that European security was threatened and it was therefore necessary to arm West Germany, the Soviet Union proposed an all-European treaty on collective security as an alternative to the European Defence Community. Acceptance of this proposal would have ensured the neutralisation of the two German states and created favourable conditions for the settlement of the German problem.

The USA rejected the idea of neutralising Germany, feeling that this would weaken its own position in Europe. All the Soviet proposals were counterposed by the Western powers with the Eden plan for "free" elections in East and West Germany. Actually, by placing their organisation in the hands of the occupation authorities the Eden plan could not ensure free elections. It envisaged holding elections at a time when West Germany would have already become a signatory of the Paris and Bonn treaties, in other words, a member of a military bloc directed against East Germany. This alone showed that the Western powers were not counting on the realisation of the Eden plan. Moreover, the Eden plan indefinitely postponed the conclusion of a German

peace treaty and provided no guarantees that the elections would not bring to power men who would again steer Germany toward aggression.

At the conference the Western Foreign Ministers had to agree that the treaties signed with the FRG would formally not be binding on the future united Germany. This was contrary to the attitude of the Bonn Government, which saw Germany's unification only under the terms of the Paris and Bonn treaties.

The GDR Government requested the conference to allow representatives of both the GDR and the FRG to be present at the discussion of the German question. The Western Foreign Ministers rejected this request with the argument that the FRG Government was not prepared to enter into contact with the regime in East Germany.

At the close of the conference, finding that no major steps towards the settlement of the German problem could be expected from the Western powers, the Soviet delegation proposed the formation of all-German committees on trade and transport and also on the promotion of cultural, scientific and sports links between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. But agreement was not reached even with regard to these committees.

The Western powers bore the full responsibility for the Berlin Conference's failure to make any headway in the German problem.

The Western moves at the Berlin Conference evoked disappointment and condemnation in both the GDR and the FRG. Evidently taking this feeling into account Erich Ollenhauer, Chairman of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany, declared in his report to that party's sixth congress in July 1954: "Regretfully, at the Berlin Conference the Soviet proposals were set aside despite the fact that they contained a constructive point of departure for a settlement conforming to the interests of democratic states."*

The Western refusal to pursue a co-ordinated policy in the German question could not, of course, hinder the development of relations between the Soviet Union and the GDR.

By agreement with the GDR Government, the Government of the Soviet Union published a Statement on March

* *Der neue Vorwärts*, Vienna, August 1, 1954.

25, 1954 in which it was announced that the USSR and the GDR were establishing "similar relations as exist between other sovereign states".* The GDR received the right to decide by itself all its internal and external affairs, including its relations with West Germany. The Soviet High Commissioner was instructed to halt his observations of the activities of the GDR authorities and confine his duties to "ensuring security and maintaining the corresponding liaison with the US, British and French occupation authorities on questions affecting the whole of Germany on the basis of agreed Four-Power decisions on Germany".**

Although the FRG Government did its utmost to belittle the significance of this Soviet move, in West German political circles opinion was crystallising in favour of direct contacts with the GDR as the standard-bearer of the struggle for the common interests of the German people.

6. The Soviet Union's Struggle Against the FRG's Involvement in the North Atlantic Bloc

The Paris Treaty providing for the formation of a European Defence Community was rejected by the French National Assembly on August 30, 1954. The Bonn Treaty on the FRG's relations with the three Western powers, whose enforcement was predicated on the ratification of the Paris Treaty, likewise hung in the air. In the Soviet Union the failure of the plans to set up a European Defence Community was assessed as a major European political development giving further proof of how prejudicial West Germany's rearmament and involvement in aggressive blocs were to the interests of the European peoples.

The Soviet Government believed that France's rejection of the treaty on the European Defence Community had made it possible to bring closer the attitudes of the Four Powers on the German question.

* *Pravda*, March 26, 1954.

** *Ibid.*

In October 1954 the US, British and French ambassadors in Moscow were handed Notes in which the Soviet Government proposed a new conference in view of the serious situation that had arisen: either the Four Powers would consider and settle the problem of Germany's unity or, if matters reached the stage of the restoration of German militarism and the FRG's involvement in aggressive military blocs, Germany's division would be sealed for a long time to come and a remilitarised FRG would menace peace in Europe.

But the USA and its allies turned a deaf ear to this warning and took a further step toward the revival of militarism in West Germany. Hardly had the news of the failure of the EDC plan become known than in Washington and London they began planning new combinations, the substance of which was to preserve the basic provisions of the General Treaty signed in Bonn in May 1952 and replace the treaty on the EDC with a more far-reaching agreement. This time there was no hitch. The Paris Agreements, under which the FRG became a member of NATO, were signed on October 23, 1954. Moreover, an agreement was concluded under which the FRG acceded to yet another bloc—the Western European Union (also known as the Brussels Treaty).

The Soviet Government strongly condemned the signing of these agreements. In order to prevent the situation in Europe from deteriorating in the event the Bonn Treaty and the Paris Agreements were ratified it repeated its proposal for a conference of all European states and the USA for the purpose of reaching agreement on a system of collective security in Europe. This proposal was rejected by the Western powers on the pretext that the basis for a successful conference was non-existent.

On January 15, 1955 the Soviet Government published a Statement which had a wide response throughout the world. In this Statement it conclusively showed the danger that the rearmament of West Germany and her inclusion in NATO harboured for all the peoples of Europe and for the German people themselves, and pointed out that unutilised possibilities still existed for reaching agreement on the question of uniting Germany and, in particular, on holding for this purpose free elections throughout Germany in 1955. The statement warned the Western powers that

the talks on this question would become meaningless and unfeasible if the Paris Agreements were ratified.

In West Germany public opinion anxiously watched the attempts of the Western powers to evade considering the Soviet proposals. In a letter to Chancellor Adenauer, Erich Ollenhauer, Chairman of the SDPG, noted that the Soviet Government Statement of January 15 contained proposals on elections in Germany which made talks on this issue much more promising than had been the case at the Berlin Conference.

Adenauer, however, was concerned only with the destiny of the Paris Agreements. Despite all warnings, he doggedly maintained that successful talks with the Soviet Union could only be held after these agreements were ratified. The warnings of the Soviet Union were ignored by the Western powers, too.

The Paris Agreements and the modified Bonn Treaty, which formed part of these agreements, came into force on May 5, 1955. This untied the hands of the West German militarists and created a threat to security in Europe.

In this connection a conference of representatives of the Soviet Union, the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania and Albania was held in Warsaw, where a treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance, known as the Warsaw Treaty, was signed on May 14, 1955.*

Article 1 of that treaty records the commitment of its signatories "in accordance with the United Nations Charter to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force and to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered".

In Article 2 the signatories declared they were prepared to participate, in a spirit of sincere co-operation, in all international actions for ensuring international peace and security, and would endeavour "to secure, in agreement with other states desiring to co-operate in this matter, the adoption of effective measures to achieve a general reduction of armaments and ban atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction".

* *Sbornik deistvuyushchikh dogovorov, soglashenii i konventsii, zaklyuchennykh SSSR s inostrannymi gosudarstvami*, Issue XVII and XVIII, Moscow, 1960, pp. 29-33.

Article 3 provides for consultations between the signatories "on all important international issues involving their common interests". Moreover, this Article states that whenever "any one of the Contracting Parties considers that a threat of armed attack on one or more of the Parties to this Treaty has arisen, they shall consult together immediately".

The commitment on mutual assistance in the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or more signatories to the treaty by any state or group of states is formulated distinctly in Article 4, a provision of which is that in the event of such an attack each signatory would in the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, afford the state or states so attacked "immediate assistance, individually and in agreement with the other Parties to this Treaty, by all the means it considers necessary, including the use of armed force".

Article 5 records the decision of the Warsaw Treaty members to establish a Joint Command, to which elements of their armed forces would be allocated by agreement between them, and "to take such other concerted action as may be necessary to reinforce their defence strength, in order to defend the peaceful labour of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories and afford protection against possible aggression".

A Political Consultative Committee (Article 6), with each signatory represented by a member of the Government or some other specially appointed representative, was set up for the purpose of carrying out the consultations envisaged by the treaty and for the consideration of matters arising out of the treaty's application. In the Political Consultative Committee the number of representatives from each member country is not limited, but regardless of the number of representatives each member has one vote.

Under Article 7 the member countries undertook not to participate in any coalitions or alliances and not to conclude any agreements whose purposes were incompatible with the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty.

The treaty records the striving of its members to promote the further development and strengthening of their economic and cultural ties in a spirit of friendship and co-

operation and in accordance with the principles of respect for each other's independence and sovereignty and of non-interference in each other's domestic affairs (Article 8).

Article 9 states that the Warsaw Treaty "shall be open for accession by other States, irrespective of their social and political system, which express their readiness, by participating in the present Treaty, to help in combining the efforts of the peace-loving States to ensure the peace and security of the peoples".

It was stipulated that the treaty was to remain in force for 20 years (Article 10). For those of its signatories who did not denounce the treaty one year before the expiry of that term it would remain in force for another 10 years. However, in the "event of the establishment of a system of collective security in Europe and the conclusion for that purpose of a General European Treaty on collective security, a goal which the Contracting Parties shall steadfastly strive to achieve, the present Treaty shall cease to have effect as from the date on which the General European Treaty comes into force" (Article 11).

For its content, aims and character the Warsaw Treaty is a purely defensive organisation directed towards safeguarding the peace and security of the peoples of Europe and the rest of the world.

Signed six years after the formation of NATO, the Warsaw Treaty is a retaliatory measure of the peace-loving states against the aggressive activities of NATO and other imperialist military blocs.

At the signing of the Warsaw Treaty GDR Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl read a declaration in which his country pledged to help achieve Germany's peaceful and democratic unification. The GDR Government, the declaration said, was acting on the principle that a united Germany would be free of the commitments undertaken by one or the other part of Germany in the military and political treaties and agreements signed prior to her unification. This declaration was received with understanding and taken into consideration by the signatories of the Warsaw Treaty.*

* *Pravda*, May 15, 1955.

7. The German Question at the Geneva Four-Power Conference (1955)

The question of Germany's reunification acquired a new aspect after the Paris agreements came into force.

A Four-Power (Soviet Union, USA, Britain and France) Summit conference was held in Geneva in July 1955. The Soviet Government considered that the main task before the conference was to relax world tension and create an atmosphere of trust between countries.

At the opening of the conference the Soviet representatives made it plain that it had become difficult to settle the German problem. One could not close one's eyes to the changes that had taken place in the social and political system in the GDR and the FRG and count on the possibility of these states uniting mechanically. The Soviet Government insisted that efforts had to be made to draw the GDR and the FRG closer together and suggested the establishment in two stages of a system of European security that would facilitate the settlement of the German problem.

However, the point of departure of the governments of the USA, Britain and France was that a united Germany would necessarily be a NATO member. They argued that the inclusion of West Germany and, subsequently, of a united Germany in NATO did not prejudice any country's security inasmuch as NATO was a defensive organisation. At the conference the US President Dwight D. Eisenhower told the Soviet Defence Minister G. K. Zhukov that initially he did not think the question of European security be discussed at Geneva.*

When the summit conference's directives to the Foreign Ministers were being drafted, the Western powers gave prominence to the German question and made the examination of the problems of European security and disarmament dependent on its settlement. This was clearly an attempt to force the Soviet Union to agree to the inclusion of a united

USSR Foreign Policy Archives, Record of a conversation on July 23, 1955 between the Minister for Defence of the USSR G. K. Zhukov and the President of the USA Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Germany in NATO on the threat that otherwise the settlement of problems in which the USSR was interested would be wrecked. These problems were European security and disarmament. The Soviet delegation insisted that the first question to be considered by a Foreign Ministers conference should be security in Europe and that its settlement should not be made dependent on the achievement of an agreement on the German question because that would complicate the question of European security.

The debate became so sharp that during a recess the Soviet representatives were compelled to state unofficially that if the Western powers did not budge from formulations that were unacceptable to the Soviet Union the Soviet delegation would leave Geneva.*

Confronted by this firmness, the Heads of the Western powers agreed that European security and Germany's unification were inter-related problems and that the problem of European security should be given prominence. Further, agreement was reached on the possibility of consultations between the four Foreign Ministers and representatives of the GDR and the FRG.

The Soviet delegation showed that the Western attitude to the German question was totally untenable. After two states (the GDR and the FRG) with different social systems had taken shape in Germany and these states had become members of opposing military blocs and Germany's unification had become a difficult problem, the Western powers proposed "free elections" purely for propaganda purposes.

The Soviet delegation pointed out that the Soviet Union had earlier repeatedly suggested holding such elections and placing them in the hands of the Germans themselves without interference from the occupying powers. But this suggestion had not been accepted. Naturally, the Soviet delegation rejected the Western proposal for giving the USSR illusory "guarantees of security" in exchange for its consent to the inclusion of a united Germany in the Western military group directed, as everybody knew full well, against the USSR. While declaring itself in favour of Ger-

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Circular of July 30, 1955 of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

many's unification, the Soviet delegation stressed that the opinion of the Germans themselves on the ways of settling the German problem had to be treated with the utmost attention and respect.

The summit conference adopted brief directives defining the further work of the Foreign Ministers. In the section headed "European Security and Germany", the directives stated that acknowledging their responsibility for the settlement of the German question and for Germany's reunification, the Heads of Government were agreed that the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections had to be settled in accordance with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security.*

In other words, the directives linked two different theses, namely, the Western thesis on Germany's unification by means of "free elections" and the Soviet thesis that the German question had to be settled in accordance with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security. All the attempts in the West to give a different interpretation of this fact pursued definite political aims: misrepresent the Soviet Union's attitude and abuse its striving to restore the spirit of co-operation with the Western powers in the settlement of the German question in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement. That agreement's main provision—the demand, written in the blood of the peoples, that militarism and nazism should be uprooted so that Germany would never again threaten her neighbours and world peace—will always remain in force. Naturally, the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition bore the responsibility for the observance of the principles proclaimed at Potsdam. As regards the Soviet Union, it had never shirked that responsibility. This was demonstrated in the corresponding wording of the directives adopted at Geneva.

Returning from the Geneva Conference, the Soviet Government delegation stopped at Berlin, where it had talks with the Government of the GDR. Upon completion of these talks the sides issued a joint Statement in which they gave their views on the German question. The German question,

* *Pravda*, July 24, 1955.

the Statement said, should under no circumstances be an obstacle to European security and it could only be settled with the participation of the Germans themselves and through closer relations between the GDR and the FRG.

The sides agreed that the time had come to consolidate the friendly relations between the USSR and the GDR and create the conditions for the further development of these relations by signing the appropriate bilateral treaty.

The Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the USA, Britain and France sat in conference in October-November 1955. The absence of a common language became obvious as soon as the Ministers sat down at the negotiation table and opened the directives of the Heads of Government.

The principal aim of the Soviet delegation was to facilitate the further relaxation of international tension, strengthen world peace and secure the adoption of agreed measures in that direction. The instructions of the Soviet Government to its delegation stated: "It must be borne in mind that the representatives of the three Western powers may try to aggravate the discussion on some issues, notably the German question. While upholding the Soviet Union's principled stand, the delegation shall avoid an aggravation of the debate and try to give the discussion of the items on the agenda a calm and constructive character. . . . The principal question is that of security in Europe, while the German question is a specific issue subordinated to the settlement of the main problem of European security. These considerations underlay the corresponding agreements between the powers on the German question during and after the Second World War. It will be recalled that in these agreements there was special emphasis on the need to prevent the revival of German militarism, which may again threaten peace in Europe. . . . Hence, a postponement of a settlement of the problem of European security would be tantamount to an indefinite postponement also of the settlement of the question of Germany's reunification."*

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Instructions of October 26, 1955 of the Government of the USSR to the Soviet delegation at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Geneva.

Acting on the directives of the Heads of Government the Soviet delegation proposed inviting to Geneva, on behalf of the conference, the GDR Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl and the FRG Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in order to hear their view on the German question. This proposal was rejected by the Western delegations.

At this conference the Soviet delegation submitted the draft of a treaty on collective security in Europe. But the Western powers stated they would not participate in a system of European security whose establishment was not preceded by Germany's unification.

They displayed not the least desire to combine Germany's unification with the interests of European security, despite the fact that on Soviet insistence this provision had been included in the agreed directives of the Heads of Government. On the contrary, they made Germany's unification conditional on the remilitarisation and inclusion in NATO of the whole of Germany.

The question of Germany's unification could no longer be approached with the same yardstick as in the past, when the Western powers had not split the country, when two states with different social systems had not taken shape on German soil and when neither NATO nor the Warsaw Treaty existed.

However, the Western powers continued to press for the adoption of the Eden plan for elections throughout Germany, only supplementing that plan with a treaty containing a reference to a guarantee of the Soviet Union's security in the event the united Germany decided to join NATO. The Soviet Union, naturally, could not place itself in a situation where its security would depend on a guarantee by other countries. The Western powers arbitrarily interpreted the directives of the Heads of Government and persevered in evading a settlement of the German question in accordance with the interests of European security, which was the keynote of the agreed directives.

With the Western powers insisting on this approach there could be no question of translating the directives of the Heads of Government into concrete deeds. But this evidently suited the Western powers.

8. The Soviet Union Establishes Diplomatic Relations with the FRG

An important place in the Soviet Union's European policy was occupied by the establishment and promotion of the closest possible fraternal relations with the German Democratic Republic. The USSR regarded the GDR as a bulwark of peace and security in Europe and a reliable mainstay against German militarism and revanchism. It noted with satisfaction that in the GDR social relations were improving, the anti-fascist bloc was gaining strength and the living standard was rising.

The Soviet people displayed generosity toward the entire German people. There was profound significance in the fact that it was the Soviet Union that took the initiative in establishing diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. Although the policies of the FRG Government were arousing serious concern, the Soviet Union had no intention of ignoring that country. As early as January 25, 1955 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR promulgated a decree terminating the state of war between the Soviet Union and Germany and calling for the establishment of peaceful relations with her. This step created the legal conditions for the normalisation of relations with the FRG.

In a Note to the Government of the FRG in the summer of 1955 the Soviet Government offered to establish direct diplomatic, trade and cultural relations and pointed to the desirability of direct contact between the statesmen of the two countries.

The Bonn leaders found themselves in a difficult position. Having committed themselves to the fruitless "positions of strength" policy, they were basing all their calculations on tension and antagonism between the FRG and the Soviet Union. The Soviet initiative upset these calculations. The response evoked by it in West Germany left no doubt about the fact that most of the citizens of that country wanted to live in peace with the Soviet Union.

After long vacillation, Bonn finally sent an affirmative reply to the Soviet offer. At the request of the West German Government there was a preliminary exchange of views between the USSR and FRG embassies in France. The FRG

Government asked for a specification of the range of questions that could be settled at the establishment of diplomatic relations. The Soviet Government, naturally, had no intention of evading a discussion of the questions in which the FRG Government showed an interest.

An FRG Government delegation led by Chancellor Adenauer arrived in Moscow on September 8, 1955. At the very first meeting with the Soviet Government delegation he declared that he felt it was inadequate to establish diplomatic, economic and cultural relations "mechanically". He raised the question of the release of the Germans still imprisoned in the Soviet Union. At a time when Adenauer was still preparing to go to Moscow a provocative campaign was started in West Germany for the return of hundreds of thousands of German prisoners of war who, it was alleged, were still held in the Soviet Union. The newspapers published endless lists of war prisoners, in which were arbitrarily included all the servicemen whose whereabouts were unknown when the war ended. Using falsified data, West German propaganda poured salt on war wounds that had not yet healed.

The Soviet delegation pointed out that with regard to German prisoners of war there was evidently a misunderstanding. All the German prisoners of war who had been held in the Soviet Union had been released and sent home. On September 1, 1955 there were in the USSR only 9,626 war criminals from the former Nazi army. These men had been sentenced by Soviet courts for heinous crimes against the Soviet people and against peace and humanity.

These criminals had already spent a long time in prison. The GDR President Wilhelm Pieck asked for a mitigation of their sentences. This was also requested by the FRG delegation. These requests were granted and at the talks agreement was reached that depending on the gravity of their crimes all of the 9,626 prisoners would be either amnestied or turned over to the German state in whose territory they had been resident prior to the war. The sides agreed that the question of the repatriation of German citizens would be considered separately and independently of the question of establishing diplomatic relations.

The question of Germany's unification was touched upon by the FRG delegation only in a most general way. The

Soviet side stated the opinion that this question would not be settled correctly without the corresponding efforts on the part of the Germans themselves.

The talks produced an agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations and the opening of embassies in Bonn and Moscow. This agreement was confirmed by an exchange of letters between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Federal Chancellor.

But hardly had the talks ended than Adenauer made an attempt to kindle revanchist feeling in the FRG. On September 14, the day of his departure from Moscow, he told a press conference that the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the FRG "did not signify recognition of the territorial composition of the two sides".* Further, he made the absurd statement that the Federal Government was authorised to represent the German people in international affairs.

On behalf of the Soviet Government TASS issued a Statement declaring: "The Soviet Government regards the Federal Republic of Germany as part of Germany. The other part of Germany is the German Democratic Republic. In connection with the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany the Government of the USSR considers it necessary to state that the question of Germany's frontiers was settled by the Potsdam Agreement and the Federal Republic of Germany exercises jurisdiction over the territory under its sovereignty."**

9. Treaty on Relations Between the USSR and the GDR

A GDR Government delegation arrived in Moscow on September 16, 1955 to continue the talks that were begun in Berlin in July of the same year. The meetings and talks of members of the Soviet Government with Walter Ulbricht,

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Statement by Adenauer at a press conference in Moscow on September 14, 1955.

** *Pravda*, September 16, 1955.

Otto Grotewohl and other GDR representatives showed that there was an identity of views on a wide range of questions and a common aspiration to promote and strengthen friendly relations between the USSR and the GDR. The talks ended on September 20 with the signing of the Treaty on Relations Between the USSR and the GDR.

Article 1 formally confirmed that the relations between the two countries were founded on complete equality, mutual respect of sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Accordingly, the GDR was free to decide all questions of its internal and foreign policy, including its relations with the FRG, and also the promotion of relations with other countries. Under Article 2 the sides pledged to consult each other on all major international issues affecting their interests and to take all the measures in their power to prevent any breach of the peace. In accordance with Article 4 Soviet troops were temporarily to remain in the GDR with the agreement of its Government on terms defined in a supplementary agreement.

The GDR took over the protection and control of its own frontiers, of the external perimeter of Greater Berlin and the frontier in Berlin and also of the communications between the FRG and West Berlin across GDR territory. It agreed to ensure the settlement, with the appropriate FRG authorities, of all problems linked with transit railway, motor or waterway traffic of the FRG or West Berlin, of their citizens or residents and also of foreign countries and their citizens with the exception of the personnel and freight of the US, British and French armed forces in West Berlin. The only function left to Soviet troops was that of controlling the movement between the FRG and West Berlin of the personnel and freight of the French, British and US garrisons in West Berlin. This agreement was formalised by an exchange of identical letters between V. A. Zorin, Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister, and Lothar Bolz, GDR Foreign Minister.*

By agreement with the GDR the Soviet Government abolished the office of Soviet High Commissioner in Germany. The Soviet Ambassador in the FRG was charged with the function of "maintaining the appropriate contact with rep-

* *Pravda*, September 21, 1955.

representatives of the USA, Britain and France in the FRG on questions concerning Germany as a whole on the basis of the decisions of the Four Powers".*

The Treaty of September 20, 1955 gave the relations between the USSR and the GDR a new, solid foundation conforming to the interests of the Soviet and German peoples. The treaty furthered the fruitful work of the Party and state organs of the Soviet Union and the GDR in organising broad and equal co-operation between the two countries in the economic, cultural, scientific and technical fields and in uniting their efforts in the maintenance of peace and security in Europe.

* * *

Major democratic changes were put in effect in the German Democratic Republic in the period between 1949 and 1955. Profoundly sincere friendship linked the USSR and the GDR. The relations between them began to be founded on complete equality, respect for sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs; they were permeated with a spirit of mutual trust and solidarity.

During these years the Soviet Union did all in its power to consolidate peace and security in Europe and ensure Germany's national unity as a peaceful and democratic state. But the Western powers, far from meeting the Soviet proposals half way, regarded them as a hindrance to their own plans of forming a West German army and drawing the FRG into their aggressive military blocs.

The only answer to every Soviet proposal was: "No." Without Germany's division the USA would have been unable to put the German militarists back in the saddle and make them allies against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The rejection of the proposals made by the Soviet Union in the period March-April 1952 was striking evidence of the fact that the Western powers wanted neither free elections in Germany nor that country's unification.

As regards the revival of militarism in West Germany and the conversion of that country into NATO's assault force, the Soviet Union's firm and consistent stand com-

* *Pravda*, September 21, 1955.

pelled the Western powers to keep postponing their plans and look for roundabout ways of putting them into effect. Had it not been for this stand West Germany's remilitarisation would have been achieved much earlier than was actually the case.

Small wonder that Western policy had no room for a German peace treaty. For the Western powers to attain their imperialist objectives it was necessary that the basic problems of Germany's post-war development should remain unresolved.

The unsettled state of affairs in Germany created one of the most tangled knots of international contradictions. As the years went by this knot was drawn tighter and the international tension caused by it mounted accordingly.

Chapter Twenty-Three

THE SOVIET UNION IN THE DRIVE TO END THE WARS IN KOREA AND VIETNAM AND ACHIEVE A GENERAL RELAXATION OF WORLD TENSION (1951-1956)

World tension reached an ominous level as a result of the creation of NATO, the US aggression in Korea, the intensified arms race and West Germany's militarisation. US imperialism intensified its struggle for world domination. Relying on their temporary superiority in nuclear weapons, the aggressive imperialist circles were making preparations for another war with the objective of wiping out the socialist system, restoring to capitalism the countries that had broken away from it and crushing the swiftly growing national liberation movement.

Soviet might and the consistently peaceful policy of the USSR and other socialist countries were the main factors preventing the imperialists from starting another world war. The military strength of the USSR and the solidarity of the socialist states discouraged the US imperialists from spreading the hostilities from Korea to China and thereby sparking a world war. However, the threat of another war had by no means been removed. Soviet diplomacy was therefore oriented by the CC CPSU and the Soviet Government toward preventing any further swelling of world tension and the threat of war and ensuring the preservation of peace.

1. Termination of the War in Korea

In mid-1951 the Soviet Government used the favourable situation for a major diplomatic move designed to restore peace. In a televised speech on the occasion of United Na-

tions Day, the Soviet representative in the UN suggested that the belligerents begin talks on a cease-fire and the conclusion of an armistice with a mutual withdrawal to the 38th parallel.

This proposal received wholehearted support from world democratic opinion. In July 1951 the US Secretary of Defence George C. Marshall told a Senate committee that the statement of the Soviet representative in the UN had "produced a very serious reaction which we are having to combat on all sides".* The US Ambassador in Moscow Alan G. Kirk asked the Soviet Foreign Ministry whether the statement of the Soviet representative in the UN mirrored the attitude of the Soviet Government. Needless to say, the Soviet representative had acted on instructions from his Government. The Soviet initiative gave the impetus for beginning peace talks and, through them, for the restoration of peace in Korea.

The US Government found it had to agree with the Soviet suggestion and begin negotiations. True, in October 1952 it broke off these negotiations and made another attempt to achieve success with the aid of arms. But the US offensive in the winter of 1952-1953 likewise ended in failure.

In the spring of 1953 the USSR and the other socialist countries vigorously supported the Chinese-Korean initiative calling for the resumption of the negotiations. The attitude of the socialist countries was warmly approved by democratic opinion throughout the world. This approval was reflected also in the UN. On April 16, 1953 the 7th General Assembly unanimously endorsed a resolution expressing the hope that the armistice talks between the Korean and United States delegations would soon end successfully.

An agreement on the repatriation of war prisoners, a problem that had been a major obstacle to the conclusion of an armistice, was signed on June 8, 1953. This was followed on July 27, 1953 by the signing of an armistice agreement. In the preamble it was noted that the aim of the agree-

* *Mutual Security Act of 1951. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services, US Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, July 27, 1951. Washington, 1951, p. 41.*

ment was to end the Korean conflict and conclude an armistice that would ensure the cessation of all hostilities and hostile acts in Korea until a peace agreement was signed. The demarcation line was defined in accordance with the actual positions held by the forces of both sides: mainly along the 38th parallel with slight deviations in the west in favour of the Korean and Chinese forces and in the east in favour of the "UN forces". A two-kilometre-wide demilitarised zone was established on either side of the demarcation line. The agreement prohibited the introduction of weapons and reinforcements into Korea for the entire period of the armistice, defined the functions of the armistice commission consisting of representatives of both sides and established the composition and functions of the armistice observation commission consisting of representatives of neutral countries, namely, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden and Switzerland. Further, the agreement established the order for the repatriation of war prisoners and provided, three months after it came into force, for a political conference to consider Korea's unification and the withdrawal of foreign troops.*

The armistice put an end to a brutal war that had lasted for three years, abolished a flashpoint of another world war and helped to ease tension in the international situation as a whole. For Soviet foreign policy the cessation of the war in Korea was an outstanding success in its struggle to preserve world peace.

The termination of the war in Korea was a serious setback for the USA and spelled out the collapse of many of its aggressive plans in Asia that it had linked with that war.

2. Berlin Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference

In Europe the most acute problem was that of Germany. The proposals made by the Soviet Union in 1952 on that problem did not receive a favourable response from the Western powers.

* *Mezhdunarodnoye pravo v izbrannykh dokumentakh*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1957, pp. 342-53.

The steps taken by the CC CPSU and the Soviet Government to relax world tension had such an enormous impact on world opinion that the Western leaders found they had to somewhat modify their tactics. It was no longer possible simply to ignore the Soviet proposals for a German peace treaty and that country's unification,* or for European security.

At the Berlin Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference in January 1954 the Soviet delegation proposed a General European Treaty on Collective Security and the abolition of military blocs, in other words, the creation of an all-European system of collective security. Such a treaty would have ended the ranging of some countries against others and Europe's split into military blocs. Until Germany's unification had been achieved the signatories of the treaty, including the GDR and the FRG, would refrain from attacking each other in any way, settle all disputes by peaceful means, consult with each other if there was the threat of an armed attack in Europe and go to the aid of any attacked signatory or signatories with all the means at their disposal, including armed force. It was envisaged that representatives of the USA and the People's Republic of China would participate as observers.**

Moreover, the Soviet delegation proposed the signing of a state treaty with Austria on the basis that had been agreed upon earlier with the simultaneous adoption of measures to guarantee Austria's independence and rule out the possibility of her manpower and material resources being used by foreign states for aggressive purposes. However, these proposals met the same fate as the proposals on the German question: they were rejected by the Western powers.***

In addition to the German question, an Austrian treaty and European security, the Berlin Conference considered, on a motion from the Soviet delegation, the possibility of convening another Foreign Ministers Conference not of four but of five powers—with the participation of the People's Republic of China. It was proposed that that conference

* See Chapter Twenty-Two.

** *Pravda*, February 11, 1954.

*** See Section 5 of this chapter.

would chart measures to ease international tension: that it would consider the conclusion, subsequent to the armistice, of peace in Korea and an agreement on the termination of the war in Indochina. The Soviet Government had instructed its delegation to take such action at the Berlin Conference as would "help . . . to curb the aggressive ambitions of the imperialist camp and thereby meet with the interests of lasting peace".*

The US delegation disfavoured the holding of a Five-Power conference. Dulles fulminated against the proposal to invite China to a conference but failed to muster support. France was taking a beating in Vietnam and hoped a conference would extricate her from an extremely difficult situation. Britain's attitude was influenced by members of the British Commonwealth (India, Pakistan and Ceylon), who were demanding an end to the hostilities in Indochina.

Finally, agreement was reached on a Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva with the participation of the People's Republic of China. The USA subscribed to this agreement reluctantly, only as a result of pressure from Britain and France.

At and after the Berlin Conference the Western Foreign Ministers and other statesmen assiduously argued that the North Atlantic Treaty was a defensive alliance. Their aim was to weaken the impression created by the Soviet proposal for a system of collective security in Europe. Taking up these claims about the defensive nature of the North Atlantic pact, the Soviet Government, in a Note of March 31, 1954, requested the three Western powers to consider the question of the Soviet Union's accession to that pact, declaring also that it saw no obstacle to the USA's participation in the General European Treaty on Collective Security proposed by it.

This offer was not accepted by the Western powers, who thereby acknowledged that the North Atlantic pact was a closed military bloc directed against the Soviet Union and gave further evidence of their unwillingness to take steps to safeguard European security.

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Instructions of the Soviet Government to the Soviet delegation at the Berlin Conference, January 1954.

3. The 1954 Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina

In Geneva the Five-Power Foreign Ministers Conference opened on April 26, 1954. The Korean question was the first item on the agenda, and it was considered with the participation of representatives of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, South Korea and the 12 countries involved in the foreign military intervention in Korea.

The Soviet delegation supported the KPDR proposal for the restoration of Korea's national unity by holding free elections for an all-Korea National Assembly under the supervision of a commission consisting of representatives of North and South Korea. The Assembly would form a Government for the whole of Korea. Provision was made for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from that country. The USSR stated that it was prepared, along with other countries, to guarantee Korea's peaceful development. On a number of issues the delegations of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries acceded to the wishes of the Western powers, agreeing to international inspection by neutral states, a phased withdrawal of foreign troops, and other points. Nevertheless, the constructive proposals of the socialist countries, proposals that could open the way to Korea's peaceful reunification and the formation of an independent democratic state, were rejected by the USA and its allies, who bear the responsibility for the fact that to this day Korea remains divided.

A more favourable situation arose for talks on Indochina. True, the USA opposed a peaceful settlement, desiring the war to continue. It had increased its deliveries of military equipment to France, promising her additional financial resources in 1954 to the tune of US \$ 385 million.* It saw in Indochina an important strategic base and a source of raw materials** and was preparing to take a direct part in the hostilities up to and including the use of atomic bombs.***

* *Documents on American Foreign Relations. 1953*, New York, 1954, pp. 350-51.

** Pierre Rouanet, *Mendès-France au pouvoir (18 juin 1954-6 février 1955)*, Paris, 1965.

*** Eisenhower wrote in his memoirs: "The strategic importance of Indochina ... is obvious." The loss of Indochina "would have meant

On May 3, 1954, shortly before the Indochina problem came up for discussion, Dulles left Geneva in order to show that the USA was not interested in ending the hostilities in Indochina. However, this gesture did not make any notable impression on his partners.

On May 8 representatives of the Soviet Union, China, the three Western powers and the delegations from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam began their discussion of the question of restoring peace in Indochina. The French garrison in the fortress of Dien Bien Phu, around which heavy fighting had been raging for several months, had surrendered on the previous day (May 7).

At the conference the Soviet Union and China staunchly supported the DRV proposal envisaging the recognition of the independence of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, the withdrawal of foreign troops from their territories, the unification of each of these countries through free elections, the formation of national governments without foreign interference and a mutual exchange of war prisoners. It was proposed that as the first step hostilities should cease.* However, on account of the stand adopted by French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, who was acting in close contact with the Americans, the talks progressed slowly.

In France there was increasing popular discontent with the Laniel Government, which wanted to continue the dirty war in Vietnam. The anti-war movement was headed by the French Communist Party. The military setbacks of the French colonialists aroused opposition feeling even among the bourgeoisie. The Laniel Government fell on June 12, 1954. The new Prime Minister, Pierre Mendès-France, went to Geneva determined to end the costly and unpopular war, in which France was taking a beating.

The agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and the Final Declaration were signed on July 20 and 21, 1954. France undertook to withdraw her forces from the whole of Indochina. International commis-

to surrender to Communist enslavement of millions. On the material side, it would have spelled the loss of valuable deposits of tin and prodigious supplies of rubber and rice" (*Mandate for Change*, New York, 1963, pp. 332, 333).

* *Pravda*, May 11, 1954.

sions for supervision and control of the fulfilment of the agreements were set up (they consisted of representatives of Canada, India and Poland). The agreements banned the introduction of fresh foreign troops, military personnel, armaments and munitions and the building of foreign military bases in all the Indochina states. The governments of Laos and Cambodia declared they would refrain from joining any military alliances. One of the provisions of the agreement on Vietnam was that neither the People's Republic of Vietnam nor South Vietnam would align itself with any military blocs and that no foreign bases would be built on their territory.

In the Final Declaration the countries participating in the conference pledged to respect the sovereignty of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and to allow no interference in their internal affairs. It was stated in the Declaration that free elections would be held in Laos and Cambodia in 1955 and that a political settlement would be reached in Vietnam on the basis of its independence, unity and territorial integrity. The settlement would be achieved with the aid of free elections under the supervision of an international commission. The elections were set for July 1956. A temporary demarcation line running somewhat south of the 17th parallel was established between the DRV and South Vietnam. As co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference the Soviet and British Foreign Ministers were authorised to consider all problems arising out of the fulfilment of the agreements.*

Subsequently, failing to win the support of their people and fearing defeat, the South Vietnamese authorities made it impossible to hold free elections. They had the backing of the US imperialists, who soon acquired decisive influence in South Vietnam and turned it into their strongpoint in Southeast Asia.

Although the USA had not signed the Indochina cease-fire agreements it declared that it would take note of these agreements and "refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb them".** This commitment was soon flouted.

The agreements on Indochina were a major step toward relaxing tension in international affairs and strengthening

* *Mezhdunarodnoye pravo v izbrannykh dokumentakh*, Vol. III, pp. 371-84.

** *The Department of State Bulletin*, August 2, 1954, p. 162.

the position of a new socialist state—the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

But an easing of world tension did not enter into the plans of the US ruling circles and was achieved against their will. To counterbalance its setback in Geneva, US diplomacy hastened to initiate talks on the formation of an aggressive military bloc in Southeast Asia (the conclusion of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty [Manila Pact] and the creation of its military organisation [SEATO]) while the Geneva Conference was still in session. The members of the new aggressive bloc were the USA, Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand. The US imperialists were able to draw into SEATO only three Asian countries, which were most heavily dependent on the USA: Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan. These talks ended on September 8, 1954. At the same time, a protocol was signed spreading the operation of the treaty to the Indochina states. This was a gross violation of the Geneva Agreements and contravened the clearly expressed negative attitude of the Indochina states to their territories being embraced by SEATO commitments.

The Soviet Government assessed these actions of the USA and its allies as measures "directed against the interests of security in Asia and the Far East and against the freedom and independence of the peoples of Asia".*

On October 12, 1954, jointly with the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union published a Declaration strongly denouncing the formation of the military bloc in Southeast Asia as serving imperialist objectives and directed against the security and independence of the Asian countries.

In violation of the Geneva Agreements the USA continued sending armaments to Indochina, chiefly to South Vietnam. It followed this up later by sending officers and other military personnel to South Vietnam and engaging in direct military interference on the side of reaction in the internal struggle that broke out in that country.

A Mutual Defence Treaty was signed in Washington with the Chiang Kai-shek clique on December 2, 1954. This treaty provided for military aid to the Kuomintang and the building of US naval bases in Taiwan and the

* *Pravda*, September 15, 1954.

Penghu Islands. Shortly afterwards, on January 28, 1955, the US Congress passed a resolution authorising the US President to take any step "he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores (Taiwan and the Penghu Islands.—*Ed.*) against armed attack".* The US military used this decision to intensify aggressive actions in the Far East, thus increasing tension in the region of the Chinese off-shore islands and the Taiwan Strait.

The Soviet Union gave its utmost support to China against the USA's policy of aggression. In a conversation with the British Ambassador William Hayter in January 1955 Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov made it plain that the mounting tension in the region of Taiwan was due to the USA's flagrant interference in China's internal affairs, to its efforts to wrest Taiwan away from China.** The situation in the Taiwan Strait was discussed at a meeting between Dulles and Molotov on May 14, 1955. Dulles claimed that the PRC Government, which was receiving assistance from the USSR, was building a military springboard on the continent opposite Taiwan for an invasion of that island. The US Government, he declared, was under strong pressure to hit that springboard or permit the Chiang Kai-shek regime to do that itself. In reply Molotov said "the Soviet Union was helping the PRC and regarded any Chinese construction on Chinese territory as the internal affair of China", stressing in conclusion that "the USSR wants a peaceful settlement of the situation in the region of Taiwan".***

In Indochina the flames of war were extinguished through the efforts of the Soviet Union, other socialist countries and all other peace-loving states. The only reason that another world war did not break out in that extremely tense and crucial period in the Far East was that the US aggressors were checkmated by the Soviet Union.

* *Documents on American Foreign Relations*. 1955, New York, 1956, p. 299.

** *Pravda*, January 29, 1955.

*** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Record of a conversation on May 14, 1955 between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov and the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

The breakdown of the imperialist plans of aggression in the Far East was further striking evidence that the growing might of the socialist community, above all of the USSR, was increasingly influencing international relations.

4. The Soviet Union and the Austrian State Treaty

An important Soviet step toward relaxing world tension was the peace settlement with Austria, achieved as a result of the initiatives instituted by the Soviet Government to end the deadlock over the signing of the Austrian State Treaty. For a number of years the USA and its NATO partners had obstructed the settlement of this question for they were planning to bring Austria into NATO and turn her into that bloc's "Alpine fortress". They renounced the articles of the State Treaty that had been agreed upon at meetings of the Foreign Ministers Council and, in contravention of the agreement that had been reached, proposed a "short draft" of the treaty, which was totally unacceptable to both the Soviet Union and Austria.

The Soviet Government directed its efforts to secure the earliest re-establishment of an independent and democratic Austria and prevent that country from becoming involved in Western military blocs. After the Raab Government came to power in 1953 the Austrian ruling circles began to show understanding for the Soviet stand. That same year the Soviet Government took steps to ease the occupation regime and normalise relations with Austria, believing that as an interested party that country should take an active share in the negotiations for a treaty. On the initiative of the Soviet delegation a representative of Austria was invited to attend the Berlin Foreign Ministers Conference in February 1954. He told the conference that "Austria has no intention of aligning herself with any military alliance".* This was an extremely important statement by Austria.

Taking the Austrian Government's point of view into account and with the purpose of getting the State Treaty signed as quickly as possible, the Soviet delegation at the

* *Europa Archiv*, 1954, No. 8/9, p. 6521.

Berlin Conference proposed that the text of the Austrian State Treaty on the basis that had been agreed earlier should be finalised within three months; that the treaty should be supplemented with an Austrian commitment to refrain from joining military alliances directed against any of the powers that had liberated her and to deny the use of her territory for foreign military bases. In view of the plans for West Germany's remilitarisation and the threat of another *anschluss*, the Soviet delegation suggested that small contingents of troops of the Four Powers should remain temporarily in Austria until the German peace treaty was signed and that these troops should have no occupation functions.

The reluctance of the Western powers to accept the Soviet proposals* was due to their unwillingness to give up their plans of using Austria for aggressive purposes.

Guided by its desire to lessen international tension, reduce the number of outstanding international problems and meet the interests of the Austrian people, the Soviet Government initiated a further step in February 1955 that took the position of the other powers into account. It announced that it considered Soviet troops could be withdrawn from Austria before the German peace treaty was concluded. However, it insisted on a solution "that would make it impossible for Germany to annex Austria again".** It suggested holding a Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference without any delay to consider both the German and the Austrian question. This proposal was not accepted by the Western powers.

This prompted Soviet diplomacy to take a different road: it was decided to begin direct talks with the Austrian Government. Chancellor Julius Raab was invited to Moscow to draw up the State Treaty.

Direct talks between the USSR and Austria were held in Moscow from April 12 to 15, 1955. The results were recorded in a confidential Memorandum.*** The Austrian Government undertook to publish a Declaration committing

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Statement of February 12, 1954 by V. M. Molotov at the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, Britain, the USA and France.

** *Izvestia*, February 9, 1955.

*** It was subsequently published simultaneously with the State Treaty. See *Pravda*, May 16, 1955.

Austria to permanent neutrality on the model of Switzerland, and to take the appropriate steps to have the Declaration endorsed by the Austrian parliament and receive international recognition. Further, it was agreed that Austria would raise before the Western powers the question of a Four-Power guarantee of the integrity and inviolability of Austrian state territory.

For its part, the Soviet Government stated that it was prepared "forthwith to sign the Austrian State Treaty and recognise the Declaration on Austria's neutrality", and agreed that the troops of the Four Powers should be withdrawn from Austria after the State Treaty came into force, and not later than December 31, 1955. Outstanding economic problems were also settled.

The Moscow talks provided the foundation for the settlement of the Austrian question. The Soviet initiative made it possible to sign the Austrian State Treaty, which ensured Austria's neutrality.

The State Treaty on the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria was signed in Vienna on May 15, 1955 by representatives of the Four Powers and Austria. Under that treaty Austria was committed to permanent neutrality, including non-participation in military blocs and the pledge to refrain from allowing foreign military bases on her territory. For their part, the USSR, the USA, Britain and France pledged to respect Austria's neutrality. Thus, there appeared one more non-aligned country in Europe. Thanks to the Soviet Union, a settlement was reached which conformed to Austria's national interests and to European security.

An important international development, the settlement of the Austrian question, reaffirmed that there were extensive possibilities for settling international problems by negotiation. The Austrian treaty was yet another notable result of the steps that were being taken by the Soviet Union to relax international tension.

Of immense significance to peace in the north of Europe and to the development of friendly relations with Finland was the signing, on September 19, 1955, of a protocol prolonging the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and Finland for another 20 years. In view of the good-neighbourly relations

with Finland and of the certain alleviation of world tension, the Soviet Union found it possible to renounce, before the appointed time, its lease of the naval base of Porkkala-Udd (the lease was to expire only in 1997). Having earlier given up its naval base at Port Arthur, the Soviet Union now dismantled its last base on foreign territory. At the same time, it continued its struggle for disarmament in a situation marked by a nuclear arms race and the threat of a nuclear war.*

5. Four-Power Summit at Geneva

Whereas the signing of the Austrian State Treaty and a series of other developments were indicative of a certain easing of tension in Europe, the signing and ratification of the Paris Agreements envisaging West Germany's remilitarisation, on the contrary, led to a fresh aggravation of the situation. They were evidence that the proponents of war and aggression had by no means abandoned their dangerous activity and were continuing to obstruct the settlement of the German question.

Early in February 1955 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR reviewed the international situation, discussed and approved the Soviet Government's foreign policy, and adopted a Declaration on the world situation. The Declaration drew the attention of all peoples and parliaments to the mounting tension on the international scene, denounced war propaganda and underlined that "the peoples are vitally interested in the consolidation of world peace. They have every possibility of preventing another world war for the peace forces are steadily growing and are today more powerful than the forces of aggression and war".** The Supreme Soviet proposed direct contact between the parliaments of all countries through exchanges of delegations, which would "meet with the desire of the peoples for friendly relations and co-operation".*** This peace-seeking action enabled the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to establish contact with the parliaments of many countries. Up until November 1, 1957,

* See Chapter Twenty-Four.

** *Sittings of the Fourth Supreme Soviet of the USSR (2nd Session)*, Verbatim Report, Moscow, 1955, p. 527 (in Russian).

*** Ibid.

the Soviet Union was visited by parliamentary delegations from 31 countries, while delegations of the Supreme Soviet visited 19 countries. These exchanges helped to achieve better understanding.

Moreover, the Soviet Union proposed holding a summit conference with the purpose of improving the international atmosphere and discussing the issues that were complicating it. Despite the USA's negative attitude to this proposal it was favoured by Britain and France. World public opinion was demanding a summit conference.

The USA, Eisenhower writes in his memoirs, was pressured into agreeing to a conference by its allies and world opinion: "Not wishing to appear senselessly stubborn in my attitude toward a summit meeting—so hopefully desired by so many—I instructed Secretary Dulles to let it be known through diplomatic channels that if other powers were genuinely interested in such a meeting we were ready to listen to their reasoning."*

At the signing of the Austrian State Treaty the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, Britain and France exchanged views on the question of a Four-Power summit meeting. The Western representatives said they did not believe a summit would settle major international issues such as the German problem, disarmament and the problem of nuclear weapons. They held that the meeting's principal purpose should be to give an impetus to the work of the Foreign Ministers or other Four-Power agencies, chart the further discussion of outstanding international problems and map out how this work should proceed.

The Soviet Government declared itself in favour of a summit, contending that such a meeting should have no definite agenda in order to enable the Heads of Government to bring up any issue they felt had to be discussed. For its part, the Soviet Government was interested in discussing collective security in Europe, an arms reduction and the banning of nuclear weapons.**

In the talks that were continued through diplomatic channels agreement was reached on a summit meeting in

* Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, p. 506.

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Record of a conversation on May 14, 1955 between V. M. Molotov and Dulles, Macmillan and Pinay.

Geneva on July 18, 1955. The Soviet Government's motivation for insisting on such a meeting was that the international situation had to be frankly discussed with the other Great Powers.

The instructions received by the Soviet delegation stated: "The principal aims of the conference of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers should be to relax international tension and help to create the necessary atmosphere of trust in the relations between states. Accordingly, efforts must be made to get the conference to adopt decisions conforming to these aims or, at least, a corresponding declaration (or statement)." Further, the Soviet delegation was instructed to oppose all attempts to discuss questions that would signify interference in the internal affairs of the USSR or of countries friendly to it.* This was particularly necessary because Dulles and his backers in the USA were planning to bring up at the international conference questions concerning the internal situation in some socialist countries and the activities of the Communist Parties in the capitalist world.

During the anniversary session of the General Assembly in San Francisco on June 23, 1955 the US Secretary of State informed the Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov that the meeting could discuss questions such as disarmament, European security, Germany, the "status" of the East European countries and the activities of "world communism". The Soviet Foreign Minister replied that the Soviet Government was opposed to the US President's proposal for a discussion of the situation in the East European countries and the activities of "world communism", noting that it was not within the jurisdiction of the meeting to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. Its purpose was to discuss disarmament and collective security, and also a conference on the Asian question and economic problems.**

When the Geneva Conference opened the Soviet delegation declared it was interested, above all, in a discussion of an arms reduction, the banning of nuclear weapons, the

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Instructions to the Soviet delegation at the Geneva summit meeting, July 1955.

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Record of a conversation on June 23, 1955 between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the US Secretary of State.

creation of a system of collective security in Europe, and the Asian and Far Eastern problems. Further, it suggested discussing the following issues: the cessation of the cold war, the build up of trust between states, guarantees for the security of neutral countries, the withdrawal of troops from European countries, and the German question.

In the end it was decided to discuss the German question, European security, disarmament and the promotion of East-West contacts.*

The Western powers gave prominence to the German question. However, as Eisenhower subsequently admitted, they had no intention of finding a mutually acceptable solution to that question: "We had obligations to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and the Federal Republic of Germany. No matter how harmless a Soviet proposal might appear, we were determined to do nothing that might injure the Chancellor or weaken Western resolution" to sustain the practices existing in the FRG.** The Western powers were eager to seize the initiative in the talks in order, as Eisenhower later wrote, "to keep the Soviets on the defensive by proposing a series of measures which we hoped would seem logical to the peoples of the world and which we were prepared to support vigorously".***

The discussion of the German question was opened by the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, who repeated the plan (Eden plan) he had proposed at the Berlin Foreign Ministers Conference in 1954.**** He rejected the idea of a system of collective security in Europe, proposing instead a security treaty between the participants in the conference and a united Germany. Under that treaty the Soviet Union would receive "guarantees of security". It was implied that a united Germany would join the North Atlantic bloc.***** This was also the stand of the USA.

The results of this discussion were recorded in the form of a joint directive of the four Heads of Government to the Foreign Ministers.*)

* *Pravda*, July 20, 1955.

** Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, p. 523.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 519.

**** See Chapter Twenty-Two.

***** *Pravda*, July 20, 1955.

*) See Chapter Twenty-Two.

At the discussion of European security the Soviet delegation declared that the security of the European peoples could only be ensured by the joint efforts of all the European states. The Soviet Government felt that the two German states should take part in creating a system of security. However, in view of the Western powers' reluctance to disband their military blocs, the Soviet delegation submitted the draft of a General European Treaty on Collective Security in which this attitude was taken into account.* The Soviet proposals were that during the first phase of the establishment of a collective security system the participating states would continue to be bound by their obligations under earlier treaties but would promise to refrain from using armed force and settle all outstanding issues by peaceful means. All the obligations envisaged in the collective security treaty would come into force at the second stage, when the North Atlantic pact and the Warsaw Treaty would cease to operate simultaneously.

At Geneva the Western powers made no constructive proposals on the question of security. More, they made the settlement of this question dependent on Germany's unification on their own terms, one of which was that a united Germany would become a member of NATO. This was contrary to the Geneva summit directive, which prescribed the settlement of the German question "in accordance with the interests of European security". Germany's membership of a military bloc directed against the USSR and other socialist countries would, of course, basically undermine European security and increase tension in Europe. At the close of the discussion the Heads of Government instructed the Foreign Ministers to examine the proposals for systems of European security made by all the delegations at the Geneva Conference.**

At the debate on the question of disarmament the Soviet delegation insisted on the Western powers stating their attitude to the Soviet disarmament proposals of May 10, 1955 in the Subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission. It proposed recording that agreement had been reached on the armament levels of the Great Powers, pointing out

* *New Times* No. 31, 1955, Documents.

** *Pravda*, July 24, 1955.

that the Soviet draft was based on the proposals that had earlier been submitted by the Western powers themselves. Further, it suggested that the conference participants should undertake to refrain from using atomic and hydrogen weapons and call upon all other countries to follow their example. The Soviet delegation gave much of its attention to the creation of a system of international inspection of the cutback in armaments and the banning of nuclear weapons.

The Western powers evinced no desire to take effective steps to end the deadlock over the disarmament problem. Their proposals made no provision for disarmament and were wholly concerned with control and inspection of existing armaments and armed forces. They did not even mention the need for a reduction of armaments and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The US delegation suggested that the USSR and the USA exchange information about their armed forces and permit the aerial photographing of their territories.*

At the discussion of the last point on the agenda—the development of East-West contacts—the Soviet delegation suggested that the conference would contribute towards easing international tension by declaring itself in favour of the promotion of economic, cultural and other links between nations and the development of international trade.

While expressing themselves generally in favour of more economic contacts, the Western powers, notably the USA, made no concrete proposals for ending the discriminatory measures they had taken in regard to economic links with the Soviet Union. At the discussion of the question of contacts their chief concern was to provide bourgeois propaganda literature, radio broadcasts, etc., with more possibilities for penetrating the USSR. As a result of this discussion, the Foreign Ministers were instructed to study the materials that could lead “to a gradual lifting of the barriers preventing free intercourse and peaceful trade between nations and the establishment of such free contacts and links as would mutually benefit the interested countries and peoples”.

The situation in Asia was touched upon during unofficial talks between Soviet and Western representatives. The

* *Pravda*, July 22, 1955; also see Chapter Twenty-Four.

Soviet representatives suggested settling the question of Taiwan as an inalienable part of China and also the question of restoring China's rights in the UN. Eisenhower and Dulles rejected the Soviet proposals, declaring that time was needed for such a settlement.*

No agreement was outlined at Geneva on key international problems. Nevertheless, following the Geneva Conference there was some relaxation of tension in the relations between states.

6. Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference at Geneva (1955)

In determining the Soviet delegation's guidelines for the Foreign Ministers Conference that was being convened in fulfilment of the decision of the Geneva summit, the CC CPSU and the Soviet Government devoted much of their attention to European security. The instructions given the Soviet delegation stated: "At the examination of the question of security in Europe, the delegation shall insist that the task of ensuring effective security in Europe would be best of all served by establishing a system of collective security, regarding which the Soviet Government had submitted the appropriate proposal at the Conference of the Heads of Government of the Four Powers in Geneva, and concluding to that end a corresponding treaty. In view of the fact that, essentially, this proposal had not been examined at the summit, the delegation shall bring it up so that the representatives of the Three Powers can state their attitude to it. At the discussion it is to be remembered that this is the basic Soviet proposal on the question of European security."**

The conference opened in Geneva on October 27, 1955. The first question on the agenda was: "European Security and Germany". From the very beginning the exchange of

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*. Record of a conversation on July 21, 1955 between the Head of the Soviet delegation and Eisenhower. Dulles and Eden at the Geneva Conference.

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*. Instructions of October 26, 1955 to the Soviet delegation at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva.

views showed that the USA and its Western allies were not interested in organising European security and that all their efforts were directed toward obtaining the USSR's agreement to the inclusion of a united Germany in the aggressive North Atlantic bloc spearheaded at the USSR and other socialist countries. This attitude doomed the conference to failure. That was exactly what US diplomacy wanted.

Consistently in keeping with its policy of strengthening peace the Soviet Government proposed that the conference discuss the draft of a General European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe, which had been submitted earlier at the summit in Geneva.

The Western delegations rejected the Soviet proposal, advancing a somewhat modified version of the Eden plan.*

The Soviet delegation pointed out that since the Berlin Conference in 1954, when it was possible to hold general elections in Germany, the situation in that country had changed considerably: the Paris Agreements had come into force and West Germany had become a member of NATO and was rearming. The problem of reuniting Germany under the new conditions could only be settled gradually, step by step, and only through a detente and co-operation between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Soviet delegation amended its initial draft treaty on European security. It proposed discussing the possibility of concluding the treaty with the participation of a smaller number of countries: the USSR, the USA, France and Britain and also the other members of the Western European Union and the Warsaw Treaty, including the GDR and the FRG.** This proposal was also rejected by the Western powers, whose refusal to reach agreement on security in Europe in effect nullified the Geneva summit decisions on the German question. It will be recalled that the summit decisions made the settlement of this question dependent upon the establishment of a system of security in Europe.

The British proposal for setting up an armament restriction and inspection zone in the heart of Europe, submitted

* See Chapter Twenty-Two.

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Statement of October 31, 1955 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

at the Geneva summit, had a direct bearing on the task of ensuring European security. This proposal was included in the summit directives to the Foreign Ministers Conference. The directives spoke of "creating a zone between East and West in which armed forces would be stationed by mutual agreement". In keeping with this recommendation the Soviet delegation submitted proposals envisaging the creation of a zone embracing the GDR and the FRG and all or some of the neighbouring states. It was suggested that the agreement on the zone should stipulate the maximum numerical strength of the US, Soviet, British and French forces to be stationed in the countries of the zone, and record the obligations covering armament restriction and inspection and the establishment in the zone of a joint agency for the inspection of the armed forces and armaments of the signatory powers.*

The Western powers rejected these Soviet proposals as well, putting forward their own draft which contravened the directives of the Heads of Government. It spoke of a zone "along both sides of the demarcation line between a reunited Germany and Eastern Europe".** This draft was evidence that in order to wreck any possibility of an agreement with the Soviet Union on this issue the Western powers went so far as to renounce even the proposals Eden had made at the Geneva summit.

On the question of disarmament the Soviet delegation submitted a draft decision which suggested recording the agreement reached by the Four Powers on armed forces limitations, banning atomic and hydrogen bombs, ceasing nuclear tests, and establishing international control over the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces and over the prohibition of nuclear weapons.*** Pleading technical difficulties in controlling the banning of nuclear weapons, the Western Foreign Ministers bluntly declared that it was impossible to put nuclear disarmament into effect.****

* Ibid.

** Ibid.

*** Decision of the Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference on a reduction of armaments and the banning of nuclear weapons of November 10, 1955, Council of Foreign Ministers, Document 45.

**** Statement by Antoine Pinay of November 10, 1955, Council of

Characteristically, the Western delegations refused to record agreement even on issues on which there was a concurrence of views.

During the discussion of the question of promoting East-West contacts the Soviet delegation submitted a draft decision taking into account the summit directives and also the wishes of Western business circles, scientists, cultural workers and public organisations.

The Western powers planned not so much the development of contacts and peaceful co-operation between countries as the obtaining of channels to enable them to interfere in the internal affairs of the socialist countries.

No question was decided by the Foreign Ministers Conference on account of the uncompromising stand adopted by the Western powers, who were steering toward a further aggravation of the international situation.

7. Establishment of Diplomatic Relations With Japan

As was noted earlier,* the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, India, Burma and some other countries did not sign a peace treaty with Japan at San Francisco. This circumstance was used by the USA to secure the rupture of all contacts between Japan and the Soviet Union. The US-oriented Japanese Government, headed by the leader of the bourgeois Liberal Party Shigeru Yoshida, was ignoring Japanese national interests by its refusal to normalise relations with the USSR and its opposing economic and trade relations with it.

The Soviet Government regarded as abnormal the absence of diplomatic and economic relations with one of the Soviet Union's nearest neighbours in the Far East. Therefore, in view of the changed international situation in the Far East following the termination of the war in Korea and Indochina, it took active steps to establish contacts with Japan.

Foreign Ministers. Document 46. Speech by Harold Macmillan of November 10, 1955, Council of Foreign Ministers, Document 50. Statement by John Foster Dulles of November 11, 1955, Council of Foreign Ministers. Document 51.

* See Chapter Nineteen.

The Government of the People's Republic of China supported the Soviet initiative, and a joint Sino-Soviet Declaration, signed in Peking on October 11, 1954, stated that the two countries were prepared to "take steps to normalise ... relations with Japan".*

In Japan there was a wide response to the Sino-Soviet Declaration. Many quarters in that country, including business circles, began to urge the normalisation of relations with the USSR, the PRC and other socialist countries. But normalisation was hindered by the Yoshida Government's one-sided pro-American orientation.

The Yoshida Government resigned in early December 1954. The new Cabinet was formed on the 10th of the same month by Ichiro Hatoyama, leader of the Democratic Party, which he had constituted in November 1954.** On the next day, December 11, the new Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu declared that Japan was prepared to resume relations with the USSR on mutually acceptable terms. In a number of statements Hatoyama raised the question of Japan pursuing an independent policy.***

The Soviet Government quickly responded to the pronouncements of the Japanese statesmen. On December 16, 1954 the communication was conveyed that the Soviet Union unchangeably desired to establish and promote relations with all countries seeking the same end; this was the Soviet Union's policy toward Japan as well.

The US ruling circles did not want Japan to follow an independent foreign policy. In a message to Prime Minister Hatoyama in May 1955 Dulles wrote that the Japanese Government's line of expanding economic relations with China and the Soviet Union and resuming diplomatic relations with them was giving the American people and US Congress circles the impression that Japan was looking for a detente with communist countries. This, the message said, could become an obstacle to the programme of aid to Japan that was being considered by the US Government.****

* *Izvestia*, October 12, 1954.

** A year later the Liberal and the Democratic parties merged to form the Liberal Democratic Party.

*** L. N. Kutakov, *Istoriya sovetsko-yaponskikh diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii*, Moscow, 1962, pp. 488-89.

**** *Asahi*, May 23, 1955.

Pressure from the USA, whose policies had many adherents in the Japanese ruling circles, affected the course of the Japanese-Soviet talks that were started in London on June 3, 1955. The first months of these talks yielded nothing. Among the prior condition made by the Japanese delegation for the restoration of relations and the conclusion of a peace treaty were the satisfaction of Japan's territorial claims—the transfer of the Kuril Islands and the southern part of Sakhalin Island—and the repatriation of Japanese war criminals sentenced in the Soviet Union.

On June 14, 1955 the Soviet delegation submitted the draft of a peace treaty and stated that the Soviet Union would satisfy some of Japan's wishes: it would waive its reparations claims on Japan, support Japan's application for membership of the UN and enter into negotiations for a trade treaty and a fishing convention. In order to turn the Sea of Japan into a sea of peace the Soviet delegation suggested that the straits linking it with the ocean should be open to navigation by warships belonging only to countries bordering on the Sea of Japan. Japan would undertake to refrain from joining any coalition or military alliance against any power that had fought in the war against her.*

However, the Japanese refused to discuss the question of a treaty as such. They accentuated the question of the repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war despite the fact that all such prisoners had been repatriated by early 1950 and only a small number of Japanese citizens from among former prisoners of war sentenced for war crimes were still in the Soviet Union.

The territorial problem also called forth long and fruitless discussions. The Soviet Union proceeded from existing international agreements that eradicated the injustice inflicted by Japan on Russia and restored the Soviet Union's rights to the Kuril Islands and the southern part of Sakhalin Island. These agreements had been recognised by Japan when she signed the act of surrender in 1945 and the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951.

Sincerely desiring to secure an early normalisation of relations with Japan and taking into account the fact that

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Soviet draft peace treaty with Japan of June 14, 1955.

the islands of Habomai and Shikotan are situated close to the Japanese island of Hokkaido, the Soviet delegation agreed to include an article on the territorial question in the draft peace treaty. The article would state that meeting Japan's wishes and her interests the Soviet Union would turn the Little Kuril Islands (Habomai and Shikotan) over to her.

This generous step opened the way for a quick and successful conclusion of the talks in London. However, the Soviet proposals were not appreciated by the Japanese Government, whose representative insisted on the transfer to Japan not only of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan but also of the islands of Kunashiri and Ituruppu and that the status of the other Kuril Islands and the southern part of Sakhalin Island should be decided by an international conference.

The talks were cut short by the Japanese in March 1956.

During the talks agreement was reached on the wording of an article calling for the signing of a convention regulating and limiting the salmon catch in the Northwestern Pacific in order to conserve and enlarge the fish resources. The suspension of the talks and the indiscriminate fishing by the Japanese compelled the Soviet Government to adopt a decision to conserve the fish resources and regulate the salmon catch in the open sea in regions adjoining Soviet territorial waters in the Far East. Until the conclusion of an appropriate agreement with interested countries, zones in which the salmon catch was regulated were demarcated in the Sea of Okhotsk, the western part of the Bering Sea and in the Pacific adjoining the territorial waters of the USSR.*

Pressured by the big fishing companies, the Japanese Government suggested beginning talks on a fishing agreement. A fishing convention and an agreement on rescue on the high seas were signed on May 14, 1956. At these talks it was agreed that negotiations on normalising Soviet-Japanese relations would be resumed not later than on July 31, 1956.

However, when the negotiations were resumed in Moscow on July 31 the Japanese repeated their demand regarding

* *Pravda*, March 21, 1956.

the islands of Kunashiri and Ituruppu. The Soviet Government could not agree to this demand.

Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, who led the Japanese delegation, informed his Government of the situation and requested a recess on the grounds that he had to attend a conference in London on the Suez issue. However, he recommended that Japan conclude a peace treaty on the terms proposed by the Soviet Union.*

US diplomacy again intervened in the Soviet-Japanese talks. Dulles, who was in London at the conference on the Suez Canal, had three meetings with Shigemitsu during which he brought pressure to bear on the Japanese Foreign Minister. He declared that if in a peace treaty with the USSR Japan recognised Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands as Soviet possessions the USA would perpetuate its occupation of the islands of Okinawa (of the Ryukyu group) and Bonin. At the third meeting he made it plain that the USA did not want Japan to settle the territorial question with the Soviet Union.**

US interference evoked resentment in Japan, where public opinion demanded that the Japanese Government enter into direct negotiations with the USSR and ascertain if it was possible to normalise relations without the conclusion of a peace treaty on condition that the territorial question was discussed at subsequent talks. A Japanese Government delegation led by Hatoyama went to Moscow in October 1956. The frank exchange of views in Moscow predetermined the success of the negotiations. A Soviet-Japanese Declaration was signed on October 19, 1956.

The declaration proclaimed the termination of the state of war and the resumption of diplomatic and consular relations between the two countries. The Soviet Union pledged to support Japan's application for membership of the UN, to release and repatriate all Japanese citizens sentenced in the Soviet Union and renounce its reparations claims. In keeping with the wishes of Japan and taking her interests into account, the Soviet Union agreed to the transfer of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan with the proviso

* *Mainichi*, March 9, 1956.

** *Yaponiya. Uoprosy istorii*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 272-73.

that the actual transfer would be effected after a peace treaty was signed.*

In agreeing to normalise relations with a defeated enemy, the Soviet Union did not demand any privilege or concession and did not try to bind Japan to any commitments as was done, for example, by the USA (in the Security Pact and in the Mutual Security Agreement).

The Japanese-Soviet Declaration laid down the foundation for good-neighbourly relations between the Soviet Union and Japan.

8. Further Strengthening of Fraternal Friendship Between the USSR and the People's Democracies

The CC CPSU and the Soviet Government gave their unflagging attention to promoting friendly relations with the People's Democracies and to developing and improving socialist international relations. They acted on Lenin's well-known precept that it was necessary to give "exclusive attention to the interests of various nations",** respect their national sovereignty and take the specifics of each country into account.

The most important step in that direction was, of course, the conclusion of the Warsaw Treaty.

Another noteworthy event was the improvement of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia. The deterioration of these relations in 1948-1949 was prejudicial to the peoples of both countries and only played into the hands of the imperialists. In 1953 the Soviet Government suggested that the two countries exchange ambassadors. This proposal was readily accepted by the Government of Yugoslavia. In October 1954 the Soviet Government informed the Yugoslav

* *Pravda*, January 20, 1956. In January 1960 Japan signed a new military agreement with the USA—the Treaty on Mutual Co-operation and Security, which was spearheaded at the USSR and the People's Republic of China. The Soviet Union could not allow the transfer of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to enlarge the territory used by US troops. Consequently, the Soviet Government declared that these islands would be transferred to Japan provided all foreign troops were withdrawn from her territory and a peace treaty was signed with the USSR (*Pravda*, January 29, 1960).

** V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 386.

Ambassador that as a step toward improving relations and strengthening friendly ties between the two countries the Soviet press and radio would give full coverage to questions concerning Yugoslavia.* This was followed by an agreement on a visit to Yugoslavia by a Soviet Government delegation. The delegation began its visit at the close of May 1955. These steps resulted in the normalisation of relations between the two countries. The Soviet-Yugoslav Declaration of June 2, 1955 noted the concurrence of views between the two countries on a number of fundamental problems of international development and mapped out a programme for economic, scientific, technical and cultural co-operation.

The further development of relations between the socialist countries witnessed an expansion of economic and political links and joint international actions in defence of peace and security.

This was expressed in the Soviet Union's bilateral talks and agreements with China, the GDR, the Korean People's Democratic Republic and other socialist countries. On October 11, 1954, following the Soviet-Chinese talks on broader and deeper co-operation, a declaration was published which noted the "existence of a complete identity of views on the development of comprehensive co-operation between the two countries and on the international situation".** Further, it was stated that the two governments would consult each other on all problems affecting their common interests in order to co-ordinate their actions in ensuring their own security and maintaining peace in the Far East and the world.

Agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the jointly used naval base at Port Arthur and on the transfer of that base with all its installations to China.*** In 1945 and 1946 the fact that the Port Arthur base was used by the Soviet Union was of immense assistance to the Chinese People's Liberation Army in its struggle against the Chiang Kai-shek regime. The base was now returned to China.

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Record of a conversation on October 21, 1954 between the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister and the Yugoslav Ambassador Vidić.

** *Pravda*, October 12, 1954.

*** *Ibid.*

Considerable attention was given by the Soviet Government to assistance and support for the German Democratic Republic and to the promotion of relations with it. The most important step in that direction, following the Soviet Statement of March 25, 1954 on the granting of full sovereignty to the GDR, was the treaty concluded on September 20, 1955 on relations between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic.* That treaty reaffirmed that the relations between the two countries were founded on complete equality and on respect for each other's sovereignty. Further it provided for mutual consultations on major international issues.

In January 1956 a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, set up in accordance with the Warsaw Treaty, showed that there was complete unanimity among the Treaty members in assessing the international situation and regarding the measures that had to be taken to consolidate peace and security. In the Declaration adopted at that meeting it was noted that a system of collective security had to be formed in Europe and that the Treaty members were prepared to examine jointly with other interested countries any proposal conforming to that objective.**

The Soviet Government energetically continued helping to further the economic development of all the socialist countries, making it possible for them to end the economic backwardness that many of them had inherited from capitalism.*** The Soviet Union rendered substantial assistance to China, which successfully restored her war-ravaged economy and in 1956 embarked on her first five-year plan of economic development. In addition to the first loan, extended in 1950, the Soviet Union granted China another long-term loan of 520 million rubles in 1954. The industrial equipment and raw and other materials supplied by the Soviet Union under a trade and credit agreement played an important role in China's socialist industrialisation.

* See Chapter Twenty-Two.

** *Izvestia*, January 29, 1956.

*** The share of industrial output in the GNP amounted to 10 per cent (1937) in China, 25 per cent (1939) in Bulgaria, only 1.5 per cent (1955) in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, roughly 40 per cent (1937) in Rumania, and so on. This share was further reduced during the Second World War.

In 1953 the USSR agreed to extend economic and technical assistance to China in the building or reconstruction of 141 large industrial enterprises. Agreement on Soviet assistance for the building of another 15 industrial enterprises in China was reached in October 1954. The two countries signed an agreement on scientific and technical co-operation through exchanges of experience in all branches of the national economy.* The value of the Soviet equipment supplied under these agreements totalled nearly 5,600 million rubles. In those days Mao Tse-tung wrote highly of Soviet assistance. In a telegram of September 15, 1953, he wrote: "It is the unanimous opinion of the State Council that thanks to the agreement of the Government of the great Soviet Union to render systematic economic and technical assistance to China in the building or reconstruction of 91 new enterprises and 50 enterprises currently under construction or reconstruction, the Chinese people, who are closely studying the advanced experience and the latest technical achievements of the Soviet Union, can gradually build their own powerful heavy industry. This will be of exceptionally great importance for China's industrialisation, for her gradual transition to socialism and for strengthening the camp of peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union."***

The further development of economic co-operation between the two countries was given expression in the agreements signed on April 7, 1956. These agreements envisaged Soviet assistance in the building of 55 industrial enterprises in addition to the 156 projects that were then under construction in accordance with the Soviet-Chinese agreements of 1953-1954. The value of the equipment deliveries and other technical assistance under the new agreements (1956) amounted to nearly 2,500 million rubles.***

The Soviet Union gave China every possible assistance in her industrial development. This was acknowledged by her leaders. For instance, in a speech at the 8th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in September 1956 Chou En-lai noted that "the great Soviet Union and

* *Izvestia*, October 12, 1954.

** *Pravda*, September 17, 1953.

*** *Izvestia*, April 7, 1956.

the People's Democracies have rendered us immense assistance for our first five-year plan. The Soviet Union has granted us easy-term credits, helped us to design 205 industrial projects and supplied a large portion of the equipment for them, sent us many skilled specialists and gave us considerable technical assistance in other fields. . . . Specialists from the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies working in our country have made an outstanding contribution to our socialist construction. We should like to take this opportunity to express our profound gratitude to the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies for this heartfelt, fraternal assistance".*

Similar agreements on economic assistance were signed by the Soviet Union with other socialist countries. In early 1956 under these agreements the Soviet Union was helping the "People's Democracies build 391 enterprises and over 90 individual workshops and installations". By that year it had granted "the People's Democracies long-term credits totalling 21,000 million rubles on the most favourable conditions".**

Special note must be made of Soviet assistance to the Korean People's Democratic Republic in restoring its economy that had been laid waste during the US intervention. After the armistice had been concluded in 1953 the Soviet Government announced that it was presenting the Korean people a sum of 1,000 million rubles for economic rehabilitation. In September 1953 agreement was reached on the use of this money for the restoration of the large hydropower station on the Yalu River and for the restoration and building of ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgical plants and chemical, cement and other factories. Extensive gratuitous assistance was rendered in restoring the national economy of the Korean People's Democratic Republic by other countries of the socialist community. Economic assistance from the USSR and other socialist countries enabled the Korean people to restore their industry and agriculture within a relatively short span of time and surpass the pre-war level as early as 1955.

* *8th National Congress of the Communist Party of China*. Moscow, 1956, p. 51 (in Russian).

** *The 20th Congress of the CPSU*, Verbatim Report, Moscow, 1956. Vol. I, p. 13 (in Russian).

Substantial assistance was extended by the Soviet Union to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. For instance, in 1955 it gave the DRV a sum of 400 million rubles as a grant-in-aid to help it raise the living standard and rehabilitate the war-torn economy.

Economic co-operation enabled the socialist countries to go over to the specialisation and co-ordination of production, thus giving them the possibility of making the most effective use of their production and raw material resources and combining the interests of each country with those of the socialist community as a whole.

9. Soviet Support for the Struggle of the Peoples to Achieve and Consolidate Independence

By the mid-1950s a large number of Asian and African countries had won liberation from colonial oppression and proclaimed their independence. Following Syria, the Lebanon, India, Burma and Indonesia, which achieved independence during the initial years after World War II, liberation was won by Egypt (1952), the Sudan (January 1, 1956), Morocco (March 2, 1956), Tunisia (March 20, 1956) and a number of other countries. The peoples who had won independence had to defend it not only against the old colonialists (Britain and France) but chiefly against the USA, which after the war became the mainstay of colonialism and neocolonialism and the most deadly enemy of the independence of nations.

In their struggle against the colonialists the peoples of the colonial and liberated countries found, as they continue to do to this day, powerful support from the Soviet Union. The considerable economic assistance rendered them by the Soviet Union helped them to safeguard their economic independence. For instance, in 1955 the USSR and India signed an agreement on assistance for the building of a large iron and steel works at Bhilai (the annual capacity of 1,000,000 tons of steel was to be subsequently increased). In the same period the Soviet Union signed important agreements on trade and economic co-operation with Burma,

Egypt, the Lebanon, Afghanistan, Argentina, Uruguay and other countries. A feature distinguishing Soviet aid from that rendered by the imperialist states is that it is not linked with any political conditions infringing upon the independence of the recipient country.

Soviet assistance to the new national states was not confined to the economic sphere. The Soviet Union welcomed and supported the Bandung Conference (1955) and its decisions, which were permeated with a spirit of struggle against colonialism and called for all-sided economic and cultural co-operation between the countries of Asia and Africa on the basis of the ten principles of peaceful co-existence formulated by the conference. These principles were a further development of the five principles (known as Pancha Shila) that were adopted by the governments of India and China.

Of significance in bringing about closer relations between the USSR and the countries of the East were the visits by Soviet leaders in India, Burma and Afghanistan at the close of 1955. The bilateral declarations signed during these visits reaffirmed the identity of views of the Soviet Union, India, Burma and Afghanistan on many important international problems. The USSR supported the Indian demand for the termination of Portuguese colonial rule in Goa, Diu and Daman and the reincorporation of these territories in India. The Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with Indonesia, Cambodia and Laos, and signed agreements on trade and economic and cultural co-operation with many Asian countries.

The Soviet Government took a series of steps to improve relations with the USSR's southern neighbours—Turkey and Iran. On behalf of the Soviet Government the following statement was made to the Turkish Ambassador on May 30, 1953:

“In order to preserve good-neighbourly relations and strengthen peace and security the governments of Armenia and Georgia have found it possible to renounce their territorial claims on Turkey. As regards the question of the Straits, the Soviet Government has reconsidered its view and feels that the USSR's security can be ensured from the direction of the Straits on terms equally acceptable to the USSR and Turkey. The Soviet Government therefore places

it on record that the Soviet Union has no territorial claims on Turkey.”* This statement helped to clear the way for a gradual improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey.

The Soviet Government also took the initiative to improve relations with Iran. As a result of this initiative the Soviet Union and Iran signed an agreement on December 2, 1954 on financial and border issues, whose settlement benefited the relations between the two countries.

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The efforts made by the CC CPSU and the Soviet Government in the period 1951-1956 to relax international tension yielded substantial results in spite of the opposition of the USA and other Western powers. The war in Korea was threatening to grow into a global conflict, and the Soviet Government played an immense and, in some cases, the decisive role first in limiting the US aggression and then in giving a start to the armistice talks. It helped to bring these talks to a successful conclusion. The Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference, which halted the hostilities in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and consolidated the position of the young Democratic Republic of Vietnam, was convened in 1954 on Soviet initiative. The 1954 Geneva Agreements were a major step toward a relaxation of world tension. The Soviet-Japanese Declaration, restoring diplomatic relations between the two countries, was signed in October 1956 despite the attempts of US diplomacy to prevent Japan from pursuing an independent foreign policy. The declaration laid the basis for good-neighbourly relations and the development of economic and political contacts between the two countries.

Consistently in keeping with its policy of peaceful coexistence the Soviet Government initiated steps to settle the international issues that had remained outstanding in Europe after the Second World War. The leaders of the

* *Pravda*, July 19, 1953. In December 1945 the Soviet press carried letters by two Georgian scientists, who wrote that Turkey should return to Georgia some border regions that she had acquired under the Treaty of 1921. These letters were used by Western propaganda to stir up anti-Soviet feeling in Turkey.

Western powers had to agree to a resumption of talks with the USSR on disputed international problems: Germany, European security, disarmament, East-West contacts and so on. Although these talks (the 1954 Berlin Foreign Ministers Conference; the 1955 Geneva summit, and so on) did not end in agreement, they improved the international situation and eased tension.

A Soviet initiative led to the signing of the State Treaty on the restoration of an independent and democratic Austria. That treaty perpetuated Austria's neutrality, added yet another country to those outside military blocs and reduced the number of outstanding post-war problems.

The international situation was improved also by the Soviet Union's fearless initiative in disarmament. It displayed its peaceableness and desire to strengthen friendly, good-neighbourly relations with steps such as the restoration of the Port Arthur naval base to China and the Porkkala-Udd base to Finland.

The struggle to ease international tension and avert a world war was waged by the USSR in close co-operation with the other socialist countries with whom it steadily strengthened its economic and political ties and improved socialist international relations. The Soviet Government gave its vigorous support for the struggle of the peoples of colonial and liberated countries against the colonialists and their allies.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU, held in February 1956, enlarged on and concretised the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems, stressing that in a world divided into two different social systems this was the only correct and reasonable principle.

In face of the new alignment of forces on the international scene, the Congress drew the conclusion that in the modern international situation it was quite possible to avert a world war.

The resolution adopted by the Congress stated in part: "As long as capitalism remains in the world the reactionary forces representing the interests of the capitalist monopolies . . . may try to start a war. But war is not fatally inevitable. Today there are powerful social and political forces, which have considerable means for preventing the imperialists from

starting a war, and if they try to unleash it to give a crushing rebuff to aggressors and disrupt their adventurist plans.”*

The Congress approved the peaceful foreign policy pursued by the CC CPSU and the Soviet Government, noting that along with other socialist countries the Soviet Union had “opportunistly initiated a series of foreign policy measures aimed at strengthening peace and security”** which had the active support of all the peace forces.

The energetic measures taken by the Soviet Government helped to achieve some improvement of the international atmosphere. But imperialism’s forces of aggression went on with their intrigues. In mid-1956 these intrigues led to a new and drastic deterioration of the international situation and intensified the threat of war.

* *20th Congress of the CPSU*, p. 414.

** *Ibid.*, p. 410.

Chapter Twenty-Four

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE DISARMAMENT PROBLEM AFTER THE INVENTION OF THE THERMONUCLEAR BOMB (1953-1958)

New steps designed to ease international tension were taken by the Soviet Government in 1953-1958 also in the field of disarmament. The disarmament talks had been deadlocked by the Western powers' rejection of the Soviet proposals for the prohibition of atomic weapons and a reduction of conventional armaments.* A new approach had to be adopted to the disarmament issue.

This was somewhat facilitated by the cessation of hostilities in Korea and Vietnam, the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty and other developments that brought a certain relaxation of world tension. Furthermore, in the interests of its peaceful policy in disarmament the Soviet Government could utilise the changes that had taken place during the 1950s in the world balance of power in favour of the socialist community. The Soviet Union's conspicuous achievements in science and technology had moved it into first place in the world in many spheres of civilian and war production, notably in rocketry. These achievements showed the Soviet Union's superiority over the most developed capitalist country, the USA, in a key sphere such as the manufacture of means of delivering nuclear weapons.

In those years the Soviet Union made enormous headway in the uses of nuclear energy. The Soviet Government announcement of August 20, 1953 on the testing of hydro-

* See Chapter Eighteen.

gen bombs in the Soviet Union told the world of extremely important discoveries in the synthesis of the atomic nucleus. In the USA the first hydrogen bombs were tested later. A new stage began in the development of armaments: thermonuclear weapons exceeding the explosive power of thousands of atomic bombs such as were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki appeared in the war arsenals. Whereas the explosive power of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima was equal to 20 kilotons or 20,000 conventional tons of TNT, the explosive power of the hydrogen bomb was equal to tens of megatons, or tens of millions of tons of TNT.

The discoveries in nuclear energy and technology gave a new significance to the problem of disarmament. War with the use of hydrogen bombs would involve the death of many tens and, perhaps, hundreds of millions of people and the destruction of entire countries and nations. This demanded new energetic efforts to achieve an international agreement on disarmament.

The Soviet Union was aware that in view of the invention of thermonuclear weapons the arms race was fraught with terrible consequences and it made every effort to put an end to this dangerous course of events. Following the discovery of means of using thermonuclear energy in war and after a series of important steps had been taken to settle some of the problems causing tension in the world, the Soviet Government renewed its efforts to end the deadlock in the disarmament negotiations.

The US Government made an attempt to divert public attention from measures that could lead to actual disarmament. In a speech at the General Assembly on December 8, 1953, published under the heading "Atoms for Peace", US President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed the creation of an "international" fissionable materials fund under UN aegis and consisting of small contributions from countries producing nuclear materials. The fund, the US President said, would be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, namely, in agriculture, medicine and other peaceful areas. It would thereby signify the beginning of a reduction of the potential destructive force of the world reserves of nuclear energy.*

* *United Nations. Official Reports of the 8th General Assembly*, p. 472 (in Russian).

The USA, which at the time commanded the majority of the votes in the UN, made this proposal in the calculation that the fund would be virtually under its control. This American proposal completely circumvented the question of disarmament and the banning of nuclear weapons. The transfer of small amounts of fissionable materials to an international agency would leave the bulk of these materials for use in the production of nuclear weapons and for the further improvement and stockpiling of nuclear bombs. Eisenhower's "new approach" to the nuclear armaments problem was an attempt to find a way of ascertaining the state of nuclear production in other countries and creating new levers for pressuring these countries by using an American-controlled "international" nuclear materials fund.

The USA's reluctance to reach agreement on disarmament was seen also when the Subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission was set up in 1954. Through the machinations of the US Government the Subcommittee was formed mainly of representatives of NATO countries. In the Subcommittee there were representatives from four Western countries (the USA, Britain, France and Canada) and only one socialist country (the USSR). The Soviet Government proposed the inclusion of representatives from the People's Republic of China, India and Czechoslovakia. This move was blocked by the Western powers, with the end result that the composition of the Subcommittee was unsatisfactory, a fact that adversely affected its work.*

Despite the USA's negative attitude to disarmament, the Soviet Union continued its efforts to resolve that burning problem. It looked for ways of ending the arms race, which was increasingly menacing the very existence of entire nations. Parallel with measures of a general political nature aimed at improving the international situation, the Soviet Government worked out and on May 10, 1955 submitted to the UN Disarmament Commission important proposals for a reduction of armaments, the banning of nuclear weapons and the elimination of the threat of another war. A feature of these proposals was that, first, they linked the disarmament problem with the settlement of other international issues that would ensure an improvement of the world

* *Izvestia*, February 19, 1955.

situation, second, they met the Western powers half-way on many points of the disarmament problem and, third, they envisaged new ways of settling the question of inspection.

For a number of years after the war, namely, from the initiating of the disarmament talks until 1954, the USA and its allies made no proposals on the substance of the disarmament problem. They confined themselves to suggesting measures for inspecting and collecting information on armaments and armed forces. The situation underwent a certain change when the USA lost its nuclear monopoly. The USA, Britain and France made some proposals, which were expressed in the Anglo-French Memorandum of July 11, 1954. Most of this document and some other wishes of the Western powers were taken into consideration by the Soviet Government in its new proposals.

For example, as a condition for disarmament the Western powers demanded the creation of an "atmosphere of trust" and linked the implementation of disarmament measures with the settlement of other international problems. This was taken into account in the new Soviet proposals, which envisaged the settlement of many political problems: the cessation of war propaganda and of the fanning of hostility between peoples; the withdrawal of occupation troops from Germany; the dismantling of military bases on foreign territory; the wide dissemination of scientific and technical know-how in the production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes; the settlement of outstanding issues in the Far East; the abolition of discrimination in economic relations between countries; the promotion of international contacts and links in various spheres, and so forth. The object of these measures was to establish international trust and thereby facilitate disarmament.

In proposing its disarmament programme the Soviet Union sought to create an international atmosphere that would help to achieve an agreement on that important problem. In view of the fact that the Indochina and Austrian problems had been settled shortly before the Soviet Union made its proposals on disarmament, it seemed that the prospects for disarmament talks were more favourable than in the preceding years.

On the substance of the disarmament problem the Western powers objected to the Soviet proposal for a 33 per cent

cut-back of the armaments and armed forces of the Five Powers on the allegation that this reduction did not guarantee Western security. They demanded not a percentage reduction but a cut-back to a definite numerical level, declaring that the Soviet Union's acceptance of the "level" principle would help to achieve agreement in other areas of disarmament. "All armaments programmes," stated the proposals made by the Three Western Powers on May 28, 1952, "depend upon manpower and therefore must to a greater or less degree be affected by limitations on permitted armed forces."*

In its proposals of May 10, 1955 the Soviet Union acceded to the Western stand on this question as well. It suggested that in the course of two years the numerical strength of the armed forces of the USA, the USSR and China should be reduced to 1,000,000-1,500,000 men for each country, and of Britain and France to 650,000 men each. These were the levels proposed by the Western powers themselves.

The inclusion in the Soviet disarmament programme of the Western proposals for ceilings for the armed forces of the Five Powers and the adoption of equal ceilings for the USSR and the USA cut the ground from under the assertions of Western propaganda that the USSR was ignoring the problem of an armed forces equilibrium. This killed another favourite argument of the Western powers against the banning of nuclear weapons, namely, that these weapons compensated for their deficiency in conventional armaments and that they were a means of maintaining an armaments equilibrium on a global scale.

The Soviet Union acceded to the Western desires in other areas of disarmament. For instance, in their proposals of May 28, 1952 the Western powers had made the fulfilment of the programme for a cut-back of conventional armaments directly dependent on the banning of nuclear weapons. They called for a phased ban on these weapons, with each phase directly linked with the fulfilment of the programme of the reduction of conventional armaments. In order to clear the way for successful disarmament talks this procedure for banning nuclear weapons was envisaged in the Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955.

* *Documents of Disarmament, 1945-1959*, Vol. I, Washington, 1960. p. 369.

Further, in the question of control over disarmament the Western attitude was taken into account by the Soviet Union. For example, the Western powers had insisted on permanent inspection and that international inspectors should have unlimited access to all installations and means for the effective fulfilment of their duties and functions. The Soviet proposals of May 10 provided that inspection would be permanent in the volume required to ensure the fulfilment of disarmament agreements and that the inspectors would at all times have unobstructed access to all installations subject to inspection. Provision was made for a gradual extension of the rights and functions of inspection in proportion to the fulfilment of the disarmament programme. As a new form of control designed to avert surprise attack, the Soviet proposals envisaged a warning system by means of control posts at large ports, railway stations, main highways and aerodromes. The system of control suggested by the Soviet Union provided all countries with a guarantee of their security in the event the disarmament agreements were not fulfilled and, at the same time, prevented the control mechanism from being used for espionage and for interference in the internal affairs of countries.

The Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955 were a forceful and realistic approach to the disarmament problem and differed considerably from all earlier proposals on disarmament. Together with its new proposals for inspection the Soviet Union's acceptance of the Western proposals for a ceiling on armed forces and conventional armaments and for the procedure of banning nuclear weapons brought the positions of the sides together in the most vital areas of disarmament.

The Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955 made a deep impression and created a favourable atmosphere for talks on disarmament. They were hailed by prominent statesmen of many countries. For instance, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru said: "I believe that the latest Soviet proposals for disarmament will lead to progress in the settlement of that vital problem."* The significance of the Soviet proposals was acknowledged even in the Western countries. Philip Noel-Baker, a leading British disarmament

* *Izvestia*, June 22, 1955.

expert and politician, pointed out that these proposals marked a turning point in the history of the post-war talks on disarmament.* In the Subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission British Minister of State Anthony Nutting declared that the Soviet proposals of May 10 were a step forward toward agreement on the most important points of a disarmament programme.** Jules Moch, the French representative on the Subcommittee, spoke highly of these proposals. After consulting his Government, the US representative James Wadsworth likewise expressed satisfaction with the new Soviet proposals.

The high evaluation of the Soviet disarmament proposals by the representatives of the Western powers reaffirmed that there was the possibility of achieving rapid progress in the talks that were being conducted on this question in the UN Subcommittee in London. However, this possibility was not utilised. The Western powers broke off the talks. When they were resumed after an unjustifiably long interval the USA and the other Western powers retracted their earlier proposals on disarmament, namely, on the ceiling for armed forces and on the procedure and conditions for banning nuclear weapons. This action strikingly showed that their proposals for disarmament had been designed solely for propaganda purposes, that they were far removed from any intention of looking for agreement on these issues. It was incontrovertible evidence that the USA and its allies were out to wreck the disarmament talks.

At the Four-Power summit in Geneva the Western representatives had passed over in complete silence the extremely important Soviet proposals on disarmament despite the fact that the basic points of these proposals had been submitted specially for their consideration. More, their own proposals did not even mention the need to reduce armaments and armed forces and ban nuclear weapons. On these questions their proposals were confined to control and inspection of existing armaments and armed forces. As we have already

* Philip Noel-Baker, *The Arms Race. A Programme for World Disarmament*, London, 1958, pp. 20-21.

** *UN Disarmament Commission. Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission*, Verbatim Record of the forty-eighth meeting DC/SC. I/PV. 48, May 12, 1955, p. 15.

mentioned, Eisenhower suggested an exchange of information between the USSR and the USA on their armaments and armed forces and the unhindered aerial photography of the territories of both countries. He proposed measures by which the two countries would give each other an overall picture of all their military installations throughout their territory, a list and the plan of these installations and the possibility of taking photographs from the air. Not only did this US proposal not resolve but it did not even touch upon the problem of disarmament. All it envisaged was espionage, the collection of information concerning the systems of defence, and in this respect it was of immense value to those who were contemplating war and working on plans for war. Under these conditions flights over the territories of other countries and aerial photography were purely instruments of military espionage directed toward laying bare the Soviet Union's defences, and could only intensify international tension.

At Geneva British Prime Minister Anthony Eden suggested considering a system of joint inspection of the armed forces confronting each other in Europe as a means fostering trust. This plan, the Eden memorandum stated, would make it possible to test international inspection of existing armed forces on a limited scale.

The US and British proposals did not go beyond control of existing armaments and made no provision for disarmament. The French proposal only touched on a reduction of military expenditures with the reduction level to be decided by the countries bearing these expenditures. All the three Western participants in the summit thus declined to consider the problem of disarmament.

When the talks were resumed in the Subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission in August 1955 the Western powers did not make any concrete suggestion for a reduction of armaments. As before, their proposals touched only on control of existing armaments and on obtaining intelligence on systems of defence. The US representatives advanced a detailed plan for implementing the Eisenhower proposals on an exchange of military information and on aerial photography. The British submitted a memorandum on the methods, objectives and rights of inspection and control. The French submitted a draft agreement on expen-

diture control and a proposal regarding the functions and powers of control and the structure of an international disarmament organisation. None of the Western powers moved proposals envisaging disarmament as such, and they formally renounced their own earlier proposals for armed forces ceilings. On September 6 the US representative in the Subcommittee declared that the United States now placed a reservation upon all its pre-Geneva proposals relating to armament levels in the Subcommittee, the Disarmament Commission or the United Nations.

The obstructionist tactics of the USA and its allies, who backed out of their own proposals on whose acceptance they had hotly insisted, evoked the indignation of world democratic opinion, including opinion in the capitalist countries. This compelled the governments of the Western powers to "explain" their clearly untenable attitude. The "explanation" was given by Harold Stassen, the US representative in the Subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission. "It is our view," he declared, "that if an effort is made to reduce armaments, armed forces and military expenditures to a level that is too low, to a level that reflects weakness, it would not be conducive to stability in the world, and to the best interests of peace. . . . It is our view that if armaments, armed forces and military expenditures are brought down to too low a level, then . . . instead of the prospects of peace being improved, the danger of war is increased."*

In "explaining" the US position Stassen was joined by US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who said: "Past efforts have usually proceeded from the assumption that it is possible to establish and maintain certain defined levels of military strength and to equate them dependably between the nations. Actually, military potentials are so imponderable that this always has been and always will be a futile pursuit."**

Statements of this kind by top-level official representatives of the USA, expressing their negative stand on disarmament, reaffirmed their refusal to look for a solution of this problem, reduce armaments and armed forces. This

* Philip Noel-Baker, *The Arms Race*, p. 29.

** *Foreign Affairs*, October 1957, p. 34.

was their uncompromising answer to any proposal for disarmament. The statements of the Western powers brought to light the fact that all their previous pronouncements on this issue had only been a propaganda cover for their unwillingness to settle the problem of disarmament.

This attitude deadlocked the disarmament talks and for some time destroyed the chances for a settlement of the problem. The policy pursued by the USA and supported by its Western partners doomed the efforts of the Soviet Union to reach agreement on disarmament. The drawn-out negotiations that were conducted on this problem throughout the post-war period showed that every approach of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to disarmament was dismissed by the Western powers on one pretext or another.

Despite Western opposition to an agreement on disarmament, the USSR and other socialist countries continued their efforts to secure a settlement of that problem and ease international tension. The contingent of Soviet troops that had been withdrawn from Austria was demobilised. That same year, 1955, the USSR unilaterally reduced its Armed Forces by 640,000 men. This example was followed by Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania, which likewise cut back their armed forces on the recommendation of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries thereby demonstrated their readiness to help stop the arms race and improve the international situation. At a conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy, held in Geneva in the autumn of 1955, Soviet scientists read a number of important papers on Soviet scientific and technical achievements in that field.

Unlike the Soviet Union, the Western powers argued that nuclear weapons maintained an equilibrium in armaments and were a means of safeguarding peace. On this pretext they stubbornly opposed the banning of these weapons. They laid stress on a reduction of conventional armaments on the grounds that it was technically difficult to control the stockpiles of nuclear materials. "It is not practicable," Dulles asserted, "to assure the abolition of nuclear weapons. . . . Therefore we must make our plans on the assumption that the nations which now have nuclear weapons

would use them in war.”* Echoing Dulles, the US representative in the UN Henry Cabot Lodge said that the USA would make no commitment that would prevent it from using nuclear weapons. At the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva in the autumn of 1955 the British representative suggested beginning the settlement of the disarmament problem with a reduction of conventional armaments without touching nuclear weapons.

In March 1956, taking this Western attitude into account and desiring to secure some tangible results and break the deadlock on the disarmament problem, the Soviet Union proposed a programme of initial steps envisaging a reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces to the level that had been earlier suggested by the Western powers.** Further, the Soviet Union suggested the appropriate measures of control guaranteeing the fulfilment of commitments under the corresponding agreement. These measures envisaged, among other things, that at a definite stage of disarmament aerial photography, on which the USA and its Western partners had insisted, would be permitted. The Soviet Union suggested the demarcation of an armaments limitation and inspection zone in Europe, including the two German states and neighbouring countries, and the implementation of partial measures such as stopping nuclear tests, prohibiting the siting of nuclear weapons in Germany and cutting military budgets by 15 per cent.

Although these Soviet proposals were a further step toward meeting the Western stand, the Western powers used every possible pretext to turn them down even as a basis for negotiations. They offered a programme in which the accent was not on disarmament but on “regulating” armaments. This programme envisaged a high manpower level for armed forces: 2,500,000 each for the USSR and the USA (instead of the 1,000,000-1,500,000 proposed by the Soviet Union) and 750,000 each for Britain and France. No provision was made for disarmament. Instead it outlined extensive measures for control, which amounted to military intelligence, including a commitment to turn over to the

* Philip Noel-Baker, *The Arms Race*, p. 9.

** *UN Disarmament Commission. Official Records*, Supplement for January to December 1956, New York.

control agency a "blueprint" of "military establishments consisting of the identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of personnel units and equipment of all major land, sea, and air forces, including organised reserves and para-military; and a complete list of conventional military plant facilities and installations with their locations; and the relevant budgetary and appropriation documents".* As regards nuclear weapons, the programme provided only for the transfer of a certain quantity of fissionable materials for peaceful uses and a limit to nuclear tests.

This programme envisaged practically no disarmament measures. It was nothing more than a plan for organising control of existing armaments that would expose a country's system of defences. In fact it was a measure designed to facilitate espionage. The proposal for fixing the manpower level of the US Armed Forces at 2,500,000 did not mean their numerical reduction, for at the time their strength did not exceed that figure. The proposal for transferring some fissionable materials to "international" control likewise lacked any significance as a means of reducing the threat of a nuclear war. Very large stockpiles of nuclear materials and weapons had already been accumulated at the time. The proposal for instituting control of some fissionable materials thus pursued the aim of obtaining information on the qualitative content of the fissionable materials at the disposal of the Soviet Union and using the materials transferred to the "international" agency for political purposes. The suggestion that nuclear tests should be limited likewise did not resolve the problem of banning nuclear weapons and preventing the atmosphere from being contaminated with radioactive fall-out. The purpose of this suggestion was to obtain information on the nuclear devices in the possession of other countries.

By not suggesting a programme that could serve as the basis for talks and by refusing to consider the Soviet proposals, the Western powers again doomed the disarmament negotiations to failure. The negotiations continued to remain

UN Disarmament Commission, Official Records, Supplement for January to December 1956, New York, pp. 13-14.

in a vicious circle. As soon as the Soviet Union accepted any concrete Western proposal or agreed with the Western approach to the disarmament problem, the Western powers backed out of the proposals on whose acceptance they had insisted.

Nevertheless, at the talks in the Subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission held in London in the spring and summer of 1957 the Soviet Union presented a new disarmament programme that took the considerations, stand and proposals of the Western powers into account. It included the Western proposal for a reduction of the armed forces level at the first phase to 2,500,000 men each for the USSR, the USA and China and to 750,000 men each for Britain and France, with the addition that at the second phase this level, as had been suggested earlier by the Western powers themselves, would be lowered to 1,000,000-1,500,000 men each for the USSR, the USA and China and to 650,000 men each for Britain and France.

In nuclear armaments it was proposed that at the first phase the powers concerned would renounce the use of these weapons and refrain from siting them outside their own frontiers, and that at the second phase the production of these weapons would be stopped and they would be removed from the national arsenals.

In armaments control it was proposed that alongside permanent inspection and control posts to warn against surprise attack there should be "aerial photography in areas in Europe where the main armed forces of the North Atlantic bloc and the Warsaw Treaty are located up to a depth of 800 kilometres" from the frontiers between the countries belonging to the North Atlantic bloc and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.* While agreeing to aerial photography as a form of control, the Soviet Government stressed that although it did not resolve the disarmament problem or the problem of controlling the fulfilment of an agreement on an armaments cut-back and was of significance only to military intelligence the Soviet Union had included it in its disarmament programme because the Western powers had made aerial photography a condition for an agreement on disarmament.

* *Izvestia*, March 20, 1957.

Moreover, the Soviet disarmament programme provided for control of guided missile strength, the dismantling of military bases on foreign territory and the creation of an armaments limitation and inspection zone in Europe.

This programme, too, was not accepted by the Western powers. Their representatives now categorically refused to accept for any phase the armed forces levels that they had themselves earlier proposed for the USA, the USSR, Britain and France. They declared that talks on an armed forces reduction below the level of 2,500,000 men for the USA and 750,000 men for Britain and France could be held only after the armaments and armed forces of all the countries concerned had been inspected.

The US memorandum on a partial agreement submitted in the Subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission and insisting on reducing the strength of the Soviet and US armed forces to the level of 1,900,000 men was declared null and void as soon as it was ascertained that some of the provisions of the memorandum were acceptable to the Soviet Union and could serve as the basis for agreement on partial disarmament.

The subsequent talks held in 1957 and 1958 in the Subcommittee and other UN agencies did not lead to any progress in the disarmament problem. At these talks the Western powers continued to pursue solely intelligence aims, demanding control and inspection of existing armaments and defence systems. They rejected all the proposals for a reduction of armaments and armed forces and for the banning of nuclear weapons.

Due to Western opposition the efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the period 1953-1958 to secure a settlement of the vital disarmament problem did not yield any practical results. Nevertheless these efforts played a significant role in international developments in that they helped to ease international tension and mobilise public opinion against the arms race, in favour of disarmament. The Soviet disarmament programmes, including Western proposals, and the statements explaining the attitude of the

socialist countries to disarmament made it difficult for the imperialist powers to pursue a militarist, aggressive policy.

The disarmament talks brought it home to people throughout the world that the imperialist powers did not want disarmament. Underlying their negative stand in this issue was the apprehension that agreement on disarmament would weaken their international standing founded on their "positions of strength" policy and shatter their military blocs. Another reason for this attitude was that they based all their political calculations and military plans on the USA's imagined superiority over the USSR in nuclear weapons and in the means of delivering these weapons. It was believed that by using its stockpiles of nuclear weapons and its huge long-range bomber force with its many bases on foreign territory as an instrument of pressure the USA, with the support of its allies in military blocs, would be able to dictate its will to the Soviet Union and the whole socialist community. This was the foundation of US imperialism's "positions of strength policy", "brinkmanship" and "nuclear diplomacy".

These calculations were upset by the Soviet Union's monumental scientific and technical achievements. In the summer of 1957 the USSR successfully tested intercontinental ballistic missiles. These tests showed that the Soviet Union could launch a missile to any part of the world with unerring accuracy. At the same time, new improved types of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons were tested in the USSR. In October 1957 the Soviet Union was the first country to launch a rocket into outer space and place the first man-made satellite in orbit round the Earth. This started a new chapter in the life of mankind—the era of space exploration. The launching of the first artificial Earth satellite demonstrated the Soviet Union's momentous achievements in science and technology, particularly in rocketry. Prior to this event, the USA, with its bases in Europe and Asia and with its possibility of striking at the territory of the USSR, was, because of distance, practically out of reach of the Soviet Air Force, which had no bases on foreign territory. With the appearance of intercontinental ballistic missiles the USA's military invulnerability was broken and its bases on foreign territory became vulnerable targets for Soviet missiles that could strike at any objective with a high degree of accuracy.

Although the technical discoveries had changed the strategic situation in favour of the USSR, the Soviet Government continued its efforts to achieve disarmament. Its contention was that the discoveries in the manufacture of weapons of mass annihilation and in rocketry had made war more destructive, with the result that the settlement of the disarmament problem had become more vital than ever before to the whole of mankind.

Chapter Twenty-Five

AGGRESSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IMPERIALIST INTRIGUES IN HUNGARY (1956-1957)

The real prospect for achieving a further consolidation of peace that opened in the mid-1950s clashed with the interests of the ruling circles of the imperialist powers. In an attempt to safeguard their imperialist interests, chiefly the interests of the oil monopolies in the Middle East, Britain, France and Israel started an armed aggression against Egypt. At the same time, international reaction headed by the imperialist circles in the USA provoked a counter-revolution rising in Hungary.

These acts of aggression were links of the Western imperialist policy of perpetuating colonialism, strangling the freedom and independence of nations, undermining the unity of the socialist community and weakening the world socialist system.

1. The USSR Supports the Arab Peoples and Curbs the Anglo-French-Israeli Aggression Against Egypt

After the Second World War the Arab peoples showed their determination to uphold their national independence and sovereignty and their legitimate right to dispose of their natural wealth as they saw fit.

In 1952 patriotic officers of the Egyptian Army deposed the corrupt regime of King Farouk and his pro-British

clique, seized power and proclaimed a republic. An anti-imperialist orientation was adopted by the new Government, which was soon headed by the outstanding leader of the Egyptian revolution Gamal Abdel Nasser. It declared it would pursue a policy of neutrality and non-alignment and demanded the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal zone. In face of the new balance of strength in the world and influenced by the further strengthening of the world socialist system, which had become a mainstay of the independence of the peoples of Asia and Africa, the British imperialists found they had to satisfy Egypt's just demands. An Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the evacuation of British forces and the dismantling of the British military base on Egyptian territory was signed in 1954. The last British soldier was shipped out of Egypt on June 18, 1956, thus bringing to an end the 74-year occupation of Egypt by British troops. But Britain still had huge economic and strategic interests in the Middle East. The liberation struggle of the Arab peoples was only just beginning. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries went to the assistance of these peoples when it became evident that there was mounting hostility toward them from the imperialist world. In September 1955 agreements were signed on supplies of armaments to Egypt from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland. These agreements were an important factor strengthening Egypt's international position and her ability to offer resistance to the imperialists.

This breaking of the imperialist monopoly over the supply of armaments to the Middle East threw international reaction into confusion and evoked its resentment. The imperialists made an attempt to obstruct Egypt's deliverance from that monopoly, which had been preventing her from pursuing an independent policy. US Assistant Secretary of State George V. Allen was sent posthaste to Cairo with extraordinary powers up to presenting Egypt with an ultimatum demanding that she stop receiving arms from socialist countries. The incompetence of this demand was made all the more obvious by the fact that the USA was itself supplying huge quantities of arms to all, including the Middle Eastern states, which it felt was useful to arm. This concerned chiefly Israel. The Soviet Government gave Egypt the necessary support, publishing a Statement stress-

ing that its "stand is that every country has the legal right to look to its defences and buy armaments for its defensive requirements from other countries on the usual commercial terms and that no country has the right to interfere and make any unilateral claims in violation of the rights and interests of other countries".*

The USA was made to back down by the firm policy adopted by Egypt, which relied on Soviet support. Britain, too, became more circumspect, relinquishing her intention of presenting an ultimatum. In a number of pronouncements President Nasser spoke highly of Soviet assistance and said that Egypt had to be freed from having forcibly to buy obsolete armaments, which the Western powers were selling to their former colonies in a futile attempt to retain them in their grip.

The Egyptian Government launched measures to eradicate the appalling consequences of long British colonial rule, develop the national economy and raise the people's standard of living. It planned to build the Aswan High Dam that was to increase the irrigated crop area by one-third and provide the electric power for industrial development. In February 1956 the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development agreed to grant Egypt a loan of US \$ 200 million provided US \$ 70 million were extended to her in the form of "aid" by the USA and Britain. This decision by the Western powers was a bid to use aid as a means of political pressure in order to return Egypt to the fold of dependence on US and British imperialism.

The Egyptian Government rejected the humiliating political terms offered by the Western powers. In an arrogantly worded reply (July 17, 1956) the imperialists withdrew their promise to give Egypt a loan for the building of the Aswan Dam.

This jeopardised the plan of building a vital project. Nonetheless the Egyptian Government did not yield to the pressure of the imperialists. It turned to a source of large convertible currency revenues, the Suez Canal Company, which had been lining the pockets of its shareholders, chiefly British and French capitalists. The nationalisation of that company was announced in Cairo on July 26, 1956. This

* *Pravda*, October 2, 1955.

act was dictated by the interests of the Egyptian and all the other Arab peoples.

The Western powers declared that the canal had been seized. Questioning the Egyptian Government's right to nationalise the Suez Canal Company, the imperialist circles of Britain, France and the USA deliberately confused the company's nationalisation with the question of free navigation in the canal.

From the very beginning there were two fundamentally different attitudes to the Suez issue. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, most of the Afro-Asian countries and all other peace-loving, progressive forces unequivocally sided with Egypt, approving her lawful actions. The Soviet Government published a Statement declaring that it regarded "the Egyptian Government's decision to nationalise the Suez Canal as a fully legitimate action arising from Egypt's sovereign rights".*

In the Suez question the imperialist powers—Britain, France and the USA—sought to curtail the national sovereignty of the Egyptian Republic and the interests of the Egyptian people. They brought economic pressure to bear on Egypt. The governments of Britain and France froze Egypt's sterling account and sequestrated the Suez Canal Company's assets. Similar steps were taken by the US Government. At the same time Britain and France began war preparations in order to intimidate Egypt.

In its Statement of August 9, 1956 the Soviet Government in no uncertain terms censured the Western powers' hostile actions against Egypt, qualifying them as a threat to peace and security.**

Nevertheless, Britain and France kept up their pressure on Egypt, further intensifying tension in the Middle East. In this connection the Soviet Government published another Statement on September 15, 1956, pointing out that the Suez issue had to be settled peaceably and stressing that the preparations Britain and France were making for war showed their intention to seize the Suez Canal by force and were a threat of aggression against Egypt. The Statement declared that the USSR "cannot hold aloof from the Suez

* *Pravda*, August 10, 1956.

** Ibid.

issue and display no anxiety over the situation that has now arisen as a result of the actions of the Western powers. This is understandable because any violation of peace in the Middle East cannot fail to affect the security of the Soviet Union”.*

However, a peaceful settlement of the Suez conflict did not suit the Western powers. For British and French capital the nationalisation of the Suez Canal was a heavy blow that had shaken the positions of imperialism in an economically vital region—the Middle East. Middle Eastern oil was covering the bulk of the oil requirements of the West European countries. In 1956 Britain received 80 per cent and France and Italy 90 per cent of their oil from that area. Sixty per cent of this oil was transported via the Suez Canal and 15 per cent by pipeline running from Iraq and Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean coast. The annual profits which the British and US oil companies derived by pilaging the natural wealth and exploiting the people of the Middle East came to the huge total of over US \$ 3,000 million. The Rothschilds and other leading members of the financial oligarchy in Paris and London were linked with the Suez Canal Company. Being situated on the routes from Europe to Asia and the Far East, the Middle East played an important role in the strategic plans of the Western powers.

The Suez crisis acquired international significance, becoming one of the decisive engagements in the great battle of the freedom-loving peoples against imperialism that was making every effort to keep the Middle East in colonial bondage.

In starting the Suez adventure the governments of Britain and France planned to bring down Egypt's national Government and tighten their grip on all the other Arab countries. Before the armed intervention against Egypt was started, British Prime Minister Eden told the House of Commons that the Suez crisis had to be used to overthrow President Nasser.

In the USA the reaction to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company was as turbulent as in Britain and France.

* *SSSR i arabskiye strany. 1917-1960. Dokumenty i materialy.* Moscow, 1961, p. 207.

The monopoly circles in that country expressed the fear that the canal's nationalisation would jeopardise the interests of the American oil companies in the Middle East, where they controlled 60 per cent of the oil output.

When the Suez crisis broke out the USA sided with Britain and France in order to force an onerous decision of the Suez issue on Egypt. The differences between the ruling circles of the USA, on the one hand, and of Britain and France, on the other, were by no means over the question of taking the canal out of the hands of the people and Government of Egypt. On this point there was complete agreement between them. The differences were over which of the imperialist powers would play the leading role in the administration of the canal if and when it was wrested away from the Arabs. US diplomacy suggested plans aimed at taking the Suez Canal away from its legal owner, Egypt, and turning the administration of that vital sea route over to the American monopolies.

The USA produced a project for settling the Suez issue, known as the Dulles plan, which envisaged setting up an international agency to administer the canal.

This plan was discussed at an international conference in London on August 16-23, 1956. The Soviet delegation urged a peaceful settlement of the problem by justly combining the interests of Egypt and the interests of the countries using the Suez Canal. It exposed and denounced the colonialist slant of the Dulles plan, which, in addition to denying Egypt equality in negotiations, was a veiled attempt to force Egypt to accept terms that were incompatible with her sovereignty. On August 23, 1956 the Soviet delegation declared that recognition of Egypt's sovereignty and equality and of her full ownership of the Suez Canal was the only way the Suez issue could be resolved in the spirit of the times. A settlement had to take the economic and political interests of the Egyptian people into account and it had to ensure free navigation for all the countries using the canal.*

When the Egyptian Government categorically rejected the Dulles plan the USA suggested setting up an association of users of the Suez Canal, which would include the USA,

* *Izvestia*, August 24, 1956.

Britain and France and undertake the co-ordination of shipping in the canal and the collection of transit dues. The idea of setting up this association was clearly directed toward giving the imperialists control of the Suez Canal.

In the Soviet Government Statement of September 15, 1956 it was noted that this plan of the three Western powers could only be assessed as a dangerous provocation designed "to aggravate the situation over the Suez Canal still further and artificially provoke incidents that could be used as the excuse for employing force against Egypt".*

This assessment was borne out by the statements made at this time by representatives of the governments of the USA, Britain and France on the Suez issue. On September 13, 1956 US Secretary of State Dulles told a press conference that if the Egyptian Government obstructed the free movement of the ships of the association of users in the canal the countries using the Suez Canal would feel they had the right to turn the Suez problem over to the United Nations or take other steps in accordance with the situation.** British Prime Minister Eden made a statement to the effect that if the efforts of Britain and her allies to settle the Suez crisis failed the British Government would regard itself free to take whatever action it considered necessary. A statement by French Prime Minister Guy Mollet on September 13 was worded in the same key.

The Egyptian Government did not mince its words in denouncing the efforts of the imperialist powers to resort to pressure. On September 15 President Nasser declared that if any ship entered the Suez Canal without the permission of the Egyptian authorities it would be regarded as an act violating Egypt's sovereignty. "Egypt will defend the canal," Nasser said. "We are prepared to fight for it."

The official statements of the Western powers made it clear that from the very outbreak of the Suez crisis Britain and France had planned to use armed force against Egypt. This was subsequently confirmed by Eden, who wrote in his memoirs: "The Government determined that our essential interests in this area must be safeguarded, if necessary by military action.... But economic and political pressures

* *SSSR i arabskiye strany, 1917-1960. Dokumenty i materialy*, p. 203.

** *The Department of State Bulletin*, October 8, 1956, p. 546.

alone might not succeed in checking Nasser and re-establishing international control over the canal. From the start we had to prepare to back our remonstrances with military action.”*

The US Government was kept posted on the British and French war preparations against Egypt. At a conference of the British, French and US Foreign Ministers in London on July 29-August 2, 1956, Dulles briefed his colleagues on the attitude of the USA. “The President,” Eden wrote, “did not rule out the use of force. He recognised the transcendent worth of the canal to the free world and the possibility that the eventual use of force might become necessary in order to protect international rights.”** At the conference Dulles declared: “A way had to be found to make Nasser disgorge what he was attempting to swallow. . . . We must make a genuine effort to bring world opinion to favour the international operation of the canal. . . . Then if a military operation had to be undertaken it would be more apt to succeed and have less grave repercussions. . . .”***

The USA was thus encouraging aggression. But wishing to avoid aggravating its relations with the Arab countries it declared on September 13 that it had no intention of making a road for itself through the canal by force. But Eden was told something quite different. On October 1 Dulles told him that he did not rule out force “as an ultimate resort”.**** After assuring themselves of US support the governments of France and Britain started secret talks with the Israeli Government in order to work out a joint plan of armed aggression against Egypt. Israel was given the role of instigator, and the Israeli Government willingly accepted that role. While acting as a weapon of the imperialist powers against the Arab national liberation movement, the Israeli ruling clique had its own plans of aggrandisement.

Israel became an independent country in 1947 by decision of the United Nations, and soon afterwards its ruling élite embarked on a policy of wresting territory from neighbour-

* *The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden*, pp. 426-27.

** *Ibid.*, pp. 436-37.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 437.

**** *Ibid.*, p. 503.

ing Arab states. In 1948-1949 Israel seized most of the territory of the Arab state whose formation had been envisaged in Palestine by the same United Nations decision that set up an independent Israel in the former British mandated territory of Palestine. Nearly a million Arabs were driven from their homes by the Israeli Government. The Arab refugees found themselves without country and without the means of subsistence. But their fate did not worry the Israeli rulers, who now hoped that aggression against Egypt would bring them new territories. Some avowed extremists, who had the ear of Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and War Minister Moshe Dayan, dreamed of creating an Israeli empire embracing a territory stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates. With support from Zionist organisations there was a massive flow of arms to Israel from the USA, Canada, Britain and France.

The aggressors' bloc was finalised in the latter half of October 1956 as a result of official negotiations between France, Britain and Israel. In the night of October 29-30 Israeli troops launched a surprise attack and crossed the frontier into Egypt.

On October 30, 24 hours after Israel began operations against Egypt, the British and French governments sent an ultimatum* giving Egypt 12 hours in which to:

- a) stop all warlike action by land, sea and air;
- b) withdraw all Egyptian military forces ten miles from the Suez Canal;
- c) accept occupation by British and French forces of key positions at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez.

The ultimatum threatened that if these terms were not accepted Britain and France would take military action.**

This insolent ultimatum was categorically rejected by the Egyptian Government.

Britain and France started hostilities against Egypt on

* The Anglo-French ultimatum was formally addressed also to Israel, but this hypocritical step, designed to depict Britain and France in the role of arbiters, in fact served only their own interests and legalised the seizures made by Israel whose troops had advanced into Egyptian territory to a depth of 160 miles.

** *United Nations. Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly Covering the Period from 16 July, 1956 to 15 July, 1957, New York, 1957, p. 35.*

October 31. British and French aircraft made massive raids on Egyptian territory. In an Arab language broadcast on November 2, 1956 the British Broadcasting Corporation warned Egyptians to keep away from railway bridges and railway stations as these would be bombed by British aircraft. This supercilious statement was made because the air forces of the aggressors could bomb any objective they chose following the heavy losses suffered by Egypt's Air Force as a result of the surprise attack. On November 5 Britain and France began the occupation of the Suez Canal zone, landing a joint force near Port Said. The Egyptian people rose to fight the aggressors.

This was a brutal colonial war. Many Egyptian towns and villages were bombed and there were civilian casualties. The invasion evoked the anger and indignation of the democratic forces in all parts of the world. Statements condemning the triple aggression and demanding the withdrawal of the invaders from Egyptian soil were made by the governments of the USSR and other socialist countries of the Arab and many Asian and African countries.

On October 31, 1956 the Soviet Government denounced the triple aggression and requested the Security Council to restore peace and tranquillity in the Middle East by taking immediate steps to end the aggression against Egypt and secure the withdrawal of the British, French and Israeli troops from Egyptian territory.*

Not wishing to associate itself with the extremely unpopular and, as was quickly seen, abortive aggression against Egypt, the US Government pursued a singularly perfidious policy. In words it dissociated itself from its NATO allies—Britain and France.** But in fact it continued supplying them with oil and gave Britain a loan of US \$ 500 million.

After Israel had attacked Egypt and before Britain and France started their armed intervention the Soviet Government moved a draft resolution on the Israeli aggression in the Security Council. The draft demanded the termination

* *Izvestia*, November 1, 1956.

** In the Security Council on October 30 the USA introduced a draft resolution requiring the immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of Israeli troops to the 1949 armistice line.

of hostilities and the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from Egyptian territory. Britain and France vetoed the Soviet draft. The USA hypocritically abstained from voting.*

On the recommendation of the delegations of a number of countries the question of the armed attack on Egypt was turned over to an emergency session of the General Assembly. On November 2, by an overwhelming majority of votes, the General Assembly passed a resolution calling on Britain, France and Israel to cease hostilities against Egypt and pull their forces out of Egypt. Only five countries voted against this resolution. Among them were the three aggressors—Britain, France and Israel—who refused to comply with the resolution and continued their military operations against Egypt.

At this crucial moment the Soviet Union acted with determination. On November 5, 1956 it demanded the immediate cessation of the military invasion of Egypt, sharply condemned the criminal actions of the invaders in the Egyptian Republic and warned against the dangerous consequences of continued military action. A message to the British Prime Minister stated in part: "In what situation would Britain find herself if she were attacked by stronger states possessing all types of modern destructive weapons? Such countries could, at the present time, refrain from sending naval or air forces to the shores of Britain and use other means—for instance, missiles. . . . With deep anxiety over the developments in the Middle East, and guided by the interests of the maintenance of world peace, we think that the Government of the United Kingdom should listen to the voice of reason and put an end to the war in Egypt. We call upon you, upon your Parliament, upon the Labour Party, the trade unions, upon the whole British people: Put an end to the armed aggression; stop the bloodshed. The war in Egypt can spread to other countries and turn into a third world war." The message ended with the words: "We are fully determined to crush the aggressors by the use of force and to restore peace in the East."**

* *United Nations. Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly Covering the Period from 16 July, 1956 to 15 July, 1957*, p. 31.

** *Izvestia*, November 6, 1956.

In a telegram of its Foreign Minister of November 5, 1956 to the Chairman of the Security Council the Soviet Government suggested the adoption of a resolution giving Britain, France and Israel 12 hours in which to cease hostilities and three days in which to withdraw the troops that had invaded Egypt. The telegram stated that the Soviet Union was prepared to render military and other assistance to the victim of aggression, Egypt, by sending naval, air and land units, volunteers and instructors, military equipment and other forms of assistance if Britain, France and Israel failed to comply with the Security Council order within the deadline.*

Moreover, the Soviet Government contacted US President Eisenhower, proposing joint efforts and the prompt use of the naval and air forces of the two countries to halt the aggression and end the bloodshed. The US Government did not accept the Soviet proposal.**

The Soviet people unanimously supported the resolute actions of their Government to stop the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt. Protest rallies were held throughout the country. In the evening of November 5 massive demonstrations were held in front of the British, French and Israeli embassies in Moscow, the demonstrators carrying placards condemning the aggression. A movement was started to collect funds in aid of the Egyptian people. A vivid expression of the Soviet people's heartfelt sympathy for the people of Egypt was the flow of applications from Soviet citizens, including World War II veterans—pilots, tankers, artillerymen and officers of the reserve—requesting to be sent to Egypt as volunteers to fight side by side with the Egyptian people against the aggressors.

The Soviet Union's firm defence of the Egyptian Republic and its determination to take an active part in curbing the aggressors, restoring peace in the Middle East and averting another world war had a sobering effect on the ruling circles of Britain and France and played the decisive role in halting the hostilities. This was acknowledged even by the bourgeois press. For instance, on November 12, 1956 both *The New York Herald Tribune* and *The New York Times* wrote

* *Izvestia*, November 6, 1956.

** *The Department of State Bulletin*, November 19, 1956, pp. 796-97.

that the Soviet warning was the real reason inducing Britain, France and Israel to pull out of Egypt.*

Hostilities in Egypt ceased 22 hours after the Soviet Ambassadors in London and Paris handed the messages of the Soviet Government to the Heads of Government of Britain and France. As a result of the heroic resistance of the Egyptian people and on the demand of the USSR and most of the other UN members the Israeli, British and French troops were evacuated from Egyptian territory. The aggression ended in a fiasco. A local war engineered by the imperialists and which threatened to bring mankind to the brink of another global catastrophe was stopped by the concerted efforts of the Egyptian people, the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries.

The aggressors erred in their calculations. They lost sight of the basic factor of the times, namely, the new balance of strength in the world springing from the crisis of the imperialist system and the further strengthening of the world socialist system.

Support for the just struggle of the Egyptian people earned the Soviet Union esteem throughout the East, notably of the Egyptian people and the peoples of other Arab countries.

Interviewed by Soviet journalists President Nasser declared: "I take this opportunity to express the gratitude of the Egyptian people to the Soviet people for their support of Egypt during the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression that was started with the object of seizing Egypt and depriving her of her freedom and sovereignty. The Egyptian people highly appreciate the support of the Soviet people. This is a factor of Soviet-Egyptian friendship and I should like this friendship to grow from strength to strength."***

The extinguishing of the flashpoint in the Middle East opened up wide possibilities for consolidating the independence of the Arab countries.

2. Counter-Revolutionary Rising in Hungary

Fearing the immense role that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries were playing in countering imperialism

* *The New York Herald Tribune*, November 12, 1956.

** *Pravda*, December 28, 1956.

in the Middle East, the ruling circles of the Western powers stepped up subversion against the European socialist countries. They counted on diverting the Soviet Union's attention and strength from the developments in the East. West Germany, the USA's principal ally, was particularly active in this subversion. In addition to assisting their US backers, the West German revenge-seekers calculated on benefiting by the subversion against the socialist countries. The rising provoked in Hungary in October-November 1956 bore the imprint of a bourgeois-fascist counter-revolution. Its inspirers hoped that besides diverting the Soviet Union from Middle Eastern issues it would annul all that the Hungarian working people had achieved during the decade following the establishment of the People's Democratic system.

Under the terms of the Warsaw Treaty and at the express request of the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic the Soviet military units in Hungary helped the Hungarian troops to restore order in Budapest. Subsequent to this action Imre Nagy, the new Chairman of the Council of Ministers, who proved to be a traitor, requested on behalf of his Government the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest. The Soviet Government complied with this request. Acting on orders from Nagy the Hungarian troops halted operations against the insurgents with the result that the counter-revolutionary forces mounted an offensive throughout the country. Massive reprisals were started against Communists and against the civic leaders and statesmen who supported the People's Democratic system. Many true sons of the Hungarian people were brutally killed.

The forces acting against the Hungarian People's Republic were the internal counter-revolution and international reaction. The rising relied on the deposed classes—the landowners and capitalist and petty-bourgeois elements associated with them—and on the Horthyites and reactionary Army officers who had taken refuge in the West. The putsch was inspired mainly by the United States. Allen Dulles, head of the CIA, told an open sitting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the US Government had known of the rising in Hungary in advance. In effect he admitted that the USA had planned the rising. Speaking in Texas on October 27, four days after the rising broke out in Hungary, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles bluntly urged the

replacement of the existing Hungarian Government.* On November 2, 1956 the US Government said it was prepared to give the Hungarian counter-revolution a loan of US \$20 million. This statement was hailed by the counter-revolutionary newspapers in Budapest. During the rising the US-controlled Radio Free Europe became the actual headquarters co-ordinating the actions of the insurgents. The radio station incited bandit raids on Government institutions. On October 31 it provocatively urged Hungary to renounce the Warsaw Treaty.

The counter-revolutionaries were out to secure Hungary's break with the socialist community and turn that country into a base of aggression against the USSR and other socialist countries. The revisionist and traitor Imre Nagy, who had become an obedient tool in the implementation of this criminal plan, proclaimed Hungary's "neutrality" on November 1, 1956. In contravention of the terms of the Warsaw Treaty he announced Hungary's withdrawal from that organisation and on November 4 appealed to the imperialist powers for armed assistance for the counter-revolution.** Interference by the Western powers, headed by the USA, in the internal affairs of the Hungarian People's Republic would have directly menaced the security of the socialist states and created a new flashpoint in Europe.

With mortal danger overhanging the Hungarian people and their People's Democratic system, the Hungarian working class, above all the working class of Budapest, found the strength to save its country. On its initiative a new Government, the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government, headed by Janos Kadar and Ferenc Münnich, was formed on November 3. It proclaimed a programme summoning all true patriots to safeguard the country's independence and defend the People's Democratic system against the counter-revolution. The new Government and the Provisional Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party rallied the public spirited forces of the Hungarian people against the counter-revolution.

* *Kontrrevolyutsionniye sily v vengerskikh oktyabrskikh sobitiyakh*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1956, pp. 5-6.

** *Kontrrevolyutsionny zagovor Imre Nagy i yego soobshchnikov*, Moscow, 1958, p. 139.

The Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government upheld and strengthened the lawful socialist system in the Hungarian People's Republic and ensured the observance of the Constitution and legality. The steps it took to crush the counter-revolution and consolidate the People's Democratic system were approved by the National Assembly (elected in 1953). The National Assembly unanimously passed a vote of confidence in the Kadar Government.

On November 4, 1956 the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government requested the Command of the Soviet forces in Hungary to help the Hungarian people suppress the counter-revolutionary forces and restore law and order. Guided by its desire to maintain peace and security and acting on the principles of socialist internationalism, the Soviet Government granted this request, taking a resolute stand against the imperialist export of counter-revolution.

Three rallies attended by over 4,000 Communists and trade-unionists were held in Budapest on November 6. The participants marched to the meetings in columns, carrying red banners and national flags and singing the *Internationale* and the *Marseillaise*. They denounced the rising and declared their support for the Kadar Government, calling upon it to take immediate steps to restore law and order in the capital and condemning the acts of terrorism by counter-revolutionary elements.*

With the assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the Hungarian people overcame the counter-revolution. The exposure and defeat of the counter-revolution and its foreign inspirers dispelled the hopes of the imperialists that socialism would crumble in Hungary.

The swift action taken by the Soviet Union to help the Hungarian people crush the counter-revolutionary rising had far-reaching international repercussions. In the Declaration of the governments of the USSR and the Hungarian People's Republic of March 28, 1957 it was noted that in October-November 1956, when there was the threat that Hungary would be turned into a capitalist fascist state with all the attendant grave consequences to the Hungarian

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Report of November 6, 1956 from the Ambassador of the USSR in Hungary to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

people and state and to peace and security in Europe, the fraternal assistance of the Soviet Union allowed the people of Hungary to avoid the catastrophe and preserve their freedom and independence. The support given by Soviet military units, which had acted at the request of the Hungarian Government, was instrumental in eliminating the real danger that a flashpoint of fascist aggression would have been created in the heart of Europe and averted the threat of another devastating war.*

Soviet assistance during the tragic events of 1956 in Hungary had the understanding of the Hungarian working class and working peasants and was deeply appreciated by them. In his report to the 7th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party in November 1959, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the HSWP Janos Kadar expressed the feelings of the Hungarian people when he said: "All patriotic and politically conscious Hungarians will always remember with gratitude the assistance that was rendered to the Hungarian people by the Soviet Union at the request of the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government in 1956, when a counter-revolution broke out and there was the threat of imperialist interference. Thanks to this assistance we cut short the attempts of the imperialists to re-impose capitalism and fascism on the Hungarian people and turn our country into a military springboard, into an arena of hostilities."**

Following their failure to overthrow the People's Democratic system in Hungary by means of a counter-revolutionary rising, the ruling circles of some Western powers started a diplomatic offensive with the aim of interfering in Hungary's internal affairs under the flag of the United Nations. These powers forced on the UN a discussion of what they termed the "Hungarian problem" and counted on using the discussion to fan the cold war and increase world tension.

The governments of the USSR and the Hungarian People's Republic protested against this further attempt to interfere in Hungary's internal affairs. In their declaration of March 28, 1957 they pointed out that the raising and discussion of that issue in the UN was seriously undermining

* *Pravda*, March 29, 1957.

** *Kommunist* No. 18, 1959, p. 93.

that organisation's prestige and constituted an act of flagrant interference in Hungary's internal affairs and in matters that were exclusively within the competence of the governments of Hungary, the USSR and other members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. The Declaration gave a rebuff to the attempts of Western propaganda to use the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary to set the Hungarian people against the Soviet Union and subvert Soviet-Hungarian friendship. The governments of the USSR and the Hungarian People's Republic made it plain that the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary in accordance with the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty and as the decisive factor safeguarding that country against the aggressive designs of the imperialists was dictated by the international situation arising from the existence of the aggressive North Atlantic bloc, the remilitarisation of West Germany, the activation of revanchist forces in that country, and the maintenance of many military bases near the frontiers of the socialist states by the USA and other NATO countries, that were conducting subversive activities against these countries and refusing to come to an agreement on disarmament and the banning of nuclear weapons.

Guided by these considerations the governments of the USSR and the Hungarian People's Republic held talks on the terms for the presence of Soviet military units in Hungary. An agreement on the legal status of the Soviet forces temporarily stationed in Hungary was signed on May 27, 1957.

Nothing came of the hopes of the imperialist powers to use the events in Hungary to undermine the unity and solidarity of the socialist community. To a large extent these hopes had been quashed by the Soviet Government's declaration of October 30, 1956 on the principles underlying the development and further strengthening of friendship and co-operation between the USSR and other socialist countries. In the declaration it was underscored that in its relations with socialist countries the USSR was steadfastly adhering to the Leninist principles of the equality of nations and striving to achieve a further strengthening of friendship and co-operation between socialist countries, with each country enjoying complete sovereignty.

Government and Party delegations from Poland, Rumania, the German Democratic Republic, the People's Republic

of China, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and the Mongolian People's Republic visited Moscow at the close of 1956 and in early 1957. During these visits key problems of government-to-government relations were considered and resolved with a view to furthering friendship and equitable co-operation between the countries of the socialist community.

The principles underlying the relations between socialist countries were exhaustively specified in a historic document of the international communist movement—the Declaration of the Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries that was held in Moscow on November 14-16, 1957. This Declaration stressed that in the existing international situation it was of the utmost importance to strengthen the unity of the socialist countries, gave a deep-going analysis of the principles of socialist internationalism and mapped out the ways and means of promoting friendship and co-operation between the countries of the socialist community. In the Declaration it was noted that the relations between socialist countries were founded on complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. It was underscored that fraternal mutual assistance, which effectively mirrored the principle of socialist internationalism, was an inalienable component of these relations. Further, it was stated that the solidarity and unity of the socialist countries were a sure guarantee of the independence and sovereignty of each of them. "Stronger fraternal relations and friendship between the socialist countries call for a Marxist-Leninist internationalist policy on the part of the Communist and Workers' parties, for educating all the working people in the spirit of combining internationalism with patriotism and for a determined effort to overcome the survivals of bourgeois nationalism and chauvinism. All issues pertaining to relations between the socialist countries can be fully settled through comradely discussion, with strict observance of the principles of socialist internationalism."*

At the Meeting it was emphasised that broad economic and cultural co-operation had been established between the

* *The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism*, Moscow, p. 13.

socialist countries on the basis of complete equality, mutual benefit and comradely mutual assistance. This co-operation, it was noted at the Meeting, was playing an important role not only in consolidating the political and economic independence of each socialist country but also in strengthening the socialist community as a whole. Solidarity among the socialist countries was serving the interests of all peace-loving peoples, containing the aggressive ambitions of bellicose imperialist circles and sustaining the growing peace force.*

The collapse of the counter-revolutionary rising in Hungary signified also the failure of the efforts of the imperialist powers to restore capitalism in individual socialist countries and undermine the socialist community as a whole. The events in Hungary distinctly showed that provided there was unity in the socialist camp its economic and military might reliably guaranteed every socialist country against encroachment by international reaction.

3. The Soviet Union Against Imperialist Policy in the Middle East After the Suez Crisis

After the failure of the overt aggression in the Middle East and of the subversion against the socialist countries, the Western powers went on plotting further gambles. They continued their intrigues against peace and security, particularly in the Middle East.

Following the Suez débâcle, the direction of colonialist policy was assumed by the ruling circles of the USA, who aspired to take the place of the old colonial powers—Britain and France—in exploiting and plundering the Arab countries and forcing on them the yoke of colonial rule in a new form. Here the principal role was accorded to Israel. The guidelines to this policy were charted in the Eisenhower doctrine that was formulated in the US President's message to Congress on January 5, 1957. Underlying this doctrine was the thesis that the loss of prestige by Britain

* *The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism*, Moscow, p. 13.

and France in the Middle East as a result of the failure of the Suez adventure had formed a vacuum which the USA had to fill in order to prevent "Soviet penetration" in that area.*

After the Second World War the USA had stepped up its assault on the positions of Britain and France in the Middle East and North Africa in an attempt to oust them and thereby become the dominant power in these important areas. This policy greatly aggravated the contradictions between the USA, on the one hand, and Britain and France, on the other, in their drive for the premier place in the colonial exploitation of the peoples of the Middle East.

However, the ousting of Britain and France from the Middle East was only one of the facets of the Eisenhower doctrine, whose spearhead was directed at the independence and sovereignty of all the Middle Eastern countries. The doctrine was further evidence showing that the USA had become the main bulwark of modern colonialism. The proclamation and implementation of this colonialist doctrine dispersed the myth of the USA's "anti-colonialism". The doctrine brought into sharp relief the fact that the USA had undertaken the functions of world policeman, of the strangler of the national liberation movement.

The colonialist essence of the Eisenhower doctrine was exposed in a TASS Statement of January 13, 1957, which, under the heading "US Policy in the Middle East", declared: "The imperialist programme of colonialism adopted by the United States of America is evidence that the American ruling circles have not drawn the obvious conclusions from the failure of the aggression against Egypt. They are plainly steering toward a return to the bankrupt 'positions of strength' policy. Far from helping to relax tension in that area, this is aggravating the situation and increasing the threat to peace in the Middle East. . . . In Mr. Eisenhower's message one hears not the voice of peace but the voice of war."**

The Eisenhower message directed the Arab countries to break off their links with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This demand was motivated by the striving of

* *International Affairs* No. 4, Moscow, April 1957, pp. 165-66.

** *Pravda*, January 13, 1957.

the US ruling circles to isolate the newly-independent Middle Eastern countries so that, having deprived themselves of the support of the socialist states in their struggle to consolidate national independence, they would find themselves alone in face of the Western powers and Israel.

The Soviet Government tried to prevent the situation in the Middle East from developing in such a way as to jeopardise peace. It enunciated a programme envisaging urgent and resolute measures to ensure peace and security in that area. On February 11, 1957 it proposed that the three Western powers accept its draft of the Basic Principles of a Declaration of the Governments of the USSR, the USA, the United Kingdom and France on Peace and Security in the Middle East and on Non-Interference in the Internal Affairs of the Countries of That Area. The draft suggested that the four Great Powers undertake the commitment to found their policy in the Middle East on the following principles:

- 1) The preservation of peace and security in the Middle East and the settlement of all outstanding issues exclusively by means of negotiation.

- 2) Non-interference in the internal affairs of the Middle Eastern countries and respect for their sovereignty and independence.

- 3) Renunciation of all attempts to draw these countries into military blocs involving the Great Powers.

- 4) The dismantling of foreign bases and the evacuation of foreign troops from the countries of the Middle East.

- 5) Assistance for the economic development of the Middle Eastern countries without political or military strings that would be incompatible with the dignity and sovereignty of these countries.*

The three Western powers adopted a negative attitude to the Soviet proposal, whose acceptance would have ruled out the possibility of their taking unilateral action in the Middle East.

In March 1957 President Eisenhower had a conference in Bermuda with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan (Eden had had to resign following the abortive Suez adventure). Among other things, the two leaders discussed the situation in the Middle East. One of the main results of this

* *Pravda*, February 13, 1957.

conference was the Anglo-US agreement on active US participation in the military commission of the Bagdad Pact. This step, motivated by the USA's intention to "breathe life" into that aggressive bloc, intensified the threat to the independence of the Arab countries from the Bagdad Pact.

Desiring to preserve tranquillity and peace in an area situated in direct proximity to the southern frontiers of the USSR, the Soviet Government made a Statement on April 1, 1957 on the Bermuda conference. Laying bare the aggressive character of US policy in the Middle East, the Statement noted: "Whereas hitherto the Government of the USA has been formally dissociating itself from British colonial policy in that area and adopting the pose of an adversary of colonial practices, today an end is being put to the American propaganda legend about the USA's 'anti-colonialism'. The mask has been removed and the USA is openly co-operating with the colonial powers—the United Kingdom and France—in their attempts to restore the colonial regimes in the Middle Eastern countries."*

The peoples of the Middle East denounced US diplomacy's imperialist venture. Of the Arab countries only the Lebanon and Iraq, which was a member of the Bagdad Pact, accepted the Eisenhower doctrine. Turkey and Iran acted likewise, but they had earlier been drawn into a military agreement with the USA.

The attack on Egypt and the engineering of the rising in Hungary by the Western imperialists precipitated a further exacerbation of the international situation.

The collapse of the counter-revolutionary fascist rising in Hungary and the failure of the imperialist aggression against Egypt were further confirmation that the imperialists were no longer in a position to dictate their will to the world or to decide the question of war and peace. They showed that even with the use of armed force the imperialists could not restore capitalism in the socialist countries, re-establish colonial practices in the countries that had won political

* *Pravda*, September 21, 1957.

independence, or hold up the disintegration of the colonial system. The Soviet Union's active and resolute steps in defence of peace gave further confirmation of the fact that the USSR was the mainstay of the independence of nations and the chief obstacle to imperialist aggression.

Chapter Twenty-Six

SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO THE INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE OF THE PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA (1957-1964)

1. The USSR Helps to Uproot Colonialism

In the colonial and dependent countries the national liberation struggle assumed unparalleled proportions at the close of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s. The movement dealt imperialism new shattering blows in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The break-up of colonial empires was completed in Asia. The Malay Federation and Singapore, which later formed the Federation of Malaysia, became independent in 1957 and 1959 respectively. The former Portuguese colonies of Goa, Diu and Daman were restored to India in 1961.

Following the downfall of the colonial regimes in Asia, the imperialists hoped to keep Africa as a preserve of colonialism. But this hope, too, was blasted. The peoples of Africa rose to fight for independence. The colonial regimes fell in most of the African countries. The first to achieve independence was the Sudan, and shortly afterwards Tunisia shook off her colonial dependence on France. At the same time, France and Spain recognised the independence of Morocco.

The countries of Tropical Africa likewise began to liberate themselves from colonial oppression. Ghana proclaimed her independence in 1957. A year later independence was achieved by Guinea. The formation of these states was a major development that helped to further the national liberation struggle of the African peoples. The year 1960, when 17 new independent states appeared in the African continent, is rightly called Africa year.

An active struggle unfolded against imperialism in Latin America. In Cuba, Venezuela and Colombia the dictatorships fell under pressure from the national liberation movement. The people's revolution in Cuba, started when the balance of strength in the world had changed, ended in complete victory. Cuba became the first socialist country in the Western Hemisphere. US imperialism's long and undivided domination in Latin America thus came to an end.

After achieving political independence the new states found themselves confronted with the task of overcoming their economic backwardness and building up an independent national economy. The only countries that could really cope with this task were those that had taken the road of social progress. Socialism was the only system that could ensure swift economic advancement, give the people a higher standard of living and place all of society's material and cultural blessings at their disposal. Some of the newly-liberated countries launched far-reaching social changes, enforcing a land reform, nationalising the property of the foreign monopolies and halting feudal practices. They enlarged the public sector in the national economy, notably in industry.

Industrial development brought with it a numerical growth of the working class and a modification of society's social make-up.

The Communist Party and the Government of the USSR considered that it was their duty to extend every possible assistance to the peoples fighting for deliverance from all forms of foreign rule. This is noted in the Party Programme adopted at the 22nd Congress of the CPSU: "The CPSU considers fraternal alliance with the peoples who have thrown off the colonial or semi-colonial yoke to be a corner-stone of its international policy. This alliance is based on the common vital interests of world socialism and the world national liberation movement. The CPSU regards it as its internationalist duty to assist the peoples who have set out to win and strengthen their national independence, all peoples who are fighting for the complete abolition of the colonial system."^{*}

The Road to Communism, p. 497.

The way for these enormous successes of the national liberation movement was cleared by the enhanced might of the USSR and the world socialist system, by their influence on world developments. The independent states of Asia, Africa and Latin America were not alone in their struggle to abolish all forms of foreign domination. As a sincere friend of the peoples fighting for liberation from imperialist tyranny and safeguarding their newly-won freedom, the socialist community has been, and is, giving them every possible assistance. As a result of the Soviet Union's increased might, the enhanced prestige of the socialist community and the growth of the national liberation movement imperialism lost its omnipotence. The economic, political and military strength of the USSR and other socialist countries compelled the imperialists to make concessions to the liberated peoples and in many instances it was the factor making them refrain from acts of aggression, from using force against these peoples.

The very fact of the existence of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and their readiness to assist the developing states was and remains a serious obstacle to the colonial policy of the imperialists.

While opposing interference in the internal affairs of the new national states, the USSR rendered them the utmost help and support in strengthening their political and economic independence and in their advance along the road of progress. As a consequence, the former colonial and dependent countries, which had been a reserve of imperialism, are becoming an ally of the progressive, anti-imperialist forces.

In its drive to abolish the colonial system the Soviet Union secured the implementation of major acts in the United Nations in support of the national liberation struggle. At the 15th General Assembly in 1960 it moved the draft of a Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. This important document contained the following points:

- 1) All colonial countries, trust and other non-self-administering territories shall, without delay, be granted complete independence and freedom in the building of their own national states according to the freely expressed will and desire of their peoples. The colonial regime and the colonial administration in all its forms must be abolished

completely in order to give the peoples of such territories the possibility of determining their destiny and form of state administration by themselves.

2) All bastions of colonialism in the shape of possessions or lease regions on foreign territories shall be abolished.

3) In their relations with other states the governments of all countries are called on strictly and steadfastly to adhere to the provisions of the UN Charter and the present Declaration on the equality of and respect for the sovereign rights and territorial integrity of all countries without exception, and to bar all manifestations of colonialism and all exclusive rights or privileges for some states to the detriment of other countries.*

These provisions conform to the basic interests of all mankind. They are intrinsically bound up with the content and spirit of Soviet foreign policy.

The discussion of the Declaration and the results of the voting showed that the Soviet draft had the approval of most countries, which together accounted for the overwhelming majority of the world's population. On December 14, 1960 the General Assembly adopted a Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples worded in the spirit of the Soviet draft. The resolution was supported by all countries except the colonial powers—the USA, Britain, France, Portugal, Belgium, the Union of South Africa, Spain and Australia, and also by the Dominican Republic, which had aligned itself with them. This showed the pressing need for the final abolition of the shameful system of colonial slavery. The Declaration's adoption was a major triumph for the foreign policy of the USSR, which unswervingly champions the interests of peoples fighting for national liberation. Moreover, it was a great victory of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

In order to secure the speediest abolition of all forms and manifestations of colonialism the Soviet Union tabled a motion at the 16th General Assembly in 1961 calling for a discussion of the fulfilment of the Declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples. The Soviet memorandum on this question suggested that the General Assembly should proclaim 1962 as the year of the final

* *Pravda*, September 24, 1960.

abolition of colonialism and demand the immediate cessation of colonial wars and of repressions against members of the national liberation movement, the evacuation of all foreign troops from the colonies and the dismantling of foreign military bases in the colonies, and apply the sanctions provided for by the UN Charter against the colonialists in the event they refused to comply with these demands. The UN, the memorandum stated, should demand the immediate granting of broad democratic rights and freedoms to the population of every colony, the holding in these countries of general democratic elections for national organs of power, and the annulment of all agreements restricting the sovereignty of future independent states.

Considerable attention to problems of the national liberation movement, the struggle against imperialism's colonial system and the development prospects opening for the countries that had achieved political independence was accorded at the Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in 1960.

In the documents of that Meeting it was noted that with the formation of the world socialist system extremely favourable conditions had taken shape for the successful unfolding of the anti-imperialist struggle. "The existence of the world socialist system and the weakening of the positions of imperialism have provided the oppressed peoples with new opportunities of winning independence,"* it was pointed in the Statement of the 1960 Meeting, which offered a constructive programme of action directed toward the consolidation and promotion of the gains of the national liberation revolutions. It stated that the creation of national democratic states was making it possible to complete the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolutions and give effect to measures laying the foundation for further progress.

"We are at one with the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America in that the last colonial regimes must be swept off the face of the earth," L. I. Brezhnev said in 1964. "Wherever peoples are fighting imperialist intervention—in Cyprus, Congo, Southeast Asia, the Arab peninsula and Latin America—they see and tangibly feel Soviet support

* *The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism*. p. 62.

for their just struggle for national and social emancipation.”*

The new upsurge of the national liberation movement in many Asian, African and Latin American countries that followed on the heels of the abortive imperialist aggression against Egypt was accompanied by feverish efforts on the part of the colonial powers headed by the USA to use every possible means to throttle this movement, crush the freedom-loving spirit of the peoples who had risen to the struggle and enforce new forms of colonial slavery. Imperialism gave battle as it retreated, and in some cases it would have been simply impossible to overcome its resistance had it not been for the support rendered by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to the peoples fighting for national liberation.

2. Soviet Assistance in Halting Imperialist Aggression Against Arab Countries in 1957-1964

Syria's independence was seriously threatened in 1957.

In the beginning the imperialist powers had recourse to conspiracies in an effort to depose the Syrian Government, which was refusing to take orders from the USA. A coup was attempted in August 1957 with the participation of agents of US imperialism. The plot was discovered and three members of the US Embassy in Damascus, who had been implicated in the attempted coup, were expelled from Syria.

When the “cloak and dagger” tactics failed, the USA tried to organise armed intervention. US diplomacy chose the Menderes Government in Turkey as the principal instrument of its plans of aggression against the Syrian Republic. The US President's special representative Loy W. Henderson, who had won notoriety as an expert on the organisation of conspiracies, was sent in hot haste to the Middle East, where he had talks with Turkish statesmen and military leaders. A plan for the invasion of Syria was worked out by the Turkish General Staff jointly with US military advisers.

* *Pravda*, November 7, 1964.

In accordance with that plan a large body of troops, named the Hatay Mobile Group, was concentrated along the Syrian frontier. The US 6th Fleet sailed to the Eastern Mediterranean.

The situation that took shape round Syria in the autumn of 1957 as a result of US and Turkish provocations led to a further grave escalation of tension in the Middle East. Approximately the same atmosphere reigned as on the eve of the triple aggression against Egypt.

In keeping with its policy of maintaining peace and security in the Middle East, the Soviet Government came out resolutely in defence of Syria's independence. On September 10 it sent a message to the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, seriously warning the Turkish ruling circles of the perilous consequences of an armed attack on the Syrian Republic. The message pointed out that Turkey could only suffer from participation in aggression.*

Nonetheless, prodded by the USA, Turkey continued her preparations for war with Syria. She tried to justify these preparations with allegations that Syria was "arming herself to a level in excess of her normal defence requirements" and was becoming an "arsenal".**

In this situation the Soviet Government suggested that in the event Turkey violated peace on the Syrian frontier and attacked that country the members of the United Nations should forthwith use their armed forces to help Syria cut short the aggression. It announced that the Soviet Union was prepared to use its Armed Forces to help crush aggression and punish the aggressors.***

Three days later, on October 19, 1957, the Soviet Government again warned the aggressive circles of Turkey and the USA. In a TASS Statement on the Syrian issue it was made plain that in the event Syria was attacked the Soviet Union would, in line with the aims and principles of the UN Charter and the interests of its own security, take all the measures it deemed necessary to help the victim of aggression.****

* *Izvestia*, September 14, 1957.

** *SSSR i arabskiye strany. 1917-1960. Dokumenty i materialy*. Moscow, 1961, p. 819.

*** *Izvestia*, October 18, 1957.

**** *Izvestia*, October 19, 1957.

At the 12th General Assembly the Soviet Union vigorously supported Syria's complaint against the threat to her security. The Soviet delegation exposed the intrigues of the reactionary circles of the USA and Turkey against Syria's independence and urged the UN to take resolute measures to avert the planned aggression against Syria and prevent the Middle East from becoming the scene of a conflict that could grow into a major war.

The Soviet Union's firm stand and the steps taken by it in defence of Syria averted the imperialist aggression against that country.

In addition to giving Syria diplomatic support, the Soviet Union helped her to promote industry, technology and electrification and thereby strengthen her economy.

Following an official visit to Moscow in July-August 1957 by a Syrian Government delegation led by Minister of State and Defence Minister Khaled el Azem, during which a verbal agreement was reached on economic co-operation between the two countries, an agreement on economic and technical co-operation was signed by the USSR and Syria in Damascus in late October 1957. This agreement provided for Soviet assistance in the building of railways, power stations, irrigation systems and motor bridges, in geological surveys and other projects. The Soviet Union granted Syria credits to pay for designing and for Soviet materials and equipment. In December of the same year agreement was reached on the purchase of Syrian cotton and grain by the Soviet Union and on the purchase of Soviet goods, including machines and equipment, by Syria.*

The Government of Syria expressed its gratitude to the Soviet Government for its resolute support when Syria's independence and territorial integrity were menaced.

Imperialist reaction again resorted to armed force against the Arab peoples in mid-1958, once more creating a flash-point of world tension in the Middle East.

Developments in the Lebanon, where the people rose against the anti-national policies of the Chamoun-Solh-

* *SSSR i arabskiye strany. 1917-1960. Dokumenty i materialy*, p. 454.

Malik Government, were the excuse for a US-led imperialist armed intervention. The reactionary Government in that country had signed an agreement with the USA in line with the Eisenhower doctrine and thereby renounced its policy of neutrality, which had had the massive backing of the people. This betrayal of national interests by the ruling clique sparked a wave of indignation, which grew into a people's uprising that swept across almost the entire country.

These developments alarmed the ruling circles of the USA and Britain who regarded them as a threat to their positions in a strategically important region of the Eastern Mediterranean, where the terminals of the longest Middle Eastern oil pipelines, operated by US and British monopolies, were situated. US and British naval units were moved to the shores of the Lebanon and the local reactionaries received arms from the USA.

Simultaneously, events that were far more formidable for the colonialists had taken place in Iraq. The monarchy and the reactionary regime headed by the agent of British imperialism Nuri Al-Said were toppled on July 14, 1958. Iraq was proclaimed a republic. In Iraq the Western imperialists controlled huge oilfields, and the ruling circles of the USA and Britain hastened to organise another armed intervention against the Arab peoples. US troops were landed in the Lebanon on July 15, 1958, i.e., on the day after the victory of the revolution in Iraq, and British troops occupied Jordan on the next day. The formal excuse for the US-British armed intervention was the stage-managed request for US and British assistance by the Lebanese President Camille N. Chamoun and King Hussein of Jordan. On September 13, 1958 the Chairman of the Lebanese parliament Adel Osseyranc denounced Chamoun's illegal action and in a letter to the members of the United Nations wrote that "US armed forces have been landed on Lebanese territory on the pretext of protecting the lives of Americans and safeguarding the Lebanon's independence and sovereignty. In itself this action, i.e., the landing of United States armed forces, is a violation of the Lebanon's independence and sovereignty".*

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Circular of September 13, 1958 of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

The armed intervention by the USA and Britain was evidence that in protecting the interests of the oil monopolies the governments of these countries were acting on a long-contemplated plan of aggressive actions designed to crush the national liberation movement in the Arab East. For the US and British imperialists the Lebanon and Jordan were only a stage on the route to Iraq and to Syria, situated between Iraq and the Lebanon. This was not concealed by the governments of the USA and Britain. In the pertinent White House statement the sending of US troops to the Lebanon was linked directly with the developments in Iraq. A statement by British Prime Minister Macmillan made it clear that the aim of the armed intervention in Jordan was not only to suppress the Jordanian liberation movement but also to use Jordan and the Lebanon as a springboard for an invasion of Iraq.

Once again it was the determined stand of the Soviet Union that stayed the hand of the colonialists. It prevented them from using the intervention to quash the revolution in Iraq and pressure Syria.

On July 16, 1958, the day after the US troops were landed in the Lebanon, the Soviet Government telegraphed its official recognition of the Government of the Iraqi Republic to the Prime Minister of Iraq. Soviet recognition of the new Iraqi Government in that hour of danger rendered the Iraqi people immense moral and political support and served as a warning to the colonialists, who were preparing to attack Iraq.

A Statement published by the Soviet Government pointed out that the real motivation for the US armed intervention in the Lebanon was the USA's desire to perpetuate the colonial system in the countries of the Middle East. The Statement urged the UN to take immediate resolute action to stop the intervention and protect the national interests of the Arab countries subjected to unprovoked aggression. It reiterated that the Soviet Union could not remain indifferent to developments threatening peace in a region adjoining its frontiers and reserved the right to take steps dictated by the interests of peace and security.* A similar Statement was

SSSR i arabskiye strany. 1917-1960. Dokumenty i materialy.
pp. 517-20.

published by the Soviet Government on July 18 in connection with the British intervention in Jordan.*

On July 19, 1958 the Soviet Government declared that effective measures had to be taken to secure the earliest possible elimination of the threat of war in the Middle East. It proposed a meeting of the Heads of Government of the USSR, the USA, Britain, France and India, with the participation of the UN Secretary-General to discuss the actions of the USA and Britain and effectuate the speediest evacuation of their troops from the Lebanon and Jordan.** The other socialist countries likewise denounced the Anglo-US aggression in the Middle East, demanded an immediate meeting of the Heads of Government of the Great Powers to discuss the situation in that region and insisted on the immediate withdrawal of the US and British forces.

Continuing the Dulles policy of "balancing on the brink of war", the USA rejected talks as a means of settling the situation in the Middle East. As a result of obstruction by the Western powers, the Security Council was likewise unable to ensure a quick settlement of the Middle East crisis.

On August 5, 1958, this prompted the USSR to request the convocation of an emergency meeting of the General Assembly. At that meeting the Soviet delegation proposed a programme for relaxing tension in the Middle East and demanded the immediate withdrawal of the troops that had invaded the Lebanon and Jordan. This demand was supported by the delegations of all the socialist countries and by other peace-loving states, particularly Arab countries. The USA's attempts to justify its aggression in the Middle East found no support in the United Nations despite US diplomacy's frantic efforts. The General Assembly unanimously approved the draft of a resolution submitted by ten Arab countries on August 21. The resolution authorised the UN Secretary-General to take steps that would help to maintain the aims and principles of the Charter in relation to the Lebanon and Jordan and thereby facilitate the speedy withdrawal of foreign troops from these countries. Finding themselves in total isolation, the delegations of the aggressor countries had no alternative but to vote for that resolution.

* Ibid., pp. 524-26.

** Ibid., pp. 528-40.

Parallel with the debate in the General Assembly, a massive movement was started in the Lebanon and Jordan for the evacuation of US and British troops. Chehab, the new President of Syria elected by parliament on July 31, 1958, declared that one of his country's cardinal national tasks was to secure the evacuation of the interventionist troops from Lebanese territory. One of the first acts of the Karame Government that came to power as a result of the defeat of the reactionary forces in the country, was to demand the immediate evacuation of US troops. The USA found it had to comply with this demand in October 1958. On December 10, 1958 the Lebanese Government declared that the Lebanon no longer considered itself bound by the Eisenhower doctrine. The last British soldier was evacuated from Jordan on November 2, 1958.

The forced withdrawal of the US and British invaders from the Lebanon and Jordan and the failure of the attempt to organise armed intervention against the Iraqi Republic were further confirmation that the Soviet Union was a reliable and unbreakable bulwark of the national independence of countries that had shaken off the yoke of colonialism. At the most critical moments, when the proponents of aggression brought the world to the brink of war, the Soviet Union put its international prestige and might on the scales in order to stay the hand of the aggressor. The unswerving stand of the USSR, which vigilantly guarded the independence of countries, helped the Arab peoples to foil the plans of the USA and Britain to restore colonialism in their countries: in Egypt in 1956, in Syria in 1957 and in the Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan in 1958.

The independence struggle of the Yemeni people also received substantial support from the Soviet Union. In 1962, relying on the backing of the people, patriotic military circles in the Yemen overthrew the monarchy and proclaimed a republic. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries immediately recognised the new Government and gave it vigorous assistance against the reactionaries, who had the support of the US and British imperialists. Soviet-Yemeni relations developed, and continue to develop, in a spirit of friendship. A treaty of friendship was signed by the Soviet Union and the Yemeni Arab Republic on March 21, 1964.

The Soviet Government gave much of its attention to promoting co-operation with Iraq. In July 1958, when an anti-

imperialist rising broke out and Iraq was proclaimed a republic, the Soviet Union prevented the Western powers from isolating and invading the new republic. The socialist community and the non-aligned states recognised the new Kassem Government, which declared that it would pursue an independent foreign policy. On March 16, 1959, in order to help the Iraqi people build a new life the Soviet Union signed an agreement on economic and technical co-operation with Iraq and granted that country credits amounting to 550 million rubles for the purchase of Soviet industrial plant.

However, a military coup which deposed the Kassem Government took place in Iraq on February 8, 1963. To carry out the coup the reactionaries took advantage of the people's discontent with the Kassem Government, which had failed to fulfil many of its commitments to the democratic sections of society in Iraq. But the new Government instituted a regime of terror and repressions, brutally massacring Communists and leaders of other progressive organisations. Moreover, it intensified the war of attrition against the Kurds, who were demanding autonomy within the Iraqi Republic. This led to another coup on November 18, 1963. A new Government was formed under Abdel Salam Aref. It announced that it would pursue a policy of independence and Arab solidarity. In February 1964 it signed a cease-fire agreement with the Kurds and guaranteed them their national rights in the Republic of Iraq. The Soviet Government welcomed this act as important to peace in the Middle East.

The Soviet Union also helped the Algerian people's struggle for liberation from the century-long rule of the French colonialists. In 1954 Algerian patriots rose in arms against French colonial rule. The French colonialists used their army against this independence struggle and the flames of a sanguinary colonial war raged in Algeria for nearly eight years. France's colonial war in Algeria became in effect a NATO war. Three French divisions that were part of NATO's armed forces were transferred to Algeria with the agreement of the US military. To prolong the war in Algeria the USA increased its supplies of armaments to France. While helping to suppress the Arab national movement, the US Government sought to exhaust France in order to bind her more securely to its foreign policy.

However, as the war continued it became increasingly clear that the colonialists' hopes of crushing the national liberation movement by armed force were crumbling. The French imperialists failed to force the courageous Algerian people to their knees. The liberation struggle was headed by the National Liberation Front, a mass organisation that embraced broad sections of the indigenous population of Algeria. In 1958 the NLF proclaimed the formation of the Republic of Algeria and the creation of a Provisional Government.

As soon as the national liberation war broke out in Algeria the Soviet Union called for a just settlement of the Algerian problem. The Soviet Government held the view that the situation in Algeria could not be regarded as the internal affair of France. It was a problem of serious international significance and had to be settled with account of the legitimate rights and national interests of the Algerian people. Soviet policy in the Algerian problem was directed toward rendering the utmost assistance to the national liberation struggle and securing the speediest abolition of the colonial regime.

On behalf of the Soviet Government, the Soviet representative V. V. Kuznetsov declared at a plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly on September 30, 1955 that the disquieting situation in Algeria was threatening peace in that area and could not be regarded as the internal affair of one country. He called on the UN to help achieve a peaceful settlement of the Algerian problem with account of the interests of the parties involved, above all of the legitimate rights and national interests of the Algerian people.* The Soviet delegation supported the motion of a number of Asian and African countries proposing the inclusion of the Algerian problem in the agenda of the 10th General Assembly.

At the 10th General Assembly France, supported by the other colonial powers, prevented a discussion of the Algerian problem. But at subsequent sessions the Algerian problem was included in the agenda thanks to the efforts of the socialist and Afro-Asian countries. At all these sessions the Soviet Union championed the interests of Algeria.

The Soviet Government persevered in calling on France to resolve the Algerian problem peacefully and democratic-

* *Izvestia*, October 2, 1955.

ally in the mutual interests of both the Algerian and French peoples.

In its Statement on the international character of the Algerian problem it recognised the Algerians as a belligerent with all the accompanying rights. Alongside active moral and political support, the Soviet Union rendered Algeria vital assistance, including supplies of armaments.

Representatives of the Algerian Provisional Government arrived in Moscow on September 27, 1960 for talks with the Soviet Government. At these talks it was reaffirmed that the Soviet Union would accord de facto recognition to the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. This compelled the French Government to contact and enter into negotiations with the Algerian Government as the representative of the Algerian people, whose courageous struggle for national freedom and independence had yielded positive results. When General de Gaulle came to power, the French Government realised that any further continuation of the hopeless war would only be prejudicial to France and agreed to a cease-fire in March 1962.

On March 19, 1962, the day on which hostilities ended in Algeria, the people and Government of the USSR congratulated the heroic Algerian people on their victory. The USSR officially recognised the new state. "Guided by the great principle that all peoples have the right to self-determination and profoundly respecting the just national aspirations of the Algerian people," said the pertinent Statement, "the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares its de jure recognition of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria and expresses its readiness to establish diplomatic relations with it."^{*} The Democratic People's Republic of Algeria was proclaimed on September 25, 1962. Economic, trade and cultural relations were actively promoted between the Soviet Union and Algeria.

Soviet-Algerian summit talks were held in May 1964. The resultant Soviet-Algerian communique was a major contribution to the further development of friendly co-operation and fraternal relations between the Soviet and Algerian peoples.^{**}

^{*} *Pravda*, March 20, 1962.

^{**} *Izvestia*, May 8, 1964.

3. Soviet Support for Indonesia

The Soviet Union's defence of the independence of peoples against imperialist aggression was not confined to the Middle East and North Africa.

In Southeast Asia, with support from the ruling circles of the USA the Dutch colonialists did not cease their attempts to depose the lawful Government of the Republic of Indonesia. These attempts were part of US imperialist policy of bringing the whole of Southeast Asia under US influence. In their subversive activities the colonialists had recourse to the organisation of anti-Government conspiracies, acts of terrorism, wrecking and sabotage, and political, economic and military pressure. They relied on reactionary elements in Indonesia herself, namely, the feudal landowners, the comprador bourgeoisie and the reactionary parties and cliques expressing the interests of these circles.

At the close of 1957 they organised a series of military provocations against Indonesia. The USA's diplomatic representatives in Djakarta openly interfered in Indonesia's internal affairs by encouraging the separatists. As soon as Colonel Simbolon seized power in Northern Sumatra the US Ambassador informed Prime Minister Ali Saastroamidjojo that the USA intended to give de facto recognition to the regime set up by the insurgent colonel. The USA supplied the insurgents with arms, ammunition and equipment from military bases in SEATO countries.

In this difficult situation the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries gave the Indonesian people diplomatic, economic and military support and assistance.

On May 14, 1958 the Soviet Government published a Statement emphatically condemning foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Indonesian people and their aggressive actions against Indonesia. The Statement warned the Western powers, notably the USA, of the responsibility they were assuming by interfering in Indonesia's internal affairs.

Despite the efforts and assistance of the colonialists, the counter-revolutionary rising in Indonesia was crushed by the Indonesian people.

The USSR consistently sided with the Indonesian Government and people in their struggle for the re-incorporation of Dutch-controlled West Irian in Indonesia.

The Netherlands Government contemplated granting the people of West Irian what was termed as the "right to self-determination" and doggedly refused to turn over the remnants of its colonial possessions in Indonesia to the Indonesian people. In order to justify their policy the high priests of colonialism depicted Indonesia's just demand for the liberation of West Irian as a manifestation of "Indonesian imperialism". Backing the Netherlands were influential circles in the USA and Britain who were interested in using West Irian as a military springboard for the aggressive SEATO bloc. The Americans bought most of the uranium mines in West Irian.

The Soviet Union supported the Indonesian people's legitimate demand for the immediate transfer of West Irian to Indonesia and the abolition of Dutch colonial rule in that part of Indonesian territory. The Soviet Union's principled stand in the West Irian issue was expressed in many official documents: Soviet-Indonesian communiques, statements by the Soviet Government, speeches by Soviet leaders and pronouncements by Soviet representatives during the discussion of this issue in the United Nations.

In connection with the deteriorating situation in the spring of 1960 due to the Netherlands Government's refusal to settle the dispute with Indonesia and the activation of Dutch military preparations in West Irian, the Soviet Government sent the Government of the Netherlands a Memorandum on June 1, 1960 in which it noted that the dispatch of large contingents of Dutch naval, air and land forces to that part of Indonesia could only intensify the threat of war in Southeast Asia.*

In accordance with the measures it was taking to build up its armed forces in face of the increased tension round the West Irian issue, the Indonesian Government sent a mission led by the Minister for National Security to the Soviet Union in early January 1961. The Soviet Government granted the request of the Indonesian mission for the sale of equipment that was urgently needed by the Indonesian armed forces. On January 6, 1961, the sides signed the appropriate agreement.**

* *Pravda*, June 3, 1960.

** *Pravda*, January 8, 1961.

The threat of war loomed larger in early 1962 as a result of the piratic attack by Dutch warships on Indonesian patrol vessels on the high seas.

Attention was attracted by a statement made by the commander of the US 7th Fleet to the effect that in the event hostilities broke out between Indonesia and the Netherlands US naval forces would be committed.

In its Statement of February 9, 1962 on West Irian the Soviet Union condemned the provocations launched by the Dutch imperialists and warned them that the dangerous situation in the region of West Irian "cannot but cause serious anxiety in other countries that sincerely desire to preserve peace and, needless to say, they cannot remain indifferent observers of the provocations directed against the Republic of Indonesia".*

An Indonesian Government delegation consisting of senior Army officers and officials of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, visited the Soviet Union in May 1962. This visit was prompted by the situation stemming from the mounting tension caused by the Dutch colonialists' refusal to settle the West Irian issue.

As a result of the firm attitude adopted by Indonesia, which relied on the assistance of the Soviet Union and on the solidarity of the anti-imperialist forces, the Netherlands was compelled to renounce its claims to West Irian. Following long negotiations, that were held in the latter half of 1962 with United Nations participation, the question of that part of Indonesian territory was settled in favour of Indonesia.

The Soviet Union rendered Indonesia massive assistance in carrying out her economic development plans. A general agreement on economic and technical co-operation was signed by the USSR and Indonesia in 1956. A similar agreement was concluded in 1960. The Soviet credits granted Indonesia under the agreements on economic and technical assistance were used, in part, for the building of ten large projects, including an iron and steel works with an annual output capacity of 100,000 tons of steel, an aluminium plant, a superphosphate factory and two mechanised rice farms. Trade from which both countries benefited developed success-

* *Pravda*, February 9, 1962.

fully. In a communique on the official visit to the USSR by Indonesian President Sukarno in June 1961 the Indonesian Government noted its high appreciation of the Soviet Union's friendly assistance for Indonesia's economic development.*

Soviet assistance was a major factor strengthening Indonesia's political and economic independence.

4. Geneva Conference on Laos

The same may be said of other countries in Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union did everything in its power to facilitate the fulfilment of the 1954 Geneva decisions on an armistice and political settlement in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. However, the peace efforts of the USSR and other socialist countries, as well as of the non-aligned states, encountered the dogged resistance of the Western powers.

The USA and its allies created artificial obstructions to the unification of Laos and unceremoniously interfered in that country's internal affairs. They engineered the formation of a pro-US Government that could draw the country into the SEATO military bloc.

US policy was resented by the Laotian people. On August 9, 1960 an uprising in Laos swept away the puppet regime and brought to power a Government headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma.

Refusing to respect the will of the Laotian people, the USA and some other members of the aggressive SEATO bloc were determined to depose that Government. A rising against the lawful Government was provoked in the south of Laos with their assistance. In fact, the rising was inspired by the USA. Thailand, the Philippines and the puppet Government of South Vietnam also took part in the intervention in Laos.

As a result Laos was again plunged into the flames of a civil war. An uninterrupted flow of arms and equipment, including heavy tanks, transport and rocket-carrying aircraft, and helicopters were airlifted to the insurgents or sent by other means from Bangkok and Manila. These huge supplies of military equipment from the USA and its allies enabled

* *Pravda*, June 13, 1961.

the insurgents to win temporary successes and gain control of a large part of the country. However, as early as the spring of 1961 the national democratic forces of Laos began to press the insurgents.

On May 3, 1961, i.e., the day of the cease-fire, these forces were in control of at least two-thirds of the territory of Laos. Matters were moving towards the total defeat of the insurgents.

The USA began pressuring its SEATO partners in preparation for collective intervention by the members of the bloc against Laos. The danger of becoming the arena of a major international conflict hung over Laos.

The Soviet Government consistently stood by its policy of peace, neutrality and the observance of the Geneva Agreements on Indochina. In October 1960 it established normal diplomatic relations with Laos and, in accordance with an agreement, rendered that country considerable assistance, sending it food and fuel.

On December 22, 1960, in view of the tense political situation in Laos caused by US provocations, the Soviet Union sent Britain, whose representative was a co-chairman at the Geneva Conference, a Note suggesting an international conference with the purpose of settling the Laotian problem and normalising the situation in that country. Moreover, it proposed the resumption of the work of the International Commission for Observation and Control in Laos. This proposal was favourably received in Laos and was supported by the socialist countries and also by India, Burma and other non-aligned states. The Soviet initiative was opposed by the USA, which was hoping to settle the Laotian problem in its own favour by military means.

Soviet diplomacy initiated steps to convene a new conference on Laos. A Statement noting that the USA was extending its interference in Laotian internal affairs and again drawing the US Government's attention to the fact that its actions were aggravating the conflict in Laos and creating an extremely dangerous situation in that region of the world was made to the US Ambassador in Moscow on January 16, 1961. "This," the Statement said, "is a flagrant violation, by the US Government, of the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina, which bind all the participants in the Geneva Conference, including the USA, to refrain from any inter-

ference in the internal affairs of Laos". In conclusion the Statement expressed the Soviet Government's hope that "the Government of the USA will, after all, cease its military aid to the insurgents, refrain from any steps that may escalate the military conflict in Laos, agree to a conference on the pattern of the 1954 Geneva Conference, and join in the efforts of those countries that sincerely want a peace settlement in Laos".*

In April 1961, thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Government, the two co-chairmen (Soviet and British) of the 1954 Geneva Conference succeeded in reaching agreement on a conference on Laos.

With events in Laos developing unfavourably for the USA's puppets, with the contradictions deepening between, on the one hand, the USA and, on the other, Britain and France, which had stated that they were in favour of settling the Laotian problem by negotiations, and with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries as well as the non-aligned states pressing for a peaceful settlement of the Laotian problem, the US had to change its attitude and agree to another international conference.

The conference on Laos opened in Geneva on May 16, 1961 and continued, with intervals, until July 23, 1962. It was attended by representatives of 14 countries: Britain, Burma, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, India, Cambodia, Canada, the People's Republic of China, Poland, the USSR, the USA, South Vietnam, France, Thailand and Laos. From the very beginning there were two fundamentally different attitudes to a settlement of the Laotian problem. The Soviet Union urged an agreement ensuring a peaceful settlement in Laos based on recognition of the Laotian People's legitimate rights and strove to achieve a settlement of the problem in keeping with the interests of the people of Laos and with the task of ensuring peace in Southeast Asia.

To achieve this objective the Soviet Government proposed the draft of a declaration on Laos' neutrality recording commitments by Laos to pursue a policy of neutrality and non-

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Statement of January 16, 1961 by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the US Ambassador.

alignment with military blocs, disallow foreign military bases on its territory and carry out the obligations defined earlier by the 1954 Geneva Conference.

The Western powers (the USA, Britain and France) pursued a different objective. Together with their allies in military and political blocs (Canada, Thailand and South Vietnam) they wanted the conference to pass decisions that would enable them to pursue the old imperialist colonial policy in Southeast Asia.

On most of the key points of the Laotian problem the delegations of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries enlisted the understanding and support of the non-aligned states. This compelled the Western powers to retreat, step by step, from their original objective of drawing Laos into their aggressive military and political blocs.

The continued strengthening of the positions of the progressive, peace forces in Laos and the support of most of the participants in the conference for the steps proposed by the USSR left the USA with no alternative but to agree with the basic provisions of the Soviet draft.

On July 9, 1962 the Laotian Government announced that it would abide by the five principles of peaceful coexistence, that it would work for a "peaceful, neutral, independent, democratic, united and flourishing Laos". This statement was included in the Geneva Conference's Declaration on Laos that was based on the provisions of the Soviet draft. The Declaration called on all countries to respect the "sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos", and to refrain from interfering in its internal affairs or involving it in military agreements. Further, the Declaration called for the evacuation from Laos of all foreign troops and personnel serving them. An international commission consisting of representatives of Poland, India and Canada was set up to supervise the enforcement of the agreement.

However, at the close of 1963 the situation in Laos again deteriorated, when in violation of its commitments the USA renewed its support for the reactionary groups in Laos who were opposed to the Geneva Agreements.

A military coup that placed a reactionary group in control of Vientiane took place on April 19, 1964. The representatives of Neo Lao Hak Sat of the Patriotic Front of Laos had

to flee the capital. A split took place in the neutralist group: some of the neutralist leaders joined hands with the reactionnaires. The troops of the reactionary forces resumed their attacks on regions controlled by Neo Lao Hak Sat. US aircraft began bombing these regions in May 1964. As a result of the intrigues of US imperialism and of direct US interference in the internal affairs of Laos, peace was again shattered in that country and the fulfilment of the 1962 Geneva Agreements was cut short.

While exposing the USA's aggressive ambitions in Indochina, the Soviet Union continued, and continues, its efforts to give effect to the 1962 Geneva Agreements. In the Soviet Government Statement of July 25, 1964 it was again noted that the USA was flagrantly violating its obligation to respect the independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of Laos and refrain from interfering in its internal affairs, that it was thereby endangering peace in Southeast Asia. The Soviet Union condemned US interference in the internal affairs of Laos and proposed another international conference on Laos.

The Soviet Union's attitude is helping the progressive and patriotic forces of Laos in their struggle for a peaceful, neutral, independent, united and democratic Laos.

5. Events in the Congo and the Soviet Stand

On June 30, 1960 the struggle of the Congolese people for liberation from Belgian colonial rule was crowned with the proclamation of the independence of the Republic of the Congo. As soon as this proclamation was made and a national Government headed by Patrice Lumumba was formed the Belgian Government started a number of provocative actions against the Congo and then organised armed intervention against the new republic with the support of its NATO allies—the USA, Britain, the FRG and France. The principal towns were occupied by Belgian troops and the armed aggression was accompanied by attempts to partition the Congo. In violation of the Congolese Constitution, Moïse Tschombe, puppet of the foreign monopolies and self-styled “president” of Katanga, a province in the Congo, announced

the secession of that extremely rich region from the republic.

On July 13, 1960 the Soviet Government published a Statement on the imperialist intervention in the Congo. Denouncing the aggressive actions of the Western powers, the Statement called on the UN Security Council to take urgent steps to stop the aggression and restore all the sovereign rights of the Republic of the Congo.* On July 14, 1960, acting on the request of the Lumumba Government, the Security Council passed a decision calling on Belgium to withdraw her troops from the Congo and authorising the UN Secretary-General to take steps, in agreement with the Congolese Government, to provide the Congo "such military assistance as may be necessary until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks".**

In order to help the Congolese people in their struggle against aggression the Soviet Government granted the Lumumba Government's request for means of transport, including aircraft, which were used to airlift the troops sent to the Congo by decision of the Security Council. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Society of the USSR sent to the Congo a team of Soviet doctors and other medical personnel and also medicaments and medical equipment. Guided by its desire to help the Congolese Government normalise the country's economic life, which had been disorganised by the actions of the Belgian colonialists, the Soviet Government declared in its Statement of July 31, 1960 that it was prepared to render the Republic of the Congo economic and technical assistance and promote mutually beneficial economic co-operation and trade with it on the basis of non-interference in internal affairs, complete equality and mutual respect for sovereignty, without making any political, military or other conditions that would infringe on the interests and sovereign rights of the Republic of the Congo.***

On August 20, 1960 the Soviet Ambassador in Leopoldville informed Prime Minister Lumumba that the Soviet

* *Izvestia*, July 13, 1960.

** *Pravda*, July 15, 1960.

*** *Vneshnaya politika SSSR*. Issue VIII (July-August 1960), Moscow, 1960, pp. 363-65.

Government had, "acting on its unchangeable policy of giving its utmost support to peoples fighting to consolidate their national independence and sovereignty, decided to render the Government of the Republic of the Congo urgent assistance in building up a national army and strengthening the country's defence capability".* Lumumba expressed his gratitude to the Soviet Government.**

However, in violation of the spirit of the Security Council decision, the UN troops sent to the Congo in effect assisted the Belgians, who on September 4 started an open war against the Congolese people.

Ignoring the Security Council decision UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and the UN Command in the Congo headed by Andrew W. Cordier of the USA began to help the colonialists. UN troops were used against the Congolese Army fighting to uphold the republic's independence. They occupied the base regions of the Congolese national liberation movement. Hammarskjöld refused to co-operate with the lawful Congolese Government in the restoration of its authority in Katanga province. More, the UN Command prevented the Congolese Government from taking effective measures against the insurgents. UN troops took over the Government radio station, thereby depriving the central Government of the possibility of directly addressing the people. Further, they occupied the Leopoldville aerodrome and cut off communications between the capital and other regions of the country. The UN Command thus wrecked the fulfilment of the Security Council resolution and, by its actions, sanctioned the partition of the Congo by the Katanga puppet authorities, who had the support of the Belgian and other colonialists.

In its Statement of August 20, 1960 on the situation in the Congo, the Soviet Government exposed the intrigues of the imperialist powers against the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo. It denounced the attempts to portray the separatist actions of the puppet Tschombe against the central Congolese Government as the

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Instructions of August 20, 1960 of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Soviet Ambassador in the Congo.

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Report of August 23, 1960 from the Soviet Ambassador in the Congo.

internal affair of the Congo. Noting the unconstitutional character of the regime established by Tschombe, who had seized power in Katanga as a result of an uprising organised by the imperialist interventionists against the republic's lawful Government, the Statement stressed the impermissibility of support for the Tschombe "Government". It pointed out that the Security Council decision had been based on the state integrity of the Republic of the Congo and provided for assistance to the central Government of the Congo and to nobody else.*

On September 6, 1960 Lumumba told the ambassadors in the Congo that the "action of September 4 by the Belgians cannot be qualified otherwise than as a conspiracy against the Republic of the Congo, as a conspiracy inspired by the Belgian, French and US imperialists.

"This conspiracy was plotted with the active assistance and direct participation of the UN representative in the Congo, whose troops are operating here as invaders".

Further, Lumumba said that "from the beginning Hammarskjöld has been acting in a manner that can only be described as criminal sabotage of the Security Council decision relative to the Republic of the Congo".**

On September 9, 1960 the Soviet Government published a Statement in which it qualified the actions of the UN Command, which had in effect paralysed the normal functioning of the central Congolese Government, as an attempt to replace the old colonial regime in the Congo with a form of collective colonialism of the NATO countries under the blue flag of the United Nations. Underscoring the treacherous role that had been undertaken in relation to the Congo by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, the Statement noted that all in all the UN apparatus headed by him had proved to be the element that was most openly operating in favour of the colonialists and thereby compromising the United Nations in the eyes of the world. The Soviet Government demanded the evacuation of the armed forces under UN command from all of the country's aerodromes, the

* *Pravda*, August 21, 1960.

** *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Report of September 6, 1960 from the Soviet Ambassador in the Congo to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

return of the national radio station to the full and unrestricted disposal of the Congo Government, and the removal of the UN Military Command that was not using its troops for the purpose they had been sent to the Congo in accordance with the Security Council decision.*

For his part, the Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba denounced the actions of the UN Secretary-General as directed toward provoking war in the Congo. He sent a Memorandum to the members of the Security Council requesting them to recommend that the Secretary-General and his associates in the Congo cease their direct and indirect interference in the internal affairs of that republic.

Meanwhile, the colonialists had initiated moves to depose the Lumumba Government. Shortly afterwards he and other Congolese leaders were unlawfully arrested and placed under detention. At the General Assembly the Soviet delegation pointed out that the provocations against Lumumba had been made possible by the connivance and actual complicity of the UN Command in the Congo. Further, it underscored that the Secretary-General and, above all, the UN Command were directly responsible for the safety and lives of the members of the lawful Congolese Government.

The foul murder of Lumumba and his associates—Senate Chairman Okito and Defence Minister M'Pololo—by the hirelings of the colonialists was further evidence of the reprehensible role played in the Congolese events by Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and by the UN Command in the Congo which was accountable to him.

In its Statement of February 14, 1961 the Soviet Government qualified the murder of Lumumba as an international crime and demanded the stern condemnation of its perpetrators. It demanded the appropriate sanctions, provided for by the UN Charter, against the Belgian aggressor, the arrest and trial of the colonialist agents Tschombe and others, the immediate disarmament of their hired gangs, the cessation of the "UN operation" in the Congo within a month and the immediate evacuation of all foreign troops from that country. Accentuating Hammarskjöld's responsibility as an accomplice and organiser of the killing of the Congolese

* *Pravda*, September 10, 1960.

leaders, the Government of the USSR demanded his removal from the post of UN Secretary-General. It declared that it refused to maintain any relations with Hammarskjöld or recognise him as a UN official.*

On the insistence of the USSR, other socialist countries and many African and Asian states the UN forces were withdrawn from the Congo in early 1963. However, the Western colonialists continued plotting conspiracies against the independence of the Republic of the Congo, erecting obstacles to its independent development. The most intensive activity in that direction was displayed by the US imperialists, who were determined to oust the Belgians and British and take over the key positions in that country.

The Congolese people refused to reconcile themselves to continued foreign imperialist rule enforced through obedient puppet governments.

The anti-national policy of the Adoulla Government evoked, as it inevitably had to, a sharp aggravation of the political situation in the Congo. The economic dislocation led to increasing unemployment, inflation and a drop of the already low standard of living. Large sections of the people voiced their discontent with Adoulla's administration. The Government tried to strengthen its position with military and police measures. At the end of September 1963 President Joseph Kasavubu issued a decree dissolving the parliament, which was disagreeable to the Government. The largest progressive parties were outlawed. Repressions were intensified against the leaders and active members of national patriotic organisations.

In order to suppress all opposition, the ruling clique tried to discredit the leaders of the nationalist parties by depicting them as puppets of communist countries. The Congolese radio and reactionary newspapers started a slander campaign against the USSR and the Soviet Embassy in the Congo. The police in effect blockaded the Embassy and even attacked and manhandled two Soviet diplomats.** The entire staff of the Embassy were declared "personae non grata".***

* *Izvestia*, February 14, 1961.

** *Pravda*, November 22, 1963.

*** *Pravda*, November 24, 1963.

In reply to the arrests and persecutions the nationalist parties set up a united co-ordinating agency—the National Council for Liberation—which called on the people of the Congo to support its actions in defence of the country's genuine independence.

A fresh upsurge of the national liberation struggle began in the Congo. Large detachments of patriots started armed action against the imperialists and their puppets in many provinces.

Finding that the Adoulla Government could not cope with the situation, the imperialists of the USA and Belgium felt that a tested political agent of imperialism like Tschombe was the man to put down the rising in the Congo. Adoulla was pressured into yielding the post of premier to Tschombe in July 1964. When Tschombe returned to the Congo from Europe the Soviet Union drew world attention to the dangerous situation that was taking shape round the Congo and called for measures to prevent another attack on the new republic's independence and integrity by the imperialists and their agents.*

Responding to the formation of a puppet regime the Congolese patriots intensified their struggle and quickly liberated a large part of the Congo. Alarmed by the scale of the popular movement the colonial powers, notably the USA and Belgium, had recourse to direct armed intervention. The USA placed military instructors, armaments and bomber aircraft at Tschombe's disposal, and Belgium sent units of paratroopers. Britain allowed Ascension Island to be used as a base for air raids on territory occupied by the patriots. To save their foundering agents the imperialists sent mercenaries, who had been recruited in different countries (they included Cuban counter-revolutionaries).

On November 24, 1964 the interventionists seized Stanleyville, the centre of the national movement, on the pretext of protecting their nationals and together with Tschombe's mercenaries instituted a reign of terror.

The Belgian paratroopers and mercenaries openly interfered in the Congo's internal affairs in order to throttle freedom.

* *Pravda*, July 7, 1964.

Progressive people throughout the world denounced the crimes of the colonialists in the Congo and demanded an end to the aggression.

In its Statement of November 25, 1964 to the Ambassadors of the USA, Belgium and Britain in Moscow the Soviet Government insisted on the immediate cessation of the military intervention and the evacuation of Belgian troops and foreign mercenaries.

At the same time, the Soviet Government brought this matter up in the Security Council, qualifying the landing of Belgian paratroopers in Stanleyville as a flagrant act of armed intervention by Belgium, the USA and Britain in the Congo's internal affairs and a threat to the freedom and independence of the Congolese and other African peoples. The Soviet Government made it plain that the military intervention had to end and that all Belgian troops and foreign mercenaries pulled out of the Congo.*

The Soviet move was supported by many African and Asian countries. Twenty-one African and Asian states and Yugoslavia demanded an urgent discussion of the Congo issue in the Security Council. In their statements at the discussion the representatives of the USSR, the Congo (Brazzaville), Ghana, the Sudan, Guinea, Mali, Kenya, Tanzania, Egypt, Morocco and other countries convincingly showed that the NATO intervention in the Congo was intolerable interference in Africa's internal affairs, a glaring violation of the UN Charter and a threat to the peace and security of the entire African continent.

On December 30, 1964 the Security Council passed a resolution requiring all countries to refrain from interfering in the Congo's internal affairs and ordering the evacuation of mercenaries from that country.

The struggle of the long-suffering Congolese people for freedom and for the integrity and independence of their country has the support and understanding of the Soviet people, who unchangeably stand up for absolute respect of the sovereignty and independence of all peoples and countries.

* *United Nations. Report of the Security Council*, 16 July 1964-15 July 1965, New York, 1965, p. 57.

6. The USSR and the Independence of Cyprus

The Soviet Union warmly welcomed the proclamation of the independence of Cyprus in August 1960 following the selfless struggle of the island's population against British colonial rule. However, the imperialist states imposed on Cyprus the so-called Zurich and Geneva agreements, which substantially limited the sovereignty of its Government and bound the new republic with a number of shackling commitments. Two large British military bases were preserved on the island. Britain, Greece and Turkey, who pre-empted the right to interfere in the new republic's internal affairs, were declared the "guarantors" of its independence. The imperialists used the fettering commitments forced on Cyprus to interfere in its internal affairs. Acting on the old colonialist recipe of "divide and rule" they provoked clashes between the Greek and Turkish communities. Fanned from without, these armed collisions grew in intensity and there were casualties on both sides. On the pretext of "pacifying" the island the imperialist powers interfered in its internal affairs in an effort to steer the republic away from its neutralist stand and bring it under NATO military and political control. In the Security Council the Soviet Union voted for the resolution, passed on March 4, 1964 at the request of the Cyprus Government, to send United Nations troops to the island to prevent further bloodshed and fighting between the Greek and Turkish communities.

The situation on the island deteriorated sharply in the summer of 1964 when Turkish aircraft bombed some Cypriot towns, following clashes between the Greek and Turkish population.

Washington and London tried to use the aggravated national discord in the republic to put an end to its independence. What worried imperialist diplomacy was that the deteriorating relations between Greece and Turkey as a result of the fighting between the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus had seriously weakened NATO's southern flank.

The Soviet Union consistently supported Cyprus' just cause, championing its independence and the right of all Cypriots, both Greeks and Turks, to decide their destiny by peaceful agreement between the communities, to work in

peace and to strengthen their sovereign country. The Soviet Government repeatedly declared that any attempt to decide Cyprus' internal problems by foreign interference might only lead to a further aggravation of the situation in and around Cyprus.

However, the Western powers continued to stir national feeling among the Greeks and Turks and nurture plans for dividing the island and ending its independence.

.. Soviet Political Relations with and Economic Aid to New Asian and African Countries

As we have already noted, many independent countries emerged as a result of the downfall of the colonial system in Asia and Africa. The USSR warmly welcomed the state sovereignty of nations that had shaken off colonial rule. In the period from 1955 to 1964 it established diplomatic relations with most of the Asian and African states. Common interests in the struggle against imperialism and for the independence of oppressed peoples facilitated friendly relations between the USSR and these countries. These relations are furthered by the personal contacts between Soviet statesmen and the leaders of the Asian and African states.

Between 1957 and 1964 Soviet statesmen visited India, Indonesia, Burma, Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries.

For its part, the Soviet Union played host to statesmen from many Asian countries, including Indian President Rajendra Prasad and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Indonesian President Sukarno, the King of Afghanistan Mohammad Zahir Shah, the Prime Minister of the Coalition Government of Laos Souvanna Phouma, and the Head of State of Cambodia Norodom Sihanouk.

The African statesmen who visited the Soviet Union during the same period included the Presidents of Ghana, Guinea and Mali, the Emperor of Ethiopia, the Prime Ministers of the Sudan, Somalia and Senegal, and various Government and party delegations. In 1963 the Soviet Union was visited by parliamentary delegations from Tunisia, the Congo (Leopoldville), Nigeria and Sierra Leone. Soviet

Government and parliamentary delegations visited many Asian and African countries.

In line with its Leninist foreign policy, which calls for the utmost support for peoples fighting for national liberation, the Soviet Union rendered extensive and diverse assistance to enable these peoples to achieve political and economic independence. This attitude of the Soviet Union emanates from the very nature of the socialist system. Soviet assistance to developing countries is rendered without any political, military or other conditions that are incompatible with the state sovereignty and national interests of these countries. The Soviet Union does not pursue the aim of extracting profits and, even more important, it does not seek to acquire any rights to the enterprises and other projects built with its assistance. Soviet financial assistance is rendered on very favourable terms—at 2-2.5 per cent per annum for a period usually of 12 years. The terms for repaying credits are also eased. They are repaid with the traditional exports or local currency. The capitalist states, on the other hand, grant loans on onerous terms, including conditions of a political character. In accordance with the wishes of the governments of some developing countries the USSR renders them economic and technical assistance mainly in the development of the public sector, which is accorded the premier role in strengthening the economy and the economic independence of these countries.

In particular, the Soviet Union helps many developing countries build a heavy industry, which is the foundation of economic independence.

With a number of African, Asian and other countries the Soviet Union has signed agreements providing for economic and technical assistance for their economic development plans. Such agreements have been signed with India, Indonesia, Burma, Nepal, Ceylon, Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, the Yemen, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and other countries. Agreements on economic and technical co-operation and on the granting of credits have been signed by the Soviet Union with over 20 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.*

With Soviet assistance Asian (excluding socialist states),

* To date 1970 agreements of this kind have been Signed with 38 countries.

African and Latin American countries have built or designed nearly 500 industrial enterprises and other projects. Some 100 projects were completed by the beginning of 1962. By 1963 the Soviet Union had granted India, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Argentina, Bolivia and other developing countries credits amounting to about 3,000 million new foreign-trade rubles for economic development.*

Soviet assistance plays an important role in meeting the financial requirements of many countries for their long-term plans of economic development. For example, 15 per cent of India's foreign currency expenditures on her second five-year plan were covered by Soviet credits. Soviet financial assistance to Egypt amounted to half of the Egyptian Government's expenditures on economic development. The Soviet credits granted to Afghanistan covered over one-third of all the investments channelled into that country's economic development.

Thousands of engineers and skilled workers have been trained for the Asian and African countries at Soviet institutions of higher learning and factories.

In the 1940s the Indian Government futilely sought Western credits for the building of heavy industry enterprises. The necessary credits were offered by the Soviet Government. On February 2, 1955 the Soviet Union and India signed an agreement on the building of an iron and steel works at Bhilai with an annual output capacity of 1,000,000 tons of steel. India was given credits totalling 500 million rubles. Following the completion of the Bhilai works in 1959 a new agreement was signed on increasing its annual output capacity to 2,500,000 tons of steel. Further credits amounting to about 500 million rubles were granted to India in 1957 and 1960 for the building of other industrial enterprises.

"The Bhilai Iron and Steel Works," said the late Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, "exemplifies co-operation between India and the Soviet Union. This co-operation has greatly benefited India not only in the building of factories but also in the training of skilled scientists and engineers."*** After the USSR began helping India build heavy

* *Pravda*, August 7, 1963.

** *Pravda*, June 3, 1959.

industry enterprises, Britain and some other Western powers likewise agreed to grant her credits for iron and steel plants.

The Aswan Dam, a power engineering complex that provides a solid foundation for Egypt's economic development, was built with Soviet economic and technical assistance. The largest national project in Egypt, it was completed in 1970.

The significance of economic assistance from the USSR and other socialist countries is not limited to the direct benefits that it holds out to the developing countries.

Extended on a basis of equality, this assistance strengthens their position in relation to the imperialist powers by compelling the latter to make concessions, grant credits on more favourable terms, and so forth. The better terms that the sovereign Asian, African and Latin American countries sometimes get in the receipt of economic aid from the Western capitalist countries may be regarded as indirect assistance from the Soviet Union.

In the view of the Soviet Union it is lawful and just that the foreign exploiters should return at least part of the wealth they have amassed by exploiting the oppressed peoples, and that these means, returned in the form of aid, should be used by the developing countries to further their economic and cultural advancement and raise the living standard of their people.

The imperialist powers make much of their aid to the developing countries. Actually, this "aid" is fully subordinated to their military and political aims, to their aspiration to preserve their influence in these countries. In effect, the West uses its "aid" to force a new, veiled form of colonial domination on the peoples who have embarked on independent development. Far from helping to promote the national economy, this "aid" steadily undermines the financial and economic position of the developing countries and intensifies their economic dependence.

Soviet economic co-operation with the independent countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America is a major factor consolidating the political independence of these countries and helps them to oppose the aspiration of the Western powers to keep them in economic and political bondage, to keep them in their sphere of influence. When in retaliation for the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Britain, France and the USA imposed an economic blockade on Egypt, severed

trade with her and froze her currency reserves, it was Soviet economic assistance and trade with the USSR and other socialist countries that enabled Egypt to withstand the economic blockade and political pressure of the Western powers.

"We were down to one month's reserve of wheat last winter (1956-57.—*Ed.*)," Nasser told a correspondent of the American magazine *Look*. "We were short of petrol. We needed to sell our cotton. We went to you, but you turned us down. So then the Russians sold us wheat and petrol. They bought our cotton. They helped us survive. Yes, and they helped us escape domination by the West."*

In many regions of Asia and Africa the capitalist states have been deprived of a lever of pressure like a monopoly on trade with the developing countries which they had only had recently in their possession. By expanding trade with the USSR and other socialist countries the developing states are getting a stable and dependable market for their traditional exports. Equal trade based on long-term agreements (usually providing for barter or clearing transactions) helps to strengthen their economies and benefits their trade balance and balance of payments.

Means of production and technical know-how from the Soviet Union are breaking the Western monopoly on exports of capital equipment, which the Western powers had used to reduce the liberated countries to political bondage by new forms of colonial dependence. Soviet financial assistance to these countries delivers them from the pernicious consequences of the monopoly of the industrialised capitalist states on the granting of credits and loans, which are a major instrument of colonial tyranny and exploitation.

Desiring to help the peoples of the Asian, African and Latin American countries put an end to economic backwardness as quickly as possible, the Soviet Union is exploring new effective sources for rendering economic assistance. In particular, it is suggesting that part of the colossal resources being fruitlessly used for financing the arms race should be allocated for this purpose.

The USSR's achievements in economic development create the basis for a further expansion of co-operation with Asian.

* *Look*, June 25, 1957.

African and Latin American countries with the aim of facilitating their independent economic and political development.

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The 1960s witnessed far-reaching advances by the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America. To a considerable extent the way to these advances was cleared by the growth of the socialist community's economic, political and military potential, which in many cases compelled the imperialists to refrain from using force against the liberation struggle. Soviet assistance and support for the developing countries is an effective barrier to the colonial policies of the imperialists and frequently leaves them with no alternative but to make concessions to the liberated peoples.

The Soviet Union undertook a series of major, historic actions in defence of the freedom and independence of nations, in helping to bring about the downfall of the colonial system and in support of the national liberation struggle. In 1960 it moved and secured the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples at the 15th General Assembly. The adoption of that Declaration was a signal triumph of the diplomacy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and a victory of all the freedom-loving peoples of the world.

The defeat of the imperialist aggression against Egypt in 1956 spurred the national liberation movement. Led by the USA, the imperialist powers initiated actions to suppress the popular movements, reverse the national liberation struggle and plant new forms of colonial slavery. The Soviet Government's stern warnings to the USA and its allies, and its Statement that it was prepared to use its armed forces to halt infractions of the peace averted the imperialist aggression against the Syrian Republic in 1957 and prevented the imperialists from overwhelming the Iraqi revolution in 1958. The Soviet Union played a large part in disrupting the plans of the US and British imperialists to restore colonialism in the Arab countries. It relentlessly exposed the aggressive policies of the imperialists and energetically opposed

the attempts to launch military provocations and attacks on the independence of Arab countries (Syria, Iraq, the Lebanon and Jordan) and of Indonesia, the Congo, Cyprus and other states.

The Soviet Union unhesitatingly threw its international prestige and might on the scales in order to halt aggression against any country, big or small. It rendered effective and active assistance to the independence struggle of the peoples of Algeria, the Congo and other countries. It countered the attempts of the imperialists to force the developing states to renounce their independent policy and draw them into military blocs and the orbit of imperialist influence.

While championing peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, Soviet foreign policy combined resolute action against the aggressive policies of the imperialists with diplomatic efforts to settle outstanding issues and conflicts peacefully, by negotiation.

The imperialist policies of the USA and its allies directed against the new independent countries of the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Africa sparked a series of international conflicts in the period from the Anglo-French-Israeli intervention against Egypt to the mid-1960s. It was owing to the flexible and far-sighted policy of the Soviet Union that the world coped with these crises and avoided a major military catastrophe.

Chapter Twenty-Seven

THE STRUGGLE OF THE USSR FOR A GERMAN PEACE SETTLEMENT. CLOSER FRIENDSHIP AND CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE GDR (1955-1964)

In European affairs the year 1955 did not merely mark the end of the first post-war decade. That year summed up as it were the results of the policy of the Four Great Powers in the German question and of the changes that took place in the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic in that period.

The USA, Britain and France persevered in a policy that was fundamentally at variance with the Potsdam and other Allied agreements. This policy culminated in the FRG's admission to NATO and in the placing at its disposal of the means of starting military and ideological preparations for revenge. Playing on the anti-communist orientation of the policies of the USA and its allies, Bonn brought pressure to bear to make its demands for a revision of the results of the Second World War a condition for the easing of tension in the world, for disarmament and the settlement of other major international issues, and even of the promotion of bilateral relations between the NATO members and the Soviet Union. Practically every vital provision of the Potsdam Agreements, the Declaration on the Defeat of Germany and the decisions of the Control Council was flouted in the Federal Republic. The FRG Government sought to act as though Germany's defeat and unconditional surrender were only an episode, a temporary setback, which had overtaken the Third Reich on account, as some West-German publicists suggested, of the belated recognition of the value of

"Atlantic solidarity" by the Americans, British and French.*

The hopes entertained by the peoples that German militarism would be uprooted and economic, political and social life in West Germany would be democratised were betrayed. The countries and peoples of Europe once again found themselves confronted with the task of ensuring their own security.

The two German states thus developed in totally different directions. The German Democratic Republic's peaceableness, readiness for fruitful co-operation in the interests of the German people and peace in Europe, and fidelity to international commitments were opposed by the aggressiveness and adventurism of the Federal Republic of Germany. While socialist and democratic reforms were put into effect in the GDR, the positions of the same monopoly groups that had formed the economic backbone of the Hitler regime were restored and strengthened in the FRG.

Under conditions where both states had emerged in place of the "Third Reich", acquired sovereignty and were bearing the responsibility for their internal affairs, where the FRG and the GDR had become members of opposing military organisations, a new approach had to be devised to the German issue, to the various aspects of that issue. Questions concerning the relations between these two sovereign states are entirely within the competence of the governments of the GDR and the FRG and cannot be resolved by anybody else. It is the function of the Four Great Powers to make sure that the interests of European security are taken into account when the problem of uniting Germany is considered and that the principles of unification conform to the Potsdam and other Allied agreements.

The Conclusion of a German peace treaty and the settlement of the question of West Berlin involve a large group of countries and must, above all, ensure lasting peace, and to that end formalise the results of the Second World War.

Naturally, the struggle over the German question, which sometimes became acute and tense, in many ways determined the relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany and the relations between the Four Great Powers.

* F. Engel. *Handbuch der NATO*. Frankfurt am Main, p. 40.

1. The German Peace Settlement— Key to the German Question and to an Improvement of the Situation in Europe

The FRG's inclusion in NATO laid bare why the West was sabotaging a German peace settlement. The USA, Britain and France felt it was to their advantage to prevent the signing of a treaty: any peace settlement founded on the Potsdam and other Four-Power decisions—no other basis for a peace treaty would be acceptable—would involve a radical rearrangement of their military and political positions. From the very beginning, i.e., even before the FRG was formed, NATO was set up with the calculation that for a long time West Germany would be used as the principal theatre for war preparations against the socialist countries. Any international agreement that would limit the possibility for West Germany's militarisation or, let alone, open the prospect for neutralising her territory was therefore regarded as being alien to the basic strategic concepts of the North Atlantic alliance and even deadly to that alliance.

For its part, the FRG Government went to all lengths to compound the settlement issue, believing that it could use the post-war difficulties to reduce the Allied decision to a worthless scrap of paper and strengthen its military and political positions and influence in the Western bloc. These aims were, under all circumstances, given priority over all other national or international objectives. The pronouncements of the Bonn leaders to the effect that after stepping into one of the premier roles in NATO the FRG would be in a position to settle the German question in a manner agreeable to it either mirrored a totally misguided view of the actual balance of strength in the world and of the prospects for its development or a manoeuvre to obscure the actual objectives of West German policies and create better conditions for obtaining additional concessions from the USA, Britain and France. The proponents of German militarism endeavoured to benefit by the disagreements between the victor powers, evade the responsibility for the crimes perpetrated by the nazis, and in this spirit of non-liability educate the rising generation of Germans, infect

them with ideas of superiority over other peoples and make them prepared to obey their rulers blindly.

In this situation the conclusion of a German peace treaty would not have been merely a formal juridical act that usually demarcates periods of war and peace. The purpose of a peace treaty was to legalise the victory of the forces of freedom and democracy over fascism and militarism and disencumber the relations between countries of the consequences of the war which were burdening the atmosphere in Europe. A peace settlement would have allowed the Germans to exercise their sovereign rights and acquire genuine equality in the family of nations. The signing of a German peace treaty would have made it possible to resolve, by agreement between all the interested countries, the problems of a post-war settlement essential to European security.

Jointly with the governments of other socialist countries, the Soviet Government persevered in its efforts to resolve this issue, aware that in the obtaining complicated international situation, in circumstances where two sovereign German states and a separate political entity—West Berlin—had emerged on the ruins of the Hitler Reich, there neither was nor could be a simple and conventional way to the signing of a German peace treaty. To wait until Germany was united and an all-German Government was formed would mean postponing a peace settlement indefinitely. This could only suit those who wanted to sustain tension in Europe and were building their present and even their future on the precarious soil of the cold war. Besides, there was nothing to justify making a peace settlement dependent on how many German states and governments were in existence—one or two—and on the relations between these governments. The important point was that there were governments that could assume obligations to other countries under a peace treaty. There had to be a realistic policy to these actually existing German governments or an all-German organ set up by them.

The German Democratic Republic made repeated representations to the FRG, proposing co-operation in order to speed up the conclusion of a peace settlement that would open up favourable prospects for resolving the problems in the relations between the GDR and the FRG. On June 27, 1957 the GDR Government published a Statement under the

heading "The Road of the German Nation in Ensuring Peace and Reuniting Germany", in which it expounded the idea of a German Confederation. This would be a voluntary and equal alliance of the two existing German states and, on behalf of the German people, the Confederation would sign a peace treaty with the powers of the anti-Hitlerite coalition. Within the framework of that alliance the GDR and the FRG would pursue a common policy on issues such as non-participation in military blocs, the prohibition of war propaganda, the renunciation of the production, invention and siting of nuclear weapons on German territory, the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of the two states, and the regulation of intra-German trade, transport, cultural relations, and so forth. It was envisaged that in future the competence of the Confederation would spread to other spheres of the political and economic life of the two German states.

There was a wide response to this proposal. It was supported by the Soviet Union and other socialist states. The Soviet Government expressed its readiness to help achieve such a rapprochement if such assistance was required by the FRG and the GDR. Of immense significance here could have been the fact that following the establishment of diplomatic relations with the FRG in 1955 the Soviet Union was the only Great Power with official relations with the two German states.

Judging by press comments, the idea of a Confederation evoked a certain interest even in the USA and some other Western countries, whose leaders were beginning to realise the futility of trying to change the situation in Germany to suit their aims. However, the Americans did not enter into a dispute with the FRG Government when it rejected the proposal for the creation of a German Confederation. Chancellor Adenauer stubbornly clung to a policy of "lost opportunities", disregarding national interests in order to restore German imperialism to its former positions.

A Soviet Memorandum to the USA Government on February 28, 1958 suggested considering the question of a German peace treaty at an international conference of Heads of Government and inviting the governments of the GDR and the FRG to such a conference. This proposal was supported in a Declaration on the international situation and on steps

to ease world tension adopted by the Warsaw Treaty Organisation in Moscow on May 24, 1958.

On September 5, 1958, in view of the fact that the Western powers were obviously putting off a summit meeting, the GDR Government proposed to the USSR, the USA, Britain and France that they should forthwith set up a Four Power commission for consultations on the drawing up of a German peace treaty. It was implied that the GDR and the FRG could be invited to participate in the work of this commission in an appropriate form. The GDR Government suggested that the FRG Government should join it in setting up a commission of representatives of the two states to consider problems linked with the drawing up of a peace treaty and discuss measures aimed at creating a united peace-loving and democratic German state.*

The Soviet Union declared its unequivocal support for the GDR proposal. It expressed the hope that the USA, Britain, France and the FRG would react favourably to the GDR initiative, which was opening the road for a practical settlement of the urgent problem of a German peace treaty.** But, as in the past, the ruling circles of the Western powers remained deaf to the call to close the book of the Second World War with its grave consequences to the European peoples.

In the autumn of 1958 the Soviet Government raised the question of normalising the situation in West Berlin. The city had in fact become a NATO base situated far in the east and directed at the USSR, the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and other peace-loving states. Hardly a day passed without provocations on the frontier between West Berlin and the GDR. Huge quantities of raw materials, manufactured goods and currency were smuggled out of the GDR through West Berlin. Specialists were lured and inventions and scientific discoveries were stolen via the same route. This inflicted a huge material loss on the GDR amounting to at least 3,500 million marks annually.

During the years of occupation West Berlin had become a concentration point of imperialist intelligence and subver-

* *Neues Deutschland*, September 6, 1958.

** *Izvestia*, September 20, 1958.

sive agencies—US, British, French and West German—the equal of which could hardly be found in the world.

The city, which had witnessed the greatest triumph of the joint struggle of the powers belonging to the anti-Hitler coalition, became a source aggravating the contradictions between them and one of the most dangerous sources of disagreement and conflict.

On November 27, 1958 the Soviet Government put to the USA, Britain, France and the two German states the question of abolishing the outworn foreign military occupation of West Berlin and turning it into a free demilitarised city.

Under the protocols of September 12 and November 14, 1944 of the European advisory Commission and subsequent agreements between the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition, Berlin, as the capital of the former nazi Reich and the headquarters of the Control Council (the supreme authority for the whole of Germany), was to be jointly occupied by the Four Powers and was to have a special administration. Territorially, economically, politically and administratively Berlin was part of the Eastern zone. But the Western occupation of West Berlin continued after the Control Council ceased to function. It became one of the main centres for subversion against the GDR and all the other countries of the socialist community.

Of course, it would have been most reasonable to return West Berlin, artificially isolated by the three Western powers, to the GDR. But for the sake of peace and improving the situation in Europe the GDR Government made a major sacrifice by agreeing to West Berlin's existence as an independent free city.

After the war the three Western powers came to Berlin in accordance with the agreement on the Four-Power administration and control of Germany. Under the Allied accords the purpose of the occupation was to effect Germany's demilitarisation and democratisation. These agreements bound the signatory powers to carry out the Allied decisions on Germany's political and economic reorganisation with the aim of turning her into a peace-loving, democratic state. But the USA, Britain and France flouted their Allied obligations with regard to Germany's demilitarisation and on all other essential counts, sticking only to those points in the agree-

ments that allowed them to keep occupation troops in the Western sectors of Berlin.

None of the Four-Power agreements provided for the indefinite and unconditional occupation of Germany or any part of her territory. On the contrary, the agreement on the control mechanism in Germany plainly stipulated that the occupation of Germany and all the Allied organs of control and administration would be temporary and abolished as soon as Germany fulfilled the basic points of the unconditional surrender.*

The Soviet Note showed the untenability of the Western powers' attempts to bury in oblivion the fundamental points of the Four-Power agreements on Germany regarding her demilitarisation, denazification and democratisation and preserve only what suited them in these agreements, namely, the presence of their troops in West Berlin. "When the Western powers began to arm West Germany and turn her into a weapon of their policy directed against the Soviet Union", the Note stated, "the substance of the Allied agreement on Berlin was invalidated upon its violation by three of the signatories, who used this agreement against the fourth signatory, the Soviet Union. Under these conditions it would be ludicrous to expect the Soviet Union or, in its place, any other power to pretend not to notice the changes that have taken place. . . . It should be clear to every sensible person that the Soviet Union cannot preserve in West Berlin a situation that prejudices its legitimate interests, its security and the security of other socialist countries."***

The proposal for turning West Berlin into a free demilitarised city was the best possible solution of the problem in view of West Berlin's position as an enclave in the GDR with a different state and social system than in the territory surrounding it. In making this proposal the Soviet Union sought to avert a painful break-up of the way of life in West Berlin and to do everything in its power to allow a change in the status of West Berlin to take place according to peace-time requirements, in a calm situation without fric-

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Protocol of the European Advisory Commission (45), 2nd sitting, May 1, 1945.

** *Izvestia*, November 28, 1958.

tion and with the maximum consideration for the interests of the sides involved.

The Soviet Union suggested giving the free city reliable international guarantees of the freedom of choice of the social system by its population and also of unobstructed communication with all countries and of the city's economic viability. All that was needed was the recognition of the city as an independent political entity and guarantees preventing its territory from being used for hostile, subversive activity and propaganda against other countries. This would have benefited, above all, the West Berliners themselves, who were tired of the burden of living in a "front-line city".

The idea of turning West Berlin into a free city was included in the Soviet draft of a German peace treaty which was submitted for consideration to the interested governments and peoples.*

The Soviet Government called upon the Western powers to end the deadlock over the differences that arose after the victorious termination of the war, to end the needless polemic and begin working on practical solutions in accordance with realities. Having no desire to see the world divided into vanquished and victors and harbouring no feeling of vengeance toward its war-time enemies, the Soviet Union formulated its draft of a peace treaty in such a way as to give fair consideration to the interests of the German people and the countries that had been the victims of nazi aggression. The Soviet draft envisaged restoring full sovereignty to the German people. It did not make any terms that were incompatible with the national dignity of the Germans. It recorded and formalised the existing frontiers.

The draft gave recognition to Germany's right to maintain the armed forces necessary for her defence and provided for some military restrictions, namely, the non-participation of Germany, which had started two world wars, in military groups directed against any of the countries that had belonged to the anti-Hitler coalition, and the prohibition of the manufacture of nuclear and rocket weapons in Germany

* *Pravda*, January 11, 1959.

and of the equipment of the German armed forces with such weapons. These natural and understandable commitments did not diminish the possibilities and rights of the Germans to contribute towards collective security in Europe.

As the lawful successors of the former German Reich the GDR and the FRG expressed German interests in world affairs. For that reason the Soviet proposals made it plain that they, and only they, should represent the German side at a peace conference. Needless to say, if a German Confederation were formed by the time the conference opened, the peace treaty would be signed by the Confederation.

The Soviet Government urged that a peace conference should be convened as early as possible, naming Warsaw or Prague as the venue. It stated that it would agree to Four-Power talks provided the GDR and the FRG, as the countries directly concerned, were represented at the talks.

These were the principal points of the Soviet proposal of January 10, 1959 on a German peace settlement.

The Soviet initiative opened a new chapter of the struggle of the socialist countries for world peace and security, and it had the broadest response throughout the world. Progressive opinion saw in the Soviet plan the hope for a radical change for the better in the international situation.

But the prospect for eliminating the survivals of the Second World War precipitated a fit of bellicose hysteria in the capitals of some NATO powers, particularly in Bonn.

The Soviet Union declared it was prepared to work with the USA and its allies to draw up terms for a peace settlement that would satisfy all the interested countries. Nevertheless, the Western powers alleged that they had been presented with an ultimatum.

The Soviet Union suggested normalising the situation in West Berlin. But US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles demanded that the city be "defended", saying the USA would not permit its "surrender". Matters reached a point where the Americans threatened that the Western powers would not recognise GDR sovereignty over the communications of West Berlin, that they would ignore GDR control and fight their way to West Berlin. Violent passions were

aroused over the conclusion of a German peace treaty and over the settlement of the West Berlin issue on the basis of the treaty.

However, even those who fulminated against an agreement did not risk getting the peoples to regard them as open adversaries of negotiations. Therefore since negotiations could not be avoided, various manoeuvres were set on foot to preclude any chance of agreement at these negotiations. Adenauer and his associates demanded that a peace settlement should be made conditional on a Four-Power agreement on Germany's reunification in accordance with the Bonn programme of absorbing the GDR, and on the solution of the extremely complex problems of disarmament and European security. A vicious circle was thus created deliberately.

The main argument of the opponents to a peace treaty was that there was nobody to sign such a treaty with. They contended that the Germany that had fought the anti-Hitler coalition had been defeated and that it no longer existed, and that neither the GDR nor the FRG, together or singly, had the authority to replace the former Germany. These were far-fetched arguments. But the FRG and the GDR are active in international affairs. Each has signed many international treaties as a sovereign state. The USA and other Western powers have themselves signed various treaties, including the military Paris agreements, with the FRG. According to the logic of the Western powers, the German states could sign agreements on participation in military preparations but they did not have the competence to deal with questions concerning the post-war peace settlement and undertake peace commitments on behalf of Germany.

In 1959 they studiously avoided mentioning the pronouncements they had made ten years earlier regarding a German peace treaty. In a document on the drawing up of a peace treaty with Germany, submitted by the US delegation at the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1946, it was stated that there was no need for a German Government that would accept a settlement.* The Hoover Plan, which was discussed in US Government quarters in

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Foreign Ministers Council. Document 46/211 of July 9, 1946.

1947, called for the creation of a separate West German state and for the conclusion of a peace treaty with it.* In September 1949 none other than Federal Chancellor Adenauer himself urged the conclusion of a peace treaty between West Germany and the Western powers, stressing that this was "very important" on the argument that there would evidently have to be a long wait before a peace treaty was concluded with the participation of the USSR.** At the close of 1952 the leadership of the West German Social-Democratic Party likewise suggested that a peace settlement, on the pattern of the peace treaties with Italy and Japan, should be signed by the FRG with the Western powers.

Consequently the Western powers had not regarded Germany's division as an insuperable obstacle to a peace settlement. On the contrary, they felt a peace settlement could be worked out regardless of whether an all-German Government existed or not. What was it that actually induced them to object to the Soviet proposals for a peace settlement? As in previous year, in 1959 the attitude of the USA and its allies mirrored what on the whole was a single political line: they sought to settle the German question in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. In the German issue they pursued a separate line which had nothing in common with the Four-Power Allied agreements.

On February 17, 1959 the Soviet Government declared that if a peace treaty was not signed with the two German states it would sign a treaty with the Government of the German Democratic Republic with all the ensuing consequences to, among other things, the occupation regime in West Berlin, and that violation of the GDR's sovereignty would receive a determined rebuff regardless of where such a violation occurred—at sea, on land or in the air.

* Similar recommendations were made by Lewis H. Brown, who toured Germany in the spring of 1947 as a representative of a group of leading US financial and industrial monopolies (Lewis H. Brown, *A Report on Germany*, New York, 1947).

** *Manchester Guardian*, September 9, 1949.

Influential circles in the West gradually came round to asking themselves whether, after all, there was a way out of the situation on the basis of agreement as suggested by the Soviet Union. The attempts to use a tough language to the USSR had obviously been ill-advised. Dulles declared that US policy was reckoning with the fact that there were two German states and that recognition or non-recognition of the GDR was only a question of political expediency. He went on to say that the notorious "free elections", which Western diplomacy had been speaking about for almost a decade, was not mandatory and not the only way to a reunited Germany.

In Britain there was perhaps an even greater awareness of the need to look for an accord with the Soviet Union on the German question. At the talks during the official visit to the USSR by British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan on February 21-March 3, 1959, it was recognised by both the Soviet and British sides that an early settlement of the problems relating to Germany, including a peace treaty and the Berlin issue, were "of great importance for the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security in Europe and throughout the world." They agreed that there had to be early negotiations between the interested governments to overcome the differences between them.*

The idea of negotiations was thus forcing its way despite the resistance of the opponents of an agreement.

An indication of the public mind in West Germany in that period was the FRG Social-Democratic Party's "plan on the German question", which was based on the reality of the existence of two German states. The plan gave recognition to the fact that in the unification of Germany no progress could be achieved without the active participation of the Germans themselves, without a rapprochement and co-operation between the FRG and the GDR.** However, this plan was soon buried in oblivion by its authors: in the leadership of the Social-Democratic Party the upper hand was gained by the most diehard, Right-wing elements who preferred not to quarrel with Adenauer.

* *Izvestia*, March 4, 1959.

** *Izvestia*, April 5, 1959.

2. Talks Between the Soviet Union and Other Countries Interested in Settling the German Question.

The Soviet initiative led to a Foreign Ministers conference, which sat in Geneva from May to August 1959. In addition to the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the USA, Britain and France, the conference was attended by the Foreign Minister of the GDR and a representative of the FRG.

The conference was convened to clear the ground for the adoption of an agreed decision on the signing of a German peace treaty and, on that basis, to normalise the situation in West Berlin. The Soviet and GDR delegations tried to get the conference to focus on a discussion of the proposals for a peace treaty. But as soon as the conference opened it was found that the Western Foreign Ministers had come to Geneva with a bagful of reservations and objections to an early peace settlement.

The US, British and French Foreign Ministers obdurately evaded considering the provisions of the Soviet draft of a peace treaty, confining themselves to remarks to the effect that the draft was much too "tough" toward Germany. They saw this "toughness" chiefly in the proposal that Germany should not participate in military blocs and that there should be no foreign troops and military bases on her territory.

The Soviet Foreign Minister explained that the USSR did not object to the FRG and the GDR remaining temporarily members of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation respectively. In view of the Western objections the Soviet Union suggested recording in the peace treaty a commitment by the Four Powers to help the FRG and the GDR reunite Germany.

But the efforts of the USSR to reconcile the positions of the sides did not meet with any response. The fluid phrases of the Western Foreign Ministers about generosity to a vanquished country did not conceal the war plans and mercenary calculations of each and all the members of the aggressive North Atlantic bloc. Wilhelm G. Grewe, who represented the FRG at the Geneva conference, admitted in September 1959: "Nobody can deny that the postponement

of the peace settlement for more than 14 years after the termination of hostilities has many serious drawbacks and even constitutes a certain threat to peace and international security. To secure a lasting peace it is indisputably necessary to achieve a final settlement of all the outstanding issues that may lead to war or which sprang from war.”^{*} But that was exactly what the FRG ruling circles wished to avoid. They bent every effort to maintain hotbeds of tension in the hope of whipping tension up into war when they were ready for revenge.

Neither prior, during, nor after the 1959 Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference did the Western powers explain how they pictured a post-war settlement, what commitments had to be undertaken by Germany and how the other war-engendered problems had to be resolved. They preferred to remain silent, for to show their hand would have meant unmasking themselves as accomplices of the West German militarists and revenge-seekers.

At Geneva instead of proposals for a peace settlement, the Western powers brought up for discussion what they termed as a “package plan”, in which were bundled the most diverse questions related to Germany, disarmament and European security. In order to achieve progress in any one of these questions there had to be agreement on all the others. This alone made the settlement of these questions impracticable.

Moreover, it was suggested that a peace treaty should be concluded last, after Germany's reunification on Western terms. It was declared that a reunited Germany had to have complete freedom to decide its internal and external affairs. Behind these florid words was the intention to give Germany the right to participate in military blocs and to allow its territory to be used for foreign military bases and for the stationing of foreign troops. The aim of the “package plan” was not only to perpetuate the occupation regime in West Berlin but to deprive the GDR of its capital and spread the occupation regime to the whole of Berlin.

The Western plan contained points (the setting up of an all-German committee, the adoption of a declaration on

^{*} Wilhelm G. Grewe, *Deutsche Aussenpolitik der Nachkriegszeit*, Stuttgart, 1960, p. 259.

a peaceful settlement of all international issues, the reduction of the armed forces of the Four Powers to a certain level, and so on) which the USSR and the GDR delegations felt could be discussed. However, the three Western Foreign Ministers declined to explain their stand on these acceptable elements of the "package plan", thereby making it clear that these points were only a propaganda move and by no means evidence of a readiness to reach agreement.

One of the questions studied at the Geneva Conference was the normalisation of the situation in West Berlin. The Soviet delegation suggested that it should be resolved on the basis of a peace treaty, showing that it was necessary to terminate the occupation regime and turn West Berlin into a free demilitarised city. The Soviet Government had carefully elaborated the question of providing the most reliable international guarantees of West Berlin's independence up to and including the temporary stationing in it, as guarantors, of symbolic contingents of troops of the Four Powers or of neutral countries. In its turn, the GDR Government officially stated its agreement to ensure West Berlin's unobstructed communication with the rest of the world.

The USA, Britain and France recognised that the situation in West Berlin was abnormal. They reiterated that the city was not part of the FRG and that the competence of the West German authorities did not spread to it. However, they objected to turning West Berlin into a free city and to the evacuation of occupation troops from it. US Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Dulles' successor, declared that although the rights of the Three Powers in Berlin had arisen out of the war, their commitments stemmed from the trusteeship they had undertaken to exercise in relation to the population of Berlin until Germany's reunification removed the need for Western protection. The US Government pursued a twofold aim: to exercise the rights springing from the Four-Power agreements on Germany and create a new legal basis for its presence in West Berlin in accordance with NATO decisions.

Wishing to create the foundation for agreement, the Soviet Government suggested the phased normalisation of the situation in West Berlin and, in parallel, the drawing up of a peace treaty and the charting of steps to reunite Germany. Essentially, this suggestion boiled down to the following.

An all-German Committee of representatives of the two German states would be set up to work out the measures that would lead to Germany's reunification and the signing of a peace treaty. While the Committee was thus engaged (in the course of a year or eighteen months), the following modifications would be introduced into West Berlin's status: the numerical strength of the Western garrisons would be reduced, all subversive activities and propaganda against other countries would be halted in the city, and the siting of nuclear weapons and missiles in West Berlin would be banned. If within the set time-limit the GDR and the FRG did not reach agreement on the issues involved, the participants in the Geneva Conference would consider what to do.

The GDR Government recommended that in addition to an all-German Committee there should be a Four-Power Committee to draw up the peace treaty. Acceptance of this recommendation would have hastened a peace settlement, and it had the support of the Soviet delegation.

A certain rapprochement was achieved at the discussion of a provisional agreement on individual points. Nevertheless, no agreement was reached in view of the refusal of the Three Powers and, above all, the FRG, to set up an all-German Committee. The Geneva Conference was closed on August 5, 1959.

The debate on a peace treaty and on West Berlin at the Geneva Conference mirrored two distinct policies. The Soviet Union was out to preserve peace and meet the vital interests of the peoples. The Western powers, on the other hand, preferred a situation marked by war hysteria, which helped them to turn the FRG into NATO's main nuclear-missile base and use West Berlin for purposes hostile to the socialist countries and the cause of peace.

The Soviet Union's sincere desire for peaceful coexistence and for a settlement of outstanding issues kindled hopes throughout the world for changes for the better. The peoples saw that there was a realistic possibility of easing tensions and consolidating peace. This and the change in the world balance of strength in favour of socialism made many Western statesmen reconsider their attitude to problems of war and peace. In the USA, the leading country of the capitalist world, it was being gradually realised that Bonn's revanchist ambitions were pushing the USA into an open conflict with

the Soviet Union and that it was time to take a sober look at the modern world with all its diversities.

One of the main points discussed at the meeting between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the US President in the autumn of 1959 was, naturally, the signing of a peace treaty and the normalisation of the situation in West Berlin.

At this meeting the Soviet side reiterated its readiness to restore trust and co-operation between the powers that had defeated fascism in the Second World War. It was emphasised that joint efforts were needed to end the state of war with Germany. A settlement on that score would, at the same time, resolve the problem of West Berlin. It was stated that if the Western powers were not prepared to achieve a post-war settlement immediately, a provisional agreement could be worked out to give the GDR and the FRG another opportunity to work out the ways for Germany's reunification within a set time limit. If they failed to reach agreement, a peace treaty would have to be signed with the GDR and the FRG.

In official pronouncements and in conversations Eisenhower admitted that the situation in West Berlin was abnormal and that it had to be set right. He asserted that the USA had no intention of perpetuating its military presence in that city and was prepared to come to an arrangement that would give it an honourable way of pulling out its troops. He made it clear that he neither believed in an early reunification of Germany nor had any sympathy for such a development. He did not deny that in the obtaining situation the USSR had the right to sign a peace treaty with the GDR but he tried to secure the preservation of the USA's occupation privileges in West Berlin. He said he was prepared to look for agreement that would safeguard the interests of the USSR, the Western powers, East and West Germany and West Berlin. It was arranged that the "talks on the Berlin question would be resumed, that no time-limit would be set but that they should not be delayed indefinitely".

The governments of the GDR and other socialist countries gave their full backing to the Soviet Union's efforts to achieve a German peace settlement that would accord with the interests of world security and relax tension in Europe.

The prospect of a settlement spurred the proponents of the "positions of strength" policy. The greatest zeal in that direction was displayed by the ruling circles of the FRG. Adenauer toured the USA and Japan in an obvious effort to mobilise the warmongers in order to wreck all possibility of an agreement with the Soviet Union. If NATO, he said, wished to prove its strength it should not yield an inch and should not allow any change in the existing status of West Berlin.

On the eve of a Four-Power summit, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR paid a state visit to France where he had useful talks with President de Gaulle. At these talks both sides recognised that a successive negotiated settlement of questions related to Germany, including a peace treaty and the Berlin issue, would be an important factor strengthening European and world peace and security.

It was found that the views of the USSR and France concurred on some major issues. It was the opinion of both the Soviet and French governments that the German frontiers established after the Second World War were final. President de Gaulle reiterated his statement, made in the autumn of 1958, that the Germans should "not question the present frontiers in the West, East, North and South". The two sides agreed that the situation in West Berlin had to be normalised. As de Gaulle noted on April 1, 1960, the two governments had no irreconcilable differences over the German question.

The Four-Power summit in Paris, scheduled to begin on May 16, 1960, was to be a major landmark in the settlement of the German question and in the improvement of East-West relations. But that meeting, which was awaited with hope by all nations, was torpedoed by the reactionary circles in the USA. Aided by Bonn, these circles instituted measures that were deliberately aimed at wrecking a German peace settlement and aggravating the general situation.

The Adenauer Government and the US reactionaries went to all lengths to make it difficult to resume contacts between states on key international issues. Their actions—from the stepped up arming of the Bundeswehr and the plans of forming a multilateral NATO nuclear force to the increasingly more brazen provocations in West Berlin—were clearly aimed at compelling the socialist countries to adopt unilateral decisions on the German question.

The Soviet Union unswervingly pursued its policy of exploring every possibility of resolving the problem of a German peace treaty in a manner agreeable to all the participants in the anti-Hitler coalition.

It established genuinely fraternal relations with the German Democratic Republic and offered friendship and peace to the Federal Republic of Germany. It called upon the FRG to join the efforts being made by many countries to settle outstanding issues with the aim of putting an end to the cold war and replacing the sinister threat of a nuclear-missile war with lasting peace.

However, the Adenauer Government was unable to dissociate itself from policies calling for a revision of the results of the Second World War. It thought along the line of "imperial" categories that had brought the "Third Reich" to catastrophe and wanted not peaceful coexistence with socialist countries but to "drive Soviet Russia out of central Europe".

In a Memorandum of February 17, 1961 to the FRG Government the Government of the Soviet Union set forth the fundamental issues in Soviet-West German relations that had to be settled. "We," the Memorandum stated, "wish to conduct peace talks not behind the back of the German people and not at the expense of their legitimate rights, but with the most direct participation of the Germans themselves and with due respect and consideration for their national interests. In working out its proposals for a peace settlement with Germany the Soviet Government maintained close contact with the German Democratic Republic. We are prepared to enter into appropriate talks with the Government of the Federal Republic at any time."* While describing the Soviet Memorandum as "the most important document in the entire history of relations between the FRG and USSR", the Adenauer Government nonetheless clung to its old policies.

The defeat of the Republican Party at the presidential elections in the USA in November 1960 and the assumption of the US presidency by John F. Kennedy, who had urged the normalisation of relations between countries, created new conditions for resuming contacts on questions connected with the conclusion of a German peace treaty. The Soviet pro-

* *Pravda*, March 4, 1961.

posals on these questions gave the Kennedy Administration wide possibilities for looking for mutually acceptable decisions and giving effect to the intentions declared in its policy statements.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR had talks with the US President in Vienna on July 3-4, 1961. The Soviet side repeated that it was prepared to sign a peace treaty that recorded the post-war situation, legally formalised the existing German frontiers and, on the basis of a reasonable account of the interests of the sides, normalised the situation in West Berlin. If for various reasons the Western powers were not prepared to sign a single peace treaty with the GDR and the FRG, treaties could be concluded with each of these states individually. In that case the participants in the anti-Hitler coalition would sign one of two treaties at their discretion. In the event some countries did not sign the German peace treaty, it would be signed without them and the question of West Berlin would be resolved on its basis.

With the enforcement of the peace treaty the Western powers would found their relations with the GDR in accordance with the legal norms in operation throughout the world. Naturally, this would apply to access to West Berlin by the lines of communication belonging to the German Democratic Republic.

The Vienna meeting led to better understanding on a number of important problems and of the intentions of the two sides. Further, it showed how difficult it was for the US ruling circles to switch to a realistic approach to international problems.

There was a dual reaction in the West to the Soviet Government Statement calling for the speediest conclusion of a German peace treaty. The aggressive circles, particularly in the USA and the FRG, used this Statement as the pretext for intensifying war preparations up to and including the mobilisation of reservists and the organisation of a vile campaign of slander against the Soviet Union. However, more people in the West began to demand a reasonable settlement of outstanding issues by negotiation. In August and September 1961 Moscow was visited by Italian Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani, some prominent French statesmen and the Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak.

The talks with these and other leaders showed that there was deep anxiety among all sections of the people in capitalist Europe, particularly in the small countries, on account of the dangerous policies pursued by the Pentagon and the Bonn revanchists and also of the military and political actions being planned by the Western powers within the NATO framework. The pressure for talks and agreement with the socialist countries mounted with the exposure of the policy of "intimidation" and as more people began to see that this policy was totally untenable.

3. The GDR Takes Steps to Protect Its Frontier With West Berlin. The USSR and the USA Exchange Views on a German Peace Settlement

In the summer of 1961, in reply to the Soviet proposal for putting an end to the remnants of the Second World War, the imperialists decided to create a highly dangerous situation in central Europe. This situation arose at a time when only a determined rebuff could safeguard the interests of the socialist states and make the imperialists see reason.

Consultations were held between the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation in early August 1961 in order to work out steps that could normalise the situation in Berlin.

As a result of these consultations it was recommended that the GDR "establish on the frontiers of West Berlin a procedure that would reliably close the road to subversion against the countries of the socialist community; that it should set up a reliable system of protection and effective control round the entire territory of West Berlin, including its frontier with democratic Berlin".* On August 12, 1961 the GDR Council of Ministers passed a decision on ensuring the security and defence of the GDR by intensifying the measures of protection and control at the frontiers with the western sectors of Greater Berlin.

On August 13, 1961, using the right enjoyed by every sovereign state to protect its frontiers, the GDR established

* *Pravda*, August 14, 1961.

a system of strict control on the frontiers with West Berlin, thereby substantially crippling the subversive activities that were being conducted from that city against socialist countries.*

The US, British and French commandants in Berlin complained to the Soviet military authorities. Replying to their letters on August 18 the Soviet commandant in Berlin wrote that the Kommandatura of the Soviet garrison in Berlin did not interfere in the affairs of the GDR capital. He explained that the measures taken by the GDR Government were "aimed at safeguarding the interests of the entire socialist community as had been stated by the countries of that community in their joint address to the German Democratic Republic".**

The just measures taken by the GDR to protect its state frontiers sparked a burst of fury in the West. A hysterical campaign was started in West Germany against the GDR. The campaign was joined by the reactionaries in the USA, Britain, France and some other countries. Fascist-type thugs stormed and raged in the Western sector of the city at the Brandenburg Gates. Fire and fury were breathed by entrepreneurs who were deprived of the possibility of exploiting people who lived in the democratic capital of the GDR and worked in West Berlin. The district committees of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany in West Berlin were raided by hooligans. The threats against the GDR were accompanied by preparations in the armed forces of the USA, Britain and France. The military machine of the aggressive NATO bloc was readied for action. The Western powers deliberately pushed the world to the brink of war in order to impose their will on the socialist community.

The Soviet Government gave the necessary backing to the steps taken by the GDR. When American tanks approached the frontier dividing Berlin they found Soviet

* Hundreds of currency exchange offices and other establishments engaged in profiteering and subversion against the GDR were closed after control posts had been set up on the frontiers between the GDR and West Berlin. There was a virtual exodus of capital, scientific cadres and specialists from West Berlin to the FRG. A total of 266 firms transferred their main offices from West Berlin to the FRG in the period from 1962 to 1966 (*Berliner Zeitung*, February 2, 1967).

** *Pravda*, August 21, 1961.

and GDR tanks on the other side. At the same time, the Soviet Union instituted measures to strengthen its own defence capability. In the autumn of 1961 the budget allocations for defence were increased, the reduction of the Soviet Army's numerical strength was halted and the demobilisation of servicemen who had completed their term of conscription was temporarily postponed. Lastly, new types of super-powerful nuclear weapons were tested.

The firm rebuff that was given to the imperialist intrigues by the socialist countries cooled more than one hothead. The USA and its allies had to reckon with the reality of the reinforced protection and control on the frontiers with West Berlin. Soon the US Government suggested that the USSR should join it in considering the questions subject to a settlement and the possible conclusion of a German peace treaty. American and some other representatives of the Western powers said that after an agreed decision had been reached on these questions the West would accept the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and the GDR.

In order to achieve an agreed settlement of post-war problems the Soviet Union raised no objections to this approach. In a conversation with Spaak on September 19, 1961 the Head of the Soviet Government stressed that for the USSR the important thing was not the form but the content of agreement: reasonable treaties were better than headlong fights. The Soviet Union was against endless procrastination, but it was also against fatal time-limits for the achievement of a German peace settlement.* From the standpoint of the most acute and direct interests of the USSR, the GDR and other socialist countries the question of a German peace treaty was no longer as urgent as it was before the defensive measures had been taken in Berlin.

In the autumn of 1961 and in the course of 1962 a series of meetings took place between Soviet and American representatives in New York, Washington and Geneva. They discussed the issues that had to be resolved in connection with a German peace settlement. One of these issues was the normalisation of the situation in West Berlin by ending

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*. Record of a conversation on September 19, 1961 between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium Paul-Henri Spaak.

the occupation regime and replacing the occupation troops with troops of neutral countries or the UN, who would be stationed in the city for a stated period. This would turn West Berlin from a NATO military outpost and centre of subversion against the GDR and other socialist countries into a free city. Another issue was that of ensuring respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, in particular in providing access to West Berlin. The Soviet Government declared that without respect for the sovereignty of the GDR no agreement could be reached with the Western powers on the problems they were interested in.

The formal recognition of the existing frontiers of the two German states had to be a *sine qua non* of an agreement. Further, there was the question of the nuclear non-armament of the two German states. Actually, it was a question of the non-arming of the FRG Bundeswehr, for the GDR Government had already stated it would not equip its army with nuclear weapons provided a similar commitment was made by West Germany.

Lastly, a vital question was that of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

The Soviet-American talks led to a rapprochement on many points of the post-war settlement arrangement. They included formal recognition for the existing German frontiers, respect for the sovereignty of the GDR, the non-arming of the GDR and the FRG with nuclear weapons and the conclusion of some form of agreement on non-aggression between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

A major obstacle to agreement was the question of the status of West Berlin. Properly speaking, the bone of contention was not the question of troops in West Berlin but of the status of these troops and of how long they would remain in the city. The Soviet Government suggested that the troops in West Berlin should not represent NATO, that the NATO flag in West Berlin should be replaced with the flag of the United Nations, and that organisation should undertake certain international obligations and functions in the city. The USA continued to insist on the presence in West Berlin of troops of the three occupying powers, i.e., troops belonging to NATO members. Under these conditions the change in West Berlin's legal juridical status, to which the USA and Britain agreed, would in fact only

signify a change of signboard, the elimination of an outworn form without any guarantee that the situation would be brought into line with the requirements of the day.

The Western attitude made it impossible to reach agreement on problems inherited from the Second World War. On account of the policies pursued by the USA and its allies the hopes of the European peoples for a fundamental improvement of the situation in the continent were not destined to come true. On the other hand, it was becoming increasingly evident that the reactionary forces were unable to effectuate their plans in the German question and infringe upon the interests of the GDR and other socialist states. The Adenauer-Dulles policy had come to a dead end.

4. Further Strengthening of Fraternal Relations Between the USSR and the GDR. The USSR-GDR Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Co-operation

In the period from 1955 to 1964 there was further marked progress in the relations between the USSR and the GDR in all spheres.

Trade grew steadily, while scientific and technical links and also specialisation and co-operation between factories and whole industries became closer and more diversified. For instance, in the period from 1950 to 1963 trade increased more than sevenfold and exceeded the volume of trade between the USA and West Germany. Fruitful economic co-operation and exchanges of scientific information and production know-how helped to speed up technical progress and the development of the productive forces in the two countries.

Moreover, there were mutually profitable exchanges in culture, art, the health services, education and sports. Closer contact was established between public and creative organisations of the two countries.

Common aims in the struggle for peace and security, for the freedom of nations and social progress provided the foundation for unwavering, friendly co-operation between the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Central

Committee of the SUPG and between the governments of the USSR and the GDR. Practically every important proposal made by the two countries on European security, a German peace settlement, disarmament and other key problems was, before it was made public, the subject of consultations or friendly exchanges of opinion, or the result of a joint study of the obtaining situation.

Signed on June 12, 1964, the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Co-operation was an expression of the steady development of fraternal, friendly relations between the two countries. This historic achievement of the two peoples serves their vital interests, the interests of the entire socialist community and the interests of European peace and security and it was recorded in the treaty, in which were embodied the principles of complete equality, mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and socialist internationalism.

In face of the threat of aggression from the forces of militarism and revenge, the USSR and the GDR solemnly declared in the treaty that the integrity of the state frontiers of the GDR was one of the basic factors of European security. They reaffirmed their determination jointly to ensure the inviolability of these frontiers in accordance with the Warsaw Treaty and to take all necessary measures to prevent aggression on the part of the forces seeking to revise the results of the Second World War.

The treaty created the conditions for the further promotion of all-sided co-operation and relations of brotherhood and solidarity between the USSR and the GDR. The treaty thus embodied in practice the Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism in the relations between the USSR and other socialist countries, and was a contribution to the cause of peace and European security.

The efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to strengthen European security and settle the German problem helped to foster the trend towards a relaxation of tension in Europe. The awareness of the threat harboured in the revanchist and militarist policies of the FRG and in

the interference by non-European powers in Europe's internal affairs prompted the European peoples to demand the establishment of broad peaceful coexistence and an end to the continent's division into opposing military and political groups.

The struggle for a peace settlement and for safeguarding the historic gains achieved by the peoples in the Second World War and as a result of subsequent far-reaching social changes forming the make-up of modern Europe united the socialist countries. It promoted amity between the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary and other fraternal socialist states.

Chapter Twenty-Eight

THE USSR AND OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY IN 1957-1970

The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government continued to give every attention to strengthening the might and cohesion of the socialist community, to deepening, extending and improving all forms of co-operation between the socialist countries. In the Central Committee report to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU it is noted that the "CC CPSU puts forward for the future as one of the main orientations of the Party and the Soviet state in the sphere of foreign policy the development and consolidation of ideological, political and organisational bonds with the Communist parties of all the socialist countries based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism; the development and consolidation of political, economic and other bonds between the USSR and the socialist states; the promotion in every possible way of the cohesion of the socialist community and the strengthening of its might and influence".* This provision received unanimous approval at the congress.

1. Further Development and Improvement of Economic Co-operation Between the USSR and Other Socialist Countries

A conference of the Communist and Workers' parties of the CMEA member states in May 1958 gave further momentum to the development of economic co-operation be-

* 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1966, p. 18.

tween the USSR and other socialist states. It was attended also by representatives of the Communist Party of China, the Workers' Party of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Korean Workers' Party and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. This conference passed a resolution stating that in a situation in which the economic relations between socialist states had made considerable progress and become all-embracing, particularly great importance was attached to "deeper specialisation and co-operation of inter-related branches of the economy of the countries belonging to the socialist community".* Specialisation and co-operation of industries help to economise on material resources, step up labour productivity, and make the most efficient use of the natural resources and economic conditions of the socialist countries in order to speed up the growth rates of extended socialist reproduction.

In the fulfilment of these tasks a large role was played by the 12th CMEA meeting in 1959. That meeting adopted the CMEA Charter, which came into force on April 13, 1960.

The Charter expressed the determination of the member states to continue "promoting all-sided economic co-operation through the consistent implementation of the international socialist division of labour for the purpose of building socialism and communism in their countries and ensuring lasting world peace".** The Charter stated the aims of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance: by uniting and coordinating the efforts of the member states to promote the balanced development of the national economy, speed up economic and technological progress, raise the industrialisation level of countries with a less developed industry, foster the growth of labour productivity and improve the standard of living.

The Charter legally confirmed the principles governing the work of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

CMEA functions on the basis of the sovereign equality of all its members, respect for sovereignty and national interests, mutual benefit and comradely mutual assistance. This is recorded in Article 4 of the Charter: "In the Council all recommendations and decisions are adopted

* *Izvestia*, May 25, 1958.

** *Uneshnaya torgovlya* No. 9, 1960, p. 39.

only with the consent of the interested member states, each country having the right to declare its interest in any issue before the Council. Recommendations and decisions do not affect countries that have stated their non-interest in the given question. However, each country may subsequently subscribe to the recommendations and decisions adopted by the other member states.”*

Whereas at the initial phase of the development of the world socialist community the economic relations between the member countries were founded mainly on bilateral trade, scientific and technological exchanges, following CMEA's establishment and, notably in the period under review, multilateral co-operation among a large number of countries increasingly became standard. Since 1956 the CMEA member states have been coordinating their economic development plans. The USSR and the other CMEA member states concentrated particularly on specialisation and co-operation of production, which enabled them to coordinate the development of the key branches of their national economies.**

An increasingly important role began to be played by regular consultations and exchanges of views between Party and Government leaders on basic economic and political problems.

New trends in the economic co-operation between the socialist countries led to the deepening of the socialist international division of labour, specialisation and co-operation and to further efficiency in the management of the socialist economy.

Acting on a multilateral basis, the CMEA countries have put many important economic measures into effect. These include the building and commissioning of the Druzhba oil pipeline; the integrated Mir power grid with a central control panel; the CMEA Institute for Standardisation.

At a conference in June 1962 the Communist and Workers' parties of the CMEA countries approved a document of paramount importance—Basic Principles of the International Socialist Division of Labour, which had been drawn up at the 15th CMEA meeting.

* Ibid., p. 40.

** *Planirovaniye v yevropeiskikh stranakh sotsializma*, Moscow, 1962, p. 35.

This document defines the main directions, content and fundamental forms of economic co-operation among the CMEA countries at the present stage of their development, when the conditions have been created for the planned implementation of the international socialist division of labour. It states that the aim of this division of labour is to "enhance the efficiency of social production, help achieve higher rates of economic growth and of the rise of the standard of living in all socialist countries, promote industrialisation, achieve a gradual levelling up of the existing differences in the economic development of the socialist countries, and create the material basis for their more or less simultaneous transition to communism in a single epoch".*

The international socialist division of labour is put into effect in the most diverse forms. These forms of co-operation are being steadily improved. Needless to say, this division of labour is effectuated in conditions where the integrity of each country's national economy is preserved and a rational complex of mutually supplementing branches of the economy of each socialist country is promoted.

The same June 1962 conference set up a standing organ, the CMEA Executive Committee invested with wide powers, and coordinated the economic development plans for the five-year period from 1961 to 1965.

A large contribution toward improving the forms and methods of economic co-operation was made by the decisions adopted at a conference of First Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' parties and Heads of Government of the CMEA countries in Moscow on July 24-26, 1963. The conference approved the time-limits for coordinating plans for the next five-year period (1966-1970). Moreover, it approved the CMEA proposal for a transition to multilateral settlements in the trade between the CMEA countries and the establishment for this purpose of an International Bank for Economic Co-operation.**

The agreement on multilateral settlements in transferable rubles and on the establishment of the International Bank for Economic Co-operation was signed in Moscow in October

* *Osnovniye printsipy mezhdunarodnogo sotsialisticheskogo razdeleniya truda*, Moscow, 1964, p. 7.

** *Pravda*, July 28, 1963.

1963. The new system of settlements and monetary relations brought into operation by this agreement conformed to the present stage of economic co-operation between the CMEA countries. The bank was set up to promote economic co-operation, the further economic development of the CMEA countries, mutually beneficial trade and other economic links between them. Its functions are to effect multilateral settlements in transferable rubles, provide credits for foreign trade and other operations, attract and hold in deposit free funds in transferable rubles, transact operations in freely convertible and other currencies, control the fulfilment of settlement commitments by the member states, and transact other banking operations in accordance with the aims and tasks specified in its Charter. As the communication on its establishment stated, the bank "may, on instructions from the interested countries, finance and provide credits for the building, modernisation, and operation of industrial enterprises and other projects from funds allocated by these countries."^{*}

The bank operates on the basis of truly democratic principles: equality and respect for the sovereignty of the member states. In the Council and Board all member countries have equal rights in the decision of questions linked with the bank's activities. Decisions are adopted by the Council, the bank's highest organ, only by agreement among all the member countries.

The principles underlying the work of the International Bank for Economic Co-operation differ fundamentally from the principles in operation in capitalist monetary organisations. For example, in the governing organ of the International Monetary Fund the USA has almost the same number of votes as 50 Asian, African and Latin American countries combined, while in the governing organ of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development the USA has more votes than all the affiliated economically less developed countries put together.^{**} Small wonder, that the Americans are virtually in control of these banks and enforce decisions in keeping with US interests.

While promoting economic relations with the European socialist countries the Soviet Union renders them substantial

^{*} *Pravda*, October 24, 1963.

^{**} *International Affairs* No. 4, Moscow, April 1964, p. 61.

assistance. The following figures give an idea of the dimensions of this assistance. During the closing years of the 1960s the enterprises built with Soviet assistance accounted for: in the national steel output—100 per cent in Bulgaria, 37 per cent in Poland, 17 per cent in Hungary; in the national output of nitrogen fertilisers: 100 per cent in Bulgaria and Rumania, 63 per cent in Hungary and 25 per cent in Poland. The power stations built with Soviet assistance accounted for the following proportion of the total national power-generating capacity—67 per cent in Bulgaria, 33 per cent in Rumania and 25 per cent in Poland.*

In the agreements signed after the war (up to January 1, 1969) the Soviet Union undertook to build or modernise nearly 1,600 industrial enterprises and other projects in the socialist countries. Most of these projects are now operational. In some socialist countries the Soviet Union has helped to build entire branches of industry.

For their part the CMEA countries help to promote economic development in the Soviet Union. The level achieved by industrialisation in the European socialist countries has enabled them to considerably increase their exports of machines and equipment. In 1966, for instance, the USSR imported 2,300 million rubles' worth of equipment, of which 78 per cent or 1,800 million rubles' worth came from the European socialist countries.** The largest imports of equipment by the USSR are from the GDR and Czechoslovakia. But other European socialist countries are likewise increasing their exports of machines.

In 1965, after the CMEA countries had fulfilled their five- and seven-year economic development plans and entered a new five-year period (1966-1970), they became the first group of countries in the history of international economic relations to coordinate their long-term economic development plans and on that basis to coordinate their reciprocal deliveries of goods on a large scale. The adoption of these plans coincided in time with the economic reforms effectuated in the CMEA countries. The aim of these reforms was to improve the management of the national economy by per-

* *Vneshneekonomicheskiye svyazi SSSR za 50 let*, Moscow, 1967, Supplement No. 9, p. 27.

** *50 let sovetskoi vneshnei torgovli*, Moscow, 1967, p. 105.

fecting planning, provide bigger incentives in production, encourage initiative and economic independence at factory level, and give the working people a larger material interest in the results of their work.

The new system of economic management in the socialist countries is making possible to improve the forms and methods of running the socialist economy, eliminate disproportion between the various branches of industry and step up efficiency. Moreover, the economic reforms are helping to further economic co-operation between the fraternal countries and deepen and improve the international socialist division of labour.

Since the foundation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance the member states have put far-reaching changes into effect in all spheres of the economy, achieved marked headway in science and technology and substantially raised the standard of living. A system of inter-state relations of a new type founded on the principles of proletarian internationalism is now in operation for the first time in history.

The CMEA countries form the world's most rapidly developing industrial zone. In 1969 compared with 1950 their gross industrial product increased 6.3-fold, while in the developed capitalist countries it increased only 2.7-fold.* In 1968 the socialist countries accounted for approximately 39 per cent of the world industrial output.

Parallel with the trend towards the comprehensive development of the socialist states there is a growing objective need for a closer economic union between them. The Communist and Workers' Parties of the CMEA countries are helping to consolidate the economic achievement of their countries, combining this work with the interests of the socialist community as a whole. The programme for international economic socialist integration mapped out at the 23rd special CMEA summit at the close of April 1969 in Moscow was an important contribution strengthening the unity of the world socialist community and enhancing its political and economic influence.

Socialist integration, now being effected by the fraternal parties and governments of the CMEA countries, meets with

* *Kommunist* No. 8, 1970, p. 15.

the socialist community's objective need for further socio-economic progress and fully conform to Lenin's teaching on the creation of an "international co-operative of working people." The ways and means of integration now being mapped out in the CMEA countries and agencies are a further creative enlargement on the ideas propounded by Lenin.

The formation of the world socialist economy embraces a long period and a series of stages. At present this process is characterised by features showing that it has entered the stage of economic integration, the stage of a conscious and planned economic union of the CMEA countries and of the building of an international economic complex.

Integration is closely linked with the scientific and technological revolution and represents a way of achieving a steep rise of the efficiency of social production and a higher level of the use of the advantages held out by the world socialist economy.

Integration is attained on the basis of joint planned regulation of economic development by the interested countries through the establishment of appropriate international organisations and institutions. A specific feature of integration is that it simultaneously embraces production, circulation and management, that it involves a complex approach to all the urgent problems of improving co-operation among the CMEA countries.

At the special 23rd CMEA meeting close attention was given to all the aspects of the long-term Comprehensive Programme for socialist economic integration, and recommendations were made on ways and means of translating it into life: on furthering specialisation and co-operation of production, improving the coordination of economic development plans within the CMEA framework (for 1971-1975 and subsequent years), coordinating research and development, and the creation of joint scientific centres. The meeting discussed circulation and other problems forming the structure of the extensive programme for integration.*

In May 1970 the 24th CMEA meeting appraised the immense work that had been accomplished by its special agencies in the period after the 23rd meeting.

* *Pravda*, April 27, 1969.

Important decisions were adopted on the promotion of joint planning in key sectors of the economies of the CMEA countries both in production and circulation, and on joint consultations on economic policy. Agreement was reached on the setting up in 1970 of an International Investment Bank to finance specialisation and co-operation in production on an international scale. The meeting approved proposals for exchanges of know-how and co-operation in prognostication in leading economic, scientific and technical spheres. It was decided to set up an International Institute for Economic Problems of the World Socialist System to study economic problems and the means of further deepening and improving co-operation among the CMEA countries. The meeting considered other specific problems linked with the deepening of co-operation among the CMEA countries, problems which had to be jointly resolved in the process of coordinating the economic development plans for 1971-1975.*

The decisions of the 23rd and 24th CMEA meetings gave further impetus to the growth of the socialist community's political and economic might and helped to foster the unity of the socialist countries and to consolidate their position in the struggle between the two systems.

At the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties on June 7, 1969 L. I. Brezhnev noted:

"In many ways the situation on the front of the anti-imperialist struggle is now determined by the course of the economic competition between socialism and capitalism. It may be said with gratification that in this sphere the socialist countries have scored many achievements. If we take, for instance, the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, we shall find that during the past ten years their national income has increased 93 per cent, while in the developed capitalist states the national income rose 63 per cent in the same period. Occupying 18 per cent of the world's territory and having only 10 per cent of the world's population, the CMEA countries now account for approximately one-third of the world's industrial production. On this foundation the people's standard of living is

* *Pravda*, May 15, 1970.

rising and increasing possibilities are opening for further successful economic, scientific and cultural development.”*

A few words must be said about the Soviet Union's economic relations with the People's Republic of China.

In April 1956 the USSR and China signed an agreement on Soviet assistance for the building of 55 industrial enterprises in addition to the 156 projects that were already being built under earlier agreements. These 55 enterprises included iron and steel, mechanical engineering, chemical, electrical engineering and radio engineering plants, artificial fibre and plastics factories, power stations, and aircraft industry research institutes.

An agreement on joint research in science and technology and on Soviet assistance in this work was signed by the USSR and China in January 1958 in Moscow. This agreement envisaged, among other things, joint work in 1958 through 1962 on scientific and technological problems that were of crucial significance to China and also greater direct contact between research institutions in the two countries.**

Economic co-operation between the Soviet Union and China was furthered by the Treaty on Trade and Navigation and the Protocol on Trade (signed on April 23, 1958). The treaty provided for a further advance of trade relations between the two countries, which undertook to accord each other most-favoured-nation treatment in all matters pertaining to trade and navigation and also other forms of economic links.***

On August 8, 1958 an agreement was signed in Moscow on Soviet assistance for the building and enlargement of 47 projects, including iron and steel, chemical, coal, mechanical engineering, wood-working and building enterprises and power stations. Under that agreement the Soviet Union gratuitously transferred to China licences for the production of various commodities and also blueprints and

* *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 145.

** *Izvestia*, January 19, 1958.

*** *Uedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, August 7, 1958, pp. 688-93.

other technical documentation for the organisation of production at the above-mentioned enterprises.*

Altogether the Soviet Union helped China to build 256 factories, workshops and other projects,** which received the most up-to-date equipment. With Soviet assistance China built industries she had never had before: car, tractor, aircraft, power engineering, heavy and precision engineering, instrument-making, radio engineering and other industries. In the period from 1954 to 1963 the USSR turned over to China 24,000 sets of scientific and technical documents, including over 1,400 designs for large enterprises. The Soviet Union gave China extensive assistance in strengthening her defence capability and building a modern defence industry, and in training engineers, technicians and workers. In 1950-1962 it granted China long-term credits amounting to 1,816 million rubles on favourable terms.***

Economic co-operation between the USSR and China embraced the joint building of railways. This dates back to 1952 when work was started on the Lanchow-Urumchi-USSR frontier railway, which runs for nearly 3,000 kilometres. In addition to building the sector on its own territory, the Soviet Union helped to build this railway on Chinese territory. However, the project was not completed by China. The sector of the railway adjoining the Soviet frontier remained unfinished.

Another railway linking China with the Mongolian People's Republic and, through it, with the Soviet Union was the Chining-Erhlien-Ulan Bator line. Under an agreement signed in 1954 the Soviet Union undertook to build the sector of the line from Ulan Bator to the frontier between Mongolia and China. The Chining-Erhlien sector was completed in November 1955 and the Moscow-Ulan Bator-Peking railway was opened to traffic in early 1956. The new railway shortened the route from the Soviet Union to China by 1,100 kilometres and could have made it possible to achieve

* *Izvestia*, August 12, 1958.

** *SSSR i zarubezhnye strany posle pobedy Velikoi Oktyabrskoi sotsialisticheskoi revolyutsii*. Statistics, Moscow, 1970, p. 144.

*** M. A. Suslov, *O Borbe KPSS za splochnost mezhdunarodnogo kommunisticheskogo dvizheniya*. Moscow, 1964, p. 53; *Za splochnost mezhdunarodnogo kommunisticheskogo dvizheniya. Dokumenty i materialy*, 2nd edition, Moscow, 1964, p. 206.

a substantial expansion of economic co-operation with China. Soviet aid was highly appreciated by the Chinese leaders. For instance, in April 1957 Mao Tse-tung said: "In their struggle for national liberation the Chinese people had the fraternal sympathy and support of the Soviet people. After the Chinese revolution the Soviet Union rendered immense assistance in the building of socialism in China. This will never be forgotten by the Chinese people."*

"In marking the tenth anniversary of the People's Republic of China", Chou En-lai wrote, "the people of our country express their most sincere gratitude to the Soviet Union, which helped our country to build 166 projects during the first five-year plan period, and last and this year signed agreements on aid to our country in building 125 projects. During the past ten years the Soviet Union has sent to China 10,831 specialists to work in the economy, in the cultural sphere and in education. At the same time, gratitude must also be expressed to other socialist countries, which in the period of the first five-year plan helped our country to build 68 projects and have signed new agreements on assistance in building over 40 projects, and which have at various times sent over 1,500 specialists to work in China. Our achievements are indissolubly linked with the immense assistance we have received from the peoples of fraternal countries. Our people will never forget their earnest enthusiasm and friendship. They will always abide by the Marxist-Leninist principles of combining patriotism with internationalism and will steadfastly strengthen and promote fraternal co-operation with them.**

A letter of November 6, 1959 signed by Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai contains the following acknowledgement: "The Soviet people continue, as they have always done, to render the Chinese people powerful support and immense assistance in their struggle against imperialism and in building socialism, and for this the Chinese people express their heartfelt gratitude."***

* *Jenmin Jihpao*, April 18, 1957.

** *Pravda*, October 9, 1959.

*** *Pravda*, November 7, 1959.

2. Further Strengthening of Solidarity Among Socialist Countries. The Problem of European Security

Parallel with promoting economic relations, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government unchangeably pursued a policy of fostering unity and political co-operation among socialist states. Here a large contribution was made by the 1957, 1960 and 1969 meetings of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow.

Further progress in developing fraternal co-operation among socialist countries was achieved in the 1960s. This was mirrored in the pertinent treaties. For instance, on July 6, 1961 the USSR and the Korean People's Democratic Republic signed a Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, which cemented the long-standing alliance and unity between the Soviet and Korean peoples. On June 12, 1964 the USSR and the GDR signed a Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Co-operation, which was a further major contribution to the friendship between the two socialist states and to the struggle for the GDR's legitimate rights as a sovereign state, against the revanchist claims of the Bonn reactionaries, for security in Europe.*

Reciprocal visits by Party and Government leaders of the socialist countries and exchanges of views on basic problems of foreign policy and international relations have helped to reach unanimous decisions on pressing issues and to work out and coordinate common political guidelines on outstanding international problems. These visits have become not only an important means of resolving the political problems in the relations between the Soviet Union and other socialist states but also a means of sharing experience. Exchanges of Party and Government delegations play an important role in furthering political co-operation among the socialist countries.

In the period under review members of the Political Bureau, Secretaries of the Central Committee and many members of the CC CPSU have had systematic meetings with the leaders of the Communist and Workers' Parties of

* *Pravda*, June 13, 1964.

almost all the socialist countries. L. I. Brezhnev, N. V. Podgorny and A. N. Kosygin visited Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries. The Soviet Union was visited on many occasions by Todor Zhivkov, Janos Kadar, Kim Il-Sung, Walter Ulbricht, Gustav Husak, Nicolae Ceausescu and other leaders. In 1964-1970 there were innumerable meetings and talks between Party and Government delegations of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries at summit level. At these constructive talks the delegations considered the further development of co-operation between the socialist states, a wide range of international problems and the situation in the international communist movement.

These friendly talks resulted in the signing of important bilateral agreements or in the prolongation of the agreements already in operation.

Replacing the Treaty of April 21, 1945, the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, signed by the Soviet Union and Poland in Warsaw on April 8, 1965, envisages the strengthening of friendship between the two countries in keeping with the principles of socialist internationalism and broader co-operation between the two countries directly and within the framework of CMEA. The inviolability of the Oder-Neisse frontier is accentuated in the treaty.

Under the terms of this treaty the USSR and Poland committed themselves to the use of all the means at their disposal to prevent aggression by the militarist and revanchist forces in the FRG or in countries that entered into an alliance with it, and immediately to render each other every possible assistance, including the use of armed force, in the event of an armed attack on any one of them.*

Similar provisions on co-operation and mutual assistance are contained in the Soviet Union's treaty with Bulgaria of May 12, 1967, with Hungary of September 7, 1967, with Czechoslovakia of May 6, 1970 and with Rumania of July 7, 1970.

Besides, the Soviet-Bulgarian treaty has a provision calling for good-neighbourly relations, mutual understanding and co-operation in the Balkans and in the Black Sea.

* *Pravda*, April 10, 1965.

Considerable political significance attaches to the Treaty of May 6, 1970, signed in Prague by the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, which reaffirms the principles of the Bratislava Statement of August 3, 1968 on the collective defence of socialism in each country of the socialist community. This treaty declares the Munich agreement null and void from the very moment it was signed.

Somewhat earlier, on January 15, 1966, a Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance was signed by the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic. Under that treaty the signatories pledged to maintain and strengthen friendship and co-operation between the countries of Asia.

In the new treaties the signatories have reaffirmed their fidelity to the principles underlying the former treaties. The new treaties conform to the tasks facing the USSR and other socialist countries in the struggle for peace and security, for the defence of the revolutionary achievements of the fraternal peoples. They are permeated with the spirit of socialist internationalism and joint defence of the socialist gains of the peoples of the socialist community.

Its huge military and economic potential and the fact that it is one of the two leading world powers make the Soviet Union the most reliable mainstay of the peace and security of the socialist states. "The Soviet Union," said Janos Kadar, "is the mightiest bulwark of the peoples of the socialist countries and aslo of the nations fighting for independence; it is the bulwark of all progressive aspirations, of all people fighting for a lasting peace, against the threat of a world war."^{*}

Mutual support in foreign policy issues, in international problems, is one of the specifics of socialist foreign policy and diplomacy. It has time and again cut short the aggressive designs of US imperialism against socialist countries and repelled all attempts at pressuring these countries. It will be recalled, for example, that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries rendered effective assistance to the People's Republic of China when the US imperialists and their Kuomintang agents aggravated the situation in the Taiwan

^{*} *Privetstviya Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soyuzu v svyazi s 50-letiem Velikogo Otkryabrya*, Moscow, 1967, p. 15.

Strait. In 1955-1958 and in subsequent years the Soviet Union backed China in the question of Taiwan, primordial Chinese territory which the US armed forces had virtually occupied. When the ruling circles of the USA started further aggressive actions against China, the Soviet Government resolutely upheld the interests of the Chinese people, stating on September 7, 1958: "Any attack on the People's Republic of China, which is our great friend, ally and neighbour, is an attack on the Soviet Union. Ever true to its duty, our country shall do everything in its power, jointly with People's China, to safeguard the security of our countries and peace in the Far East and the rest of the world."*

In those years China's leaders highly assessed the stand of the Soviet Union. In a letter of November 6, 1958, Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai wrote: "The Chinese people have received powerful support from the Soviet people in their struggle against US imperialism, which has seized the Chinese territory of Taiwan and intruded into the Taiwan Strait. For this the Chinese people express their profound gratitude."**

On the international scene the Soviet Union has consistently opposed the imperialist "theory of two Chinas" and pressed for the restoration of the PRC's rights in the United Nations.

The problems on which the Soviet Government feels agreement must be reached in the immediate future include European security inasmuch as Europe has been the scene of two world wars and has suffered most from these wars. To ensure European security, the Soviet Government contends, means, above all, to put an end to all revanchist doctrines and recognise the real situation in Europe. The Soviet Government has expressed its readiness to agree on an effective and all-embracing system of collective security in Europe as the alternative to the existence of two opposing military groups.

Along with other European socialist countries the Soviet Union took the initiative in raising the question of setting up an international system of security in Europe. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, genuine security in Europe

* *Izvestia*, September 9, 1958.

** *Pravda*, November 7, 1958.

could be ensured only on an all-European basis, on the basis of co-operation between the countries of Eastern and Western Europe. European peace cannot be regarded as stable as long as one group of European states is opposed to another, as long as the arms race continues and as long as troops are concentrated on either side. The Soviet Union has pointed out that this situation is inimical to the interests of Europe and only benefits those who want to keep Europe in a state of political and military tension.

The Soviet Government has stated time and again that it is prepared to negotiate with all European states in order to discuss all urgent European problems and map out concrete ways of setting up a system of security in the continent.

As the Soviet Government sees it, the principal conditions for ensuring European security and co-operation are recognition of the existing frontiers, including the Oder-Neisse frontier and the frontier between the two German states, the unconditional recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state, and denial to the FRG of all access to nuclear weapons. Guided by the commitments undertaken by the members of the anti-Hitler coalition to do everything to prevent Germany from ever again menacing her neighbours and to maintain world peace, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries stood resolutely against the West German militarists receiving nuclear weapons.

A meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee in January 1965 in Warsaw demonstrated the unbreakable unity of these countries against imperialist aggression. The Political Consultative Committee declared that "in face of the imperialist threat the socialist countries are indivisibly united and close-knit and the attempts of the imperialist circles to undermine this solidarity are doomed to failure".*

In connection with the plan to form a NATO multilateral nuclear force and give the West German revanchists access to nuclear weapons, the Political Consultative Committee made it plain that in response to the FRG's nuclear armament the socialist countries would be compelled to take the appropriate defensive measures to safeguard their security.

* *Pravda*, January 21, 1965.

A further contribution to the struggle of the socialist community against imperialism, for world peace and security, was the Bucharest meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee in July 1966 and the documents adopted by it: the Statement on the US Aggression in Vietnam and the Declaration on Strengthening European Peace and Security. The significance of the Bucharest meeting lay, above all, in the fact that it convincingly demonstrated the unity of the Warsaw Treaty countries, this being the indispensable condition for effective joint action to preserve and consolidate peace, to avert another world war. The meeting closely analysed the international situation and mapped out a series of proposals whose implementation could remove the threat of war in Europe and benefit all mankind.

The Warsaw Treaty countries reiterated their principled stand on the Vietnam issue and forcefully warned the US Government "of the responsibility it was assuming before the whole of mankind by continuing and escalating this war for all the unforeseen consequences also to the USA itself". Similar warnings were issued by the Bucharest meeting in connection with the USA's actions in spreading the war to Laos and Cambodia. The Warsaw Treaty countries declared their intention to continue giving every possible assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam "with account of the requirements springing from the new phase of the war in Vietnam", and also their readiness "if the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam so requests" to allow their volunteers to go to Vietnam.*

Problems of European security received close attention at the Bucharest meeting. The principled stand of the socialist countries relative to the plans for setting up a so-called NATO joint nuclear force, within the framework of which West Germany could receive access to nuclear weapons, expressed, notably, in the decisions of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee in early 1965, and the consistent struggle of the socialist and all other peace-loving states against these plans headed off the attempts to give nuclear weapons to the West German revanchists. "If, in spite of everything," states the Bucharest Declaration on Strengthening European Peace and Security, "the NATO

* *Pravda*, July 8, 1966.

countries persist in acting against the interests of peace and effectuate their plans of setting up a multilateral nuclear force or giving West Germany form of access to nuclear weapons, the Warsaw Treaty states will have no alternative in face of the grave consequences of such action to the cause of European peace and security but to take the necessary defensive measures to ensure their security." The Bucharest meeting made it plain that the Warsaw Treaty states were prepared, along with other countries, to look for mutually acceptable ways of strengthening peace in Europe and that on the international scene they were determined to "pursue a policy of international co-operation, of uniting all freedom-loving and progressive forces, of opposing imperialist aggression, dictation and coercion, of supporting the cause of freedom, national independence and social progress".*

At the Bucharest meeting the Warsaw Treaty countries solemnly reaffirmed that they were in favour of the simultaneous abolition of the two opposing military blocs: the North Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. However, inasmuch as the NATO countries were not willing to take such a radical step, the Bucharest meeting advanced a new proposal, namely, that two groups should abolish not the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic alliance as such but only their military organisations and that the pertinent agreement should be reached without further delay. The Bucharest meeting drew attention to important partial measures that could ease tension in Europe, such as the dismantling of foreign military bases, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territory of other countries, a coordinated cutback in agreed proportions of the armed forces of the two German states, the creation of nuclear-free zones and a commitment by the nuclear powers to refrain from using nuclear weapons against the countries in these zones.

The Bucharest meeting mooted the idea of an all-European conference, to discuss European security and co-operation among all the European countries.

The USSR and the other Warsaw Treaty countries are of the opinion that the creation of reliable guarantees of peace and security in Europe is a problem whose solution requires

* *Pravda*, July 9, 1966.

patient and constructive discussion by all the European states. The proposal in the 1966 Bucharest Declaration therefore does not claim to be the final plan for the creation of a system of European security. But the approach of the Warsaw Treaty countries to the elaboration of a programme for European security is practicable and promising. At that stage the proposals of the USSR and other socialist countries were confined to defining the main areas in which measures to strengthen security in Europe could and should be taken.

In view of imperialism's new aggressive intrigues the Soviet Union and the other socialist states paid special attention to the further strengthening of their own defence capability.

The idea of strengthening European security was further enlarged on at the Karlovy Vary Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties at the close of April 1967. The Statement adopted by that conference called upon all countries to recognise European post-war realities. The action programme, proclaimed in the Statement,* opened up a concrete prospect for peace by suggesting that the opposing military blocs should be replaced with a system of European security.

The problem of easing tension and ensuring European security has been unchangeably on the agenda of the conference of the leaders of the Warsaw Treaty countries. This problem was discussed at the Sofia (1968) and Budapest (1969) meetings of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee, and at the Moscow (1969) and Prague (October 1969) meetings of the Party and Government leaders of the Warsaw Treaty countries. The Prague meeting worked out proposals for the agenda composition of a conference on European security. It was declared that the participation of the USA and Canada in such a conference was possible and expedient.

This problem continued to be discussed in 1970, in particular at the Warsaw Treaty Foreign Ministers Conference in Budapest on June 21 and 22, 1970. The Budapest conference issued a Memorandum, which was forwarded to the governments of the possible participants in a European conference. In this important document the socialist states suggested placing the preparations for a European conference

* *Pravda*, April 27, 1967.

on a practical footing and proposed the composition and agenda.

The Memorandum stated that a European conference could be attended by all European countries, including the GDR and the FRG on an equal footing and having equal rights with the other European states, and also by the USA and Canada. It suggested the following agenda:

- European security and the renunciation of the threat or use of force in the relations between European states:

- promotion of trade, economic, scientific, technical and cultural relations on a basis of equality and directed toward the development of co-operation among the European countries;

- the formation of an agency on questions of security and co-operation in Europe.

The hope was expressed that the suggestions in the Memorandum, which took the views of many interested states into account, would be favourably received by the governments concerned.

Six months later, in December 1970, the question of a European conference was discussed at the Berlin meeting of the Party and Government leaders of the Warsaw Treaty countries. In the Statement issued by that meeting it was noted that the efforts of the socialist countries were helping to improve the situation in Europe and implement the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. The conviction was expressed that a European conference on security and co-operation would be a further major step toward consolidating peace in Europe. There were, therefore, the Statement pointed out, no grounds for delaying the conference and making any preliminary conditions.

Moreover, it was noted that "the agenda has been more or less outlined, the composition has been determined and a broad foundation has been laid for understanding and for ensuring favourable results at the conference". The communique issued at the closing of the Berlin meeting stated that the Warsaw Treaty countries were prepared to do everything in their power to strengthen world security.

The world's leading revolutionary force and the mainstay of the anti-imperialist movement, the socialist community of nations is moving from strength to strength. Economic

and political co-operation within the community is being expanded and improved. This is of the utmost importance as a factor promoting not only the economic and cultural development of each country in the community but also the international political position and defence capability of every socialist country and of the community as a whole. "The combined forces of the socialist camp," it is stated in the Programme of the CPSU, "are a sure guarantee for each socialist country against encroachments by imperialist reaction. The consolidation of the socialist countries in a single camp, its increasing unity and steadily growing strength, ensure the complete victory of socialism and communism within the framework of the system as a whole."^{*}

The growing international weight of each socialist country is the direct result of the formation and development of the world socialist system. Extremely indicative in this respect is the example of the European socialist states. Is there any comparison, for example, between Poland's present international position with, as facts had shown, the constantly menaced and helpless position of bourgeois- and landowner-ruled Poland before the Second World War?

For the first time in their history these countries have acquired a reliable defence of their security and national independence. Formerly the threat of aggression by German imperialism had hung over the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks and other peoples of Central and Southeastern Europe like the sword of Damocles. Today their security is guaranteed by the entire might of the socialist community. The peoples of the socialist countries have been delivered once and for all from anxiety about the morrow. As a member of the family of socialist states, every socialist country is confident of its future. Today the defence capability of each socialist country consists not only of its own military and economic potential but also of the potential of the entire socialist community. The colossal nuclear-missile strength of the Soviet Union safeguards the security of the socialist countries. Today these countries are able to reinforce their security with incomparably smaller outlays for defence than had they not been members of the socialist community. Membership of that community enables the socialist countries to channel consid-

^{*} *The Road to Communism*, p. 465.

erable additional material and manpower resources for economic and cultural development. The might of the Soviet Union serves all the countries that have taken the road of socialist development. The Soviet Union guards world peace and the great achievements of world socialism.

The vanguard role of the CPSU and the Soviet state guided by it is recognised by all the socialist countries and by the entire international communist movement. At the 1960 Moscow Meeting the Communist and Workers' Parties unanimously noted that "the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has been, and remains, the universally recognised vanguard of the world communist movement, being the most experienced and steered contingent of the international communist movement. The experience which the CPSU has gained in the struggle for the victory of the working class, in socialist construction and in the full-scale construction of communism, is of fundamental significance for the whole of the world communist movement. The example of the CPSU and its fraternal solidarity inspire all the Communist parties in their struggle for peace and socialism, and represent the revolutionary principles of proletarian internationalism applied in practice."^{*}

The unity and solidarity of the socialist countries are of decisive significance for the consolidation of the forces of peace, democracy and socialism and for mankind's advance along the road of social progress. The experience gained by the world socialist community convincingly shows how vital the close alliance, co-operation and joint efforts of the socialist countries are to the struggle for peace and security and to the creative work of building socialism and communism. Any step directed toward undermining this unity and breaking the principles of fraternal friendship between the peoples of the USSR and other socialist countries is unequivocally denounced by these peoples, by the international working class and by progressive opinion throughout the world.

In 1968 the growth of the forces of world socialism prompted its enemies to launch another act of subversion against the world socialist community. This time they attacked the socialist system in Czechoslovakia, embarking on one of their biggest acts of subversion in the hope of breaching the

^{*} *The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism*, p. 80.

socialist community and thereby changing the balance of strength in Europe in their favour. Thus, in 1968 Czechoslovakia became a crucial sector of the struggle between imperialist reaction and counter-revolution, on the one hand, and the forces of socialism, on the other.

With the active assistance of international imperialist reaction the counter-revolutionary forces precipitated a political crisis in Czechoslovakia and created a serious threat to the revolutionary achievements of the Czechoslovak people. "The weakness and absence of unity in the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia," Gustav Husak said at a rally in Moscow in October 1969, "in which there also were Right-opportunist and revisionist elements, opened wide possibilities not only for the Right-opportunists but also to counter-revolutionary anti-socialist groups massively supported and inspired by the imperialist forces in the West."*

Using pseudo-socialist slogans, these groups split the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, shook the foundations of the socialist system in Czechoslovakia, undermined her allied relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist states and subverted Czechoslovakia's relations with the international communist movement.

In this situation representatives of the Communist and Workers' parties of six countries, including Czechoslovakia, met in conference in Bratislava in early August 1968 and adopted a Declaration reaffirming that "they will never allow anybody to drive a wedge between socialist countries and undermine the foundations of the socialist social system. Fraternal friendship and unity in this area meet with the vital interests of our peoples and provide a reliable foundation for carrying out the socio-economic and political tasks on which the Communist parties of our countries are working".

Further, it was underscored that the "maintenance, consolidation and defence of the gains achieved at the cost of heroic effort and dedicated labour of each people are the common internationalist duty of all the socialist countries".

In fulfilment of the principles underlying the Bratislava Declaration allied troops entered the territory of Czechoslo-

* *Pravda*, October 28, 1969.

vakia in August 1968. This was a necessary emergency measure. It was an act of internationalist assistance in defence of the socialist achievements and the socialist state of the Czech and Slovak peoples.

In the Main Document of the 1969 Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow it is noted that the formation of the socialist world is part of the class battles on a global scale. It stressed that the enemies of socialism would not abandon their attempts to undermine the foundations of socialist state power, halt the socialist remaking of society and restore capitalist rule. "The defence of socialism," the Main Document points out, "is an internationalist duty of Communists."*

The resolute measures taken by the USSR and other allied socialist countries in defence of the socialist achievements of the peoples of Czechoslovakia wrecked the sinister plans of external and internal reaction.

In December 1970 a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia adopted a document under the heading "Lessons of the Crisis in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and in Society After the 13th Congress of the CPCz", in which a detailed assessment was given of the situation in mid-August 1968. It stated that at the time Czechoslovakia was on the brink of a fratricidal struggle that was being precipitated by counter-revolution. The "entry of allied troops into Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968 averted this bloodshed and was, consequently, an indispensable and the only correct action".

Addressing a Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship rally in Moscow on October 27, 1969, L. I. Brezhnev said that "the principled stand of the Communists, the unity of the socialist countries and their internationalist solidarity proved stronger than those who wanted to reverse the history of Czechoslovak society and wrest power from the working class, from the working people. Counter-revolution did not and will never gain the day!"*

* *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 23.

* L. I. Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1970, p. 475.

3. Soviet-Chinese Relations

There was a radical shift in China's foreign policy at the close of the 1950s and early 1960s.

During the initial years after the People's Republic of China was proclaimed the Chinese leaders oriented their policy on support from world socialism. But whereas the overwhelming section of the party and the working people regarded this support as the key to the socialist transformation of Chinese society, the leaders of the Communist Party of China, as has now become obvious, were guided mainly by nationalistic considerations. They counted on using the socialist progress achieved by China in alliance with the USSR and other socialist countries for their hegemonistic plans.

In 1959 Great-Power, nationalistic trends began to manifest themselves more and more clearly in the policies of the Chinese leaders. They lost the ability to weigh the situation realistically and their policies became more and more adventurist. Renouncing the decisions that had been agreed and jointly adopted at the 1957 and 1960 meetings of the Communist and Workers' parties in Moscow, China's leaders tried at first, by subterfuge and duplicity, to impose their own ideological programme and leadership on the socialist community and the communist and national liberation movements and to supplant Marxism-Leninism and the experience of the socialist states with the "thought" of Mao Tse-tung, a petty-bourgeois nationalistic revision of Marxism-Leninism.

The differences between the CPC, on the one hand, and the CPSU and other fraternal parties, on the other, centred round questions affecting the interests of all peoples: war and peace, the development of the world socialist system, and the strategy and tactics of the world working-class movement and the national liberation struggle. When the design to subordinate the socialist community and other revolutionary forces failed the Chinese leaders openly steered towards a split of the socialist community and the communist and national liberation movement.

The sharp edge of the Chinese leaders' international actions is directed against the USSR and other socialist countries which do not let them force their adventurist policies

on the world revolutionary movement and prevent them from achieving their hegemonistic, predatory ambitions. The education of the Chinese people in a spirit of hatred of the USSR and the CPSU and the inculcation of a kind of psychological barrier to rapprochement with the Soviet Union have become a key element of what is today called the "thought" of Mao Tse-tung.

This is not only incompatible with Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism but clashes with the guideline mapped out by the CPC at its 8th Congress in 1956. In the political report of the Central Committee to the congress it was stated: "The developments over the past years show that the great alliance between China and the Soviet Union is a major bulwark of peace in the Far East and the rest of the world. The Soviet Union has rendered our country immense assistance in socialist construction; extensive assistance has also been rendered by the People's Democracies of Europe and Asia. The Chinese people will never forget this comradely assistance of the fraternal countries.... China's unity and friendship with the great Soviet Union and other socialist countries, founded on common aims and mutual assistance, are eternal and unbreakable. The further consolidation and strengthening of this friendship and unity are our highest internationalist duty and the foundation of our country's foreign policy."*

In violation of the universally recognised norms of relations between socialist countries, the Chinese leaders have tried to introduce into these relations methods and forms that are manifestly at variance with the principles underlying socialist international relations and with the nature of socialist diplomacy. They ignore the fact that under international socialist co-operation diplomacy acquires a qualitatively new content. It has to be disencumbered of all the lies and deceit so broadly employed by bourgeois diplomacy.

In an effort to destroy the socialist community and in total disregard of the interests of the socialist countries, the Chinese leaders evolved a "theory" according to which each country has to build socialism with its own resources, in other words, that a country's national economy should be self-sufficient and

* *8th National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, Moscow, 1956, p. 63 (in Russian).

that its economic relations with other countries should be confined to trade.

With this theory as the pretext the Chinese Government sharply curtailed economic and cultural relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. In 1960 it demanded a revision of all the agreements and protocols it had signed with the USSR on economic, scientific and technological co-operation and relinquished a large part of the Soviet equipment whose delivery had been planned. As a result, as early as 1962 the deliveries of plant and materials from the USSR dwindled to 2.5 per cent of the 1959 level.* Because of the policy pursued by the Chinese leaders the share of the socialist countries in China's trade dropped from 68 per cent in 1959 to approximately 20 per cent in 1967. In the period 1959-1966 China's trade with the East European socialist countries diminished by 73 per cent while with the industrialised capitalist states it increased 150 per cent.** This is evidence of the Maoists' efforts to isolate the Chinese people from the socialist community.

In order to aggravate relations with the USSR the Chinese leaders made unfounded claims to Soviet territory.

The Soviet Government proposed consultations with the purpose of specifying the frontier between the USSR and China in individual sectors. In making this proposal the Soviet Government acted on the assumption that no territorial issues existed between the USSR and China and that there could only be the question of specifying some sections of the frontier where such specification was necessary. These consultations, held in Peking in 1964, were suspended by the Chinese.

After 1960 there was a radical switch also in China's stand on the question of a coordinated foreign policy by the socialist countries. In addition to refusing to coordinate its actions on the international scene with those of the other socialist countries, China began to attack the agreed policies pursued by the majority of the socialist states. The Chinese Government's disregard of the treaties and agreements it had signed with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries was one of the expressions of its general trend toward a rupture with the socialist community.

* M. A. Suslov, *op cit.*, p. 55.

** *International Affairs* No. 2, Moscow, February 1968, p. 18.

The Chinese leaders totally abandoned joint, agreed actions with the USSR and other socialist countries on the international scene and departed from the common foreign policy of the socialist states on major world issues. They propounded an adventurist programme on the question of war and peace, a programme that was sharply at variance with the principles of Marxism-Leninism and with the socialist foreign policy founded on these principles. Instead of intensifying the struggle against world imperialism the Maoists spearheaded their attacks at the socialist states.

In their propaganda the Chinese leaders belittled the threat and horrors of a thermonuclear war, maintaining that the "atomic bomb is a paper tiger". They declared that they would not hesitate to sacrifice half of the world's population if that hastened the downfall of imperialism. "On the ruins of imperialism," they asserted in a work entitled *Long Live Leninism!*, "the victorious peoples will rapidly create a thousand times higher civilisation than the capitalist system and build a truly wonderful future for themselves."

This absurd theory was emphatically rejected by the Soviet Government in its Statement of September 21, 1963. "We," the Statement said, "are fully aware of what modern nuclear weapons are like and therefore consider that instead of concentrating their efforts on the struggle to avert another world war the Chinese leaders are engaging in absurd and irresponsible forecasts of the casualties in a future war."*

The Chinese leaders irresponsibly juggled with pseudo-revolutionary phrases in key problems of war and peace: "There obviously are two possibilities," they declared, "either to attack imperialism resolutely and bury it or to be afraid of sacrifice and surrender."** This approach left no room for a peaceful settlement of outstanding issues and for peaceful coexistence, which, in view of the existence of countries with opposing social systems, is the only correct and reasonable principle for relations between them.

Time and again the CPSU and the Soviet Government suggested that the Chinese leaders cease the polemic, normalise relations with the USSR and join in the struggle against imperialism and aggression.

* *Pravda*, September 21-22, 1963.

** *Jenmin Jihpao*, July 20, 1963.

However, instead of heeding the voice of reason they steered toward a further aggravation of their relations with the USSR and other socialist countries, giving their attacks on the CPSU and the international communist movement the character of state policy.

Relations between the USSR and China deteriorated sharply when the "cultural revolution" was started in China. The "cultural revolution" brought the actual political aims of the Chinese leaders into bold relief. It showed that they had adopted anti-Marxist policies and had discarded proletarian internationalism in favour of Great-Han chauvinism and nationalism.

Acting on the motto that "the aim justifies the means", the Chinese leaders had recourse to the most odious methods of political struggle. Repressions stalked Chinese citizens for showing any sympathy for the Soviet Union.*

In 1967-1969 wild orgies were staged by the hungweipings outside the USSR Embassy in Peking, and many Soviet officials were attacked and manhandled. On the preposterous claim that the USSR was "conspiring" with US imperialism, that "capitalism was being restored" in the Soviet Union, the Chinese leaders stepped up their political attacks on the USSR and other socialist countries and started divisive activities in the international communist movement.** They declared that the CPSU and the Soviet Union were "Enemy No. 1", against whom they intended "to fight to the end" and whose "defeat" was ludicrously proclaimed as a "condition" for the struggle against imperialism. The anti-Soviet policies of the Chinese leadership were formally endorsed in the decisions of the 9th Congress of the CPC in April 1969. Nation-wide campaigns in which the people were indoctrinated in an anti-Soviet spirit followed one another in China.

Moreover, in 1969 the Chinese leaders provoked armed clashes along the Soviet-Chinese frontier (on Damansky Island, in the region of the Tasta River, Semipalatinsk Region, on Goldinsky Island, and elsewhere). A Soviet Government Statement of March 29, 1969 emphasised that these provocations and the tension on the Soviet-Chinese frontier

* *Pravda*, November 27, 1966.

** *Pravda*, November 7, 1966.

were "seriously prejudicing the cause of socialism and peace, the general front of the anti-imperialist struggle and friendship between the Soviet and Chinese peoples".*

Despite the openly hostile, anti-Soviet policy of the Chinese leadership, the Soviet Government displayed maximum restraint and made every effort to preserve the unity of the socialist countries and reconcile the differences between the USSR and China. On Government and Party level repeated offers were made to the Chinese leaders to normalise state relations between the USSR and China.

The policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government toward China was clearly enunciated in L. I. Brezhnev's speech at the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, in the Soviet Government Statements of March 29 and June 13, 1969, and in the decisions of the CC CPSU Plenary Meeting in June 1969 and the sixth session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. This policy is based on the concurrence of the long-term interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples in the building of socialism.

On Soviet initiative the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. N. Kosygin, who was returning to Moscow from Hanoi, stopped at Peking where he had a meeting on September 11, 1969 with the Premier of the State Council of the PRC Chou En-lai. They considered the question of normalising the situation on the frontier, an exchange of ambassadors, an expansion of trade and economic links, and other problems. Moreover, they discussed steps to normalise government-to-government relations.

This was followed by some lessening of the tension on the frontier. The Soviet Union sent its Ambassador to the PRC and China appointed her Ambassador to the USSR; a protocol on an expansion of trade between the two countries in 1971 was signed in November 1970. However, China's overall policy toward the USSR remained unchanged. Anti-Soviet propaganda continued unabated in Chinese newspapers and magazines. Pamphlets inciting hatred of the USSR continued to be disseminated. And war hysteria against the USSR continued to be artificially fanned.

Talks on frontier issues opened in Peking on October 20, 1969 between Government delegations of the USSR and the

* *Pravda*, March 30, 1969.

PRC. At these talks the Chinese made a number of clearly unacceptable conditions and evaded concrete negotiations on a specification of the frontier. A. N. Kosygin noted in his election speech that the Chinese had adopted an attitude that made it impossible to achieve "any tangible progress either in the normalisation of relations generally or in the present talks in Peking between the government delegations of the two countries on a settlement of frontier issues".*

Mentioning China's policies toward the Soviet Union in an election speech on June 12, 1970, L. I. Brezhnev noted that the "Chinese leadership is continuing its ideological and political attacks on the Soviet social system and on our Party's Leninist guidelines.

"We shall, as we have in the past, resolutely reject these attacks and consistently and firmly uphold the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism."***

4. Soviet Assistance to Revolutionary Cuba

In the period under review the world socialist system was joined by a country of the Western Hemisphere. In Latin America the upswing of the national liberation movement led to the victory of the revolution in Cuba. The reactionary regime headed by the US-installed dictator Fulgencio Batista was deposed in Cuba on January 1, 1959 and a revolutionary Government headed by Fidel Castro was formed.

The new Government was recognised by the Soviet Union on January 10, 1959. In April 1961 Cuba was constituted a socialist state. The Cuban revolution broke the chain of imperialist oppression in Latin America and led to the establishment of the first socialist state on the American continent, marking a historic turning point and opening in that region a new phase of the revolutionary movement.**

The revolution in Cuba evoked the hatred of the US imperialists and they used against it their entire arsenal of political blackmail, economic pressure and counter-revolutionary plots. In addition to political pressure and threats

* *Pravda*, June 11, 1970.

** *Pravda*, June 13, 1970.

*** *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties*, p. 29.

they organised an economic blockade of Cuba, believing that that would undermine Cuba's economy, artificially induce economic difficulties and thereby compel the Cuban Government to surrender. This was the USA's objective when it went back on its commitment to import Cuban sugar, a major source of national income without whose export Cuba, which depends on imports of food and other commodities, cannot exist. This put Cuba in an extremely difficult position.

Trade with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and extensive disinterested economic assistance from the USSR enabled Cuba to neutralise imperialist pressure and repulse the economic aggression started by the USA with the aim of subverting the Cuban revolution. A trade and payment agreement creating the conditions for close economic co-operation between the USSR and Cuba and ensuring Cuba with Soviet economic assistance was signed as early as February 1960. Under this agreement the USSR pledged to purchase Cuban sugar in exchange for the commodities required by Cuba and also to grant Cuba credits amounting to US\$100 million for the purchase of plant and other goods in the Soviet Union. Fidel Castro spoke highly of the assistance of the USSR and other socialist states in strengthening the independence of the Cuban republic. "We," he said, "withstood the attacks because a rapidly developing large and powerful community of socialist countries exists... because, despite being virtually encircled by the imperialists, our country has the possibility to acquire oil, to sell its products and purchase machines."*

The liberation struggle of the Cuban people against US imperialism received the full understanding and active support of the Soviet Union. Besides extending economic assistance to Cuba, the Soviet Government warned the aggressive circles in the USA that the USSR was prepared to take the most resolute steps to safeguard Cuba's independence. When Raul Castro, the Cuban Minister for the Revolutionary Armed Forces, visited the USSR in July 1960 the Soviet Government assured the Government of Cuba of its support. Shortly before that visit, in June 1960, an agreement was signed on the sale of Soviet oil to Cuba, with the result that Cuba was delivered from her dependence on the US im-

* *Pravda*, October 18, 1960.

perialists for her fuel. At a meeting with Fidel Castro on September 23, 1960 at the 15th General Assembly in New York the Head of the Soviet Government reaffirmed the Soviet Union's readiness to give Cuba every possible assistance and support.

The Kennedy Administration, which took over from the Eisenhower Administration in January 1961, continued the latter's bankrupt policies toward Cuba.

On April 17, 1961 Cuba was piratically attacked by armed gangs who were supported by US naval vessels and aircraft.

On the next day, April 18, the Soviet Government published a Statement exposing the USA's support of the invaders, expressing firm determination to give the Cuban people all the assistance they required in their struggle for freedom and independence and demanding the cessation of the aggression against Cuba. "Cuba is not alone," the Statement warned.* The USA was compelled to beat a retreat.

However, subsequent developments showed that the failure of the April invasion had not discouraged the US imperialist circles in their attempts to strangle revolutionary Cuba. They started preparations for another invasion, this time with the use of their own land forces.

In this tense situation the Soviet Union helped Cuba to build up a strong army to guard the revolutionary achievements of her people. In the summer of 1962, in view of the mounting threat from the USA, Cuba requested additional assistance from the Soviet Union. Agreement was quickly reached between the USSR and Cuba on further steps to strengthen Cuba's defence capability. On October 22 the Kennedy Administration announced that it had blockaded Cuba, calling the blockade a quarantine to deceive world opinion.

The blockade of Cuba was gross violation of the freedom of the high seas, which the USA had hitherto proclaimed as one of its key foreign policy doctrines. A blockade in peace-time was a glaring violation of international law. Moreover, the USA began to concentrate armed forces in the Caribbean and alerted its forces in Europe—the 6th and 7th fleets, airborne, infantry and armoured divisions and air units. The threat of invasion hung over Cuba.

* *Pravda*, April 19, 1961.

In face of these military preparations the Soviet Union was compelled to take the corresponding defensive steps. On October 23 the Soviet Government issued a Statement warning the US Government that it was "assuming a grave responsibility for the destiny of the world and recklessly playing with fire".* It called upon all governments and peoples "to protest against the US acts of aggression against Cuba and other countries, categorically denounce these acts and prevent the US Government from starting a thermonuclear war".** The Soviet representative in the United Nations was instructed to call for an immediate meeting of the Security Council to consider the question of the USA's violation of the UN Charter and its threat to world peace.

The Soviet peace initiative aimed at settling the Caribbean crisis received the whole-hearted support of the socialist countries and of many other UN member states.

Agreement on a settlement of the crisis was reached as a result of an exchange of messages between the Head of the Soviet Government and the US President.

Unparalleled in the post-war years, this crisis, which had confronted mankind with the threat of a world-wide thermonuclear shambles, was resolved thanks to the Soviet Government's firm and flexible stand, the determination of the Cuban people to defend their country's independence and the support that this just cause received from the Warsaw Treaty states.

The whole world highly evaluated the peaceableness and wisdom displayed by the Soviet Union and its Government during that anxious period.

The peaceful settlement of the Caribbean crisis strengthened Cuba's international position.

Soviet-Cuban relations were considerably furthered by a visit paid by Fidel Castro to the USSR in April-May 1963. The Soviet-Cuban Statement, signed as a result of the talks held during that visit, declared that the two countries were at one in their assessment of the obtaining international situation and in their attitude in the struggle to safeguard and strengthen peace.*** It was stressed that the trade and eco-

* *Izvestia*, October 24, 1962.

** Ibid.

*** *Pravda*, May 25, 1963.

conomic relations between the two countries were making successful headway.

Friendship and all-sided co-operation between the USSR and Cuba continued to develop in subsequent years. In the political sphere note must be made of the reciprocal visits by Party and government leaders. Fidel Castro, Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba, paid a ten-day visit to the Soviet Union from January 13 to 23, 1964. The communique published at the close of the talks during that visit noted that the sides had exchanged views on the international situation and reaffirmed the concurrence of these views as indicated in the Soviet-Cuban Statement of May 23, 1963. The communique stated that in the sphere of economic relations the sides had arranged to sign a long-term trade agreement.*

Cuba's President Oswaldo Dorticos Torrado visited the Soviet Union on October 14-17, 1964. In the pertinent Soviet-Cuban communique it was noted that at the talks there was a comprehensive exchange of views on the further development and promotion of fraternal links and constructive co-operation between the USSR and Cuba.**

In October-November 1965 the Soviet Union was visited by Raul Castro, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Armed Forces. Shortly afterwards (in December 1965) a visit to the Soviet Union was paid by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba and a Minister of the Government.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. N. Kosygin visited Havana on June 26, 1967 at the invitation of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba. During that visit the sides examined the development of Soviet-Cuban co-operation and international problems.

The Soviet Union has consistently upheld Cuba's sovereignty and independence against encroachment by US imperialism. On August 9, 1964, for example, the Soviet representative at the United Nations forwarded a Soviet Government Statement to the Security Council Chairman regarding

* *Pravda*, January 23, 1964.

** *Pravda*, October 19, 1964.

the decisions that were adopted against Cuba on July 25 at a conference of OAS Foreign Ministers. The Statement denounced the USA's attempts to circumvent the UN Charter and harness the Organisation of American States to its aggressive policy toward Cuba, a member of the United Nations. On May 30, 1966 TASS published a Statement condemning the provocations of the US military against the Republic of Cuba.

Ever since the Republic of Cuba was proclaimed the Soviet Government has been doing much to help it break the economic and trade blockade enforced by US imperialism. Moreover, the Soviet Union is helping Cuba to end her isolation on the international scene. In regard to Cuba the Soviet Government pursues a policy of rendering her disinterested assistance in building socialism.

From the very outset the Soviet Union has been helping the Cuban people to repulse US imperialist economic aggression and enforce socio-economic reforms. As early as 1959 it purchased substantial quantities of Cuban sugar. In December 1960 it declared that it would supply Cuba with all the goods she could not purchase in other countries, and would, in the course of the year, buy 2,700,000 tons of sugar if this sugar was not bought by the USA. Moreover, the USSR announced that it would sell Cuba oil and oil products at lower prices than had been paid to US oil companies. Beginning with 1960 the USSR commenced delivering to Cuba up to 5 million tons of oil and oil products annually and buying from two to three million tons of unrefined sugar every year.

Note must be made of the important Soviet-Cuban five-year trade and payment agreement of February 13, 1960.* It was, in effect, Cuba's first-ever agreement based on the equality of the signatories and on mutual benefit. For a period of five years (1960-1964) this agreement gave Cuba an assured market for one million tons of unrefined sugar annually and ensured her with deliveries of Soviet industrial plant, currency and other benefits. Fidel Castro characterised it as "one of the most advantageous agreements ever signed by the Republic".** A Soviet-Cuban protocol on

* *Pravda*, February 15, 1960.

** Fidel Castro, *Speeches and Pronouncements*, Moscow, 1960, p. 278 (in Russian).

mutual deliveries of goods for 1964 and an agreement on favourable Soviet long-term credits to Cuba were signed in Havana on January 11, 1964. Ten days later, on January 21, an agreement was signed on deliveries of unrefined sugar for 1965-1970, under which the USSR pledged to purchase a total of 24,100,000 tons of sugar from Cuba (2,100,000 tons in 1965, 3,000,000 tons in 1966, 4,000,000 tons in 1967 and 5,000,000 tons in each of the subsequent years).^{*} The agreement provided for fixed prices for sugar over a prolonged period. Besides its importance from the standpoint of trade, this agreement guaranteed the Cuban economy against fluctuations in regard to the demand for and price of sugar in the world market and against economic subversion by US monopoly capital. It gave Cuba bigger possibilities for the long-term planning of her economic development on a sound foundation with a view to raising the living standard of her people. This made the agreement a major factor of economic development in Cuba.

Since 1960 there has been a steady expansion of trade between the Soviet Union and Cuba.^{**}

Without belittling the significance of trade and commodity exchanges, it must be said that trade is only part of Soviet-Cuban economic co-operation, which is broadening and deepening with each passing year.

As early as the first two or three years after the Cuban revolution the Soviet Union began to extend the most diverse assistance to Cuba. This was noted in the Soviet-Cuban communique of May 25, 1963, which stated that the Soviet Union was rendering Cuba technical assistance in geological surveys, in the enlargement and reconstruction of three metallurgical conversion plants, in the building of two large power stations, in the enlargement of the nickel, chemical and fishing industries, in urgent irrigation and drainage projects and in the building of a mechanical factory.

The USSR is helping Cuba to build up heavy and metal-working industries and to construct factories producing spare

^{*} *Noticias de Hoy*, January 30, 1964; *Kuba, 10 let revoliutsii*, Moscow, 1968, p. 256.

^{**} *Uneshnaya trgovlya SSSR. Statistichesky sbornik. 1918-1966*, 1967, p. 69.

parts for machines. In 1962 work was started on a fishing base in Havana, the most modern and largest port in Latin America.

Two agreements were signed by the Soviet Union and Cuba in 1964: one on co-operation in irrigation and land drainage for 1964-1965, and the other on Soviet technical assistance in the building of industrial and other projects. In particular, the Soviet Union undertook to reconstruct almost the entire sugar industry in Cuba. The first stage of this reconstruction, which will embrace 60 refineries, was started in 1965.

There was a further expansion of Soviet-Cuban co-operation in 1965-1969. A protocol on technical assistance to Cuba in geological surveying was signed on September 20, 1965; a protocol on broader economic and technical co-operation was signed on November 23, 1965. The USSR helped Cuba build several communications projects, a large hospital at Holguin, a file factory, an auto-repair works and many other projects.

Under the protocol of May 7, 1967 on the second stage of the reconstruction of Cuba's sugar industry, the Soviet Union granted Cuba long-term credits to pay for equipment deliveries.

The Soviet Union remains Cuba's largest supplier of machines and equipment for industry, agriculture and transport.

Mention must also be made of Soviet assistance in the training of skilled workers, engineers and technicians for Cuba in the USSR and at training centres in Cuba. Such centres have been set up for the training of specialists for agriculture and various industries. Hundreds of young Cubans receive the most diverse skills in the USSR.

On December 9, 1970 an agreement was signed on the establishment of a Soviet-Cuban commission for economic, scientific and technical co-operation. This agreement was evidence that co-operation between the two countries had risen to a higher level.

In all spheres of Cuba's national economy the Cuban people feel the friendly hand of all-sided fraternal assistance from the peoples of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. It was due to this assistance that ever since the victory of the revolution Cuba has been making success-

ful headway in all spheres of her economy, science, technology and culture.

Every year when the Cuban people mark the anniversary of their revolution they proudly look back to their achievements, noting the role played by the assistance, support and solidarity of the socialist countries, above all of the Soviet Union. At a rally marking the 10th anniversary of the Republic Fidel Castro stressed: "Today when we can firmly count on the success of our motherland, when we can already see our wonderful future, we must note the significance of the solidarity of the socialist community, especially of the solidarity of the USSR. . . . In all justification we must say that for us this assistance has been decisive."*

* * *

The period from 1957 to 1970 was characterised by further successes in the development of the world revolutionary process. The most important event was the victory of the socialist revolution in the Western Hemisphere: the first socialist state, the Republic of Cuba, was created in Latin America. Relying on the assistance and support of the USSR and other socialist countries the Republic of Cuba successfully embarked on the building of socialism. These years saw the countries of the socialist community making noteworthy progress. Economic co-operation among them embraced not only trade but also production. Economic development plans began to be coordinated on a growing scale. The USSR continued rendering socialist countries extensive fraternal assistance in the economic and cultural fields. The national economies of the CMEA countries entered into the process of socialist integration.

All these years extensive work was conducted to improve the Soviet Union's allied relations with the other socialist countries. This period witnessed the conclusion of the new treaties of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance with the Korean People's Democratic Republic, the GDR, Poland, Mongolia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Rumania. "Alongside the Warsaw Treaty, which will continue to be strengthened and improved," L. I. Brezhnev said

* *Pravda*, January 7, 1969.

in a speech on June 12, 1970, "these bilateral treaties form a wide-ranging and integral system of reciprocal obligations of the socialist countries to each other and to the socialist community, which represents a common achievement benefiting them all."*

In this period the advantages of socialism and the wider co-operation and mutual fraternal assistance enabled the socialist countries to step up their economic development, make further headway in the economic competition with capitalism and strengthen the economic and military might of the entire socialist community. The socialist system was thus becoming the decisive factor of social development. On June 7, 1969, L. I. Brezhnev characterised this period as follows: "The 1960s will occupy a special place in the history of world socialism. It was in this decade that many of the fraternal countries completed the building of the foundations of socialism and went over to building a developed socialist society. As it becomes more mature socialist society more fully reveals the advantages of its economic and socio-political organisation and of the true democracy inherent in it. All this is a considerable contribution to our common cause, to the cause of strengthening the anti-imperialist front."**

The Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community act in concert, as they have always done, in the struggle for peace, for a negotiated settlement of outstanding international problems. This joint action and mutual support have cut short many of imperialism's aggressive designs, helped to preserve peace and ease international tension.

* *Pravda*, June 13, 1970.

** *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties. Moscow 1969*, p. 145.

NEW SOVIET INITIATIVES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR DISARMAMENT (1959-1970)

1. Soviet Proposals for General and Complete Disarmament at the 14th General Assembly

In 1959 the Soviet Government launched a new important initiative in the struggle for disarmament, for averting the threat of war. The continued massive stockpiling of atomic and hydrogen weapons and the development of super-long-distance means of delivering these weapons, combined with the tension generated by the cold war of the imperialist powers, had created a serious threat to world peace. The situation demanded the most determined action by all the peace forces. The Soviet Government was concerned for the destinies of peace and it could not fail to take account of the fact that because of the attitude of the Western powers the disarmament talks, conducted in the UN agencies for nearly 14 years, had yielded no practical results and entered an impasse.

In the course of these 14 years the Soviet Union had explored all possible variants of a settlement of the disarmament problem in an effort to induce the Western powers to agree to a cutback of armaments and armed forces and to steps to eliminate the danger of a nuclear war. It suggested that disarmament should begin with the banning and destruction of nuclear weapons. The Western powers turned down this suggestion on the grounds that this would be prejudicial to them because the USSR had the advantage in conventional armed forces. Taking this objection into consideration the Soviet Union suggested beginning disarma-

ment with an agreed reduction of conventional armed forces and then going over to the elimination of atomic and hydrogen bombs. But this, too, proved unacceptable to the Western powers. To overcome Western objections the Soviet Union suggested the adoption of at least some initial partial measures that would improve the international situation, as the Western powers had earlier insisted on in words. But as soon as the pertinent suggestions were put forward by the Soviet Union, the USA and its allies went back on their agreement to the partial measures they had talked so much about.

After carefully weighing the obtaining international situation and the experience of the disarmament talks, the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet Government came to the conclusion that a new approach had to be tried in order to settle the most pressing disarmament problems and that the surest step would be to propose an international agreement on *general and complete disarmament by all states*, i.e., on the destruction of all means of warfare and thereby ruling out the very possibility of war.

At the 14th General Assembly in New York on September 18, 1959 the Soviet Union tabled concrete proposals for general and complete disarmament.

These proposals, submitted in the form of a Declaration, were an enlargement on the basic ideas of the draft convention on general and complete disarmament that had been proposed by the Soviet Union in February 1958 at the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission and at the Disarmament Conference. The Soviet Declaration stated:

"This is a radical programme but it is precisely this that guarantees its feasibility in the obtaining conditions. The existence of the opposing groups of powers, within which are tens of states linked by mutual military commitments, and the headlong development of military equipment require courageous and far-reaching solutions to ensure peace.

"The proposal for complete and general disarmament differs from all other disarmament proposals in that its implementation rules out all unequal conditions and the possibility of creating any military advantages for any country."*

* *Izvestia*, September 19, 1959.

The substance of the Soviet proposals was that all countries should effectuate complete disarmament, i.e., the complete abolition of their armed forces and armaments, and should have no means of conducting war.

The Soviet Government proposed the abolition of land armies, navies and air forces, and the disbandment of general staffs and military schools so that countries would only have the minimum contingents of internal security forces (militia, police) armed with small weapons and designed for the maintenance of internal law and order.

Further, the Soviet proposals envisaged the destruction of all existing stockpiles of atomic and hydrogen bombs, missiles of all ranges, and all chemical and germ weapons—poisons and asphyxiants and artificially created lethal germs capable of starting grave epidemics. It was suggested that henceforth nuclear energy should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and that rockets should remain only as a means of space transport and exploration for the benefit of all mankind.

All these measures would be put into effect under strict control exercised by a specially formed international agency consisting of representatives of all countries and having broad powers and possibilities. The volume of control and inspection would conform to the degree of the phased disarmament. Upon the achievement of general and complete disarmament the international control agency would have free access to all the objectives subject to control.

The disarmament programme would be carried out within the shortest possible time—in the course of four years—by agreed consecutive stages. At the first stage there would be a substantial numerical reduction of the armed forces of all countries (including the USSR, the USA and China—to 1,700,000 men each; and Britain and France—to 650,000 men each) and armaments and military equipment would be correspondingly cut down. The remaining conventional armed forces and armaments, including military bases on foreign territory, would be abolished at the second stage. The third stage would involve the destruction of all types of nuclear, missile, chemical and germ weapons and the complete disbandment of military institutions, departments and schools.

The Soviet Union called for the implementation of this programme for general and complete disarmament without delay.

These proposals marked a *new stage* in the Soviet Union's struggle to deliver mankind from the inexorably growing burden of the arms race and of the threat of war. These proposals were made at a time when a radical change had occurred in the world balance of strength: the world socialist system was becoming the decisive factor of world development. The question of war and peace could no longer be approached solely from the standpoint of the operation of the predatory laws of capitalism. The growth of the socialist community's might and, in particular, the superiority achieved by the Soviet Union in rocketry had created a sound foundation for the policy of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems.

The USSR, which had started the full-scale building of communism, had reached an unparalleled level of strength, of economic, scientific and cultural development. Its achievements in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and in the development of pin-point inter-continental missiles and space rockets, the launching of the world's first man-made Earth satellites and the sending of rockets to the Moon were convincing evidence of its signal successes in key branches of science and modern technology, including the manufacture of military equipment. With the appearance of inter-continental missiles, the USA's relative strategic invulnerability receded into the past. The strategic balance of strength changed in favour of the socialist camp. This was not denied even by the ruling circles of the USA. At a hearing before a Congressional committee in early 1960, Thomas S. Gates, Secretary of Defence in the Eisenhower Administration, acknowledged that the USA had no defence against inter-continental ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, while General Thomas S. Power of the US Strategic Air Command declared that the USSR could in fact wipe out the entire US strike force in a matter of 30 minutes.

But this did not induce the Soviet Union to speak in the language of military threats. On the contrary, it stepped up its initiatives calling for peace, for the destruction of all types of weapons in order to make the world safe against the horrors of a missile-nuclear war.

The Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament received broad support throughout the world. In all countries a movement was started demanding the acceptance of these proposals. The Soviet disarmament plan, wrote the Mexican newspaper *Popular* in early November 1959, had won the hearts of all peoples, and scores of millions of people were becoming proponents of the Soviet idea of general and complete disarmament in three phases over a period of four years. These proposals, the newspaper *Burman* of Rangoon wrote, received approval in all parts of the world. Even *The New York Times*, which is close to US official circles, acknowledged that the simple and lucid Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament had made a deep impact in many, particularly neutral, countries.

As soon as the Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament were made at the 14th General Assembly they received vigorous backing from the other socialist countries. In the Declaration published by the Warsaw Treaty Organisation on February 4, 1960 it was stated that "the disarmament proposals made by the Soviet Government in the United Nations express the common attitude of the Warsaw Treaty countries, of all socialist states".*

Statements approving and supporting these proposals were made also by the governments of Indonesia, Afghanistan, India, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Guinea, Ghana and other countries.

In Britain the Labour Party pressed the Government to accept in principle the proposals moved by the Soviet Union in the UN on September 18, 1959. The leadership of the Labour Party in Australia demanded a discussion of these proposals in the United Nations with the aim of achieving total agreement on them. The Advisory Council of the National Committee of the US Democratic Party, which was then in the opposition, declared that the US Government should make immediate use of the Soviet disarmament proposals as the basis for negotiations.

These proposals received unqualified approval and support in Japan, where the trade unions and the press expressed their appreciation to the Soviet Government.

In some countries the Soviet proposals were supported by religious organisations. The Archbishop of Canterbury Geoff-

* *Pravda*, February 4, 1960.

rey Fischer, for instance, declared that no Christian could have proposed a better plan.

With world opinion insisting on the adoption of the Soviet disarmament proposals the Western powers did not venture to speak openly against them. They affected approval of the idea of general and complete disarmament but declined to accept the concrete plan for such disarmament as proposed by the Soviet Union. On November 20, 1959, following the debate on the Soviet proposals, the 14th General Assembly passed a general resolution stating that "the question of general and complete disarmament is the most important one facing the world today" and calling upon the governments "to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem". The same resolution turned the Soviet proposals and the disarmament proposals of other countries over to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee that had been set up in the summer of 1959 by agreement between the USSR, the USA, Britain and France.

The resolution was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly. No country represented in the United Nations openly opposed the idea of general and complete disarmament as enunciated by the Soviet Union. In fact, after preliminary talks between the US and Soviet delegations in the United Nations, the USA sponsored the resolution along with the Soviet Union.

The adoption of the resolution on November 20, 1959 was of fundamental significance. For the first time the United Nations, on behalf of all its members, charted a clear-cut aim—general and complete disarmament—and called upon all countries to achieve that aim as quickly as possible. This strengthened the hand of the champions of disarmament and to some extent hampered the further manoeuvres of its adversaries.

2. The Soviet Union's Struggle for an International Agreement on General and Complete Disarmament After the 14th General Assembly

The Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament gave the peace forces of all countries a concrete programme of struggle for lasting peace. However, it was obvi-

ous that this would be a long and persevering struggle. In view of the fact that in the capitalist countries influential circles were opposing disarmament in order to keep the threat of war alive and sustain the arms race, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries stepped up the drive to expose these circles and realise the aspiration of the peoples for lasting peace. General and complete disarmament became one of the central objectives of Soviet foreign policy.

The Soviet Union did not confine itself to calls for disarmament. It set an example by taking practical steps to implement disarmament and create favourable conditions for an international agreement on complete disarmament. On January 15, 1960, acting on recommendation from the Soviet Government, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed a decision on a further substantial numerical reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces, this time by 1,200,000 men, i.e., by one-third of its total strength at the time the decision was taken. In passing this decision the Supreme Soviet called upon the parliaments and governments of all countries to respond to the new Soviet initiative by adopting practical steps to reduce their existing armed forces.

But this initiative was not taken up by the Western powers. Instead they, notably the USA, continued the arms race and increased their war budgets, once again showing the world who wanted disarmament and who was opposed to it.

Extensive diplomatic work was conducted by the Soviet Government to promote the idea of general and complete disarmament in its bilateral talks with the governments of many European, Asian, African and American states in the course of 1959-1962. At the meetings between the leading statesmen of the Soviet Union and other countries much attention was usually devoted to disarmament. In the joint statements signed by the leaders of the USSR and of Guinea, India, Burma, Indonesia, Afghanistan, France, New Zealand, Cambodia, Italy, Austria, Finland and other countries unequivocal support was given for general and complete disarmament. In all cases the Soviet proposals on this issue were highly appreciated.

The Soviet Government gave a particularly exhaustive explanation of its view on *international control of disarmament*, because while hesitating to come out openly against

the Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament the adversaries of disarmament were seeking to undermine trust in these proposals by spreading the lie that the Soviet Union was proposing disarmament without control and was intending to deceive the Western powers by persuading them to disarm unilaterally. Fabrications of this kind were spread not only by reactionary press organs but also by statesmen of the USA and other Western countries.

Yet it was common knowledge that the Soviet programme for general and complete disarmament submitted to the General Assembly on September 18, 1959 clearly stated that disarmament had to be implemented under the supervision and control of an international control agency composed of representatives of all countries. The volume of control and inspection would conform to the phase of disarmament, in other words, the disarmament measures being actually implemented would be subject to control and inspection. In the Soviet proposals it was expressly stated that the international control agency "must have all the material conditions for exercising strict control".

In public statements, in letters to foreign statesmen and in other pronouncements Soviet statesmen repeatedly expounded the Soviet Government's attitude to armaments control. In particular, it was underscored that there had to be constant international control of all disarmament measures and that when complete disarmament was achieved international inspectors would remain in all countries to make sure that the treaty on disarmament was honoured by every state.

3. The Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee and the Disruption of Its Work by the Western Powers.

Soviet Proposals for Disarmament of June 2, 1960.

The Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee (the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, the USA, Britain, France, Italy and Canada) for whose consideration the UN General Assembly had turned over the disarmament proposals of the Soviet Union and other countries, began its deliberations on March 15, 1960.

The USSR and other socialist countries had consented to participate in the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee in the hope of speeding up a concrete agreement on general and complete disarmament in accordance with the recommendations that had been adopted unanimously by the General Assembly. The Soviet Government instructed its representative on the Committee to explore every possibility for the speedy achievement of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. It thereby reaffirmed its readiness to give every consideration to all proposals directed toward the achievement of that goal.

However, it soon became evident that the Western powers were pursuing totally different aims. The NATO countries did not wish to speak of general and complete disarmament and studiously avoided a discussion of the Soviet proposals.

They did not specify any concrete steps towards disarmament, confining themselves to proposals for "control" of existing armaments, in other words, for a system of legalised military espionage. Such a measure did not lessen the threat of war; it would only have stepped up the arms race. The NATO "plan for general and all-embracing disarmament", submitted to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee, did not envisage the destruction of the means of warfare—hydrogen and atomic bombs, war missiles, aircraft, tanks and warships.

It was an open secret that the USA was dragging out the talks in order to use the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee as a screen for continuing the arms race. The provocative intrusions of US military U-2 spy planes into Soviet air space in April and May 1960 and the disruption of the summit conference that was to have taken place in Paris in mid-May clearly showed that the Eisenhower Administration wanted not disarmament but the hotting up of world tension.

However, the Soviet Union refused to lend itself to provocation. It reaffirmed its desire to reach agreement on disarmament. The proposals for disarmament that the Soviet Government had prepared for the summit conference were sent to the governments of all countries and submitted for discussion to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee on

June 2, 1960.* These proposals took into account the recommendations of the French President General de Gaulle that at its very first stage disarmament should begin with the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons: aircraft, warships, missiles and so forth, in other words, that these means should be destroyed before the destruction of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Government stated that it was prepared to speed up a disarmament agreement despite the USSR's superiority in the latest and most effective means of delivering nuclear weapons, namely intercontinental ballistic missiles.

In accordance with the wishes of the USA and other Western countries, the Soviet proposals of June 2, 1960 specified the provisions on disarmament control in greater detail: they outlined a plan for setting up an inspection system and exercising the broadest international control of all disarmament measures. It was suggested that international inspectors should be stationed in such a way as to enable them to discharge their functions as soon as disarmament was started. The inspectors were to have wide powers—as early as at the first stage of disarmament they were to have unrestricted access to all factories and shipyards that had previously been engaged fully or partially in the manufacture of missiles, aircraft, surface warships, submarines and all other means of delivering nuclear weapons.

In keeping with the wishes of the Western powers, the new Soviet proposals provided for concrete measures to ensure world peace and security when general and complete disarmament had become a reality: when necessary units from the contingents of the police (militia) remaining in the different countries would be placed at the disposal of the Security Council.

These new proposals attracted the attention of political circles and of the public in all countries and were rightly assessed as further evidence of the Soviet Union's desire to achieve disarmament as soon as possible.

Statements in support of these proposals were made also by the governments of the People's Republic of China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Bulgaria and other socialist countries. The Government of Yugoslavia officially

* *Pravda*, June 4, 1960.

informed the Soviet Government of its whole-hearted support, declaring that the new proposals contained all the elements giving mankind lasting peace and ensuring peaceful co-operation among all nations. Indian Prime Minister Nehru wrote to the Soviet Government noting that its proposals were a constructive approach to the disarmament problem and provided a sound basis for further discussion. The Indonesian Government welcomed the Soviet proposals as an "effort genuinely directed towards reconciling the different positions with the purpose of implementing the idea of general and complete disarmament".*

However, in the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee the Western powers in fact evaded discussing the Soviet proposals.

The talks that were conducted in the Committee in the course of several months showed that the Western powers were disinclined to ban and destroy nuclear weapons and that they had no desire to destroy conventional weapons and disband armed forces. Their "contribution" remained their repetition, in different variants, of proposals for legalising espionage under the guise of "control of disarmament" and of attempts to justify their war preparations and the existence of their innumerable bases on foreign territory.

To continue the fruitless discussions in the Ten-Nation Committee under these conditions would have been tantamount to helping the organisers of the arms race to deceive the peoples and give them a false impression of what was being done to carry out the UN decision on general and complete disarmament. The fact that the Soviet Union, whose sincere efforts to achieve agreement on disarmament were appreciated throughout the world, was one of the Ten-Nation Committee's members was being used to delude the peoples and give the West a screen for the arms race. The Soviet Government felt that this situation could not be tolerated. By agreement with the governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria, which were likewise members of the Ten-Nation Committee, it decided to suspend its participation in the work of that Committee and

* *USSR Foreign Policy Archives*, Letter of June 29, 1960 from the President of Indonesia to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

put before the 15th General Assembly the question of disarmament and of the situation that had taken shape following the adoption of the General Assembly's resolution of November 20, 1959. At the Ten-Nation Committee's sitting on June 27, 1960 the Soviet representative declared that "the Soviet Union has been and remains consistently in favour of talks on disarmament and is prepared to continue participating in such talks. But it wants talks that, instead of being a war of words, would facilitate a constructive and fruitful examination of the problem of disarmament". He stressed that "in the interests of the matter in hand the question has arisen of bringing into the talks some other countries, in addition to those represented in the Ten-Nation Committee".*

The other represented socialist countries also discontinued their participation in the Ten-Nation Committee. This step by the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria exposed the deceit and demagoguery practised by the NATO powers at the disarmament talks.

To give the disarmament talks a chance of success it was vital to draw the attention of hundreds of millions of people throughout the world to them. Here again the initiative was taken by the Soviet Union, which, in August 1960, proposed that top-level statesmen should head the delegations of their countries at the General Assembly and take a direct part in the quests for a settlement of the disarmament issue.**

4. The USSR and the Disarmament Question at the 15th and 16th Sessions of the General Assembly

Despite strong Western opposition, the Soviet initiative brought 10 Heads of State, 13 Heads of Government, 57 Foreign Ministers and other leading statesmen to the 15th General Assembly, which opened on September 20, 1960. One of the central points on the agenda was the question of disarmament. Brought up by the Soviet Union, this question commanded world-wide attention.

* *Izvestia*, June 27, 1960.

** *Pravda*, August 10, 1960.

True to its practice of approaching the disarmament question constructively and not confining itself to general statements, the Soviet Government submitted to the General Assembly a well-considered proposal under the heading "Basic Principles of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament". Founded on the proposals of June 2, 1960, this proposal went further in meeting the wishes of the Western powers stated when some of the key provisions of a disarmament programme were being debated. In particular, it took into account the statements of the US and British representatives that it would be expedient, at the very first phase of disarmament, to combine nuclear disarmament with a cutback in armed forces and conventional weapons.

The Soviet Government felt that if a comprehensive discussion of the disarmament question at the General Assembly did not at once lead to a full solution it would at least indicate a more specific direction for further disarmament talks. It was important that the body to which the General Assembly would delegate the question of finalising the wording of an agreement on disarmament should have clear-cut and binding instructions stating the aims of its work and preventing subterfuge and misrepresentation by the wreckers of disarmament. Accordingly, at the 15th General Assembly on October 13, 1960 the Soviet delegation submitted a draft resolution headed "On Disarmament and on the Situation Over the Fulfilment of the General Assembly Resolution of November 20, 1959 on This Question". This draft succinctly stated the main principles on whose basis an agreement on general and complete disarmament should be concluded.

Further, in the draft it was pointed out that modifications had to be introduced in the structure of the UN Secretariat and Security Council to enable the three groups of countries in the world—socialist states, the countries belonging to the Western blocs, and the non-aligned countries—to have equal representation in these bodies. This was suggested in order to make certain that the future international police (militia) were used properly. By raising this question the Soviet Union gave further evidence that its attitude to disarmament was not abstract, that it wanted to clear the way for the practical implementation of the disarmament programme.

In a bid to avoid a repetition of the fruitless debates in the Ten-Nation Committee and holding that it would be proper if the agency handling the drawing up of a disarmament treaty more correctly mirrored the actual political situation, the Soviet Government put before the 15th General Assembly the question of enlarging the Disarmament Committee. It suggested that in addition to the five socialist states and the five NATO countries that had earlier taken part in the negotiations, the Committee should include five non-aligned countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

At the 15th General Assembly the Western powers produced nothing except their old proposals for "disarmament control" to counterpose the Soviet programme for general and complete disarmament and the Soviet Government's reasonable and constructive considerations on how to speed up and effectuate the drawing up of a disarmament treaty. Their behaviour confirmed that they did not want and feared disarmament.

The Western representatives repeated, as they had done so often in the past, the slanderous assertions of bourgeois propaganda to the effect that the Soviet Union was suggesting uncontrollable disarmament.

At the 15th General Assembly the Soviet Union continued to insist on the adoption and realisation of a programme for general and complete disarmament, clearly and concretely enunciating its proposals, including control of disarmament. The Soviet representative V. A. Zorin, who had time and again explained the Soviet stand on disarmament, declared at a sitting of the Political Committee on October 19, 1960:

"At the very first phase of general and complete disarmament we suggest establishing on-site international control of the elimination of all means of delivering nuclear weapons, including the latest types of war missiles. Similarly, we propose that international inspection teams should be sent to military bases and troop stations on foreign territory to control the dismantling of these bases and the withdrawal of these troops to their national frontiers. Further, we propose the institution of control at aerodromes and ports to ensure that these aerodromes and ports are not used for military purposes. We propose on-site control at all factories and shipyards manufacturing missiles, aircraft and other means of

delivering nuclear weapons, and are prepared to reach agreement on permanent inspection teams at some factories and installations of this kind. The international inspection teams would have the right to make a comprehensive inspection of rocket devices to be launched for peaceful scientific purposes and to witness the launching. International inspectors would have unhindered access to data concerning budget allocations for military purposes. Lastly, we propose the implementation of the necessary control over the disbandment of troops and the destruction of conventional weapons.

"We propose the organisation of similarly effective control during the second and third phases. Moreover, we propose that the control system should continue functioning after the realisation of general and complete disarmament, that it should exercise permanent inspection so that no country would resume war production or return to the formation of armed forces. We believe that would be quite adequate."*

The Western powers had such a pathological fear of serious talks on disarmament and of a broad discussion of the Soviet proposals that they made a dead set against the Soviet proposal for a discussion of the disarmament issue directly at plenary meetings of the General Assembly with the participation of the Heads of State and Government who had come to New York. However, the NATO diplomats were unable to prevent the Soviet Union from stating its stand on this issue to all the delegations attending the session. In fact, the disarmament problem was not only discussed at the plenary meetings but was in the centre of the session's entire proceedings.

The 15th General Assembly clearly demonstrated that most of the United Nations sincerely desired general and complete disarmament and appreciated the Soviet Union's efforts to secure an agreement as early as possible and get disarmament finally started. By raising barriers to disarmament and opposing the opinion and will of the majority of mankind the USA and its allies found themselves virtually in a state of political isolation.

All the socialist countries represented in the UN declared themselves in favour of the earliest realisation of general and complete disarmament. Prominent representatives of the

* *United Nations*. Document A/C. 1/PV. 1085, October 19, 1960.

neutralist world likewise supported the Soviet Union in the question of general and complete disarmament.

When twelve non-aligned countries—India, Indonesia, Egypt, Morocco, Iraq, Ghana and other states—submitted a draft resolution on the basic principles of general and complete disarmament in an effort to find what they hoped would be an acceptable compromise solution, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries responded favourably to this move. However, the NATO powers attacked the proposals of the non-aligned countries. The Eisenhower Government openly opposed any decision on general and complete disarmament. As a result, at the 15th General Assembly it did not prove possible to reach agreement on directives for disarmament.

In order to miss no opportunity for an agreement the Soviet Government gave every consideration to the new, Kennedy Administration's request for time to work out a new approach to disarmament. As a result, it did not insist on an examination of the substance of the disarmament question at the latter half of the 15th session of the General Assembly that opened in March 1961. Agreement was reached between the governments of the USSR and the USA to exchange views on disarmament in the summer of 1961. The General Assembly passed a resolution approving this intention.

Soviet-US talks on disarmament were held in Washington, Moscow and New York in June, July and September 1961. At these talks the Soviet Government urged an early international agreement on general and complete disarmament and made concrete, detailed proposals on this question (including control). The American side refused to discuss a programme for general and complete disarmament and suggested examining only the general principles of disarmament. However, the "principles" proposed by it did not envisage either the elimination of conventional weapons and armed forces, the banning of nuclear weapons or the dismantling of military bases on foreign territory.

It was only at the last, New York stage of the bilateral talks that the US Government found it had to accede to the Soviet demands and modify its attitude. This led to the adoption of a "Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations", in which it was stated that an agreement had to be reached on a programme of general and complete

disarmament calling, in part, for the disbanding of armed forces, the dismantling of military bases, the discontinuation of the production of armaments, the elimination of all stock-piles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction, the elimination of all means of delivering these weapons, and so on.

Further, it was stated that general and complete disarmament had to be phased and carried out within established time limits with no country receiving a military advantage at any of these phases. However, the two governments failed to agree on the composition of the negotiation organ. The "Statement of Agreed Principles" was submitted to the 16th General Assembly on September 20, 1961 as a joint Soviet-US proposal on a draft directive for a working organ, whose task would be to work out an agreement on general and complete disarmament. The proposal was approved by the General Assembly.

Due to the USA's dogged reluctance to recognise the right of the non-aligned states to equal participation in the Disarmament Committee, the question of that Committee's composition, on which no agreement had been reached at the Soviet-US talks, was settled at the 16th General Assembly. Eight non-aligned countries—India, Burma, Brazil, Mexico, Sweden, Egypt, Ethiopia and Nigeria—were included in the Committee in addition to the five socialist countries and the five Western states that had representatives in the Ten-Nation Committee. The Ten-Nation Committee thus became an Eighteen-Nation Committee.

At the 16th General Assembly the USSR presented a Memorandum on nuclear tests. Moreover, at the sitting on September 26, 1961 it submitted a Memorandum on measures to ease international tension, strengthen trust between countries and facilitate general and complete disarmament. This document contained the following points:

- 1) The freezing of military budgets (as of January 1, 1961).
- 2) Renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons.
- 3) The banning of war propaganda.
- 4) The conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries.
- 5) The withdrawal of foreign troops from foreign territory.

6) Steps against the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

7) The creation of nuclear-free zones.

8) Steps to reduce the threat of surprise attack.

By a majority vote on November 24 the General Assembly passed a resolution declaring Africa a nuclear-free zone (the pertinent proposal had been made by Ghana) and a Declaration banning the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

The 16th General Assembly thus showed that the struggle of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries for general and complete disarmament was proceeding successfully. A steadily growing number of states, notably non-aligned countries, supported the effort of the socialist countries to deliver mankind from the menace of a catastrophic nuclear war.

5. The Soviet Union Continues Its Struggle for General and Complete Disarmament in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and at the 17th General Assembly

The Eighteen-Nation Committee began its deliberation in Geneva in March 1962.*

In order to enable the Committee to work with maximum effect, the Soviet Government proposed that its proceedings should be launched by the Heads of Government (or State) of the countries represented in it.**

Kennedy and Macmillan withheld their support for this proposal, thereby showing their reluctance to assume personal responsibility for the success of the talks in the Committee.

* Actually, only 17 countries took part in the work of the Committee because the French Government refused to delegate representatives to it. However, a seat for France was formally preserved and the name "Eighteen-Nation Committee" remained in use. Later, when eight more countries (the Mongolian People's Republic, Japan, Argentina, Hungary, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia) were included in the Committee, it became known as the Disarmament Committee as of August 26, 1969.

** *Izvestia*, February 23, 1962—Message of February 21, 1962 of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

The Eighteen-Nation Committee began its work at Foreign Ministers' level and continued it at the level of Deputy Foreign Ministers and special representatives.

To give the talks a constructive character from the very outset, the Soviet Government submitted an exhaustive draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control on March 18, 1962, the day on which the Committee began its work. A. A. Gromyko, who led the Soviet delegation, noted that in this draft "the programme for general and complete disarmament is set forth article by article, paragraph by paragraph in the precise language of binding formulations".* The draft was based on the principles for general and complete disarmament that had been agreed between the USSR and the USA and approved at the 16th General Assembly.

As the preceding Soviet proposals, the draft called for the complete disarmament of all countries in the course of four years by three consecutive stages. The first stage envisaged the destruction of all means of delivering atomic and hydrogen weapons, the dismantling of all military bases on foreign territory and thereby, in effect, removing the threat of a nuclear war. Every measure toward disarmament would be carried out from beginning to end under strict and dependable international control. The Soviet Government accompanied this draft with a solemn reiteration of its repeated statement that "it is prepared to accept any proposals of the Western powers for control of disarmament provided these powers accept the Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament".**

Taking the wishes of the Western powers into consideration the Soviet Government included in its draft a series of measures to reinforce peace and security at the very outset of disarmament, namely, the banning of the launching and orbiting in outer space of carriers of weapons of mass annihilation, international control of the launching of rockets for peaceful purposes, the commitment to refrain from giving nuclear weapons to other states, and so on.

Further, the USSR proposed that without waiting for the consummation of the talks on general and complete disarmament

* *Pravda*, March 16, 1962.

** Memorandum of March 15, 1962 of the Government of the USSR—*Pravda*, March 17, 1962.

mament measures should be taken to help strengthen trust between countries and create more favourable conditions for disarmament, that agreement should be reached on the cessation of nuclear tests and on the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Europe, and that the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO should sign a non-aggression pact.

The detailed Soviet proposals provided a sound foundation for constructive work in the Eighteen-Nation Committee directed towards the speedy drawing up of an international agreement on general and complete disarmament. Naturally, therefore, despite the opposition of the Western delegations, the Soviet draft in fact became the basis for all the talks on disarmament in the Committee.

All that the Western powers could offer to contrapose the Soviet Union's constructive proposals was an outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under conditions of world peace. This outline was submitted by the USA in the second half of April.

In fact, beginning with its heading, this American document was a propaganda manoeuvre designed to mask the intentions of the USA and the other NATO countries to prevent the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Deliberately worded in vague terms, the American proposals provided neither for general and complete disarmament nor for the removal of the threat of a nuclear war.

The USA was, on the whole, opposed to a treaty on general and complete disarmament that would commit all countries to dismantle their war machines within a definite time-limit. It refused to set an overall time-limit for general and complete disarmament. Its proposals were worded in such a way as to give the Western powers the possibility of endlessly dragging out disarmament or, at any time they felt was convenient, to disrupt it altogether. The USA suggested the registration of nuclear weapons for the purpose of inspection only at the end of the second phase of disarmament. The destruction of these weapons was put off to the third phase, whose duration was not specified. More, the USA insisted that after disarmament there should be large international armed forces equipped with nuclear weapons. While proposing that at the first stage there should be a

30 per cent reduction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the USA insisted that its military bases on foreign territory should remain intact. This was an obvious attempt to acquire a military advantage over the Soviet Union under the guise of disarmament. While proposing extremely limited disarmament measures, the USA sought the introduction of all-embracing international control, which in fact amounted to a system of espionage. Although the proposals for self-sufficing control of armaments were somewhat modified in the new American plan and called for so-called selective control by zone, their purpose was patently to facilitate military espionage, in particular, the identification of the Soviet missile and nuclear weapons sites.

All these specifics of the USA's proposals, which had the backing of the other NATO countries, were relentlessly unmasked in the statements of the representatives of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria in the Eighteen-Nation Committee in the spring and summer of 1962.

To clear the way for an agreement the Soviet Union introduced substantial amendments in the draft treaty it had earlier submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The opinion expressed by the Western powers was taken into account in these amendments.

At the 17th General Assembly in September 1962 the Soviet Union took another major step to meet the Western powers half-way in order to speed up an agreement on disarmament. Inasmuch as at Geneva the US Government had categorically objected to the destruction, at the first phase, of all means of delivering nuclear weapons and argued that a "defensive nuclear umbrella" had to be preserved for some time, the Soviet Government declared its consent to leaving, by way of exception, a strictly limited agreed number of intercontinental, anti-missile and surface-to-air anti-aircraft rockets at the disposal of the USSR and the USA as a precaution against possible violators of the disarmament agreement.

By a vote of 97 in favour with one abstention (France), the 17th General Assembly passed a resolution on November 21, 1962 reaffirming the need to conclude an agreement on general and complete disarmament as early as possible and calling on the Eighteen-Nation Committee to resume its negotiations without delay and conduct them "in a spirit

of constructive compromise, until agreement has been reached".*

However, neither the efforts of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, nor the summons of the General Assembly induced the USA and the other Western powers to modify their fundamentally negative attitude. Towards the close of 1962 the Eighteen-Nation Committee agreed, in the main, only on the preamble and on some general articles of a disarmament treaty.

The Soviet Government was fully aware of how vital the removal of the threat of a world nuclear war was to all the peoples of the planet, to the progress of all mankind, and it continued its drive for an agreement on general and complete disarmament. A major stage of this drive was the World Peace and Disarmament Congress in Moscow on July 10, 1962. At that Congress the Soviet representatives searchingly criticised the attitude of the Western powers to disarmament and clearly stated the stand of the Government and people of the USSR, declaring the Soviet Union's readiness to look for a mutually acceptable wording of all the provisions in the Soviet draft treaty and, where necessary, agree upon a compromise if it was not inimical to general and complete disarmament.

In order to extend the front of the struggle for general and complete disarmament, enable the peoples of all countries to have a more profound understanding of the significance of that struggle and prepare favourable conditions for an agreement on disarmament, the Soviet Government submitted to the 17th General Assembly another important question, that of an economic programme of disarmament. Substantiating this new initiative, the Soviet representative declared at the General Assembly: "It is the view of the Soviet Government that already now, without waiting for the consummation of the talks on general and complete disarmament, the United Nations should commence working out an international programme for the peaceful utilisation of the funds and resources presently being channelled for military purposes. The elaboration of this programme in advance would not only allow for a painless switch of the

* *Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly During Its Seventeenth Session, 18 September-20 December, 1962*, United Nations, New York, 1963, pp. 4-5.

economies of countries to a peaceful footing on a world-wide scale but also help the peoples to gain a better understanding of the need for and significance of disarmament and thereby rally millions upon millions of new proponents of that cause to the banner of peaceful coexistence and disarmament.”*

On December 14, 1962, relative to the question raised by the USSR, the General Assembly unanimously adopted a Declaration on channelling the funds and resources released by disarmament for peaceful needs. This Declaration, drafted jointly by the Soviet and US delegations, called on the governments of all countries to redouble their efforts to achieve the earliest possible general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In the Declaration the General Assembly expressed the conviction that the resources being spent on military requirements throughout the world (roughly US\$120,000 million annually) could be channelled for peaceful purposes in such a way as to benefit all countries and improve economic and social conditions in all parts of the world, and that disarmament could be achieved in all countries not only without prejudicing their economies but with immense returns in terms of the actual welfare of their peoples. The Declaration accentuated the importance of using the funds released by disarmament for raising the living standard in the less developed countries.

The foundations of the Soviet attitude to general and complete disarmament under effective international control were thus laid as early as at the close of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s. This attitude was approved by most of the UN member-states and in fact underlay the work that was conducted in the United Nations and other international organisations in drawing up the appropriate international agreement. Appreciating the difficulties involved in resolving this problem in the modern world, where imperialism with its piratical policies is still strong, the CPSU and the Soviet Government are perseveringly waging a consistent struggle to achieve the noble aim of general and complete disarmament, which is vital to the peoples of the whole world. In that struggle the Soviet Union co-operates closely with other socialist countries and relies on the understanding and support of all peace-loving, progressive coun-

* *Izvestia*, September 22, 1962.

tries, on the support of millions upon millions of peace fighters in all the continents. The question of drawing up a treaty on general and complete disarmament has been repeatedly raised by the Soviet Union in the United Nations and other international organisations. In February 1970 the Soviet representative in the Geneva Disarmament Committee urged the Committee to resume its detailed examination of and agree the proposed drafts of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. This, the Soviet representative said, was demanded by the situation in the world. The peoples did not wish to live in constant fear, with the threat of devastating wars hanging over them.*

6. The Soviet Union's Efforts to Secure an End to Nuclear Weapons Tests (1959-1962)

Parallel with its struggle for general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union continued its efforts to halt the testing of atomic and hydrogen bombs. Started on Soviet initiative the talks between the USSR, the USA and Britain on the cessation of nuclear tests went on for three years (from the autumn of 1958 to the beginning of 1962) in Geneva. The history of these talks, started when the Soviet Union submitted a draft treaty on the discontinuation of tests, is a history of the unremitting struggle waged by the USSR to deliver the world from atomic and hydrogen bomb tests that were contaminating the world's atmosphere, soil and water, leading to the further improvement of weapons of mass annihilation and stepping up the nuclear arms race.

However, the Soviet Union's straightforward and clear-cut stand on this issue was doggedly resisted by the USA and Britain and by their NATO allies. Throughout the entire period of the talks the Western powers used all sorts of artificial pretexts to hinder the elaboration of an agreement on ending all nuclear tests. In effect, all their proposals were designed to give substance to these pretexts. On the pretext of ensuring international control over the fulfilment of a nuclear test ban treaty the USA and Britain produced

* *Pravda*, February 18, 1970.

one plan after another, whose aim was essentially to set up a system of legalised espionage against the USSR. They refused to recognise the right of the socialist countries to equal participation in international control agencies, sought to place the contemplated control organisation under one director through whom they could impose their will on the Soviet Union, and misrepresented the USSR's stand, groundlessly attributing to it the intention of introducing the veto in questions of control.

Totally ignoring the fact that the level reached by science and technology had made it possible to detect nuclear tests in any country with the aid of the instruments available to other states outside the country, the USA and Britain demanded an unreasonable number of inspection posts on Soviet territory. More, they changed their own attitude time and again and rejected the conclusions of their own experts. Such, in particular, was the case at the beginning of 1959, when the US Government repudiated the recommendations that it had agreed with the Soviet and British governments on the detection of nuclear explosions and, alluding to "new seismic data", claimed that it was difficult to detect underground explosions. This claim was made in order to erect further barriers to an agreement on the banning of nuclear tests.

The Western powers, principally the USA, took the line of obstructing the total banning of all forms of nuclear tests.

In order to achieve an agreement acceptable to all the powers concerned, the USSR accepted some of the Western proposals on important provisions of a treaty on ceasing tests. As a result some progress was made in Geneva: by May 1959 agreement had been reached on 17 articles and on the preamble of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests.

At the talks the Soviet Government submitted proposals taking the considerations of the other powers into account in order to facilitate agreement. For example, in April 1959 to reconcile differences over the question of control it proposed acting on the idea put forward by British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and reach agreement on a system of selective checks, in other words, on an established small number of annual inspections on the territories of the signatory powers in cases where there was suspicion that nuclear devices had been exploded. Meeting the wishes of the govern-

ments of the USA and Britain, the Soviet Government agreed to further talks between experts in the summer and autumn of 1959, this time on methods of detecting tests in the atmosphere and on so-called scientific criteria for inspection. In effect, the Soviet Union accepted the US proposal, made in Geneva in February 1960, on a phased cessation of tests, making the reservation, however, that while the methods of identifying underground tests lying outside the operation of the treaty were being studied, the signatory powers would pledge to enforce a moratorium on such tests.

But all these constructive steps of the Soviet Union were either rejected outright by the Western powers or subordinated to drawn-out, endless arguments over secondary technical details with the object of evading an answer to the questions that had been raised. As a result, throughout 1960 no agreement was reached in Geneva on any new article of a draft treaty on the ending of tests.

At a meeting with the US President in Geneva in the summer of 1961, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR proposed that inasmuch as it was proving to be difficult to reach agreement on a cessation of nuclear tests, a solution should be found to this question not separately but in connection with a treaty on general and complete disarmament. It was reiterated that if the Western powers accepted the proposal for general and complete disarmament the Soviet Union would be prepared to accept unconditionally any of their proposals on control and also their proposals on the question of halting nuclear tests. This would have been a radical decision that could have removed all the difficulties that had arisen at the Three Power talks in Geneva.

But the government of the USA and Britain clearly had no intention of ceasing nuclear tests, much less of signing an agreement on general and complete disarmament.

In addition to sabotaging the Geneva talks on a test ban, the Western powers intensified their aggressive, provocative policy, aggravating the international situation and precipitating a further arms race and a new series of nuclear tests.

On December 29, 1959 President Eisenhower announced that as of the beginning of 1960 the USA would consider itself free of all commitments to refrain from testing nuclear

weapons and could resume such tests at any time. This step was taken by the USA despite the fact that on November 5, 1958 the General Assembly had passed a resolution calling on the participants in the Geneva talks not to resume nuclear tests.

Meanwhile preparations for a resumption of nuclear tests were started in the USA. In October 1960 John A. McCone, Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission, declared that the tunnels and mines in the Nevada proving grounds were ready for further test explosions. In the summer of 1961 the Nato countries headed by the USA began to put large-scale military measures into effect, including mobilisation and the sending of huge numbers of troops to Europe. In connection with the question of West Berlin US leaders threatened to begin a war against the USSR. In this situation the Soviet Union had no choice but to strengthen its defence capability and resume the testing of nuclear devices, including weapons which could not be matched even by the USA. A statement issued on this question on August 31, 1961 noted: "The Soviet Government is forced to take this step . . . under pressure of the international situation created by the imperialist countries . . . to discourage the aggressor from playing with fire, so that he should know and see that there is a fully armed power in the world capable of repulsing any assault on the independence and security of peace-loving states and that the weapon of retribution will reach the aggressor in his own lair."* The Statement solemnly reiterated the Soviet Union's determination to create a situation in which there would never again be a need for nuclear tests and to achieve general and complete disarmament.

On November 28, 1961, when the talks on ending nuclear tests were resumed in Geneva, the Soviet Government submitted new proposals founded on the suggestions made by Kennedy and Macmillan, who in their messages of September 3 of the same year to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR had declared that relative to tests in the atmosphere the USA and Britain were prepared to rely on existing means of detection, which they considered adequate, and had not recommended additional measures of

* *Pravda*, August 31, 1961.

control.* But whereas the US President and the British Prime Minister had suggested limiting the ban to tests in the atmosphere, the Soviet Union proposed the immediate conclusion of an agreement banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater and in outer space, where they could be easily detected by the technical means available to the signatory powers. With regard to underground tests, the USSR suggested that a commitment should be taken to refrain from making such tests until agreement was reached on an appropriate system of controlling these tests within the framework of overall control of general and complete disarmament. More, the Soviet Government raised the question of inviting France to the talks on a nuclear test ban.

The USA and Britain did not accept these proposals. Instead, the Americans went ahead with underground tests, which had been started in September, and Kennedy and Macmillan agreed that in 1962 with Britain's co-operation and on the British-owned Christmas Island the United States would conduct a new series of tests in the atmosphere, including high-altitude explosions in the upper layers of the atmosphere. After warning the Western powers that these actions would compel the USSR to test nuclear weapons in order to maintain its defence capability at the proper level, the Soviet Government continued its efforts to secure an agreement on an end to nuclear tests.

However, in January 1962 the governments of the USA and Britain refused to continue the talks in Geneva, obviously with the aim of giving free scope for a nuclear arms race. The Soviet Government was prepared to go on with the talks, but in view of this attitude of the Western powers it agreed to an attempt to find a solution to the test problem in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. However, even in that Committee, which began its work in March, the Western powers stuck to their negative position, showing an interest not so much in ending tests as in getting the possibility of carrying on large-scale espionage in the USSR under the pretext of international inspection.

In the period from April to August 1962 the Eighteen-Nation Committee worked to the accompaniment of a huge series of atmospheric and high-altitude nuclear explosions

* *Izvestia*, September 9, 1961.

conducted by the USA with the co-operation of Britain. These tests, conducted in defiance of world public opinion, worsened the conditions for the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and deliberately drew the USSR into a fresh round of the competition to perfect nuclear weapons.

In order to help end the deadlock created by the NATO powers in the talks on banning nuclear tests and worried by the situation, the eight non-aligned countries in the Eighteen-Nation Committee (Burma, Brazil, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Egypt, Sweden and Ethiopia) submitted to the Committee on April 16, 1962 a Memorandum with proposals on the question of test-ban controls. The substance of these proposals was that control should be exercised on the basis of the existing national networks of observation posts. It was suggested that an international commission composed of a limited number of highly qualified scientists should be set up to process the information received from these posts, and that the signatories to a treaty should have the possibility of inviting the commission to inspect their territory in the event suspicious explosions were detected.

The Soviet Government assessed this initiative of the eight peace-loving states as a constructive step and declared that it was prepared to "consider the proposals in the Memorandum of the non-aligned states as the foundation for further talks".* This initiative received the vigorous support of the other socialist countries represented in the Committee: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria. It must also be mentioned that in the resolution adopted by the 17th General Assembly on November 6, 1962 it was stressed that the Memorandum "represents a sound, adequate and fair basis for the conduct of negotiations towards removing the outstanding differences on the question of effective control of underground tests".**

But the Western powers ignored the constructive proposals of the non-aligned countries and the Soviet Union's agreement to accept these proposals as the basis for further negotiation. They insisted on a broad espionage network on Soviet

* *Pravda*, April 20, 1962.

** *Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly During Its Seventeenth Session, 18 September-20 December, 1962*, United Nations, New York, 1963, p. 3.

territory under the guise of "inspection" as the condition for their agreement to a total ban on nuclear tests.

When the 17th General Assembly asked that all nuclear tests "should cease immediately and not later than 1 January, 1963",* the Soviet Union declared its readiness to abide by this call if the Western powers likewise ceased their tests.

7. The Moscow Test-Ban Treaty

In 1963 the Soviet Government initiated a new step in order to induce the Western powers to agree to a practical solution of the question of ending nuclear tests in as many environments as possible. On July 2, 1963, after carefully weighing the situation, it declared that inasmuch as the Western powers were opposed to an agreement on the banning of all nuclear tests, it was prepared to sign an agreement banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater. This proposal had been made earlier, but the Western powers had wrecked the chances of reaching agreement when they made additional conditions envisaging large-scale inspection on Soviet territory.

The Soviet Government called upon the Western powers to meet the aspirations of the peoples of the world and accept this proposal, thereby removing the danger of further radioactive contamination of the atmosphere and eliminating the threat to the health of the present and future generations.

As a result talks were held between representatives of the Soviet, US and British Governments (A. A. Gromyko, Averell Harriman and Lord Hailsham) in Moscow on July 16-25, 1963. The text of an agreement, proposed by the Soviet Union, was elaborated and initialled. A treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater was signed in the Soviet capital on August 5 by the Soviet, British and US Foreign Ministers in the presence of the leaders of the CPSU and the Government of the USSR.

The signatories to this treaty, which became known as the Moscow Treaty, undertook "to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out any nuclear test explosions, or any other nuclear explosions" in the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space, or under water, or in any other environ-

* Ibid., p. 4.

ment if such explosion caused radioactive fall-out outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion was conducted.

The treaty stated that the principal aim of its signatories was to achieve the speediest agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control and in two of its paragraphs underscored the aspiration of the signatories to reach agreement on a total ban of nuclear explosions, including underground explosions. The Moscow Treaty came into force on October 10, 1963 after the instruments of ratification were exchanged between the three initial signatories.

This treaty, signed as a result of the Soviet Union's unflagging efforts to halt nuclear tests, efforts backed by the will of all nations, was a major triumph of the forces of peace and progress. Within two months the treaty was signed by over 100 countries.

While it was aware that the test-ban treaty could not halt the arms race and did not remove or even essentially diminish the threat of a nuclear war, the Soviet Government saw its immense international significance. It was not only a means of delivering the peoples of radioactive fall-out caused by nuclear explosions but an important step towards creating the conditions facilitating the settlement of other outstanding international issues. It showed the whole world that provided there was the desire and good will on the part of the powers, it was quite possible to settle international issues on mutually acceptable terms.

8. Against the Nuclear Arming of the FRG and Giving It Access to Nuclear Weapons in Any Form

After the Moscow Treaty was signed the Soviet Union consistently went forward with its efforts to achieve further progress in disarmament, to bring the world nearer to general and complete disarmament. It proposed some partial measures to limit the arms race.

At the 18th General Assembly in the autumn of 1963 the Soviet Government declared that in order to halt the arms

race in outer space agreement had to be reached with the Government of the USA to ban the orbiting of vehicles carrying nuclear weapons. On October 17, 1963, following talks between representatives of the USSR and the USA, the General Assembly passed a resolution welcoming the expressions by the USSR and the USA of their intention "not to station in outer space any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction" and solemnly calling upon all states to refrain from placing weapons of mass destruction in outer space.

There was a considerable aggravation of the international situation in the autumn of 1964 when US imperialism attacked the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and swiftly escalated its intervention in South Vietnam. Preparations were started to give the revanchist circles in the FRG access to nuclear weapons. These preparations were conducted in West Germany by rapidly building facilities for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and training the Bundeswehr in the handling of these weapons, and on the international level in the shape of attempts to give the FRG access to nuclear weapons in the NATO military bloc by setting up a "NATO multilateral nuclear force" or "Atlantic nuclear force".

The imperialist camp stepped up its pressure on the national liberation movement by organising counter-revolutionary conspiracies and coups in some of the liberated states in Asia and Africa (Indonesia, Ghana) and encouraging open armed aggression against countries that had taken the road of progressive social development (the events in the Middle East in the summer of 1967).

In this situation, naturally, the principal task before the Soviet Union and other socialist countries was to strengthen the defence capability and unity of the socialist community, heighten vigilance with regard to the plots of the imperialists and extend every possible assistance to the peoples fighting imperialist aggression.

But even in this situation the Soviet Union did not relax its efforts to settle the disarmament problem and deliver mankind from the threat of another world war. "The Soviet Government regards the struggle for general and complete disarmament as one of the central aims of its foreign policy," A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the

USSR, said in his report to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on December 9, 1964.

On May 8, 1965, the 20th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War, L. I. Brezhnev, First Secretary of the CC CPSU, declared:

"With the same energy that we are strengthening our defence capacity we are working and shall continue to work for peace, for complete and general disarmament. On this point there neither is nor will be any vacillation on our part. It is necessary to win over step by step, the positions from the proponents of the arms race. We advocate the banning and destruction of nuclear weapons. Together with the peoples of all socialist countries and other peace-loving states we shall continue our efforts to settle this problem, which worries virtually the whole of mankind. We are confident that sooner or later the pressure of the peaceloving peoples will breach the dam being erected by the imperialist militarist circles to disarmament and to the destruction of nuclear weapons."^{*}

In this new situation Soviet policy in disarmament concentrated mainly on achieving a settlement of the most urgent problems and removing the most acute threats to world peace.

This meant, above all, a struggle to prevent the arming of West German imperialism with nuclear weapons in any form and to halt the further proliferation of these weapons. At the same time Soviet diplomacy continued its consistent struggle for other partial measures in disarmament that could facilitate the settlement of the basic problems worrying mankind.

In the foreign policy programme outlined in the CC CPSU report to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU and unanimously approved by the Congress it was stated that one of the prime tasks was:

"To conclude an international treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; completely remove the question of the nuclear armament of the FRG or of giving it access to nuclear weapons in any form; implement the aspiration of the peoples for setting up nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world; secure a solemn obligation on the part of the

^{*} L. I. Brezhnev, *Velikaya pobeda sovetskogo naroda*, Moscow, 1965, p. 46.

nuclear powers to refrain from using nuclear weapons first; reach an agreement on the banning of underground nuclear tests—implementation of these steps aimed against the threat of a nuclear war would open the road for a further advance towards the complete banning and destruction of nuclear weapons.”*

The struggle to prevent the FRG from gaining access to nuclear weapons became one of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the USSR and its socialist allies in 1965-1970. Throughout these years in innumerable official documents, in Statements and diplomatic Notes, in talks with statesmen of other countries and in the United Nations the Soviet Government consistently and energetically upheld the principle of preventing the West German revanchists from getting access to nuclear weapons as one of the cornerstones of peace in Europe and the rest of the world, as an indispensable condition for the normalisation of relations with the Federal Republic of Germany.**

In that struggle the Soviet Union was unfailingly aided by the fraternal socialist countries, especially by the Warsaw Treaty member states. An important milestone of that struggle was the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee's meeting convened in January 1965 on Soviet initiative in Warsaw and attended by the leaders of the fraternal parties and governments of the member states. This meeting adopted a joint Statement seriously warning the world of the threat harboured in the NATO plans of giving the West German revanchists camouflaged access to nuclear weapons.

“The Warsaw Treaty member states,” the Statement said, “are emphatically opposed to the transfer to the Federal Republic of Germany of nuclear weapons in any form—directly or indirectly through a bloc of countries, by placing such weapons entirely at its disposal or giving it any form of participation in their disposal. . . .

“The vital interests of all peoples demand the renunciation of the plans of setting up a NATO multilateral nuclear force. If, however, flouting the interests of peace the NATO countries effectuate the plans of setting up a multilateral

* 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow, 1966, p. 55.

** See Chapter Thirty.

nuclear force in any form, the serious consequences of this action to peace and security in Europe will compel the Warsaw Treaty member states to take the necessary defensive measures to ensure their own security.”*

At its Bucharest meeting in July 1966 the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee adopted a Declaration in which Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia repeated their warning, forcefully stating:

“In view of the danger that the FRG’s nuclear claims harbour for peace in Europe, the states must direct their efforts towards excluding the possibility of the FRG receiving access to nuclear weapons in any form—directly or indirectly through a bloc of countries, by placing such weapons entirely at its disposal or giving it any form of participation in their disposal. The future of European, and not only of European, peoples will in many ways depend on how this question is settled. There must be no half-hearted decisions on this matter.”**

This attitude received the whole-hearted support and approval of progressive, peace-loving circles in many countries, above all of the vanguard of the working people—the international communist movement. At a conference of European Communist and Workers’ parties in Karlovy Vary in April 1967, 24 fraternal parties proclaimed that one of the basic elements of lasting peace in Europe was “the exclusion of the possibility of the FRG getting access to nuclear weapons in any form, including so-called European, multilateral or Atlantic”***

Merging with the peace struggle of the peoples of all countries, the struggle waged by the USSR and other socialist states to prevent the West German imperialists from receiving access to atomic and hydrogen bombs had considerable success. In fact it foiled the plans of setting up a “multilateral” or any other nuclear force under the aegis of

* *Pravda*, January 22, 1965.

** *Dokumenty Soveshchaniya Politicheskogo Konsultativnogo Komiteta gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo dogovora*, Moscow, 1966, p. 16.

*** *Dokumenty Konferentsii yevropeiskikh kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii v Karlovykh Varakh*, April 24-26, 1967, Moscow, 1967, p. 11.

the North Atlantic bloc that for several years had been worked on in Washington, Bonn and other NATO capitals. Although the need for unceasing vigilance relative to the designs of the most aggressive forces of imperialism remained, this was a major victory.

A further extremely important stage was the successful struggle of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries for a formal international ban on the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

9. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

All these years an international treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was one of the principal objectives of Soviet policy in disarmament. At the 18th and 19th sessions of the UN General Assembly and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee in 1964 the Soviet Union had repeatedly suggested that an agreement should be signed to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, stressing that under no circumstances should such weapons be given to non-nuclear states either directly or through military blocs. Acting in the spirit of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, which had time and again called upon its member states to help achieve an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in co-operation with its socialist allies the USSR started preliminary talks with the USA with the purpose of working out a mutually acceptable draft international agreement on this question and submitting it to the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The draft was, in the main, worked out by 1967, although some NATO countries, notably the FRG, continued to obstruct the final wording of the treaty, which they regarded as a serious hindrance to West German imperialism's nuclear armament.

The Soviet Union's stand on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was appreciated and supported by the other socialist countries and fraternal parties. In the Karlovy Vary Statement it was noted that "as a major step towards ending the arms race, the conclusion of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" was one of the

cardinal aims of the democratic peace forces of Europe and the whole world.*

While the draft of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty was being drawn up, the Warsaw Treaty countries held a series of consultations and exchanged views. The final text of the treaty, which was completed in March 1968, took account of the proposals and wishes of these countries and of other states—members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee and the United Nations.

On March 7, 1968, at a sitting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee in Sofia, the leaders of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia published a Statement in which it was emphasised that the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons was an urgent task and declared their support for the draft treaty that had been submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee by the USSR.**

On June 12 of the same year the Soviet Union and its allies scored a notable victory in their struggle to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons: by a vote of 95 against 4 (with 21 abstentions) the General Assembly approved the draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that had been submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on the recommendation of the USSR and the USA and expressed the hope that it would be signed by all the nuclear and non-nuclear states.

On July 1, 1968 the treaty was opened for signature simultaneously in the capitals of the three depository states—the USSR, the USA and Britain. In Moscow the treaty was signed on July 1 by Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko and by the Ambassadors of the USA and Britain. It was then signed by the representatives of 33 other countries, including Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and the Mongolian People's Republic. Altogether, by the close of 1968 the treaty had been signed by 83 countries.

The treaty unconditionally forbids the direct or indirect transfer of nuclear weapons or control of such weapons to other states, clearly stating that nobody, i.e., either indi-

* *Dokumenty Konferentsii yevropeiskikh kommunisticheskikh i rabochikh partii v Karlovykh Varakh*, April 24-26, 1967, p. 11.

** *Pravda*, March 9, 1968.

vidual non-nuclear states or military blocs, is to be given possession of such weapons.

Control of the observance of the treaty by non-nuclear countries was entrusted to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The procedures and forms of this control were worked out by the experts of many countries, including the Soviet Union and other socialist states. Among the IAEA inspectors there are representatives of the socialist states.

The problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was settled by the treaty on a long-term basis. The question of whether the treaty will remain in force indefinitely or whether it will be prolonged for some new period is to be decided in 25 years' time from the date on which it was signed.

Worked out in the course of long and complex negotiations with the Western powers and non-aligned states, the treaty, naturally, contains points that bear the imprint of a certain compromise. This was inevitable, for it was the only way agreement could be reached. But this compromise did not affect any of the fundamental points upheld by the USSR and its allies in their efforts to provide effective safeguards against the spread of nuclear weapons. This conformed to the interests of socialism and to the interests of all peace-loving nations.

Speaking on the day after the signing of the treaty, L. I. Brezhnev stressed: "We have reached a new and very important milestone. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—the fruit of many years of energetic effort—has been approved by most countries and on July 1 it was opened for signature. This, comrades, is a notable success of our Leninist foreign policy.

"The significance of the Treaty is mainly that it prevents the spread of nuclear weapons and ensures the necessary international control of the fulfilment by countries of their commitments in this respect. It is a document of peace aimed at reducing the threat of a nuclear war and safeguarding the security of nations.

"We call upon all countries to sign this important document and to do everything to allow the treaty to come into force as early as possible and begin to work in favour of peace and progress."*

* *Pravda*, July 4, 1968.

Support and approval of the treaty was declared by the peoples of the whole world. Within a period of a little over eighteen months it was signed by nearly 100 countries. The formal act of depositing the instruments of ratification with the depository states—the USSR and the USA—took place on March 5, 1970. The third depository country, Britain, had deposited its instrument of ratification in November 1969. Inasmuch as the treaty was ratified by another 40 countries, it came into force on March 5, 1970. Speaking after the ceremony of depositing the instruments of ratification, A. N. Kosygin expressed the deep satisfaction of the Soviet Government. "Now, with the treaty having come into force," he said, "the commitment on the renunciation of the spread of nuclear weapons has become a key rule of international law. The countries that are not a party to the treaty cannot but reckon with this international legal norm."^{*} Further, he reiterated the Soviet Government's striving to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament and on partial measures to limit armaments.

10. The USSR in the Struggle for Partial Disarmament Measures

With general and complete disarmament as one of the main objectives of its foreign policy, the Soviet Union urged also partial measures that, as a start, could at least limit the arms race.

In December 1964 the Soviet delegation at the 19th General Assembly stressed that the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee were proceeding unsatisfactorily, that the NATO countries did not desire disarmament, that although the statements in favour of disarmament were becoming more and more lavish the world was in fact witnessing an unparalleled arms race. At that session it submitted a Memorandum on measures for a further easing of international tension and restriction of the arms race.

Actuated by the desire to clear the way for an agreement on the cardinal issue—general and complete disarmament—

^{*} *Pravda*, March 6, 1970.

the Soviet Government suggested an agreement on immediate steps such as a 10-15-per cent or some other agreed reduction of military budgets; the withdrawal or numerical cut-back of troops in foreign territory; the dismantling of foreign military bases; the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons; the banning of the use of nuclear weapons; the establishment of nuclear-free zones in a number of regions, the banning of underground nuclear tests (in addition to the Moscow partial test-ban treaty); the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries.

The Soviet Union subscribed to the proposal of the Cairo Conference of non-aligned states (in October 1964) for a world disarmament conference with the participation of all countries, and also to the proposal of the Chinese Government for a world summit to discuss the question of a total ban on nuclear weapons and the destruction of all nuclear stockpiles, and as a beginning, the question of banning the use of nuclear weapons. This proposal of the Chinese Government coincided with what the Soviet Government had been proposing all along.

Also, in the question of partial measures to limit the arms race, the Soviet Union's stand coincided with that of its socialist allies, the international communist movement and other peace-loving, democratic forces. The Declaration adopted by the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee at its meeting in Bucharest underscored the significance of partial measures for a military relaxation in Europe such as the dismantling of foreign bases, the withdrawal of troops from foreign territory, the creation of nuclear-free zones, and so forth. The European communist parties that attended the Karlovy Vary Conference declared themselves unequivocally for "an agreement on partial measures, above all in the sphere of disarmament, that would create a favourable atmosphere for more far-reaching treaties".

One of the articles of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons binds its signatories to conduct talks in a spirit of good will on effective measures to end the race for nuclear armaments in the immediate future and achieve nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. In keeping with the spirit and letter of this

pledge, the Soviet Government, on signing the non-proliferation treaty, forwarded to all the countries of the world a Memorandum listing urgent measures on ending the arms race and on disarmament on which agreement could be reached through the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the General Assembly and a world disarmament conference. These measures were the banning of the use of nuclear weapons, the cessation of their production and the gradual destruction of their stockpiles; the restriction and gradual reduction of the means of delivering strategic weapons: the banning of flights by nuclear-armed bombers beyond national frontiers; the restriction of the cruising zone of rocket-carrying submarines and, lastly, the banning of underground nuclear tests (that do not come under the operation of the 1963 Treaty). All these measures were aimed at reducing and ultimately removing the threat of a nuclear war.

Moreover, the Soviet Memorandum envisaged a vital measure to world security such as a ban on the use of chemical and germ weapons. Further, it suggested agreement on the dismantling of military bases on foreign territory, measures directed toward regional disarmament (the creation of nuclear-free zones and the reduction of armaments in various parts of the world), and steps to ensure the peaceful utilisation of the seabed and the ocean floor.

In proposing this wide-ranging and, at the same time, realistic programme of partial disarmament measures to all the governments of the world, the Soviet Government reiterated in its Memorandum that it was "necessary to bend every effort to secure tangible results in the settlement of the problem of general and complete disarmament".*

Enlarging on the programme outlined in its Memorandum of July 1, 1968, the Soviet Government embarked on further important initiatives.

In March 1969 it submitted to the Disarmament Committee a draft treaty banning the use of the seabed and the ocean floor for military purposes. This was followed by extensive talks on this issue with other governments. As a result, a draft treaty banning the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in its subsoil, with account of additional recommen-

* *Pravda*, July 2, 1968.

dations, was submitted to the Geneva Disarmament Committee on April 23, 1970. The draft, co-sponsored by the Soviet Union and the United States of America, was agreed in the Committee, which submitted it to the 25th General Assembly, where it was approved on December 16, 1970. The treaty was opened for signature in Moscow, London and Washington on February 11, 1971. At the signing of the treaty A. N. Kosygin said that it "tied in with the immutable objective of the Soviet Union's Leninist foreign policy, namely, the strengthening of peace and the safeguarding of the security of nations".

Further, the 25th General Assembly approved the Declaration on Strengthening International Security, the draft of which had been submitted by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The Declaration called upon all countries, particularly the nuclear powers, to take immediate and concerted steps to put an end to and reverse the race for nuclear and conventional armaments as soon as possible, destroy nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and sign a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.*

On September 19, 1969 the Soviet Union and fraternal socialist countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia) submitted to the General Assembly their draft of an international convention on one of the cardinal problems of disarmament—the banning of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and germ (biological) weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons.

Both these initiatives of the Soviet Union and its socialist allies were welcomed by world opinion. They showed the Disarmament Committee and the UN agencies the direct road to the adoption of further concrete and fruitful decisions on disarmament.

* * *

The struggle to deliver mankind from the burden of the arms race and from the threat of a world missile-nuclear war has today become the banner of all the peace forces in

* *Izvestia*, December 19, 1970.

the world, of all champions of the freedom and independence of nations, of all the forces fighting imperialist aggression. This struggle is headed by the Soviet Union, a great power building communism. No other country in world history has applied such titanic efforts to bring nearer the day when mankind will at last be delivered from the curse of devastating, bloody wars, when the age-old dream of a peaceful life wholly devoted to constructive labour for the common good will come true. The Soviet Union is waging a tireless and uncompromising struggle against the enemies of disarmament in the imperialist camp, exposing their policies that are hostile to the interests of all mankind and showing their subterfuges to evade the agreement on disarmament demanded by the interests of all nations.

In this sacred struggle the Soviet Union marches shoulder to shoulder with other socialist countries, with the Communist and Workers' parties, in alliance with and with the backing of all the peace forces in the world. In the *Appeal in Defence of Peace* adopted unanimously on June 16, 1969 at the Moscow International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, the fraternal parties of all continents declared:

"Peace on earth cannot rest on a 'balance of fear'. Lasting peace is inconceivable without a cessation of the arms race.

"It is imperative to secure the creation of nuclear-free zones in different parts of the globe, the banning of all nuclear tests, the speediest possible enforcement of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the participation of all countries in this treaty, the banning of nuclear weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles.

"It is imperative to demand the dismantling of military bases on foreign territory, the release of countries from the aggressive military pacts forced on them and the imposition of an effective international ban on all types of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

"It is necessary to work, consistently and perseveringly, towards general and complete disarmament.

"In face of all trials we Communists have preserved our boundless devotion to Lenin's ideas of peace and friendship among nations. Today, as before, we shall struggle for these

lofty aims of the whole of mankind together with all who oppose the policy of militarism, aggression and war.”**

True to the jointly adopted decisions, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communists of other countries are steadfastly waging a principled struggle against all attempts under a screen of “Leftist”, pseudo-revolutionary verbiage to demobilise the masses and sow distrust in the ability of the socialist countries and all other peace forces to arrest the designs of the imperialist aggressors and ensure lasting peace in the world.

As a socialist state building the bright edifice of a communist society, the Soviet Union has no other aim except the happiness of the peoples, which can only be achieved by preventing the catastrophe of a world nuclear war and ensuring peace. This guideline of Soviet foreign policy meets with the vital interests of all peoples and is therefore bound to triumph. It accords with Lenin’s injunction that “disarmament is the ideal of socialism”.**

International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties, Moscow 1969, p. 50.

** V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 95.

Chapter Thirty

THE STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION. RELATIONS WITH THE DEVELOPING AND CAPITALIST COUNTRIES. THE GERMAN QUESTION AND EUROPEAN SECURITY (1964-1970)

In a speech on November 6, 1964 commemorating the 47th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, soon after the CPSU Central Committee's plenary meeting in October 1964, L. I. Brezhnev pointed out that the "general course of Soviet foreign policy, charted by the decisions of the last congresses of the CPSU, by its Programme, is consistent and constant".*

The 23rd Congress of the CPSU, held in March 1966, reviewed the work that had been accomplished by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government in international relations and determined the further orientation of Soviet foreign policy. In the Central Committee report to the Congress it was noted that in the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government special attention was devoted to strengthening the might and cohesion of the socialist community. The CPSU, the report stated, regarded the world socialist system as the greatest historic achievement of the international working class, the principal revolutionary force of the epoch and the most reliable mainstay of all peoples fighting for peace, national liberation, democracy and socialism. It was stressed that in the present epoch the main directions of development were determined by the world socialist system, by the forces fighting imperialism, for the socialist reorganisation of society.

* L. I. Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom*, Vol. I, p. 26.

The Central Committee informed the Congress that in keeping with the Leninist principles of the struggle for peace and socialism its foreign policy had created favourable conditions for the peaceful, constructive labour of Soviet people and of the peoples of the rest of the socialist community. The objectives of this policy were to ensure the utmost strengthening and development of the world socialist system, the unity of all the anti-imperialist forces, the defence of the freedom, independence and security of nations and the cause of world peace and progress.

The report characterised the unremitting struggle between the peaceful and aggressive orientations on the international scene. Jointly with the other countries of the socialist community the Soviet Union pursued a policy of easing tension, strengthening peace, promoting peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems and creating the conditions giving each people the possibility of moving freely along the road of national and social progress. From the rostrum of the Congress it was declared that the Soviet Union was waging, as it had always done, a determined struggle against the forces that were pushing mankind into war. It was reiterated that the USSR was prepared to co-operate with all countries that were pressing and would press for a relaxation of international tension and to support any initiative aimed at strengthening peace.

The Congress noted that imperialism had grown more aggressive and that to curb the aggressors and avert another world war it was necessary to form a strong peace front, to which end much had been done by the Central Committee of the CPSU and by the Soviet Government. The Congress unanimously approved a programme of measures directed towards the settlement of the most acute problems of world politics in the interests of the peoples and strengthening world peace and security.

In determining the main orientations of Soviet foreign policy the Congress set the task of reinforcing the unity and solidarity of the socialist countries, of strengthening friendship and fraternal relations with them; of supporting the national liberation movements and promoting all-sided co-operation with the young developing states; of consistently upholding the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, resolutely repulsing the aggressive

forces of capitalism and delivering mankind from the threat of another world war.*

In fulfilment of the Congress directives the Communist Party and the Soviet Government scored further outstanding successes in foreign policy. The economic and military might of the USSR and its socialist allies grew steadily and their international standing made substantial headway. As in the past, the Soviet Union was in the vanguard of the struggle against imperialism, for lasting world peace.

This struggle was waged under difficult conditions. Led by the USA, imperialism was redoubling its attempts to avenge the defeats it was sustaining in the contest between the two systems. It continued provoking local wars and pursuing a "positions of strength" policy. The USA's war of aggression against the Vietnamese people, the US military invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965, US imperialism's interference in the internal affairs of other Latin American countries, the Israeli aggression against Arab states, the political and ideological subversion of the imperialists against socialist countries, the spread of the war in Indochina to Cambodia and Laos, and the attempts to split the anti-imperialist front and shake the solidarity of the peace forces in various regions of the world were part of imperialism's moves to halt the world revolutionary process and reverse mankind's development.

But imperialism found itself confronted by the peace forces whose might was growing inexorably. As the strongest of these forces, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty allies were the main barrier to imperialist aggression, to imperialism's attempts to plunge mankind into another world war.

In keeping with the decisions of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, the strengthening of the socialist system and the further consolidation of relations with fraternal socialist countries remained one of the cardinal objectives of Soviet foreign policy.**

Every effort was made to buttress the Soviet Union's militant alliance with socialist countries on the basis of the

* 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, pp. 287-88.

** For Soviet relations with socialist countries see Chapter Twenty-Eight.

Warsaw Treaty and of bilateral treaties of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance, with the result that the unity and might of the socialist community moved from strength to strength. This community, as L. I. Brezhnev noted in a speech of June 11, 1970, "represents an association of states whose durability cannot be paralleled by any alliance, any coalition in the past or present".*

In speaking of the Soviet Union's relations with the developing and capitalist countries, of its struggle for peace, against imperialist aggression, it must be stressed that the CC CPSU and the Soviet Government pursued their foreign policy in close co-operation and constant contact with the party and government leaders of the countries belonging to the socialist community.

1. US Aggression in Indochina. Soviet Assistance to the Peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia

One of the most striking manifestations of the consistent internationalism of Soviet foreign policy is the USSR's attitude to the developments in Indochina. The Soviet Union firmly and unfailingly supported the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Vietnamese people and the peoples of Laos and Cambodia in their just struggle against US armed imperialist aggression.

In Vietnam the forces of socialism and national liberation were for years locked in mortal combat with the forces of imperialism and reaction.

In order to keep Southeast Asia in the capitalist system, the US imperialists resorted to extreme measures with the objective of preventing the national liberation of the peoples of that region, of establishing its rule and of creating a barrier to revolution and socialism.

As early as 1954 John Foster Dulles tried to block the cessation of the war in Indochina and paralyse the Geneva Conference. This attempt failed, but subsequently the USA hindered Vietnam's unification, disrupted the general elections called for by the 1954 Geneva Agreements and began to turn South Vietnam into a bridgehead against socialism

* *Pravda*, June 12, 1970.

and the liberation movement in Southeast Asia. The natural and legitimate aspiration of the people of South Vietnam for liberation from the Saigon clique of corrupt generals and bureaucrats and for reunification with the northern part of the country was brutally suppressed. Raids were made with the purpose of "tracking down and destroying Communists" and a reign of terror was instituted against resistance fighters and people demanding independence and the country's peaceful reunification in accordance with the 1954 Geneva Agreements.

In 1955, in flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreements, the USA began to send thousands of military advisers and experts to South Vietnam, where they built up and armed the Saigon Army. In 1965 the US armed forces took over the conduct of the war against the population of South Vietnam and then against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. On February 7, 1965, breaking the rules of international law, US aircraft began the systematic bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, while the US 7th Fleet began shelling the republic's coast. By the beginning of 1969, in addition to the Saigon army, over 550,000 American troops and the US 7th Fleet consisting of nearly 200 warships and 80,000 men had been committed in the piratical war. US policy relative to Vietnam was one of flagrant and cynical defiance of the rules of international law.

The world communist and working-class movement qualified this armed intervention in Vietnam as an attempt by US imperialism "to destroy one of the outposts of socialism in Asia, bar the road of the peoples of Indochina to peace, freedom and progress, strike a blow at the revolutionary national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and test the solidarity of the socialist countries and all anti-imperialist forces".*

In their hour of trial the Vietnamese people received the unhesitating assistance of the Soviet Union. The Government of the USSR declared its militant solidarity with the fraternal Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with the people of Vietnam. In early February 1965 a Soviet delegation led by A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the

* *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 43.

USSR, visited the DRV where in an atmosphere marked by cordiality, friendship and frankness it had talks with leaders of the DRV headed by President Ho Chi Minh. The sides noted their unanimity on a wide range of international issues and on questions bearing on Soviet-Vietnamese relations. The Soviet Government declared that in line with the principles of socialist internationalism the Soviet Union would not remain indifferent to the security of fraternal socialist countries and would render the DRV all the assistance and support it required.

A Party and Government delegation of the DRV led by Le Duan, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam, visited Moscow in April 1965. At the talks in the Soviet capital agreement was reached on further measures to help repulse the US aggression. In accordance with the wishes of the Vietnamese, the sides specified the further concrete forms and volume of Soviet assistance, including armaments, ammunition, means of anti-aircraft defence, motor vehicles, equipment and medical supplies. The considerable assistance rendered by the Soviet Union enabled the courageous Vietnamese people to wage a successful struggle.

Regular contact has been maintained since 1965 between the CC CPSU and the Soviet Government, on the one hand, and the CC WPV and the DRV Government, on the other. These contacts include summit meetings, in which the sides inform each other of their internal and international problems, consider further Soviet assistance to fighting Vietnam and agree on joint political actions.

In April 1965 the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam sent a permanent representative to the USSR, where he established close contact with Soviet Government institutions and public organisations. In June 1969 the Congress of People's Representatives of South Vietnam formed the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. The USSR gave formal recognition to the new Government on June 13 and took steps to secure for it the broadest international recognition. The office of the permanent representative of the National Liberation Front was raised to the status of embassy.

The first delegation of the NLF and the Provisional Revolutionary Government led by Nguyen Huy Tho, Chairman

of the Presidium of the CC NLF and Chairman of the Consultative Council, visited the USSR in November 1969.

The struggle of the Vietnamese people against the US intervention and questions concerning Soviet assistance for this struggle received close attention at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU. The Congress instructed the CC CPSU and the Soviet Government to make every effort to halt the US aggression in Vietnam, secure the withdrawal of all United States and other foreign troops from South Vietnam and give the Vietnamese people the possibility of deciding their internal affairs by themselves. In a Statement on the US aggression in Vietnam, the Congress, on behalf of the CPSU and all Soviet people, demanded an end to the US aggression in Vietnam and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from that country. The Statement declared: "As they escalate the disgraceful war against the Vietnamese people the aggressors will encounter growing support for Vietnam from the Soviet Union and other socialist friends and brothers. The Vietnamese people will be the masters of all their land. Nobody will ever succeed in extinguishing the torch of socialism that has been raised on high by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam." Statements denouncing the US aggression and pledging firm support for the just struggle of the Vietnamese people were repeatedly made by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Soviet Government.

In connection with the US aggression the Warsaw Treaty countries jointly declared their readiness to continue supporting the Vietnamese people. In July 1966 the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee issued a Statement on assistance to the people of Vietnam. In March 1968 the PCC again considered this question in Sofia and adopted a Declaration on the threat to peace from the escalation of the US aggression in Vietnam. At its meeting in Berlin on December 2, 1970 the PCC sharply denounced the US aggression and reaffirmed its solidarity with the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

The US aggression in Vietnam was condemned from the rostrum of the United Nations as well. At the same time, the Soviet Government objected to the Security Council or any other UN body debating the Vietnam question and adopting a decision on it on the grounds that the United Nations had no justification for passing decisions on the Viet-

nam question as that had already been done at the 1954 Geneva Conference.

During talks with the US President at Glassboro in 1967, A. N. Kosygin warned that the escalation of the American war in Vietnam would gravely affect Soviet-American relations and the entire situation in the world. He stressed the futility of the USA's attempts to impose its will on the Vietnamese people by force of arms and insisted that the USA respect the Vietnamese people's national aspirations as expressed in the Four Points made by the DRV and in the programme of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. The Four Points were that the United States had forthwith to cease bombing the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and halt all other acts of aggression against it; withdraw its troops and those of its allies from South Vietnam; recognise the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam; end all interference in the internal affairs of Vietnam and faithfully abide by the 1954 Geneva Agreements.

At all meetings, talks and negotiations with the leaders of foreign countries Soviet representatives clearly stated the stand of the DRV and of the NLF of South Vietnam and sought to extend the front of pressure on the USA in order to force it to end its aggression. The Soviet Government called on the leaders of a number of countries to act more energetically against the US adventurist policy in Vietnam.

Appropriate moves were made by the Soviet Government relative to the governments of Thailand, Australia, New Zealand and other countries that had sent troops to South Vietnam. It drew their attention to the responsibility they were assuming by letting themselves be drawn into the piratical war.

A powerful movement of solidarity with the Vietnamese people swept across the Soviet Union: at rallies and meetings, in the press and over the radio Soviet people spoke of their unshakable support for their just struggle. The Soviet Committee for Support for Vietnam was formed in March 1967. Soviet public organisations were active in the worldwide movement against the US aggression, in defence of the Vietnamese people (meetings, demonstrations, Vietnam solidarity weeks, international conferences and the collection of funds for Vietnam). This movement was a major lever of pressure on the aggressors.

The Soviet Union did not stint effort and means to render fighting Vietnam every possible assistance to strengthen her defence capability and repulse US aggression. In 1965-1969 the governments of the USSR and the DRV signed a new series of agreements on gratuitous military and economic assistance and on the granting of additional credits. The Soviet Union sent the DRV aircraft, missiles, artillery, firearms, ammunition and other military supplies, and also sets of equipment, vehicles, oil products, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, food, chemical fertilisers, medical supplies and other commodities. With Soviet assistance the DRV restored factories and power stations that had been damaged in US air raids.

Officers of the Vietnamese People's Army continue to receive training in the Soviet Union, and nearly 10,000 young Vietnamese were or are trained at Soviet institutions of higher learning and factories. A large group of Soviet military and other experts work in the DRV, helping the Vietnamese to learn to handle modern armaments and to organise the effective defence of the republic.

Considerable assistance was extended to embattled Vietnam by Soviet public organisations. Using the funds collected by them the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and the Soviet Red Cross sent Vietnam food, fabrics, medical supplies, and equipment for hospitals and schools.

The CC CPSU and the Soviet Government gave much of their attention to co-ordinating the actions of the socialist countries in support of the struggle of the Vietnamese people. The assistance from the socialist countries to Vietnam would have been much more effective if China, which has common frontiers with Vietnam, had combined her efforts with those of the USSR and other socialist countries in the struggle against imperialism. The CC CPSU and the Soviet Government had repeatedly proposed a meeting between representatives of the USSR, China and the DRV at summit level or a meeting of representatives of all the fraternal countries to consider and work out measures to aid Vietnam and coordinate the efforts of the socialist states. Similar proposals had been made by Poland. But the Chinese leadership turned a deaf ear to all these proposals. For a number of years the Chinese authorities obstructed the transportation

of Vietnam-bound armaments and ammunition from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries across Chinese territory and held up urgent supplies for long periods. Inimical to the struggle of the Vietnamese people, these actions played into the hands of the US imperialists.

While extending every possible assistance for the armed struggle of the Vietnamese people, the USSR vigorously supported the political and diplomatic actions of the DRV Government, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam to achieve a political settlement of the Vietnam problem. The basic requirements of the programme for a settlement in Vietnam were: the cessation of the bombing of the DRV, the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam and the formation of a provisional coalition government in the south of Vietnam.

In face of the powerful and steadily growing resistance of the Vietnamese people, who relied on the active support and multiform assistance of the socialist countries, the US Government had to order the partial cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam on March 31, 1968 and state its willingness to enter into negotiations with the DRV. On April 3 the DRV Government declared that it was prepared to appoint a representative for contacts with the representative of the USA.

On April 6, 1968 the Soviet Government stated its wholehearted support for the attitude of the DRV Government, declaring that it was convinced the DRV Government had suggested a realistic way to end the war in Vietnam and achieve a political settlement in the interests of the whole Vietnamese people and in the interests of normalising the situation throughout Southeast Asia. At the same time, it stressed that aggression had not ceased to be such with the end to the bombing of part of DRV territory. Further developments depended on whether the USA would completely and unconditionally stop the bombing raids and other warlike acts against North Vietnam and whether it would accept the proposals of the DRV Government and of the NLF of South Vietnam on the ways of settling the Vietnam problem.

After procrastination and bargaining over the venue of the talks with the Vietnamese, the US Government agreed that official talks would be held between representatives of

the DRV and the USA in Paris in early May. The talks started on May 13, 1968.

The Soviet Government closely followed the course of these negotiations. Soviet leaders had talks with the DRV representatives conducting the negotiations. The USSR Embassy in Paris maintained constant contact with the delegations of the DRV and of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. The Soviet Union brought strong pressure to bear on the US Government and on President Lyndon B. Johnson personally to achieve an end to the US aggression and, above all, to the bombing and other acts of war against the DRV, and secure a political settlement of the entire problem. In this connection A. N. Kosygin sent Johnson a number of messages.

As a result of an agreement reached in Paris, the USA ceased the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on November 1, 1968. Talks on a political settlement of the Vietnam problem were started between representatives of the DRV, the NLF of South Vietnam, the USA and the Saigon administration.

The Soviet Government assessed the agreement reached in Paris as an important step towards a political settlement in Vietnam. In its Statement of November 3, it noted that this agreement was above all the result of the long and selfless struggle of the fraternal Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the whole Vietnamese people for the freedom, independence and unity of their country with the vigorous support and assistance of the socialist countries and all other forces of peace and progress in the world.

However, the talks made very slow headway. At first the representatives of the USA and the Saigon administration contended that the talks were bilateral: between the USA and Saigon, on the one hand, and the DRV and the NLF, on the other. The purpose of this manoeuvre was to avoid recognising the NLF as an equal partner in the negotiations.

Then the USA insisted on considering military questions and turning the question of a political settlement over to negotiations with the Saigon administration.

In May 1969, to end the deadlock, the NLF proposed a 10-point programme for a settlement. Subsequently, this programme was enlarged and specified. Its main requirement was the withdrawal of the troops of the USA and its allies

from South Vietnam and the formation there of a provisional coalition government.

While in principle agreeing to discuss the withdrawal of American troops, the US representatives demanded the simultaneous withdrawal of DRV troops from South Vietnam. This question, the representatives of the DRV and the Republic of South Vietnam declared, was the internal affair of the Vietnamese. Further, the USA and the Saigon administration adamantly refused to discuss the question of a coalition government.

Meanwhile, the Nixon Administration steered towards the "Vietnamisation" of the war, forming and arming new Saigon divisions to replace US units. This, the Washington strategists felt, would "change the colour of the killed" and diminish criticism of the US Government by American public opinion. "Vietnamisation" is an attempt to effectuate Nixon's Guam Doctrine of forcing Asians to fight Asians. Also, the purpose of "Vietnamisation" was to legalise the war of aggression and perpetuate US political supremacy in Southeast Asia. For these reasons the negotiations in Paris entered an impasse. The US provocations against the DRV seriously menaced these negotiations. In May 1970 US aircraft resumed the bombing of North Vietnam, while the US President threatened the DRV with a resumption of the air war.

Faithfully abiding by the Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism and supporting the national liberation struggle, the Soviet Union energetically backed the NLF 10-point programme. The Soviet Government repeatedly drew the attention of the Government of the USA that at the Paris negotiations it would not be possible to achieve progress without clear-cut obligations on the part of the USA to withdraw its forces from South Vietnam and agree to the formation of a provisional coalition government. It warned that "Vietnamisation" could only prolong the war without any benefit to the USA.

In its Statement of December 17, 1970 in connection with US air raids on the DRV the Soviet Government noted that judging by the behaviour of the US representatives the Paris negotiations were merely a manoeuvre inasmuch as the USA showed not the least desire to end the war of aggression and come to an agreement that would conform to the inalienable rights and aspirations of the Vietnamese people. It was dec-

lared that the Soviet Government was drawing the corresponding conclusions from the new provocations and the threats to enlarge the aggression against a fraternal socialist state.

The Vietnamese people highly appreciate the assistance and support of the Soviet Union. In a telegram to the Soviet leaders on the 53rd anniversary of the October Revolution, the leaders of the DRV noted: "As in their revolution, today in the war of resistance against the US aggressors, for the salvation of the motherland, and in the building of socialism in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam the Vietnamese people enjoy the heartfelt support and extensive assistance which the Soviet people, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government are rendering in a spirit of proletarian internationalism. From generation to generation the Vietnamese people will cherish the memory of this fraternal disinterested assistance and will be sincerely grateful for it. In fulfilment of the behests of the esteemed and beloved President Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnamese people are determined to bend every effort to strengthen their militant solidarity and fraternal co-operation with the Soviet people with the aim of steadily consolidating and furthering the relations between our parties and governments."*

Parallel with the war in Vietnam, the USA increased the scale of its armed intervention in Laos. At the Geneva Conference in 1962 the USA had undertaken to respect the neutrality of Laos. However, this pledge was soon flouted. It seemed to the American strategists that intervention in Laos would hamper the liberation struggle of the Vietnamese people and help the USA win the war in Vietnam. However, apart from military considerations, the USA aspired to control the whole of Indochina. On the pretext of bombing the "Ho Chi Minh trail" US aircraft began raiding many regions in Laos. The armed forces of the Laotian reactionaries are being equipped with American weapons and they are being trained by US military advisers. Special units have been formed and placed at the disposal of the US headquarters at Udon in Thailand.

* *Pravda*, November 7, 1970.

In August-September 1969, with massive US assistance, reactionary Laotian forces started an offensive in Northern Laos, notably in the Valley of Jars, which has been under the control of patriotic forces for many years. Outnumbered, the troops of the Patriotic Front of Laos retreated, leaving the Valley of Jars and the regions adjoining it.

In February 1970 the Laotian patriotic forces started a counter-offensive. The Americans used aircraft in a desperate effort to bring the counter-offensive to a halt, the planes flying over 400 missions daily, bombing the Valley of Jars from where the population had been driven out. Despite these heavy air strikes the patriotic forces threw the enemy out of the Valley of Jars and liberated a number of other regions.

In this situation the US President requested the two Co-Chairmen of the 1962 Geneva Conference to hold consultations among the countries that had participated in that conference and consider the possibility of settling the Laotian problem. But what consultations could there be when on account of the US aggression in Vietnam some of the countries that had taken part in the Geneva Conference refused to attend a new conference? What conference could there be without the Laotian tripartite Coalition Government that was set up in July 1962 and then brought down as a result of US interference and a series of assassinations organised by the reactionaries?

The Soviet Government had repeatedly demanded an end to the armed intervention in Laos, stressing that the observance of the Geneva Agreements was the most effective way to restore peace and unity in that country. In a letter of March 13, 1970 to Richard Nixon, A. N. Kosygin reiterated the Soviet Union's condemnation of the USA's violation of Laos' neutrality and pointed out that in the obtaining situation the proposal for consultations among the parties to the Geneva Conference on Laos was unrealistic. He reminded the US President that on March 6 the Central Committee of the Patriotic Front of Laos had proposed a concrete five-point programme as the basis for a settlement. Peace, this programme stated, could be restored provided all countries respected the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos in accordance with the provisions of the 1962 Geneva Agree-

ments; the USA ceased its interference in Laotian affairs, including the bombing of Laotian territory; Laos pledged her non-participation in military alliances with other countries and denied her territory to foreign troops and bases; the monarchy was preserved; general free and democratic elections were held for the People's Assembly and a democratic Government of national unity was formed; a political consultative conference was held during the period from the restoration of peace to the general election with the participation of all the interested parties of Laos with the purpose of settling the country's affairs and forming a provisional coalition government; Laos was united as a result of consultations between the Laotian parties on the basis of equality and national concord. But, as a first step, the USA had to end escalating the war and unconditionally cease the bombing of Laos. This was the only way that conditions could be created for a meeting between the interested Laotian parties.

Failing to break the will of the Vietnamese people and in a bid to increase the difficulties of their liberation struggle, the USA spread the war to Cambodia in 1970. The war thus engulfed all three Indochinese states.

Led by Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia had been maintaining her independence and territorial integrity and firmly pursuing a policy of neutrality under extremely difficult conditions. This policy had kept Cambodia out of the war and won her considerable international prestige.

On March 18, 1970, while he was on a visit to a foreign country, Norodom Sihanouk was removed from his office as Head of State by reactionaries supported by the USA. This was followed by massive repressions by Government troops against Vietnamese residing in Cambodia. The military authorities fanned national discord in the country. Hostile acts were started against the patriotic forces fighting in South Vietnam. In order to make the Khmers accomplices in their piratical policy in Vietnam the US imperialists forced developments. On April 29-30 US and Saigon troops invaded Cambodia.

This was a flagrant act of aggression, a further brazen violation of international law. Washington ignored the fact that Cambodia was a neutral state and showed once more that for the White House international law and the sover-

eignty and independence of states were empty words. The US Government did not ask even the formal agreement of the Phnom Penh authorities for the entry of American troops.

In face of this further escalation of the US aggression the patriots of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos decided to form a united front against the common enemy. The organisation of joint resistance to aggression was discussed at a top-level conference of representatives of the peoples of Indochina on April 24-25. The representatives of the Vietnamese, Laotian and Khmer peoples declared that their aim was independence, peace and neutrality, for the attainment of which they would cement their solidarity and fight with staunchness. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR sent the conference a message in which he expressed the confidence that their work would "further strengthen the united anti-imperialist front of the peoples of Indochina, which will unquestionably play an important role in smashing the imperialist plans of aggression".*

In early May the National United Front of Cambodia was set up in Peking and a Government was formed under its leadership. The Front's programme stated that the aim of the Khmer people was to liberate their country from every form of US imperialist domination and build a democratic and flourishing Cambodia. It set the task of rallying and mobilising all the classes and strata of the population, forming the National Liberation Army of Cambodia and waging the struggle in close co-operation with the Vietnamese and Laotian peoples.

The Soviet Government strongly condemned the attack on Cambodia and the extension of the US aggression in Indochina. It issued a Statement on May 4, 1970 in which it declared that "the grave responsibility which the USA bears for the war against the Vietnamese people has now been supplemented with responsibility for the aggression against the people of Cambodia".** In a message of May 10 to Norodom Sihanouk, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR wrote that in the struggle that Sihanouk and the patriotic forces of Cambodia were waging against US aggression they could count on the sympathy and support of the

* *Pravda*, April 30, 1970.

** *Pravda*, May 5, 1970.

Soviet Union.* Soviet public organisations established close contact with the National United Front of Cambodia.

The US aggression in Indochina was further escalated at the close of January 1971, when with the support of US forces Saigon troops invaded Laos. A Statement by the Soviet Government of February 26, 1971 emphatically condemned this "new criminal act by the USA", declaring that the "just struggle of the peoples of Indochina for freedom and independence has the unfailing support of the Soviet Union, other socialist countries and all the other peace forces of the world".

2. Soviet Support for Arab Countries in Repulsing Israeli Aggression

A flashpoint today is the Middle East. The imperialists, notably of the USA, are determined to safeguard their positions in that region, and in order to keep their hands on the oil wealth of the Middle East countries they are endeavouring to prevent these countries from consolidating their independence and advancing along the road of progress. Terrorism, conspiracies and the provocation of friction and wars are among the means being used to halt the progressive development of the Arab states, hinder their progress toward socialism and weaken them. The State of Israel and international Zionism are the principal weapon of US imperialism against the Arab countries.

As soon as Israel embarked on aggression the Soviet Union denounced it and declared its support for the attacked Arab states. It acted not against Israel as a state but against the policy of aggression pursued by that country's ruling circles.

The Soviet Union treats all peoples, big and small, with respect. Every nation has the right to create its own independent national state. It was on this principle that the USSR formulated its attitude to Israel as a state when in 1947 it voted for the UN decision on the creation of two independent states—Jewish and Arab—in the former British man-

* *Pravda*, May 13, 1970.

dated territory of Palestine. In keeping with this principle, the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with Israel.

However, during most of Israel's history her ruling circles pursued a policy of seizure and expansion at the expense of neighbouring Arab countries, expelling and even decimating the indigenous population and cynically flouting the UN decisions.

Such was the case in 1948-1949, when Israel forcibly annexed a considerable part of the territory of the Arab state whose formation in Palestine had been envisaged by the UN decision. Over a million Arabs were driven out of their homes and doomed to starvation, suffering and poverty. Left without homes and the means of subsistence, these people are exiles to this day. The acute problem of the Palestinian refugees, a problem created by Israel's policies, remains unresolved and is a constant source of tension in that region.

The Israeli aggression was repeated in 1956 when Israel took part in the Anglo-French attack on Egypt. Then, too, Israel tried to hold on to occupied territory but had to withdraw her troops to the armistice line demarcated in the agreement signed by her with the Arab countries in 1949.

Throughout all the subsequent years Israel engaged in acts of aggression against Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The war of aggression started by Israel against Arab countries on June 5, 1967 was the direct continuation of the policy that the extremist ruling circles had been pursuing throughout the existence of the State of Israel. The objectives of that aggression were not only to seize Arab territory for the creation of a "greater" Jewish state stretching from the Mediterranean to the Tigris and the Euphrates and the blocking of the Suez Canal in order to undermine Egypt's economy but also to depose the progressive regimes in some Arab countries.

Acting on the directives of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU on the need to give a resolute rebuff to the forces of aggression, the Soviet Union took swift and energetic action to halt the criminal operations of the aggressor and help the Arab states. In agreement with the leaders of the Arab states, the Soviet Government secured a decision on a cease-fire by the Security Council.

Moreover, it took effective steps to help the Arab states recover from their defeat and build up their defences. In

June-July 1967 N. V. Podgorny, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, visited Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Personal contacts that helped to work out coordinated action to eradicate the consequences of the Israeli aggression were vitalised between the leaders of the Soviet Union and a number of Arab states.

During the Israeli aggression the Political Bureau of the CC CPSU and the Soviet Government kept a close watch on developments in the Middle East and promptly took the steps dictated by the situation. At a plenary meeting in June 1967 the Central Committee of the CPSU passed a decision on Soviet policy in connection with the Israeli aggression in the Middle East, setting the objective of preventing the aggressor from utilising the results of his treacherous actions and compelling him to withdraw his troops to the armistice line.

On the initiative of the CC CPSU the leaders of the Communist and Workers' parties and the Heads of Government of the European socialist countries met in conference in Moscow and Budapest in June and July 1967 to coordinate action aimed at halting the Israeli aggression and abolishing its consequences.

An emergency session of the General Assembly was convened in the summer of 1967 at the request of the Soviet Union. At the session A. N. Kosygin emphatically denounced the Israeli aggressors and their backers. "Always true to the ideals of peace, freedom and independence," he said, "the Soviet Union will take all possible measures both in and outside the United Nations to secure the abolition of the consequences of the aggression and help to establish lasting peace in that region."*

The emergency session failed to find the way to abolish the consequences of the Israeli aggression and compel the Israeli troops to withdraw from seized territory in Egypt, Jordan and Syria. The vast majority of the delegations condemned the actions of the aggressor, upholding the interests of the Arab peoples. However, the USA and the other imperialist powers, that had given Israel considerable material assistance and moral support and used her as an instrument for pressuring the Arab countries, dragged out

* *Pravda*, June 20, 1967.

the settlement of the conflict with the result that the General Assembly was unable to adopt the appropriate decision.

Nevertheless, on November 22, 1967 the Security Council adopted a resolution calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab territories, the cessation of the state of war, respect and recognition for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every country in that region and its right to live in peace within secure and recognised frontiers, the insurance of free navigation along international waterways, the attainment of a just settlement of the refugee problem and the safeguarding of the territorial inviolability and political independence of every country with the aid of various measures, including the establishment of demilitarised zones. This resolution was an important step towards the settlement of the Middle East crisis.

The Soviet Union voted for this resolution, motivated by the fact that in it the demand for the withdrawal of the Israeli troops was put forward as the prime condition for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Acting on the Security Council decision the UN Secretary-General U Thant appointed the Swedish diplomat Gunnar Jarring his special envoy in the Middle East to establish and maintain contact with the interested states for the purpose of achieving an acceptable negotiated settlement of the crisis. Jarring began his duties at the close of 1967 and established contact with the countries involved in the conflict.

Believing that the Jarring mission could reconcile the attitudes of the sides, the Soviet Government gave it diplomatic and political support. Jarring was officially informed that the Soviet Union regarded the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 as an acceptable international basis for a settlement in the Middle East and would therefore accord his mission every possible assistance in the discharge of its functions.

On May 9, 1968 the Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad wrote a letter to Jarring in which he proposed a timetable for the fulfilment of the Security Council resolution. The plan for a phased settlement could, in the view of the Egyptian Government, include the following provisions:

a) provided Israel declared its readiness to carry out the Security Council resolution, inter-related time-limits could be established for the withdrawal of the Israeli troops and

for the implementation of the other provisions of the resolution;

b) on the day fixed for the beginning of the withdrawal of the Israeli troops Israel's Arab neighbours and Israel herself would deposit with the UN a statement declaring an end to the state of war and affirming their respect and recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of each state in the region and its right to live in peace within secure and recognised frontiers;

c) the phased withdrawal of troops would proceed in parallel with the implementation of the other provisions for the settlement of outstanding issues.

The Soviet Government fully subscribed to this realistic proposal of the Egyptian Government and declared it was prepared to help in the implementation of the time-table of coordinated measures for the settlement of the Middle East problem.

Other Arab states joined Egypt in declaring their willingness to abide by all the provisions of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. For the Arab countries this was not an easy decision to adopt.

What was the Israeli Government's response? It used every pretext to avoid fulfilling the Security Council resolution. In Tel Aviv they became more and more outspoken about their plans to annex the occupied Arab territories. In violation of the Security Council decision on a cease-fire Israel daily engaged in deliberate provocations against the Arab states and pursued a policy of sabotaging the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. Because of Israel's actions Jarring could not for a long time even start the fulfilment of his mission.

The Soviet Union repeatedly warned Israel against the provocations (shelling of Arab territory, sorties by armed wreckers) she was launching against the Arab countries in an attempt to pressure them, aggravate the situation and compel them to accept her terms. "The Soviet Union," L. I. Brezhnev said at the Moscow International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties on June 7, 1969, "has rendered and will continue to render all-round assistance to the Arab states subjected to aggression. We firmly demand the full implementation of the provisions of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, which opens the

way for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.”*

Urging the utilisation of every possibility for a settlement in the Middle East, the Soviet Government initiated constructive proposals facilitating a political settlement in the Middle East and envisaging, in particular, the phased fulfilment of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. These proposals provided the foundation for exchanges of views between the four permanent members of the Security Council—the USSR, the USA, France and Britain—on the ways and means of achieving a Middle East settlement. These exchanges of views, which began in April 1969, showed that the powers concerned were aware of the danger of leaving the Middle East situation unsettled. Any delay in this issue, A. A. Gromyko told the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on July 10, 1969, was hazardous and inimical to the world as a whole. “All countries, big and small,” he said, “are equally interested in a settlement of the situation in the Middle East. Achievement of this goal would benefit the international situation and definitely tip the scales in favour of peace.”**

The USSR welcomed the statement of Egypt and then of Israel in August 1970 on a temporary cessation of hostilities along the Suez Canal and their agreement to consultations with Jarring’s mediation.

The Soviet Union used every opportunity to draw the attention to the need for the Arab countries to preserve and strengthen their unity in the struggle against aggression. In September-October 1970, when clashes flared up between Jordanian Government troops and units of the Palestinian movement, it took active steps to help the Arab countries surmount these difficulties and prevent the imperialists from interfering in the affairs of Jordan and Syria.

The Soviet Government believed that in the Middle East the cessation of the needless and ruinous arms race would bring lasting peace. This question, it felt, could be discussed by the interested Middle East states only after the consequences of the Israeli aggression against the Arab states were

* *International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties, Moscow 1969*, p. 170.

** *Pravda*, July 11, 1969.

abolished and Israeli troops were withdrawn from all the occupied Arab territories in accordance with the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. This viewpoint was reiterated by the Soviet Government in its Memorandum of July 2, 1968 on urgent measures to halt the arms race and achieve disarmament.

The ruling circles of Israel and some imperialist states that were dragging out the settlement of the conflict calculated on breaking the unity of the Arab states, overthrowing the progressive regimes in Egypt, Syria and some other countries and driving a wedge between the Arab states and the Soviet Union. Nothing came of these calculations. Developments showed that time was not working for the aggressor. The progressive regimes in Egypt and Syria were consolidated; major changes of a progressive nature took place in the Sudan and Libya; in November 1970 Egypt, Libya and the Sudan agreed to unite in a federation with the objective of evicting the invaders and restoring the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples. The federation was then joined by Syria. Egypt, Syria, Iraq, the Sudan and other Arab states broadened their friendly relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and achieved an overwhelmingly superior potential over that of Israel. Tel Aviv and its patrons had to reckon with these factors.

The Arab peoples saw that in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries they had reliable friends in their struggle for peace and security in the Middle East and in the promotion of their economic and cultural development. The late President of Egypt Gamal Abdel Nasser said in Moscow on July 5, 1968: "In assessing what we have achieved we must note the Soviet Union's fidelity and immense moral and material assistance. . . . The fact that you have been with us in all spheres of life—political, economic and military—has made and will continue to make a deep imprint on all that we are doing, on all that we plan to accomplish in the name of freedom and peace. Such is the outstanding role which the Soviet Union plays in the struggle of modern mankind."*

In a message of condolence of September 29, 1970 on the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser the Soviet leaders reiterated the Soviet Union's unchanging policy of promoting all-sided

* *Pravda*, July 6, 1968.

relations with Egypt, championing the interests of the Arab peoples in their just struggle against imperialism and strengthening their independence and economic and defence potential. It was stressed that "this policy springs from the unity of aims of the struggle of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the Arab states against imperialism and aggression".*

3. Soviet Relations with Asian, African and Latin American Countries

Subsequent to the plenary meeting of the CC CPSU in October 1964 Soviet foreign policy was characterised by a further broadening of relations and co-operation with the developing states in Asia, Africa and Latin America, by greater support for the peoples fighting for liberation from colonial and imperialist oppression and for the struggle for the total abolition of the shameful colonial system and all forms of neocolonialism.

In the decisions passed by the 23rd Congress of the CPSU it was stated that "the Soviet state will continue to: render the utmost support to the peoples fighting for their liberation and work for the immediate granting of independence to all colonial countries and peoples; promote all-sided co-operation with countries that have won national independence and help them to develop their economy, train national cadres and oppose neocolonialism".** Conformably Soviet foreign policy devoted considerable attention to promoting economic and political co-operation with the independent states of Asia, Africa and Latin America, particularly with those of them that had taken the non-capitalist road of development. The USSR gave its active support to the national liberation struggle against imperialism, to the independent Asian and African countries working to rid international relations of imperialist methods. It subscribed fully to the decisions of the 2nd Conference of Non-Aligned States and the Conference of African Heads of State and Government in Cairo in 1964, which demanded the annulment of the unequal treaties forced on some developing countries by the former me-

* *Izvestia*, September 29, 1970.

**23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, p. 41.

tropolises, the dismantling of foreign bases on their territory and the cessation of all foreign interference in their political and economic life.

Objective conditions furthered the strengthening of the anti-imperialist front of the Soviet Union, other socialist countries and the independent states of Asia, Africa and Latin America. These conditions included the aspirations of the Asian, African and Latin American countries to achieve political and economic independence and make the fullest use of their internal resources to ensure progress: the desire to preserve peace; the categorical condemnation of imperialist policy; and, above all, the struggle against imperialist aggression. The Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community unconditionally supported these aspirations and the struggle against imperialism, bearing in mind the limited means and possibilities available to the new African and Asian states.

At the close of 1970 the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations with 75 developing countries: 25 in Asia, 35 in Africa and 15 in Latin America. Personal meetings between statesmen have become an important form of contact with these countries. In 1965-1970 Moscow was visited by government delegations from over 30 Asian, African and Latin American countries. During the same period Soviet leaders visited Algeria, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Syria and Turkey. These bilateral summit meetings and talks helped to settle many practical problems and strengthen understanding and trust. Attention was invariably centred on the ways and means of further uniting the progressive forces in the struggle against imperialist aggression, colonialism in all its forms, and racism. The joint documents adopted as a result of such talks expressed the mutual striving for lasting peace and international co-operation on the basis of peaceful coexistence and support for the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, for giving all peoples the possibility of choosing their own way of life and developing their economy without hindrance. During the period under review there was a broad exchange of views at various levels—government, parliament, party and civic—with Asian, African and Latin American countries. The very existence of the great Soviet power restrained the imperialists, compelling them to refrain from the realisation of many of their

designs against the peoples and countries of these continents. This, to say nothing of direct support by the USSR, helped another 13 countries to achieve independence in the period from 1964 to 1970. These countries included Mauritius, the Maldiv Islands, South Yemen, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Singapore, Swaziland and Fiji.

The Soviet Union acted against every attempt of the imperialist powers to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, particularly against all forms of armed intervention aimed at reducing peoples to colonial bondage and installing reactionary regimes. In April 1965 the Soviet Government denounced the US armed interference in the affairs of the Dominican Republic. "Nothing can justify the US armed invasion of a sovereign state," declared the TASS Statement of May 2, 1965. "This act of undisguised violence is a brazen violation of elementary norms of international law and the UN Charter, which forbid the use of force in international relations and threats of force against the territorial inviolability and political independence of any country."

On June 5, 1965 the Soviet Government issued a statement calling upon the Security Council and all the members of the United Nations to repulse the arbitrary and illegal actions of the USA, which was high-handedly flouting the UN Charter.

Although the Western countries prevented the Security Council from adopting the Soviet-sponsored resolution condemning the US armed invasion and demanding the immediate withdrawal of US troops from the Dominican Republic, the very fact that on Soviet initiative this question was raised in the Security Council boosted the Soviet Union's prestige and made its position in the anti-imperialist struggle more understandable to the peoples.

The USSR attaches immense significance to enhancing the role of the liberated states on the international scene. The experience of the African and Asian countries in the struggle for national independence convincingly showed that much depended on the degree of their unity in world affairs. The Soviet Government did much to help cement their unity. In 1964 and 1965, during the preparations for the 2nd Conference of Heads of State and Government of Asian and African Countries, it published Statements supporting the con-

ference that was being convened not only to reaffirm the principles proclaimed at the Bandung Conference in 1955 but also to work out a joint platform for the African and Asian countries on major international problems.* The Soviet Union declared its willingness to take part in that conference. Most of the Asian and African countries were in favour of the Soviet Union's participation, for a large part of its territory is in Asia. However, the holding of the conference was disrupted by the People's Republic of China. At the close of October 1965, a few days before the conference was scheduled to open, the Chinese Government declared it would not participate in either the summit meeting or in the preparatory conference of Foreign Ministers. It gave as its motivation the argument that the conditions had not matured for the second Afro-Asian conference and that therefore if the conference were held it would only be detrimental to Afro-Asian unity and lead to a split. The real reason for this boycott was that the Chinese leaders had failed in their attempts to prevent the Soviet Union from taking part in the conference and to range the Afro-Asian countries against it. The Soviet Government appreciated the decision of the Foreign Ministers' meeting to postpone the conference, feeling that the date for it had to be determined by the majority of the African and Asian countries in accordance with the concrete situation.

The Soviet attitude to the conflict between India and Pakistan provided striking evidence of the Soviet Union's striving to strengthen co-operation between independent states and prevent the imperialists from utilising the disputes and differences between these states.

In the autumn of 1965, when hostilities were resumed on the Indo-Pakistani frontier and the situation in that region of the Asian continent had deteriorated sharply, the Soviet Government declared its willingness to help achieve the earliest possible settlement of the armed conflict between India and Pakistan. It took energetic steps to stop the bloodshed, help restore peace in South Asia and prevent foreign inter-

* Statements of the Soviet Government: "Towards Unity in the Struggle for Peace, Freedom and National Independence" and "Against Factionalism, for the Unity of the Anti-Imperialist Forces."—*Pravda*, May 5 and August 14, 1964.

ference that could deepen the conflict and spread the flames of war.

Acting on the firm conviction that peaceful, good-neighbour relations meet with the vital national interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan and the interests of peace in Asia and the rest of the world, the USSR sent messages to the Indian Prime Minister and the President of Pakistan on September 17, 1965 offering its good offices for organising a meeting between the leaders of the two countries at Tashkent or any other city in the USSR. If the two sides so desired, the messages said, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR could take part in the meeting.

The Soviet offer of mediation was welcomed. The meeting, held in Tashkent in early 1966 with the participation of A. N. Kosygin, was an important stage in the settlement of the Indo-Pakistani conflict. The very fact that the conference was held at Tashkent, its results and its high assessment by world public opinion showed the trust that the Soviet foreign policy of peace enjoyed in the world. The concluding paragraph of the Tashkent Declaration of the Heads of Government of India and Pakistan expressed profound appreciation and gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR personally for their constructive, friendly and noble role in organising the meeting which led to mutually satisfactory results.*

A point to be noted is that by that time between the USSR and India there existed relations of friendship, trust and broad co-operation, underlying which was, as is the case to this day, the Soviet Union's respect for India's policy of non-alignment. The positions of the USSR and India are close or similar on general and complete disarmament, the struggle against colonialism and racism and other major international problems. For a number of years the USSR has been giving India economic and technical assistance in the building of key industries, notably her heavy industry, which is the foundation of her independence. The Bhilai Iron and Steel Works, built with Soviet assistance, today symbolises the fruitful co-operation between the two countries. Relations with Pakistan, on the contrary,

* *Pravda*, January 11, 1966.

only began to improve. The Pakistani Government's agreement to talks at Tashkent with Soviet mediation was testimony that Pakistan had begun to reconsider her policy relative to the USSR and was departing from her unilateral orientation toward the USA. This took place not without the influence of the Soviet Government's consistent explanation of the principles and aims of its foreign policy. In the period from 1965 to 1970 the Pakistani President visited the Soviet Union three times, while the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR visited Pakistan on two occasions. The two countries have signed a number of trade and economic agreements. The development of friendly, good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union and the conviction that the USSR sincerely desired mutually beneficial co-operation with Pakistan brought the Pakistani Government round to securing the dismantling of US bases in Pakistan.

The overall pattern of the Soviet Union's relations with the big Asian countries does not include its relations with Indonesia which deteriorated markedly after the events of the autumn of 1965 and the radical political changes that took place in Indonesia. Economic, political and cultural relations were sundered and trade dwindled. The Soviet Union is taking steps to normalise relations with Indonesia and resume trade, economic co-operation and cultural exchanges with her.

Relations with neighbouring Afghanistan remained friendly and were marked by closer political and economic co-operation. The Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression, signed in 1931, was prolonged for another ten years in 1965. The Soviet Union continued helping Afghanistan to develop her national economy. Some of the natural gas from the deposits discovered in Afghanistan by Soviet geologists is exported to the USSR. The nitrogen fertiliser plant under construction with Soviet assistance will use the gas from these deposits and export part of its output to the Soviet Union. The joint utilisation of the Panj and the Amu-Darya is being planned.

There has been a considerable improvement of the Soviet Union's relations with its two southern neighbours—Turkey and Iran. In the report of the CC CPSU to the 23rd Congress it was noted that the "USSR has always attached great importance to relations with neighbouring countries and we

are pleased to note that our good-neighbourly policy has yielded beneficial results".*

The Soviet-Iranian Treaty of February 26, 1921 underlies the political and economic relations with Iran. An important development in the relations with Iran was the assurance given by the Iranian Government in 1962 that it would not allow any foreign country to have missile bases on its territory and that Iran would not be a weapon of aggression against the Soviet Union.

Soviet-Iranian good-neighbour traditions were furthered by the visit paid to Iran in 1970 by N. V. Podgorny, President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The resultant Soviet-Iranian communique highly assessed the present state of the relations between the two countries. Iran is building a metallurgical and an engineering plant with Soviet technical assistance. The trans-Iranian pipeline transporting gas to the Soviet Union has become operational. Agreement has been reached on the terms for the export of Iranian gas in exchange for Soviet machinery and equipment for the period 1970-1985. A standing Soviet-Iranian commission for economic co-operation has been set up.

Relations with Turkey were improved as a result of exchanges of state visits and of parliamentary and civic delegations. During A. N. Kosygin's visit to Turkey in December 1966 the Heads of Government of the two countries reaffirmed their intention to be guided by the traditions laid down in the lifetime of Lenin and Kemal Atatürk and to continue their efforts to promote friendly, good-neighbour relations and mutual trust.

In 1967 the USSR and Turkey signed an agreement providing for co-operation in the building of important industrial projects in Turkey. Direct air and rail communication was established between Moscow and Istanbul in 1968. Soviet-Turkish trade and tourism are on the upgrade.

Welcoming Cevdet Sunay, the Turkish President, in Moscow in November 1969 N. V. Podgorny said that "in recent years much has been done to improve Soviet-Turkish relations and a solid foundation has been laid for the future. Today it is up to us to rely on what has been achieved to

* 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, p. 51.

advance further and introduce new elements into our co-operation, making it more many-faceted and richer".*

The USSR's geographical proximity to Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey creates favourable possibilities for expanding trade and other forms of economic co-operation with these countries.

Improved relations with the Soviet Union induced Pakistan and Iran to reconsider some aspects of their attitude toward CENTO. Both countries urged a stronger accent on the economic aspect of CENTO's activities. A Pakistani Foreign Office spokesman quoted Yahya Khan as saying that Pakistan "attaches no importance to CENTO's military aspect or its military role."**

The foreign policy of the USSR and other socialist states helps the developing countries to uphold what they have achieved in their difficult struggle for freedom and independence and safeguards them against imperialist aggression. One of these states is the Republic of Cyprus. The situation on Cyprus, which is situated near the Soviet Union's southern frontiers, has always attracted the attention of the Soviet Government. In the Soviet Union there has always been warm sympathy for the struggle of the Cypriots for independence and for the dismantling of the NATO military bases on their island. The USSR exposed every intrigue of the imperialists directed toward stirring discord between the Greek and Turkish communities, dividing the island and giving British and US imperialism a stronger foothold on the island as a military base against the peoples of the Middle East.

The events of November 1967, in which the Cyprus National Guard commanded by Greek officers clashed with armed detachments formed by the Turkish community were triggered off by imperialist agents. In June 1968 direct talks were started between representatives of the island's Greek and Turkish communities in order to settle their differences. These talks were evidence that both sides desired a peaceful settlement of the internal conflict. The attitude of both the Greek and Turkish sides was strongly influenced by the

* *Pravda*, November 21, 1969.

** *Dawn*, Karachi, May 29, 1970.

Soviet Union's firm policy of peace, by its support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and the dismantling of the foreign bases on Cyprus, for the settlement of the Cypriot problem by negotiation, without foreign interference, in the interests of the Cypriot peoples, both Greek and Turkish.

The Soviet attitude to the Cyprus question was clearly formulated by the Soviet representative in the Security Council on June 10, 1969. "The Soviet Union," he said, "is firmly opposed to any attempt to infringe upon the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, against any intention, not alien to some countries, of trying to resolve the Cyprus problem behind the backs of the people of Cyprus, to the detriment of their vital interests and in furtherance of the imperialist aims of certain NATO powers."*

Taking the opinion and wishes of the directly interested sides, above all, of the Government of Cyprus, the Soviet Union raised no objection to the presence on the island of NATO armed forces, although from the very beginning it had regarded this presence as unjustified and its prolongation as abnormal.

The people and Government of Cyprus are highly appreciative of Soviet assistance and the USSR's stand on the Cyprus issue. This was noted by the Cyprus diplomatic representative in the USSR who described his country's relations with the Soviet Union as sincerely friendly and fruitful in a speech at a meeting of the USSR-Cyprus Society on August 18, 1968 on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. He expressed the hope that his Government and people would continue to enjoy the support and sympathy of the Soviet Government and people.**

In early 1970, aided by Cypriot reactionaries, international imperialist circles made another attempt to aggravate the situation on Cyprus. They called for the island's incorporation in Greece in the hope that that would create favourable conditions for turning the island into a NATO military springboard, abolishing the republic's independence and

* Security Council, Document S/PV. 1474 of June 10, 1969.

** *Pravda*, August 19, 1968.

dealing summarily with Cyprus' democratic, patriotic forces.

Cyprus' significance in the NATO plans grew immensely following the intensification of that bloc's activities in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

However, these intrigues came up against growing resistance from the people and Government of Cyprus, who had massive support in the world, above all in the Soviet Union. As was pointed out in the TASS Statement of February 18, 1970 on the intrigues of the reactionaries on Cyprus, the "Soviet Union resolutely comes out in support of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, for the dismantling of the foreign bases on Cyprus, for the peaceful settlement of the Cyprus question without foreign interference in any form". The Statement ended with the warning that the Soviet Union was closely following developments on and around Cyprus, stressing that it was necessary "to put an end to subversion against Cyprus, display restraint and sense, and respect the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Cyprus".*

In Africa the Soviet Union steadfastly supported the Federation of Nigeria, which has the largest population in that continent, in its struggle against the separatists, who had proclaimed the creation of the "Republic of Biafra".

Under the Biafra signboard the foreign oil monopolies tried to wrest the oil-rich regions away from Nigeria. The separatists had the backing of international imperialism.

The USSR tirelessly exposed the sinister imperialist plot against Nigeria. Greeting the Government and people of Nigeria on the occasion of the ninth anniversary of that country's independence the leaders of the Soviet Union noted in their telegram of September 30, 1969 that the Soviet people had every understanding for the efforts of the Nigerian Federal Government and people to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of their country.

The USSR and the other countries of the socialist community actively co-operated with the Federal Government of Nigeria and supported it in its struggle to preserve a united Nigeria. They extended material, technical and financial assistance to it, granting it in 1967 a joint credit of US

* *Pravda*, February 18, 1970.

\$100 million. The socialist countries were among the first to respond to the Nigerian Government's appeal for assistance to its people to enable them to surmount the difficulties and hardships encountered by them upon the termination of the civil war. Food, medical supplies, necessities and so on were sent to Nigeria.

The Soviet Government has always warned against the illusion that the imperialists willingly granted freedom to their colonies. It had always said that a persevering struggle had to be waged for the implementation of the UN General Assembly's 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries that had been adopted on the initiative of the USSR and other socialist countries. The Declaration stated that the subordination of peoples to foreign oppression and rule and their exploitation are inconsonant with the Charter of the United Nations and obstruct the development of co-operation and the establishment of peace throughout the world. Acting on this Declaration, the USSR uses the UN rostrum to wage a determined struggle for the great cause of the freedom of nations. A Decolonisation Committee (Committee of 24), on which the USSR is represented, was set up on the insistence of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. From the rostrum of the UN the Soviet Union continues its offensive against the colonialists, exposing the slander that the colonies are incapable of self-administration and proving that today there are no peoples unprepared for freedom but that there are peoples forcibly denied freedom. In the United Nations the Soviet Government insists on setting a concrete date for the final abolition of colonialism. Acting jointly with Asian and African countries, the Soviet Union and other socialist states broke the resistance of the imperialist powers to the discussion of colonial issues in the Security Council with the object of taking measures against the colonialists. The situation in Namibia, for example, was considered time and again in the Security Council in 1968-1970.

The Soviet Union, a country that from the very first days of its existence has been fighting against all forms of social and national inequality and discrimination, against colonial and racial oppression, for the national freedom and independence of all peoples, cannot remain indifferent to the destiny of Namibia and its people. It perseveres in calling for the

denunciation of the colonial and racist regime in South Africa and of the imperialist powers that directly or indirectly support that regime despite the decisions of the United Nations. The Soviet Union has suggested a programme whose implementation would hasten the liberation of Namibia and give its people the possibility of deciding their way of life themselves. This programme calls for the discontinuation by the Western powers of their links with and assistance to the South African regime; the adoption by the states, whose citizens and companies are engaged in industrial, financial and trade activities in South Africa and on the territory of Namibia, of legislative, administrative and other measures to block both private and state investments in the economy of the Republic of South Africa.

The Soviet Government denounced the criminal policies of the racist Government of Southern Rhodesia, championing the legitimate rights of that country's indigenous population. In 1965-1969 it issued several Statements in connection with the situation in Southern Rhodesia, strongly condemning the policies of the South Rhodesian authorities and calling on the Security Council to enforce political, economic and other sanctions against the illegal Smith regime in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The Soviet Government sharply criticised the policy of the British Government, which despite the innumerable demands of the UN, the Organisation of African Unity and many African countries, took no steps to remove the illegal Smith regime. "In violation of all its pledges," said a TASS Statement of December 6, 1968, "the British Government has become directly involved in suppressing the national rights and freedoms of the people of Zimbabwe and their lawful aspiration for self-administration and independence."* Giving the African countries its firm support in the Southern Rhodesia issue, the USSR regards with understanding and sympathy the steps they are taking individually or jointly in the UN or the Organisation of African Unity to safeguard the interests of the African peoples.

A military and political bloc, called "the unholy alliance" by the Africans, has been set up in the south of Africa under the patronage and with the direct assistance

* *Pravda*, December 6, 1968.

of the Western powers. This bloc consists of the Republic of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and a European country, Portugal, which is a NATO member. The purpose of this alliance is to suppress the struggle for freedom and independence in the south of Africa and to keep the young independent African states under the threat of invasion. The South African racists make no effort to disguise their military, economic and other assistance to the Portuguese colonialists, who are intensifying their military operations against the national liberation movement in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau).

As early as November 1965 the Security Council passed a resolution drawing attention to the fact that the situation created by Portugal's policies toward the African population, toward her colonies and neighbouring African states was seriously jeopardising international peace and security. The 22nd General Assembly condemned Portugal's colonial war in Africa, qualifying it as a crime against mankind. The Soviet Government repeatedly pointed out that Portugal would have been unable to flout public opinion, ignore the United Nations, bear the huge military expenditures and continue the war without the political, economic and military backing of international monopolies and the NATO bloc. Without this backing Portugal would not have ventured to start the aggression against Guinea in November 1970. The Soviet Government described this action as "colonial brigandage and international banditry", as a brazen attempt to "destroy the progressive regime in Guinea and strike a blow at the national liberation movement in Africa".* Siding with Guinea, the socialist countries quickly rendered her disinterested assistance.

The period under review witnessed far-reaching changes also in Latin America, which US imperialism had only recently regarded as a reliable mainstay. In Latin America today there is not a single country where a struggle is not being waged against US imperialism and its accomplices—the local military, feudal and landowner circles, and the bourgeoisie linked with foreign monopolies.** The peoples of

* *Pravda*, November 24, 1970.

** 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, p. 40.

Latin America are no longer in a mood to reconcile themselves to poverty, denial of rights and rapacious exploitation by the US monopolies. They are fighting for real independence and social progress. The front of struggle of the Latin American peoples is steadily broadening and acquiring the character of an offensive. This struggle has already yielded its first fruits.

Despite the obstacles raised by US imperialism there is a growing striving among the Latin American peoples for closer relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. For their part, the Soviet people whole-heartedly side with the peoples of Latin America, who are upholding their freedom and independence, their right to be masters in their own home.

A steadily growing number of Latin American countries are establishing diplomatic relations and fruitful trade and economic links with the Soviet Union in spite of the resistance of US imperialism and the local reactionary forces encouraged by it. At the close of 1970 the USSR had normal relations with 15 countries in that continent. In 1969 and 1970 it established diplomatic relations with Bolivia, Venezuela, Guyana, Costa Rica, Peru and Ecuador.

The capitalist world's post-war development, particularly in the period of the downfall of colonialism, is characterised by the rupture of the former colonies' political dependence on the metropolises. However, relations of economic dependence are still very much in evidence. On account of a shortage of capital and of the dependence of their one-sided, monoculture economy on the markets of the industrialised states, most of the developing countries continue to be part of the world capitalist economy. The scientific and technological revolution is tending to make this dependence heavier. The economic exploitation of the former colonies is being intensified, usually by neocolonialist methods. To this day the economic development of many former colonies is largely controlled by the imperialist monopolies.

Under these conditions enormous importance attaches to trade and economic co-operation with the Soviet Union, for this helps them to break their dependence on the former metropolises.

The leaders of Asian, African and, lately, some Latin

American countries note the immense role that economic co-operation and trade with the Soviet Union play in strengthening the independence of their countries, for this co-operation and trade carry no political conditions and are founded on respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and complete equality of the sides and on non-interference in internal affairs. The disinterested assistance rendered by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries creates the conditions enabling the young states to embark on non-capitalist development, which brings with it material and cultural progress.

In the UN report prepared for the second session of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, held in early 1968 in Delhi, it was noted that trade between the developing and the socialist countries had become one of the most active areas of world trade. In the period from 1960 to 1965 the developing countries' exports to the world socialist market grew at an average rate of 12 per cent annually, while their exports to the world capitalist market showed an average increase of 6 per cent. In the decade from 1955 to 1965 the developing countries' share of the trade of the socialist world nearly doubled—from 6.7 to 11 per cent. The Soviet Union alone almost quadrupled its exports to the developing countries in the period 1955-1967, while its trade with these countries increased 6.2-fold.* On January 1, 1965 it annulled customs tariffs on traditional imports from these countries in order to help promote their national economy.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries occupy a special place in the foreign trade of socialist-oriented developing countries, buying most of their exports. For instance, 56 per cent of Egypt's exports went to the socialist market in 1966. The same picture is to be observed in the foreign trade of the Algerian People's Democratic Republic and other countries.

Other forms of co-operation are also expanding. For instance, according to UNCTAD statistics, the credits extended to the developing states by the socialist countries had totalled US \$7,700 million by 1965. Most of these credits were used for building the foundation of economic indepen-

* *Mezhdunarodny yezhegodnik. Politika i ekonomika*, Moscow, 1969, p. 228.

dence, namely factories for the production of the means of production. In 1969 the CMEA countries extended economic and technical assistance to more than 50 states in Asia, Africa and Latin America. This included aid for the building of nearly 2,000 industrial and other projects. The Soviet Union provided assistance for 680 projects (of which almost 290 were completed by 1970) in 34 countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.*

A feature of the credits granted by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is their purposefulness. The huge economic, scientific and cultural progress achieved in the USSR within a short span of time attracted the interest of the developing countries to the Soviet experience of economic development, to its experience of planning, while the expansion and improvement of economic and technical co-operation with the USSR give these countries the possibility of acquainting themselves with and studying that experience. Interviewed by a *Pravda* correspondent in 1969, President of the Revolutionary Council of Algeria Houari Boumedienne noted that the "Soviet experience of planning, as the experience of other socialist states, is an example that must be followed".**

The Soviet Union willingly shares its knowledge and experience, helping the developing countries, particularly those that have adopted a socialist orientation, to draw up scientific plans of economic and social development. It does not thrust its experience and recommendations on any country. At the request of the governments of developing countries the appropriate Soviet organisations exhaustively study the national and economic specifics of these countries and, after a thorough and objective analysis of existing conditions, give every encouragement to the aspiration of these countries to translate the recommended forms and methods of development into practice.

The Soviet Union helps these countries to train large numbers of doctors, teachers, engineers and technicians. Over 100 educational centres and medical institutions have been built or are under construction in Asian and African countries with Soviet assistance. The number of young people

* *Mezhdunarodny yezhegodnik. Politika i ekonomika*. 1969, p. 228.

** *Pravda*, March 24, 1969.

from the developing countries studying at Soviet institutions of higher learning and technical schools almost doubled in the period 1961-1966. During the same period the number of Soviet doctors, teachers and cultural workers in 28 Asian and African countries increased fourfold.*

In all Asian, African and Latin American countries where a struggle is being waged against foreign imperialist interference, for national and social liberation, the peoples tangibly feel the support of the Soviet Union and are growing more profoundly convinced that it is the most reliable champion of their freedom and independence and the principal counterbalance to imperialism. It was against this background that in the period under review there was a considerable expansion of the Soviet Union's relations with developing countries, with peoples fighting imperialism.

4. Soviet Relations With Capitalist Countries

"The relations of the Soviet Union with countries of the capitalist world," L. I. Brezhnev said at the Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, "are based on the principle of peaceful coexistence of states irrespective of their social system, a principle substantiated by Lenin. This principle implies that outstanding issues between countries must be settled not by force, not by war, but in a peaceful way."** Peaceful coexistence, needless to say, does not apply to the relations between oppressors and the oppressed, and far from ruling out it presupposes an ideological struggle.

The programme of measures mapped out in the Central Committee report to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU with the objective of settling outstanding issues of world politics in the interests of the peoples and strengthening world peace

* 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, p. 38.

** International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, p. 170.

and security was consistently implemented by the CPSU and the Soviet Government.* The Soviet Union persevered in its efforts to achieve a relaxation of tension, promoted political, trade and economic relations with the capitalist states and, at the same time, unambiguously denounced imperialist aggression and the subversive activities of imperialist intelligence and propaganda agencies.

The Soviet Union always attached great significance to the normalisation of political and economic relations with the USA. This became particularly important after the Second World War from which the USA emerged as the most powerful state of the capitalist world. The Soviet Government repeatedly stated that it wanted normal relations with the USA, that it was in the interests of both the Soviet and American peoples to improve these relations and foster trade, economic, scientific and cultural links. However, the apparatus set in motion by aggressive circles, monopoly capital and the war-industrial complex to encourage the continuation of the cold war, anti-communist propaganda, the suppression of the national liberation movement by military means and the organisation of subversion and provocations against socialist states remains fully operative in the USA. Through the efforts of these circles and, especially, as a result of the US attack on the Vietnamese people and the USA's support of Israeli aggression the relations between the USSR and the USA deteriorated in 1964-1970.

In the Central Committee report to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU it was pointed out that as "a result of US aggression in Vietnam and other aggressive acts of American imperialism our relations with the United States of America have deteriorated".** By starting a war against the Vietnamese people and aggravating the international situation the US Government impaired the normal development of Soviet-US relations. When the USA began the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in February 1965 the Soviet Government issued a Statement in which it warned that the USA should not harbour the illusion that aggression against the DRV would go unpunished. "The Soviet Union," the

* *23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, pp. 55-57.

** *Ibid.*, p. 45.

Statement said, "has advocated and continues to advocate the establishment of normal relations with the USA and the improvement of these relations. But the promotion of relations is a reciprocal process and leaves no room for misunderstanding. This process clashes with aggressive policies which can blot out any steps taken with a view to improving Soviet-US relations."*

A serious factor weighing down on the relations between the USSR and the USA was the Israeli aggression against Arab states undertaken with the active political support of the US Government and with extensive American aid. Further, Soviet-US relations were burdened by the USA's backing of unacceptable demands in the question of West Berlin, by insinuations with regard to Cuba and so forth.

US aggression in Vietnam was accompanied by serious incidents between the USSR and the USA which directly affected the relations between them. For instance, on June 2, 1967 US aircraft bombed the Soviet motor vessel *Turkestan* in the Vietnamese port of Campha. In a Note of protest, sent on the same day, the Soviet Government characterised the attack on the Soviet ship as an act of piracy. The Note warned that "in the event acts of this kind are repeated by the US armed forces, the Soviet Union will be compelled to take the appropriate steps to ensure the security of Soviet ships".**

At the close of June of the same year the US Embassy in Moscow was handed a Note protesting against the bombing in the port of Haiphong of the Soviet merchant ship *Mikhail Frunze* by US aircraft on June 29.***

The US aggression in Vietnam and the Middle East developments were not the only reasons for the deterioration of Soviet-US relations. In Western Europe the US Government had steered towards the creation of a so-called NATO multilateral nuclear force designed as a screen for giving the FRG access to nuclear weapons. This would have been a further flagrant violation of the Potsdam Agreements and

* *Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967*, Moscow, 1967, p. 235.

** *Izvestia*, June 3, 1967.

*** *Pravda*, July 1, 1967.

given impetus for a new round of the arms race with the attendant threat to European security. The American plan was directed, above all, against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The steps taken by the USSR and its allies compelled the USA to abandon this plan.

As we have already noted, the USSR protested strongly against US interference in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic and other countries. Developments, as was justifiably stressed in the Main Document adopted by the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in June 1969, laid bare the image of US imperialism as the world exploiter and policeman, as the sworn enemy of liberation movements.

However, imperialism can do nothing to reverse the wheel of history. In Washington they have to reckon with facts such as the steadily growing economic and defence might of the USSR and other socialist countries and the changing balance of strength on the international scene in favour of socialism, to the detriment of imperialism. In the USA the exponents of a more sober policy realise that a thermonuclear conflict between the USSR and the USA, the world's most powerful states, would have devastating consequences. This explains the fact that despite the overall deterioration of Soviet-US relations fostered by the policies of the ruling circles in Washington, the Soviet Union and the USA reached agreement on individual questions concerning their relations and on some important international problems.

The Soviet-US consular convention regulating consular relations between the two countries came into force in June 1968. Direct air communication has been established between Moscow and New York. Agreement has been reached on exchanges of students, cultural workers and athletes.

In the period under review there have been many high-level talks between the Soviet Union and the USA. At these talks the delegations exchanged views and stated their stand on Soviet-US relations and on a wide range of international problems. The Soviet Government gave serious attention to the words spoken by Richard Nixon, following his election to the US Presidency, to the effect that the era of confrontation is giving way to an era of negotiation. The Soviet Government made it known that in the event the US

Government adopted that policy the Soviet Union would be prepared, as formerly, to seek a rapprochement in questions concerning the relations between the two countries and in outstanding international problems. Despite the deep-going socio-economic distinctions between the two countries, the Soviet Union, Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko noted in his report to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in July 1969, "has always acted on the principle that the USSR and the USA can find a common language in questions concerning the maintenance of peace".*

In 1967-1968 the USSR and the USA co-operated in drawing up the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and in the discussion of the treaty at the General Assembly. It was the agreed position of the USSR and the USA that made it possible to conclude the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in 1969. The treaty has been signed by most of the countries in the world.

After long negotiations the USSR and the USA reached agreement also on the renunciation of the use of the seabed and ocean floor for military purposes.

Following preliminary contacts in Helsinki in 1969 and alternately in Vienna and Helsinki in 1970, the Soviet Union and the USA started talks on limiting strategic offensive and defensive weapons. The Soviet Union went to these talks, which touch upon the most important aspect of the disarmament problem, with a high sense of responsibility and a spirit of good will, feeling that a reasonable agreement in this sphere would be a vast contribution to the preservation and consolidation of peace.**

Speaking in Kharkov in April 1970, L. I. Brezhnev referred to the prospects of these talks, noting that "if the Government of the USA really wants agreement on curbing the race for strategic armaments and if American public opinion breaks the resistance of the arms manufacturers and military, the prospects of the talks may be assessed favourably. The Soviet Union will do everything in its power to make these talks useful".***

* *Pravda*, July 11, 1969.

** Disarmament is dealt with at length in Chapter Twenty-Nine.

*** L. I. Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom*, Vol. 2, pp. 541-42.

The state of trade and economic relations between the USSR and the USA leaves much to be desired, although the objective possibilities for their development are enormous. Influential circles in the USA are increasingly realising the benefits of business with a major partner like the Soviet Union. Under pressure from these circles the US Congress passed a decision in 1970 to shorten the list of "strategic" goods, i.e., goods banned for sale to socialist countries. However, on account of resistance from reactionary elements this decision still remains only on paper. The American press reports that more and more firms are urging trade and economic relations with the USSR, "seeking markets there" and wishing to open offices in Moscow. They know that "the Soviets have a reputation as being solid, reliable customers in their dealing with American companies. Few, if any, US businessmen report any bad deals for which the Russians are blamed. In the view of most Americans who deal with them, the Soviets are tough negotiators but live up to the letter of their contracts".*

The war-industrial complex, including the Pentagon, and the anti-communist circles are the barrier to Soviet-US trade. These forces continue to cling to the futile policies of the cold war period, an element of which was the trade boycott of the Soviet Union in the hope of holding up the rate of economic advancement in the USSR. The talks held in the latter half of 1969 between the Ford Motor Company and Soviet organisations on the sale to the USSR of trucks and equipment for a car factory broke down on account of opposition by the US Defence Department. All in all, trade between the two countries remained at an insignificant level, totalling only US \$103 million in 1969,** i.e., about one-fifth of the Soviet Union's trade with a small country like Finland.

Within the same period the Soviet Union's relations with the European capitalist countries made incomparably greater progress. First and foremost, this concerns relations with neutral countries: Finland, Austria and Sweden.

A major boost was given to Soviet-Finnish relations in July 1970 by the prolongation, before the appointed time, of the

* *Business Week*, January 24, 1970.

** *Ibid.*

Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the two countries for a period of 20 years (the treaty was signed on April 6, 1948). This treaty continues to serve as a sound foundation for the promotion of good-neighbour relations and co-operation between the two countries. Soviet-Finnish relations are a vivid embodiment of peaceful co-existence. Official circles in the Soviet Union highly appreciate the consistent stand of the top-level state leadership of Finland in questions concerning relations with the USSR. This stand was expressed by the pre-schedule prolongation of the 1948 treaty. "The good-neighbour relations with this friendly country," L. I. Brezhnev said on October 2, 1970, "have now received new and clear prospects. We attach great importance to this in the context of further strengthening peace and security in the north of Europe."*

Finland displays keen interest in strengthening European security. This motivated her quick and favourable response to the initiative of the socialist countries, which proposed the convocation of a European security conference.

Trade and economic relations continue to develop successfully between the USSR and Finland. In 1969 Finland held third place in the USSR's commerce with the capitalist world: 501 million rubles, a volume that is smaller only than the USSR's trade with Britain (600 million rubles) and Japan (559 million rubles).**

An important role in promoting economic co-operation between the two countries was played by the agreement on the reconstruction of the Saimaa Canal. The agreement was carried out and the canal performs a useful function.

Soviet-Finnish economic links rest on the firm foundation of good-neighbourly relations over a period of more than 20 years. Recent developments confirm the words of former Finnish President Juho Kusti Paasikivi that the policy of friendship with the USSR accords with Finland's national interests.

A shift towards mutual understanding and co-operation has taken place in the Soviet Union's relations with Austria. A large role in fostering these relations was played by reciprocal visits by statesmen and exchanges of various delega-

* *Pravda*, October 3, 1970.

** *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* No. 24, June 1970.

tions. Stressing the positive significance of Austria's policy of neutrality, N. V. Podgorny, the President of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, noted during his state visit to Austria in November 1966 that the "consistent fulfilment by the Austrian Federal Government of its commitments under the State Treaty and its policy of permanent neutrality form a reliable and sound foundation for the further growth of Austria's prestige in the world and for her friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union, with neighbouring countries and with other states throughout the world".* In the Soviet-Austrian communique on the results of that visit, published on November 22, 1966, it was noted that "the two sides have agreed that the State Treaty on the restoration of an independent and democratic Austria and the proclamation by the Austrian Parliament of Austria's permanent neutrality, which has received international recognition, constitute a positive contribution to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of peace in Europe". The Soviet side declared that "Austria's efforts to consolidate her position as a neutral sovereign state have had and will continue to have absolute and disinterested support from the Soviet Union".

During the state visit paid to the USSR by Josef Klaus, Federal Chancellor of the Austrian Republic, in March 1967 the sides reviewed political problems and considered the further development of trade and economic relations between the two countries. It was agreed, in particular, that "there would be the earliest possible continuation of the talks on the export of natural gas from the USSR to Austria and on the building of the USSR-Italy gas pipeline across Austrian territory with the participation of Austrian enterprises".**

In 1960-1970 mutually beneficial agreements were signed with Austria on economic, cultural, scientific and technical relations. The co-operation based on these agreements is steadily broadening. Trade between the two countries shows an upward trend, totalling 140 million rubles*** in 1969.

* *Pravda*, November 15, 1966.

** *Izvestia*, March 21, 1967.

*** *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* No. 24, June 1970.

Nonetheless, the Soviet Union cannot help feeling apprehensive about the insistence of Austrian capitalist circles linked with foreign, notably West German, capital on Austria entering the European Economic Community. Yielding to this pressure, the Austrian authorities, it has been reported in the press, are prepared to participate in the Common Market on a broader scale than other neutral states despite the fact that for Austria this step is fraught with danger in view of the striving of the West German concerns to obtain a larger footing in her economy. The USSR attaches vital importance to the provision of the State Treaty forbidding Austria "to take any action or carry out any measures directly or indirectly conducive to her political or economic alliance with Germany".

Austria's entry into the Common Market would impose on her political commitments not only curtailing her sovereignty but also contravening her neutrality commitment. In the Federal Constitutional Law on Austria's permanent neutrality, passed by the Austrian Parliament on October 26, 1955, it is stated: "For the purpose of firmly consolidating her political independence and ensuring the security of her territory Austria voluntarily declares her permanent neutrality, which she will maintain and protect with all the means at her disposal." In line with this, Austria pledged never to enter into "any military alliances" or to allow "foreign countries to set up military bases on her territory".

Inasmuch as the Common Market members are closely linked with NATO and accentuate political collaboration within the EEC framework, Austria's membership of the EEC would be incompatible with her pledge to pursue a policy of neutrality.

The Soviet Union maintains friendly and good-neighbour relations also with Sweden, the third neutral country in Europe. Underlying these relations is the mutual desire to strengthen peace and international security, especially in Northern Europe. This common interest creates a sound foundation for trade, for scientific, technical and cultural exchanges and for political co-operation in a number of international problems.

Trade between the USSR and Sweden, dating from the 1920s, has reached a level benefiting both countries. Whereas in the early days the Soviet Republic had nothing to

offer the Swedish market except hemp, today the USSR exports to Sweden not only raw materials and semi-finished goods but also machinery. Official statistics show that Soviet-Swedish trade is growing at a faster rate than Sweden's trade with other countries. In only the five-year period from 1964 to 1969 Soviet-Swedish trade grew 2.3-fold, reaching 213 million rubles in 1969.*

Some circles in Sweden disrelish the time-tested policy of neutrality, which has won respect throughout the world and has the Soviet Union's full understanding. Under pressure from these circles attempts are being made in Stockholm to find the ways and means of entering the Common Market. True, the Swedish Government has declared that Sweden will participate in the EEC provided this participation does not prejudice her policy of neutrality. However, despite these reservations, even the Swedish press admits that Sweden's membership of the Common Market would bring with it increased political dependence and the risk of involvement in actions that would hardly be compatible with a consistent policy of neutrality.

In Sweden they have every reason to fear that their country's membership of the EEC would seriously limit its sovereignty and, consequently, make it impossible to pursue a neutral foreign and domestic policy independently of the Common Market and NATO.

To a certain degree the state of the Soviet Union's relations with individual capitalist countries mirrors the extent to which the ruling circles of these countries appreciate the need for peaceful coexistence in the epoch of atomic and hydrogen weapons, take into account the changes that have taken place in the balance of strength between imperialism and socialism in favour of the latter and desire to pursue an independent national policy and avoid the risk of involvement in conflicts and gambles stemming from participation in NATO, and, generally, from links with US imperialism.

Lately, the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence has been extremely successful in Europe. In the European capitalist countries there is a growing desire for broader contacts and co-operation with the USSR and other socialist countries, and for a system of collective security in Europe. This tendency

* *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* No. 24, June 1970.

is opposed by the USA, which is bending every effort to maintain its political leadership of the European states through NATO and economic pressure. This is exacerbating the contradictions in NATO, which is the main military and political bloc of imperialist powers. Some of the bloc's members are adopting a political line that conforms more with their national interests and ensures them with the possibility of pursuing an independent policy. Under the leadership of General de Gaulle France withdrew from the NATO military organisation and began to steer a course towards co-operation with the USSR.

The period under review witnessed the successful development of relations between France and the Soviet Union. The rapprochement was dictated by experience, which has convincingly shown that as two of the major states in Europe the USSR and France in effect bore a special responsibility for the maintenance of European peace.

The broadening of trade, economic, scientific and technical relations between the two countries started in 1964-1965. This was facilitated by the signing in October 1964 of a long-term trade agreement for 1965-1969. In 1965-1966 fulfilment of the agreement proceeded with such gratifying results that the countries expressed the desire to enlarge trade beyond the limits specified in that agreement. Trade was subsequently given a further boost.

Favourable results were achieved also by the joint efforts of the USSR and France in scientific and technical co-operation. On March 22, 1965 the two countries signed an agreement for the joint commercial use of the Secam system of colour television, and on May 4 of the same year they signed an agreement on the peaceful uses of atomic energy. An agreement on scientific and technical co-operation covering a broader area of joint activity, including the sale of patents and licences, was concluded between the two countries in Moscow on June 30, 1965. Moreover, they signed an agreement on co-operation in the study and exploration of outer space for peaceful purposes, including space communication via artificial Earth satellites.

Important landmarks in the development of Soviet-French relations were the reciprocal visits of General de Gaulle to the Soviet Union and A. N. Kosygin to France in 1966. During these visits the sides examined a wide range of in-

ternational problems, giving particular attention to European problems. In the Soviet-French Declaration, signed at the close of de Gaulle's visit to Moscow in June 1966, it was stated that a detente was the primary and necessary stage of the desirable development of relations between European countries irrespective of their political systems. Further, the sides expressed the view that the problems of Europe should first of all be discussed within the limits of Europe. They agreed that their aim was the normalisation and then a gradual expansion of relations between all European countries on the basis of respect for the independence of each of them and non-interference in their domestic affairs. In order to foster mutual trust and to expand the areas of accord and co-operation between the USSR and France, both governments decided to continue regular consultations.

In the Soviet-French Statement of December 9, 1966, published at the close of A. N. Kosygin's return visit to France, the two sides "stressed the usefulness of regular consultations between the Soviet and French governments on European and other international problems with the purpose of facilitating the easing of international tension and strengthening peace".* These visits marked the beginning of a new stage in the relations between the USSR and France. In a message of condolence of November 10, 1970 from the Soviet leaders to President Georges Pompidou of France on the death of General de Gaulle it was noted that the talks held during the General's visit to the Soviet Union in 1966 had started an important stage in the history of Soviet-French relations and played a role of paramount importance in effecting a rapprochement between the two countries, "in achieving a relaxation of tension, ensuring European and world security and promoting co-operation between all countries".**

Further impetus was given to Soviet-French relations by the visit of French President Georges Pompidou to the USSR in October 1970. In the Soviet-French Protocol signed during that visit the USSR and France agreed to enter into contact with each other without delay with the purpose of concerting their positions in the event situations arose which created a

* *Pravda*, December 10, 1966.

** *Pravda*, November 11, 1970.

threat to peace or a violation of peace or which caused international tension.* Further, in the Protocol the sides noted their agreement to extend and deepen consultations on major international problems of mutual interest, in particular, "the situation in Europe and the promotion of a detente, co-operation and the consolidation of security on the continent; the situation in all parts of the world where international security is threatened". These were to be regular consultations. The sides signed a joint Declaration in which it was stated that the aim of the two governments was "to promote peaceful relations and co-operation between all countries irrespective of their ideology or system, and to make every effort to strengthen international security". The results of the visit gave convincing proof of the viability and effectiveness of the line adopted by the Soviet Union and France to realise the great possibilities "inherent in the policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems".**

Friendly relations between the USSR and France were furthered by the expansion of trade and scientific and technical co-operation between them. A permanent joint Soviet-French Commission consisting of high-ranking representatives of both countries was set up in accordance with the Soviet-French Declaration of June 30, 1966. In the communique on the third meeting of the Commission, held on January 3-8, 1969 in Paris, it was noted that considerable headway had been made in co-operation between the two countries.*** It was agreed that the two countries would take steps to double the volume of trade between them. The work of the Franco-Soviet Chamber of Commerce was highly assessed in the communique. The progress made in Soviet-French co-operation in the exploration and utilisation of outer space for peaceful purposes was noted with satisfaction by the Commission. Further, it was recorded that co-operation was progressing successfully in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, in colour television and in other scientific and technical fields. The relations between the USSR and France are thus expanding and spreading to new spheres. In the period from 1965 to 1970 trade between them increased 2.6-fold,**** mak-

* *Pravda*, October 14, 1970.

** Ibid.

*** *Pravda*, January 9, 1969.

**** *Pravda*, September 8, 1970.

ing France one of the Soviet Union's leading trade partners. The further development of trade and economic relations between the two countries is envisaged in the new agreement for 1970-1974 signed in May 1969. This expanding co-operation in different areas serves the interests not only of the USSR and France but also of other countries inasmuch as it creates favourable conditions for strengthening peace in Europe and is an example of growing links and co-operation between countries with different social systems.

Stressing the importance of Soviet-French co-operation, Giscard d'Estaing, the French Minister of Economy and Finance, declared in September 1970 that it "has played and plays a cardinal role in the necessary detente between West and East".*

Speaking on October 2, 1970, L. I. Brezhnev gave a high evaluation of Soviet-French relations and declared that the Soviet Union was prepared to extend and deepen these relations. "In recent years," he noted, "the Soviet Union and France have achieved definite understanding, established political contacts at various levels and laid a solid basis for the development of mutually beneficial economic co-operation. We intend to go on doing everything in our power for the further development and deepening of Soviet-French relations on a sound, reliable foundation."**

The trend that has started in European capitalist countries towards an improvement of relations with the USSR has embraced some other NATO states.

Relations have improved between the USSR and Italy and there has been a considerable extension of trade and economic links between them. A series of important agreements have been signed with Italy. One of these, an agreement on economic, scientific and technical co-operation, was signed in Rome on April 23, 1966. On May 4 of the same year a protocol was signed in Turin on the participation of the Fiat company in the building of a passenger car manufacturing complex in the USSR. A wide range of questions concerning Soviet-Italian co-operation was discussed during N. V. Podgorny's visit to Italy in early 1967: it was the first time that a President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the

* *Pravda*, September 8, 1970.

** *Pravda*, October 3, 1970.

USSR had visited Italy. In the Soviet-Italian communique published at the close of the visit on January 30, 1967 it was stated that "the sides note with satisfaction that the relations between the Soviet Union and Italy, particularly of late, have made substantial progress in many areas" and that "the further expansion of co-operation in all fields and unalterably good relations are consistent with the interests of the Soviet and Italian peoples".* It was stressed that Fiat's co-operation in the building of a passenger car works in the USSR was a large contribution to the further development of the relations between the two countries and note was made of the importance of the export of Soviet natural gas to Italy and of the building of a gas pipeline. During the visit an agreement was signed on Soviet-Italian co-operation in the film industry.

A visit to Italy by the Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko in November 1970 provided the possibility for discussing some important international problems and also questions concerning the development of relations between the two countries. In the communique on the visit the two sides recognised the usefulness of political consultations at all levels and of the continuation and deepening of such Soviet-Italian consultations with the purpose of achieving better understanding and bringing the positions of the two countries closer in European and world affairs. Serious anxiety was expressed in the communique over the situation in the Middle East, and the sides noted their understanding that it was necessary to achieve a political settlement of the Indochina problem on the basis of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements. They expressed their mutual satisfaction over the favourable development of economic, trade, scientific and technical co-operation between the USSR and Italy and stated their intention "to expand this co-operation by exploring new directions and areas of mutual interest".**

As before, the USSR maintained political contacts and promoted business relations with Britain. There was a series of summit talks between the two countries. In 1966 and in January 1968 the USSR was visited by British Prime Minister Harold Wilson. During the visit to Britain by the

* *Izvestia*, January 30, 1967.

** *Pravda*, November 15, 1970.

Head of the Soviet Government A. N. Kosygin in February 1967 the sides considered foreign political issues and questions concerning the development of trade and economic relations between the USSR and Britain. In the joint communique on the results of that visit it was noted that there were favourable possibilities for increasing trade to the benefit of both countries and that these possibilities should be multiplied.* British Foreign Secretaries paid a number of visits to Moscow, where the sides discussed international problems and mapped out concrete steps aimed at promoting the relations between the USSR and Britain, including further trade and economic co-operation. Business co-operation between the two countries developed successfully. This is shown by the growth of trade between them. Britain occupies the leading place in the Soviet Union's trade with the capitalist world.

There was a considerable expansion of Soviet-British contacts in science, technology, education and culture. Most of the exchanges in these areas were put on a regular footing and based on agreements. A consultative committee was set up to facilitate relations and a Soviet-British joint commission was formed to consider the fulfilment of the commitments under trade and economic agreements and to study new possibilities for furthering business relations.

However, the atmosphere governing Soviet-British relations deteriorated in the second half of 1968 through the fault of the ruling circles in Britain who reacted with fierce hostility to the failure of the counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia. They had been among the most active proponents of a policy of gradually wresting individual European socialist countries from the socialist community. With British officials broadly involved in the anti-Soviet campaign, Britain curtailed her contacts and exchanges with the Soviet Union. All British propaganda media, particularly the BBC (both radio and television), played an active role in the campaign against the USSR. The British Government gave its full backing to the USA in its policy of stepping up the NATO war preparations.

This attitude of the British ruling circles was clearly inconsonant with the interests of the relations between the

* *Pravda*, February 14, 1967.

peoples of the USSR and Britain. In this connection official Soviet circles noted that hostility and a deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union leading to further tension in Europe would not bring Britain any benefits or advantages. It was explained that the Soviet Union did not desire a worsening of relations with Britain, but that the development of these relations presupposed good will and a desire to co-operate not only by one of the sides.* This stand was reiterated during the official visit paid to Britain in October 1970 by the Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko. In a statement made upon his arrival in London he said: "The Soviet Union unswervingly pursues a policy of promoting relations with Britain, motivated by the belief that the development and improvement of these relations accord with the interests of the peoples of both countries and are a factor of no little importance in improving the situation in Europe and the rest of the world."**

In recent years there has been an activation of relations with Japan. In Moscow on January 21, 1966 Japan and the USSR signed a trade and payments agreement for 1966-1970 and an agreement on direct air communication between Moscow and Tokyo. Since March of the same year Soviet and Japanese delegations have been meeting regularly in Moscow and Tokyo (Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet committees) to consider questions related to business co-operation. The two countries signed a consular convention on July 29, 1966. In August 1968 they concluded a general agreement on Japanese supplies of plant, machines, materials and other goods for the development of the timber industry in the Soviet Far East and on Soviet supplies of timber to Japan.

In replies to questions from the Japanese newspaper *Mainichi* in 1969 A. N. Kosygin highly evaluated the prospects for further trade and economic relations between the USSR and Japan and stressed the importance of strengthening political good-neighbour relations between them. "Moreover," he noted, "we feel that these relations are a significant factor in the preservation of peace and the stabilisation of the situation in the Far East and in Asia gen-

* *Izvestia*, December 16, 1968 (Moscow evening edition).

** *Pravda*, October 27, 1970.

erally.”* The Soviet Union was consequently prepared to continue working for an extension and deepening of its relations with Japan.

However, A. N. Kosygin noted that the state of these relations depended not only on the USSR but also on Japan. The Soviet Union, therefore, could not remain indifferent to Japan's policies and affairs, and it did not conceal its negative attitude to the Japanese-US Treaty on Mutual Co-operation and Security. “Further,” A. N. Kosygin declared, “the Soviet people cannot remain indifferent to the fact that there are US troops and military bases in Japan in direct proximity to our frontiers.”**

In Japan there is a growing movement calling for a reconsideration of the anti-war articles of the Constitution, the resurgence of the Samurai spirit (the Mishima affair) and the reconstitution of the navy and air force. In fact, the ruling circles of Japan are, step by step, implementing a policy of promoting the intensive rearming of the “self-defence forces”.

Militarist and openly revanchist elements are trying to hinder the further development of good-neighbour relations and Japanese-Soviet business co-operation by artificially fanning anti-Soviet sentiments and pushing Japan into a militarist and revenge-seeking policy. With the encouragement and approval of official circles they are activating an anti-Soviet campaign demanding the return to Japan of the so-called “northern territories”. The Japanese Prime Minister, Eisaku Sato, made territorial claims on the Soviet Union in a speech at the 25th General Assembly. None of this can fail to poison the atmosphere governing the relations between the two countries.

The Soviet Government has stated time and again that the territorial question between the USSR and Japan had been settled in the pertinent international agreements.

The tendentious propaganda whipped up in Japan around the “territorial issue” is inspired by elements opposed to the development of good-neighbour relations between the two countries.

* *Pravda*, January 5, 1969.

** Ibid.

5. Recognition of European Realities as the Only Possible Policy in German Affairs

The course of events in 1964-1970 fully bore out the correctness of the policy pursued by the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries in the German question. It is becoming appreciated that recognition of the post-war European realities, particularly the reality of the existing state frontiers, is the only possible basis for the development of relations between the states of that major region of the world.

For the German Democratic Republic the latter half of the 1960s was marked by the further strengthening of its international positions, by achievements in all areas of socialist construction and the final breakdown of the imperialist attempts to isolate and prevent it from winning international recognition.

The GDR is one of the ten leading industrialised countries of the world. At the close of the 1960s its industrial output was greater than that of the whole of Germany on the eve of World War II. Social relations in the GDR underwent further far-reaching changes. A new, socialist community of people welded together by a lofty sense of patriotism and responsibility for the destiny of their peace-loving and hard-working country has taken shape and grown strong.

Held in April 1967 the 7th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany set the task of building a developed socialist social system in the GDR, and in the following year (1968) a socialist Constitution was adopted by a vote of the people. The new Constitution defines the overall orientation of the GDR's policy as serving the "cause of peace and socialism, the cause of understanding among nations, and security", as supporting peoples fighting for freedom and independence.

In the SUPG Programme adopted at the 6th Congress and in a resolution passed by the same Congress it is stated that unbreakable friendship with the Soviet Union and the strengthening of the socialist community constitute the unshakable principles of the GDR's foreign policy. These principles were embodied in the Treaty of Friendship, Co-

operation and Mutual Assistance concluded between the GDR and the USSR in 1964. On the basis of that treaty the relations between the Soviet Union and the GDR continued to develop successfully, the keynotes being fraternal friendship, close co-operation and socialist mutual assistance. The strengthening of the GDR was a major achievement of socialism. Moreover, it was an expression of the determination of that country's people to prevent further aggression originating on German soil and an indication of the growing might of the socialist community as a whole. For the volume of trade and the scale of scientific, technical and cultural exchanges the GDR occupies the leading place in the Soviet Union's relations with foreign countries. In 1969 trade between the USSR and the GDR amounted to 3,031.5 million rubles,* while in the five-year period from 1965 to 1969 it exceeded the sum of 13,000 million rubles, i.e., topping the volume of trade for the preceding five years (1961-1965) by 22 per cent.

New and more efficient forms of economic co-operation—co-ordination of economic development plans, and co-operation and specialisation on the basis of special agreements concluded between individual ministries, departments and scientific organisations—are being promoted on an ever wider scale. Both countries are focussing their attention on the most sophisticated spheres of science, technology and production.

The common objectives of strengthening peace in Europe, furthering the unity of the socialist community and successfully building socialism and communism are naturally leading to a steady deepening of the relations between the CC CPSU and CC SUPG and between the Soviet and GDR governments. Meetings of the Party and Government leaders of the two countries, joint discussions of key problems and the mapping out of a common approach to these problems have become part and parcel of the co-operation between the GDR and the USSR. In 1964-1970 visits were paid to the GDR by L. I. Brezhnev, A. N. Kosygin and other prominent Soviet Party officials and statesmen, while the USSR accorded cordial hospitality to Walter Ulbricht, Willi Stoph, Erich Honecker and other GDR leaders.

* *Uneshnaya torgovlya* No. 6, 1970, p. 54.

The Soviet Union and the GDR were among the initiators of and active participants in all the measures aimed at strengthening European security. They were among the first to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The GDR urges sweeping disarmament measures on German soil and a final settlement in Europe on the basis of recognition of the results of the war and of post-war development. This policy, dictated by concern for peace and respect for other states and peoples, has the full support of the Soviet Union.

At the close of 1970 the GDR had normal diplomatic relations with 27 countries, and maintained consular and other official state contacts with many other countries. It is active in international political, economic and cultural co-operation and makes a large contribution to the collective measures taken by the European socialist countries and to the consolidation of the cohesion of the socialist community.*

The Federal Republic of Germany, on the contrary, found itself in the grip of a deep-going political crisis in the mid-60s as a result of the policies of its ruling circles. Its Government was unable to carry out any of its proclaimed foreign policy tasks. The FRG was powerless to halt the course of events in the world which day after day showed the hollowness of Bonn's claims to the prescription of its own recipes for the settlement of European problems. The forces seeking to change the political map of Europe from positions of revenge exposed themselves more and more fully, and in the eyes of growing sections of world opinion they showed that their policies were incompatible with the interests of peace, of ensuring genuine security in Europe.

In the course of five years there were four changes of government in Bonn. Konrad Adenauer, whose name is associated with Germany's division, with the formation of the West German state and with its inclusion in the NATO military bloc, had to resign. His successor Ludwig Erhard proved to be a flash in the pan and soon disappeared from the political scene. In December 1966, after a drawn-out Government crisis, a "grand coalition" cabinet was formed of representatives of the CDU/CSU and the SDPG with Kurt Kiesinger as Chancellor. This Government tried to straighten

* See Chapter Twenty-Eight.

affairs by somewhat more subtle methods, which, however, pursued the former designs and objectives that were inconsistent with peace in Europe.

As was frankly acknowledged by its architects, the "grand coalition's" "new" policy had the old objective of securing a revision of the results springing from the defeat and surrender of Nazi Germany in the Second World War.

The Kiesinger Government used as its guideline its belief that for the sake of achieving their cherished desire—tranquility and security in the continent—the European peoples would make large concessions to the FRG's demands. It maintained that in view of the FRG's larger possibilities for pressuring individual countries it should not depend on the actions of others but display its own initiative in order to "surmount the status quo peacefully".

The theory of the "peaceful surmounting of the status quo" was interpreted differently in each specific case, but its immutable elements were: the refusal to recognise the German Democratic Republic and the established frontiers in Europe as final, and the demand to "equate" the FRG with other countries in armaments, thereby nullifying the Four-Power agreements providing for a definite system of measures against the threat of a renewal of German aggression.

At the 23rd Congress of the CPSU it was noted that there was a deadly menace in the possibility of an alliance between US militarism and the West German revanchists. In this peculiar partnership, each of the partners was eager to use the other for his own imperialist aims. In the resolution adopted by the Congress attention was drawn to the persistent attempts of certain circles in the FRG to obtain access to missile-nuclear weapons in order to use them in their plans of aggression.

The FRG was the originator of various projects for the creation of a NATO nuclear force—dubbed "multilateral", "Atlantic", "European" and so forth. It is symbolic that these plans encountered opposition in the North Atlantic bloc itself. On November 5, 1964 French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou declared at a press conference: "We are anxious about the intentions to set up such a multilateral force. In short, we may ask whether this project, this multilateral force, is not destructive to Europe, is not a provoca-

tion for some other countries and whether in the long run it is not, in one way or another, turned against France."

The FRG went to all lengths to hinder the success of the talks on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons that were being held between the USSR and the USA and conducted in the Eighteen-Nation Committee in Geneva. All the indications were that in Bonn it was felt that success in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which was favoured by the vast majority of the countries and peoples of the world, would be another hindrance to the nuclear ambitions of West German imperialism. The West German military reacted to the aspiration of the states of Western and Eastern Europe to end the continent's division by demanding that NATO set up a "nuclear mine belt" on FRG territory along the frontiers of the GDR and Czechoslovakia. The forceful warnings of the Soviet Union, the joint actions of the Warsaw Treaty countries and the massive protests by the people in the FRG itself prevented the implementation of this monstrous plan, which was fraught with the menace of a nuclear war, and also the plans for forming a NATO multilateral nuclear force.

The failure of the FRG Government to break into the "nuclear club" in one leap did not mean, however, that the Bundeswehr generals and their friends in influential political circles in Bonn had abandoned their dreams of fitting a key to nuclear weapons.

West German laboratories worked on the military uses of atomic energy. Fissionable material was stockpiled. Close contacts were established with the Republic of South Africa and some other countries with the object of co-ordinating the utilisation of resources and building, with West German participation, secret enterprises for the manufacture of nuclear fuel: the building of such enterprises in the FRG would have been too patent a challenge to the peace forces.

In 1964-1969 the world witnessed the growth of the neofascist danger in the FRG. The pro-nazi National-Democratic Party appeared on the West German political scene with double-dyed chauvinist and militarist slogans. At the lander elections in 1966-1968 it won seats in the landtags of seven of the ten West German landers, while at the election to the Bundestag in 1969 it polled 1,400,000 votes, i.e., twice as many as at the preceding parliamentary

election. A point meriting close attention is that instead of exposing the NDP's militarist and revanchist activities, which were imperilling peace in Europe, bourgeois parties like the CDU and the CSU in fact adopted its political slogans and even tried to best that reactionary party in propounding nationalism and chauvinism.

The certain increase in the number of votes cast for the CDU and the CSU at the elections to the FRG landtags in 1970 was almost exclusively at the expense of the NDP. The revanchist forces considered, not without reason, that the programme of the Kiesinger-Strauss party most fully embodied their demands and was becoming the centre of reaction.

In messages to the governments of the FRG and other Western powers the Soviet Union underscored the grave responsibility that they were assuming by their non-fulfilment of the terms of the Potsdam Agreement on the uprooting of German nazism, and expressed its firm determination to do everything in its power to repulse the neonazi menace. It was both important and urgent to safeguard the peoples against the intrigues of the neonazis and prevent the situation from developing in such a way as to lead to the formation of a new hotbed of fascism in Europe and threaten world peace. To a large extent the peaceful future of the European peoples depended on the fulfilment of this task.

Unquestionably, neo-nazi activity would not have reached such proportions had the directions on the punishment of nazi war criminals been carried out in the FRG. The vast majority of these criminals, even those guilty of the most heinous crimes, have gone unpunished. Although the West German courts formally try individual criminals, the sentences passed by them are in effect a response to the demands made by the neo-nazis for the exoneration of the Hitlerite policies and the executors of that policy. In the eyes of the Bonn Themis human life is not worth even a minute's atonement.

More, in 1964 the ruling circles in the FRG made an attempt to halt all legal proceedings against nazi war criminals by invoking the "statute of limitation". By taking this step they went farther than even the loose practices in this matter in the Weimar Republic, where the law demanded legal action against war criminals without any time limitation.

This attitude triggered off a wave of indignation in all the socialist countries, in Western Europe and in the developing states. The Committee of the Parliamentary Group of the USSR and the Soviet Government protested against this intention. Pressured by world public opinion the West German authorities had to set aside their plan, although no secret was made of the fact that the desire to force everybody to forget the past as soon as possible was not abandoned.

"Extraordinary laws" were passed in the FRG in 1968 in open defiance of the Potsdam Agreement, whose provisions demanded, in particular, the democratisation of political and economic life on German territory and disallowed militarisation and excessive concentration of power. Jointly with other socialist countries, the Soviet Union exposed the anti-democratic militarist substance of these laws, which were devised to suppress every sign of resistance by the people and turn them into an obedient tool of any policy that Bonn chose to pursue.

Relying on its enhanced military and economic strength the FRG grew more insistent in its claims to a leading role in NATO. An "economic giant", the West German leaders argued, should not remain a "political dwarf" any longer. Actually, they were formulating a "new Western policy". The aspiration of certain circles in the FRG to play a leading role in the economic, military and political life of the capitalist world, to force that world to accept their notions of a post-war arrangement in Europe and draw other countries into a dangerous game against socialism brought sober-thinking Western political leaders round to weighing on the scales of history the possible dangerous consequences of the policy of some NATO circles of indulging the revanchists.

The Kiesinger Government's refusal to recognise the realities of Europe and the activation of the militarist and neonazi forces in the FRG made their imprint on the relations between the USSR and West Germany. The atmosphere governing these relations remained extremely tense. The individual initiatives that could have helped to create a better climate in these relations broke down in face of the different approach of the two countries to the problems confronting them.

In 1967 Bonn proposed that the European socialist states and the FRG should commit themselves to refrain from using force against each other in the settlement of outstanding issues. The draft documents forwarded by the FRG Foreign Ministry showed that the basic political aim of this step was to represent as "outstanding" the fundamental principles underlying the situation in Europe: to question the immutability of the frontiers, the existence of the sovereign German Democratic Republic, and the ban on giving the FRG access to nuclear weapons. The FRG Government refused to recognise the illegality of its interference in the affairs of West Berlin and the invalidity of the Munich agreement from the day it was signed. Under these conditions an exchange of statements on the renunciation of the use of force would have in fact legalised the revanchist claims of the FRG and its refusal to carry out the terms of the Potsdam Agreement. Consequently, this would only have made it more difficult to resolve problems that were vital to the European continent.

The Soviet Government made counter-proposals on this question. On October 12 and November 21, 1967 it forwarded to the FRG Government appropriate representations, which were based on the immutability of the results of the Second World War and post-war development, the concern to safeguard European security and the rights and interests of every European country, including the German Democratic Republic.

In its reply of April 9, 1968 the West German Government stated its negative attitude on all the basic questions of European security and of the FRG's relations with socialist countries. The Soviet Government noted in its Memorandum of July 5, 1968 to the Government of the FRG that what West Germany wanted to obtain from the socialist countries was neither more nor less than "agreement with the FRG's policy of claims, with its build up of strength to achieve the objectives of that policy". In September 1969 the Soviet Government proposed that the two countries enter into negotiations on the renunciation of the use of force in the relations between them.

These relations had been seriously compounded by the FRG's interference in the affairs of West Berlin. Although the city had never belonged and could not belong to the

FRG, West German circles aspired to use it as their domain, hold provocative meetings in it and fan political tension.

With the connivance of the occupation authorities of the Three Powers, the FRG's attempts to consolidate its hold on that city could not augur well either for itself or for the West Berliners. The checkpoints set up in August 1961 on the frontier between the GDR and West Berlin cut the main arteries of the subversive activities against the GDR and other socialist countries. The inevitable consequence of the reluctance to reckon with realities could be the application of strict measures against the violators of the Four Power Allied agreements that were drawn up with the object of safeguarding peace and security against the threat of German imperialism and militarism.

In 1967-1969, to counter the further vitalisation of the FRG's unlawful activities in West Berlin, the GDR instituted a number of additional protective measures. In particular, it banned the transit of Bonn ministers, military and members of neo-nazi organisations across its territory to West Berlin. In February 1969 it confirmed the ban on the transport to and from West Berlin across GDR territory of goods listed in Law No. 43 of the Control Council. These steps were taken in agreement with the Soviet Government and with its support.

The Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic regard West Berlin as a separate political entity. As such the city has everything it requires to create the external and internal conditions to ensure the welfare and tranquillity of its population. West Berlin has been accorded what are in effect unrestricted possibilities for utilising the communications of the GDR, whose authorities maintain the motor roads, waterways and other communications in the proper condition in order to cope with the huge flow of people and goods to and from West Berlin.* The only stipulation made by the socialist countries is that the people and authorities of West Berlin abide by the good-neighbour principle and prevent the city from being used as a base for revanchism, as a springboard for provocations against peace.

* Up to 12 million people and nearly 14 million tons of freight annually pass to and from West Berlin across GDR territory.

In the summer of 1969 the Soviet Government again called upon the interested countries to steer towards an easing of tension in and around West Berlin. Later, agreement was reached through diplomatic channels on an exchange of views between representatives of the Four Powers in West Berlin with the object of improving the situation there. This exchange commenced in March 1970. The sides in the exchange agreed that in West Berlin and in connection with it every effort had to be made to avoid actions that could give rise to tension. On the basis of the pertinent Allied decisions, the sides reiterated the fact that the city did not belong to the FRG and agreed that no political activity should be allowed that was inconsistent with that status. Further, it was agreed that steps would be taken to help Berlin promote broad contacts with the rest of the world. The GDR stated that to this end it was prepared to sign an accord with the FRG and West Berlin on the basis of established rules of international law.

The Soviet Union had always held the view that as a major state the FRG could play an important role in strengthening European security provided its potential was directed towards peaceful co-operation and not towards the undermining of the foundations of peace in Europe. At congresses of the CPSU, at sittings of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and in official communications to the Government and Bundestag of the FRG it was stated that the Soviet Union wanted an improvement of its relations with the FRG. However, this could only be achieved by the FRG Government switching to a realistic policy of peaceful coexistence.

The obvious discrepancy between the aims proclaimed by Adenauer and his successors and the FRG's possibilities, the adventurism in vital problems that had reduced the West German population to a hopeless confrontation with other peoples evoked profound anxiety among the people of that country. The democratic, progressive forces led by the Communists and broad sections of public opinion, the trade unions and intellectuals demanded the renunciation of the policy that harboured a threat, above all, to the Germans themselves. They urged the curbing of the neonazi movement, protested against the militarisation of political and economic life and demanded that the FRG abandon its one-sided orientation toward the West.

In September 1969 the Bundestag elections were held in an atmosphere charged with an acute struggle in West German ruling circles over some major aspects of the Bonn Government's foreign policy, particularly, over its relations with socialist countries. These elections removed the CDU and the CSU, which had been the leading power in the Rhineland for 20 years, from the leadership of the state. They were replaced by a coalition consisting of Social-Democrats and Free Democrats.

In the communique on the meeting of party and Government leaders of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia on December 3-4, 1969 it was noted that the "results of the elections in the Federal Republic of Germany and the formation of a new Government are an expression of the changes that have taken place among a section of the public in the FRG, the growth among it of the trend toward a realistic policy of co-operation and understanding between countries". It was pointed out that a positive element was the signing of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty by the Brandt Government. At the same time, it was stated that vigilance had to be maintained on account of the sinister manifestations of revanchism and of the activation of neonazi elements.*

The Brandt Government accepted the Soviet proposal on talks on the renunciation of the use of force. These talks were held in Moscow at the close of 1969 and the first half of 1970 and ended on August 12, 1970 with the signing of a treaty between the USSR and the FRG. The treaty had wide repercussions in the world. It was welcomed as an extremely important milestone in European and world developments. The recognition of the realities in Europe as a result of the war and of post-war development, of the inviolability of frontiers, including Poland's western frontier along the Oder and Neisse and the frontier between the GDR and the FRG, and the pledge of the signatories to the treaty to conform their policies to the wide-ranging interests of peace are of immense importance as factors consolidating the security of all countries and promoting co-operation and trust between them.

* *Pravda*, December 6, 1969.

On December 7 Poland and the FRG signed a treaty on the principles for normalising the relations between them.

The treaties signed by the USSR and Poland with the FRG are essential stabilising factors in European affairs. The way to these treaties was cleared by the tireless efforts of the socialist countries over a period of many years, the energetic actions of the peoples to avert further military clashes in Europe and the sense of realism and political responsibility displayed by the Brandt Government.

However, all the reactionary forces in the FRG took up arms against the treaties with the USSR and Poland. They launched a massive propaganda campaign. The reactionaries went to all lengths to prevent the ratification and enforcement of these treaties and, failing that, to hold up the favourable turn in European development and create additional difficulties in the settlement of outstanding issues. Efforts were made to consolidate all the Right-wing elements around a programme of nationalism and chauvinism: the neonazi "resistance action", non-recognition of the results of the Second World War and undisguised hostility for socialism and communism. The reactionaries enjoyed the support of powerful external forces, a circumstance that accentuated the danger of their plans of whipping up tension and complicating the international situation.

The Brandt Government recognised the untenability of the "Hallstein doctrine" and declared that it was prepared to build up its relations with the GDR on a basis of equality, non-discrimination and respect for its independence. However, it made a number of reservations about the "special character", of the relations between the GDR and the FRG and about the "unity of the nation". These reservations substantially complicate the practical settlement of the issues between these two countries.

The GDR leadership proposed a treaty on the establishment of equal international legal relations between the GDR and the FRG envisaging the settlement of all the problems between the two countries on a generally accepted international legal basis. This proposal was supported by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, which regard it as a sound foundation for a favourable turn in the relations between the socialist GDR and the capitalist FRG and for an improvement of the situation in the centre of Europe.

As the other Warsaw Treaty countries, the Soviet Union and the GDR consider that the inviolability of the existing frontiers, including the Oder-Neisse frontier and the frontier between the GDR and the FRG, is the basis for safeguarding security in Europe. They are making every effort to turn Europe into a continent of peace and co-operation. The proposals put forward by them for the settlement of the cardinal problems of European security have, in spite of the intrigues of the enemies of peace and socialism, gone a long way towards promoting among the European peoples the understanding that good-neighbour relations have to be established between the European states and that there must be no encroachment on the frontiers existing in Europe, including the frontier between the GDR and the FRG.

The expanding co-operation among the countries of the socialist community, including co-operation and allied relations between the USSR and the GDR, are the insuperable barrier to the intrigues of the sinister forces of reaction and revanchism.

6. Attitude of the Capitalist Countries to the Soviet Proposals for the Organisation of European Security

Above, in Chapter Twenty-Seven, we have shown the efforts that the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community had made in 1964-1970 to resolve the problem of organising collective security in Europe.

The USSR continued to work for a relaxation of tension and for the consolidation of international, above all European, security. Its point of departure is that European security is the key factor of international security inasmuch as European developments are uninterruptedly exerting a profound influence on the situation throughout the world. Europe has been the scene of two world wars. Currently, confronting each other in it are the main forces of imperialism and the socialist community. Further, concentrated in it are gigantic arsenals of missile-nuclear weapons and other means of destruction.

The proposal for a European conference on security and peaceful co-operation, made by the Soviet Union jointly

with the other members of the Warsaw Treaty,* has had a favourable response from world democratic opinion.

The idea of holding such a conference was supported by the overwhelming majority of West European governments. During a visit to the Soviet Union by the President of France, Georges Pompidou, both the USSR and France stated their favourable attitude to holding a European conference. In the declaration signed in Moscow it was noted that the purpose of such a conference "must be to strengthen European security by establishing a system of undertakings which would exclude recourse to the threat or use of force in mutual relations between the European states and would ensure respect for the principles of territorial integrity of states, non-interference in their domestic affairs, and the equality and independence of all states". On the subject of a European conference the influential French newspaper *Le Monde* wrote in November 1970: "This project unostentatiously progresses at each new phase of the East-West talks."

One of the countries interested in a European conference is Italy. This is shown by the communique on the results of an official visit paid to Italy by the Soviet Foreign Minister in November 1970. In the communique the two sides declared that they "feel it is necessary to ensure the success of the proposed conference by starting painstaking, active preparations and establishing multilateral contacts as soon as possible".**

Like the signing of the USSR-FRG and Poland-FRG treaties, the new phase in Soviet-French co-operation unquestionably improves the prospects for a European conference on security and co-operation. The Vatican, too, favours the holding of such a conference. An active part in the preparations is played by Finland. As early as May 1969 the Finnish Government took the initiative to convene such a conference. On May 5, responding to the Budapest appeal of the Warsaw Treaty countries, it sent all the European countries, including the GDR and the FRG, and also the USA and Canada, a Memorandum expressing its readiness to take over the organisation of the conference and also of a preliminary meeting to discuss the questions linked

* See Chapter Twenty-Seven.

** *Pravda*, November 15, 1970.

with the proposed conference. Subsequently, the Finnish Government did not relax its efforts to enlist support for its initiative from the governments of the European states. At the close of November 1970 the Finnish Prime Minister Ahti Karjalainen appealed to the governments of 35 countries to send representatives for the preliminary consultations on the organisation of a European conference. He suggested that the conference should be held in Helsinki. Support for the idea of holding the conference was declared by Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium and other European countries.

The Austrian President Franz Jonas declared that from the very beginning Austria had favoured the idea of a conference, stressing that his country welcomed and supported every initiative aimed at strengthening security and co-operation in Europe.

However, the adversaries of a detente were reluctant to yield their positions, going to all lengths to hold up the easing of tension. The forces of reaction and militarism concentrated this struggle round the proposal for a European conference on security and co-operation. As this acute and tense struggle unfolded it brought to light the anti-European mercenary essence of the USA's attempts to obstruct a detente in Europe. It sought to hinder the holding of a conference by demanding the "appropriate preparations" and making the holding of the conference dependent on the fulfilment of preliminary conditions. Pressured by the USA, which had the vigorous support of Britain, a NATO session in December 1970 made the settlement of the West Berlin issue on its terms a preliminary condition for holding a European conference.

Characterising this US policy, the West German newspaper *Frankfurter allgemeine*, which cannot be accused of liberal sentiments, wrote: "The United States is attuning itself for a new strategy that may spell out a return to 'positions of strength'.... The North Atlantic alliance is nothing less than a bastion of American foreign policy." The newspaper frankly admitted that Washington was reaching out for the "Berlin lever" on the calculation of making the West Berlin issue the bone of contention in the further normalisation of the situation in Europe. "It is not at all a matter of security considerations but of the USA's desire to

secure a postponement of the European security conference," the newspaper noted.

This policy, pursued by Washington, in the question of European and world security is being condemned by growing sections of opinion not only in Europe but in the whole world, including the USA.

It was criticised in a recently published book by Averell Harriman, a pundit of American diplomacy and a former US Ambassador in the USSR. He wrote that Washington reacted coldly to the proposal for a European security conference.

In the violent struggle of the forces of reaction and militarism against the forces of peace and socialism over the question of a European conference, the Right-wing elements in the FRG, grouped round the notorious neo-nazi "resistance action", are among the active supporters of the reactionaries.

Despite the furious resistance of international reaction, which does not scruple to use any means to prevent the holding of a European conference, the conviction is growing among various sections of European opinion that a detente would be consistent with the interests of all European countries. The peoples therefore demanded the holding of the conference and brought increasing pressure to bear on their governments.

The idea of a European conference to consolidate the security of the European states on a new foundation, on the principles of collective security instead of systems of military alliances and armaments, was winning ever increasing recognition.



During the decade 1961-1970 Soviet foreign policy continued fulfilling its cardinal task of ensuring favourable external conditions for the building of communism in the USSR and of socialism in the other countries of the world socialist community. It succeeded in preserving peace and promoting constructive relations with a steadily growing number of countries.

Its major achievements in this period were: progress in socialist integration and the strengthening of the Soviet

Union's links with the other members of the socialist community; the safeguarding of the socialist gains in Czechoslovakia by the joint efforts of fraternal countries; effective assistance by these countries to the Vietnamese people, enabling the latter to repulse aggression by the world's strongest imperialist power; joint efforts of the socialist countries to establish lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with the Security Council resolution calling for the withdrawal of the Israeli aggressors from occupied Arab territories.

Great positive significance was acquired by acts such as the conclusion of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and the signing of the Soviet-French Protocol and Declaration of October 13, 1970. Immense importance attaches to the USSR-FRG treaty after it is ratified.

The certain complication of the relations with the USA induced by its aggression against the Vietnamese people, its support of the Israeli aggression and some other causes, did not prevent an appreciable improvement of the Soviet Union's relations with European states or progress towards the holding of a conference on European security and co-operation.

Noteworthy changes took place in the Soviet Union's relations with Latin American countries: diplomatic relations were established with a considerable number of Latin American republics and there was an expansion of economic and other links with them.

These striking successes were achieved under the leadership of the Leninist Communist Party and its Central Committee, which ably and unswervingly carried out the decisions of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU and undeviatingly advanced along the road charted by Lenin.

CONCLUSION

Soviet foreign policy traversed a long and tortuous road, winning success and glory.

In the initial years it had to contend with formidable difficulties. The Great October Socialist Revolution was accomplished in a country that had been ruined by the imperialist war and was in the grip of famine, poverty and

economic dislocation. Soviet Russia's international position was overwhelmingly difficult. The very existence of the Soviet power was threatened. As soon as the October Revolution triumphed the Soviet state found itself completely encircled by hostile capitalist states.

Today the Soviet Union has become a great socialist power that has completed the building of socialism and successfully begun the building of communism. It is a member of a large community of socialist countries. Its industrial product is the second largest in the world. It is one of the world's leading powers without whose participation no international problem can be settled. All the peoples fighting imperialism, all the fighters for peace and socialism look to it with faith and hope.

This remarkable ascent to their present position was accomplished by the Soviet people under the leadership of the Communist Party, which has steadfastly followed the teaching of Lenin. It was this leadership by the Leninist Party that brought the Soviet people to brilliant achievements in economic, political, scientific and cultural development, to spectacular success in peaceful labour and on the field of battle.

Foreign policy was no exception. A study of its history over a period of more than half a century, from the days of the October Revolution, shows that it has always been conducted on the principles evolved by Lenin and that it had made a considerable contribution to the Soviet people's achievements. Such a study allows us to identify the most important foreign policy successes that substantially influenced the destiny of the USSR.

Under Lenin's direct leadership Soviet foreign policy led Soviet Russia out of the incredibly difficult position in which she found herself immediately after the October Revolution. She had practically no army, the war with German imperialism was still raging, and Russia's former allies—Britain, the USA and France—were getting ready to start an armed intervention against her.

However, the sole advantage of Soviet Russia's international position was that the imperialist groups ranged against her were at war with one another. It is this that was utilised by Leninist diplomacy, which succeeded in winning a respite for Soviet Russia by signing the Treaty of

Brest-Litovsk. Subsequently, Leninist foreign policy contributed much to the victory in the Civil War over the internal counter-revolution and the imperialist intervention.

The peace achieved by the Soviet power in 1921 created the external conditions for restoring the economy, that had been destroyed by the wars and the foreign military intervention, and then for socialist industrialisation, collectivisation and the completion, in the main, of the building of the first socialist society in world history. This epoch-making achievement became possible because the peace won after the defeat of the interventionists and the whiteguards was preserved for two decades.

Peace was ensured by the might of the Soviet state, the unity of Soviet society and, not the least, by foreign policy, which in the 1920s established friendly relations with Germany, that had been defeated in the First World War, and with the USSR's neighbours in Asia, actively helping them to shake off colonial and semi-colonial oppression. It thereby successfully averted the formation of an anti-Soviet imperialist coalition and the resumption of attempts at overthrowing the socialist system by armed force.

In the early 1930s the sharp aggravation of imperialist contradictions and the deepening of the general crisis of capitalism led to the emergence of flashpoints of another war first in Asia, as manifested by the aggression of Japanese imperialism against China, and then in the very centre of Europe as a consequence of the establishment of the fascist dictatorship in Germany.

The Soviet Government's Leninist foreign policy and Soviet diplomacy, which was a vehicle of that policy, made every effort to curb the aggressors and render active assistance to the peoples of China, Spain and other countries that fell victim to aggression, and to oppose the aggressors with a system of collective security or, at least, an alliance with Britain and France in order to repulse the most dangerous of the aggressors—nazi Germany. These efforts failed due to the refusal of the reactionary ruling circles of the Western countries to conclude an alliance with a socialist country and to their conspiracy with the aggressor at Munich.

In this they were backed by US imperialism. The conspiracy with nazi Germany, the culminating point of which was

the disgraceful Munich sell-out, pursued the aim of channelling nazi aggression eastward, against the Soviet Union.

In face of this circumstance and the menace springing from it, the Soviet Union agreed to sign the non-aggression pact that was offered by Germany. By taking this step Soviet diplomacy delayed the outbreak of war.

As a result, it proved to be possible to prevent the imperialist world from uniting against the Soviet Union as the Munichmen had planned. The war broke out initially in the imperialist system itself, between Germany and Italy, on the one hand, and Britain and France (supported by the USA), on the other. This fundamentally changed the international situation in favour of the Soviet Union.

Taking advantage of the Munich policy of the Western powers, which failed to take effective measures against aggression even after the war broke out, nazi Germany crushed and occupied more than ten capitalist states and gained possession of the resources of the entire European continent. It was only after this that she made up her mind to attack the Soviet Union. This proved fatal to the nazis and the military bloc headed by them. The German armies that had overrun Central and Western Europe were utterly defeated by the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union.

During the Great Patriotic War Soviet foreign policy contributed to victory by setting up a broad anti-Hitler coalition that united the countries at war with the nazi aggressors.

The Soviet Union's decisive role in the victory over German fascism made the whole world aware of the colossal might of the great socialist power, which had formerly been underestimated by the international bourgeoisie. The basis on which Soviet foreign policy relied grew stronger, and a new phase began in the history of the Soviet Union and its foreign policy. "The victory," L. I. Brezhnev said, "in large measure predetermined the further course of world history, creating further favourable conditions for the swift growth of the revolutionary forces."*

The Second World War brought German, Italian and Japanese imperialism a crushing defeat, sharply weakened

* *Pravda*, May 2, 1970.

Britain and France, and undermined the strength of most of the capitalist countries with the exception of the USA, whose monopoly capital profited more by World War II than by the First World War and in one way or another subordinated the policies of almost all the countries of the capitalist world.

US imperialism was bent upon achieving world supremacy. It endeavoured to restore capitalism in countries that had dropped out of the capitalist world and taken the road of socialism. It coveted the colonies that had slipped out of the weakening hands of the old colonial powers as a result of the upsurge of the national liberation movement. It strove to suppress the national liberation struggle and force the yoke of neocolonialism on the peoples who had shaken off the oppression of the old colonialists. To achieve these ends it was prepared to use all means, including military force.

In its attempts to dominate the globe and halt the world revolutionary process US imperialism encountered opposition from the great socialist power and the revolutionary forces of different countries.

Even before World War II the USSR had become the principal bulwark of international peace and the mainstay of the peoples fighting imperialism for freedom and independence. Its international role was enhanced markedly after the Second World War as a result of the growth of its own prestige, the weakening of capitalism and the breakaway from it of a number of countries in Europe and Asia. This made an end of the capitalist encirclement that had remained unbroken since 1917 and led to the formation of a world socialist system. The balance of strength changed drastically in favour of socialism. One of the contributing factors was the downfall of imperialism's colonial system and the emergence in Asia and Africa of a large number of independent countries, most of which adopted an anti-imperialist orientation.

All this helped Soviet foreign policy in its struggle against imperialist aggression, against US imperialism's bid for world domination.

But, at the same time, the Soviet people had to heal the wounds inflicted by the war, to restore their national economy. The struggle to deliver the USSR and the whole of mankind from the fascist menace had cost the Soviet people

over 20 million lives. US imperialism, on the contrary, had grown richer on the war, on the calamities suffered by the peoples of Europe and Asia. It had the atomic bomb, which the Soviet Union had yet to develop. Already in the 1940s the USA united round itself many capitalist states, setting up NATO and other military blocs spearheaded against the USSR.

Under these conditions Soviet foreign policy had to display firmness, flexibility, circumspection and consummate skill. The objective before it was to safeguard as far as possible the countries that had chosen to take the road of socialism against encroachment by US imperialism and its allies and vassals. It was oriented toward helping the peoples that had achieved or were fighting for independence. It had to give an effective rebuff to imperialist aggression and, at the same time, preserve peace by preventing the US and other imperialists from starting another world war. It rendered the world an immense service by successfully carrying out that extremely difficult task. Peace enabled the Soviet people, fired with the enthusiasm of creative labour, swiftly to restore their national economy, achieve impressive economic, scientific and technological progress and begin the building of communism. The Soviet Union shielded the new socialist countries in Europe and Asia, and later Cuba in America, repelling the attempts of US imperialism and its allies to restore capitalism in these countries. New interstate relations founded on proletarian internationalism, fraternal mutual assistance and close-knit solidarity began to take shape in the socialist community, which rapidly became the determining factor of world development.

In its turn the consolidation of the socialist community and, in particular, the growth of the Soviet Union's prestige and might accelerated the liberation of the peoples of Asia and then of Africa from colonial oppression. In their struggle against imperialism these peoples relied, as they continue to do, on the socialist countries, above all the Soviet Union. The USSR's role as the champion against imperialist aggression, as the mainstay of peace and of the freedom of nations, is acquiring growing importance in the world, especially as economic, scientific and technological progress has enabled it to build up unconquerable modern armed forces, acquire atomic and thermonuclear weapons that were developed by

the creative endeavour of the Soviet people during the difficult years immediately after the war, and promote rocketry, whose advances were demonstrated by the launching of the world's first man-made Earth satellite. This nullified the invulnerability of US territory. The US Armed Forces could no longer strike at the Soviet Union from their bases in Europe and Asia in the knowledge that the Soviet Army could effectively hit only their allies with US territory remaining difficult of access to it.

This fundamental change in the strategic situation compelled US imperialism to renounce its policy of "rolling back communism" by means of nuclear strikes. The steady shift of the balance of strength in favour of socialism forced the US ruling circles to re-examine their foreign policy and military concepts, which, nonetheless remained spearheaded against the socialist countries. In his foreign policy message to Congress on February 18, 1970 Nixon admitted that the technological revolution had altered the military equilibrium, that the Soviet Union and the USA had the means of inflicting irreparable damage on each other regardless of who struck first. This was, in fact, an admission that the Soviet Union's growing might had rendered futile the US strategy of a pre-emptive nuclear strike. It was replaced with the strategy of "flexible response", "limited wars" and so on.

The war in Vietnam spelled out the failure of the US strategy of "local", "limited" wars. For many years the USA futilely attempted to break the resistance of a numerically small people possessing meagre resources but displaying determination and courage and receiving effective assistance from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

The defeat of the aggressors in Vietnam and imperialism's failure to achieve its basic objectives with the hands of Israel in the war against the Arab peoples provided further evidence of the Soviet Union's significance as the main barrier to aggression, as the true friend of nations fighting imperialism and its agents. Recent years have strikingly shown that in Soviet foreign policy genuine peaceableness is combined with a determination to counter imperialism's acts of aggression. "Let them have no doubts in Washington about our firmness," L. I. Brezhnev said, "let them know that the USSR will continue to give a determined rebuff

to the intrigues of aggressive circles and the utmost support to peoples subjected to attack.”*

The threat of military conflicts, including another world war, has not been eliminated. It will remain as long as imperialism exists. While it has not in the least renounced the use of armed force, imperialism has, on account of the Soviet Union's growing might, activated its ideological struggle against communism and stepped up its subversive activities aimed at undermining the socialist community from within. It has intensified its ideological offensive on the calculation of winning the minds of unstable elements among the population of socialist countries. It seeks to influence young people and undermine the moral and political unity of the socialist nations. It endeavours to use and kindle discord between socialist states and artificially create such discord by fanning survivals of the past, particularly nationalistic tendencies. It hopes that these means will enable it to weaken the socialist community, to “erode” the socialist system. This subversive activity reached its peak in the organisation of the rising in Hungary in 1956 and then in the activation of anti-socialist and revisionist elements in Czechoslovakia in 1968. In both cases the reactionary plans of the imperialists crumbled. The upper hand was gained by the healthy forces of the working class and other working people, who relied on the assistance that was rendered by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in keeping with socialist solidarity, with the principles of socialist internationalism. Acting on the basis of these principles, Soviet foreign policy scored further successes in stemming subversion by US imperialism and its allies.

The Soviet Union's recent major foreign policy triumphs were achieved under the wise leadership of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, which adhered consistently to the course mapped out by Lenin.

“For more than half a century the Soviet Union's foreign policy has been based on Lenin's ideas and precepts. Written into the decisions of our Party and of the higher organs of the Soviet state they remain the immutable, principled foundation of all the Soviet Union's actions in the international arena.”** The Programme of the CPSU and the decisions

* *Pravda*, June 13, 1970.

** L. I. Brezhnev, *Lenin's Cause Lives On and Triumphs*, pp. 56-57.

of the CPSU's 23rd Congress, guiding the actions of the Party and the Soviet Government, are permeated with Lenin's ideas.

In foreign policy the basic objectives of the CPSU and the Soviet Government were:

- to ensure, jointly with the other socialist countries, favourable international conditions for the building of socialism and communism;

- to strengthen the unity, solidarity, friendship and fraternal relations among the socialist states;

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